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Abstract
Under the competences of the European Union’s intergovernmentally 
controlled Justice and Home Affairs policy, counter-terrorist co-operation and 
co-ordination of efforts have progressed at a rapid pace following the 11 
September attacks on the USA. Given, however, that Europe has experienced 
entrenched terrorist campaigns for the past three decades, one could be 
forgiven for questioning, in light of the unique co-operative position of 
Western Europe, why it has taken so long for the membership of the EU to 
reach a common definition of terrorism. Also why is it that even now, the EU 
has failed to develop a common policy against terrorism?
Political explanations are traditional responses to such questions, but there is a 
risk of underestimating the complexities of the European Project, and the 
effect which this has had on so many areas of transnational co-operation. By 
focusing therefore on the often-overlooked role played by European 
integration on counter-terrorist co-operation, in addition to empirical analysis 
of the efficiency of the co-operative structures, we place ourselves in a more 
beneficial position to understand the current situation. Intergovermnentalism, 
the controlling force of JHA co-operation, we find is not mutually exclusive to 
law-enforcement co-operation. Two theories tested for supranational 
influences -  neo-functionalism and federalism -  have also played their part, 
from the early 1960s onwards, in facilitating co-operation. The historical 
emphasis is important, because co-operation prior to the regulation of much of 
this area within the EU, following the Treaties of Economic Union, provides
111
us with ample material for analysis and greater insight into the JHA process 
and counter-terrorism.
Intergovernmentalism has helped push counter-terrorist co-operation along, 
but equally we find that it now serves as a hindrance in completing its 
development because of its in-built tendency to retain subsidiarity. Counter 
terrorist co-operation, we conclude, need not be restricted to 
intergovernmental control any longer.
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Introduction
Modern terrorism has afflicted the states of Western Europe for approximately 
three and a half decades. In this time, Europe has witnessed the advent of 
international terrorists hijacking, sabotaging and bombing commercial 
airliners; the evolution of national separatist terrorism into a strategy of high 
sophistication; and the fizzling-out of left-wing extremist ideologues, whose 
acts of terror, although ultimately futile, shocked the political establishment. 
Today, the UK and Irish governments continue to hold together a shaky peace 
process, aimed at removing the gun from Irish politics. By comparison, the 
Spanish government, with the support of France, continues with an 
uncompromising onslaught against the Basque separatists, ETA, following the 
group’s cynical employment of a ceasefire to rearm, breaking it in December 
1999. The international terrorist tlireat, however, has not abated; rather it has 
increased, with the Palestinian question overshadowed by the issue of Islamic 
extremism. The spectre of al-Qaeda, and 11 September, hangs as heavily over 
European policy as it does over US, leading to reinvigorated co-operative 
measures against teiTorism thi'oughout Europe.
Academic writers have famously equated terrorism with the mythological 
Hydra, on the premise that for every head that you cut off, another two appear 
in its place. The underlying notion here is that fighting terrorism is an 
ongoing and ultimately never-ending battle. If we explore this myth further.
we see that the hero Hercules slew the Lernaean Hydra only with the aid of his 
companion, loloas, who cauterised each wound inflicted by Hercules with 
burning torches, thereby preventing the budding of new heads. The analogy 
now takes on a new emphasis: terrorism can be defeated by innovative co­
operation. Co-operation between states is an absolute necessity to defeating 
terrorism, regardless of its typology. If the terrorist can be given no succour, 
no “haven” to plan his attacks; if justice can seek him out as readily as if he 
were residing in the state with which he were at “war”, then the terrorist 
becomes a greatly dilapidated force in attempting to force political change.
While this policy does not exactly “drain the swamp”, it certainly makes it a 
more hostile environment for the terrorist.^ Geopolitically, the states of 
Western Europe, with their unique ongoing experiment in economic, social, 
financial and political union, have been in the position, beyond that of any 
other grouping of states, to employ such a strategy against terrorism. Only in 
the wake of 11 September, however, do we finally see evidence of a definite 
move by the EU Member States in this direction. The time scale involved in 
reaching the position today is truly staggering in comparison both to the 
menace posed by terrorism, and by the measure of other great achievements of 
integrative policy, such as the removal of internal border checks amongst the 
continental Member States, and principally. Economic and Monetary Union. 
Why has it taken so long for Europe’s Member States to finally begin the
' Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary o f Defence, declared it necessary to “drain the swamp 
they live in” in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks (18 September), referring to the 
US’s opening moves in its “war against terrorism”. BBC News Kabul Fall Vindicates 
Campaign 13 November 2001
completion of work that was begun almost thirty years ago?^ This 
astonishingly simple question marks the underlying focus of this research; 
determining an answer, however, is less straightforward. One cannot assume 
that the political connotations of terrorism have been singularly responsible for 
holding back the development of this co-operation. While this explanation 
holds much stock, we cannot discount other important factors, primarily the 
way in which those responsible for the actual execution of co-operation 
against terrorism -  the police officers, the investigating magistrates, the 
judges, the counter-teiTorist officers -  have responded in their duties. It is this 
group, as much as the efforts of politicians, who are responsible for the pace 
and effectiveness of co-operative counter-teiTorist policy. Equally, both co­
operative counter-terrorist policy and the actors involved are operating in a 
geopolitical environment unlike that experienced by any other co-operating 
sovereign states, and this too is a considerable factor in understanding the 
development of this policy. The European Project is a socio-economic and 
political area that has encouraged co-operation and integration throughout 
Western Europe, enhancing many policies thr ough a communitarian approach 
while demolishing (or at least attempting to) isolationist perspectives, and 
encouraging interlinkage between European society and business at all levels. 
The Community’s role in co-operative law-enforcement development merits 
our attention if we are serious in our efforts to determine a comprehensive 
understanding of the progress made in counter-terrorist collaboration.
The Trevi Group was the first such measure, launched in 1976.
This co-operation between the European states against terrorism can be traced 
back almost thirty years, enjoying an evolutionary progression throughout. 
Many achievements have been made; however, despite their long experience 
of dealing with terrorism, the European Union Member States, with all their 
advances in integrative union, have yet to achieve a common policy on 
terrorism. Falling short of this mark in tackling such a serious transnational 
threat has significant implications. It allows terrorists leeway to exploit 
differences between the judicial systems of neighbouring states, but more 
significantly, it compromises the ability of law-enforcement to develop a long­
term co-ordinated counter-teiTorist strategy. We see this illustrated in precise 
terms in Chapter Vi’s observation of the investigation into the Strasbourg plot 
on the eve of the 11 September attacks, where excellent initial co-operation 
gradually became bogged down in a re-emphasis of national priorities and lack 
of co-ordination.^ Is the failure of the Member States to adequately address 
this question, however, due to governmental intransigence or a failure in 
policy? In answering this question, we will reach a greater understanding of 
both the competency and direction of European counter-terrorist co-operation, 
at a time when it faces its gieatest challenge.
Today, much of the co-operation on counter-terrorism within Europe occurs 
under the competences of the Third Pillar of the European Union, commonly 
known as Justice and Home Affairs issues (JHA), an area recently expanded in 
response to 11 September. JHA has gradually become the forum for the 
Member States’ internal security co-operation, following its incorporation
See Chapter VI, pp 249 -  252 for an account of this investigation.
within the Treaty of Maastricht. Moving co-operation on law-enforcement 
and judicial matters into the EU system was a necessary recognition of the 
political, social and economic integrative developments of the new European 
Union. The greater openness of Europe would create new opportunities for 
criminal elements; consequently, internal security co-operation would have to 
be increased to counter this. For example, the European Drugs Unit (EDU), 
the forerumier to Europoi (Emopean Police Office), was established quickly in 
January 1994, in an attempt to make some headway against international drug 
trafficking. Equally, police co-operation required regulating if it were to 
operate with any real effect and legitimacy between the EU Member States, 
who, through the Treaty of Economic Union, had moved beyond the 
traditional concept of sovereign and independent states. Clearly, the old-style 
approach to police co-operation, characterised through informal forums such 
as the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT) and regional border 
agreements, was inadequate to the task ahead.
The EU approach to internal security co-operation has been driven from the 
outset by intergoveiiunentalism -  the integrationist theory that allows 
governments to co-operate in specific fields, retaining maximum sovereignty 
by keeping the role of supranational institutions, such as the European 
Parliament and Commission, to a m i n i m u m I t  achieves this by co-ordinating
 ^It is the antithesis o f supranationalism -  the pooling of resources to achieve a holistic 
approach -  and the credo of many o f the EEC’s founders, such as Monnet, Schuman and 
Spinelii. Supranationalism has done much to drive the efforts o f economic and monetary 
integration, with the latter in especial representing the raison d ’être of the EEC. In relation to 
the EU, this area of co-operation is limited to the metaphor known as the first pillar, which 
deals with the competences o f the old EC. By contrast, the third pillar, upon which JHA 
policy is based, is strictly intergovernmental; as for that matter are the competences o f the 
second pillar, which centi es on the development o f a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). This last pillar however has never truly been able to develop to anything near the
JHA policy through the JHA Council, a group composed of Justice and 
Interior Ministers and officials (previously known as the K. 4 Co-ordinating 
Committee) and almost entirely isolated from Europe’s supranational 
institutions. The European Parliament, for example, is limited to receiving 
and debating one annual report from the Member State governments on their 
JHA activities, effectively limiting regular debate in this area.^ In maintaining 
an intergovernmental approach, however, JHA policy is isolated from the 
benefits of the communitarian approach, subject as it is to the need to obtain 
unanimous consensus while the subsequent bargaining process, which, in its 
desire to retain the maximum amount of sovereignty, leaves little to be pooled, 
reaching a policy typically derived from the “politics of lowest common 
denominator”. From this perspective, one might question whether the 
incorporation of JHA policy into the EU structure was simply due to 
pragmatic necessity, rather than a genuine desire to utilise the competences of 
the Community approach to establish a communitarian attitude towards 
internal security. That the EU Member States have only recently reached the 
elusive common definition on terrorism (December 2001) speaks volumes 
regarding the problems faced in achieving consensus through 
intergovernmental co-operation, especially in the contentious area of 
terrorism. Does the fault therefore rest with intergovernmentalism -  a policy 
that has played a prominent role in developing co-operative counter-terrorist
level of sophistication o f the other two, due to the difficulties in attempting to achieve 
consensus in foreign policy decisions. This was illustrated through the divisions regarding 
military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, but far more significant has been the failure to reach 
consensus over military intervention against Iraq in 2003, and the fundamental consequences 
that this will have for the future of the EU. By maintaining this “pillar” construction, the EU 
is said to resemble the pediment of a temple, resting upon these three pillars.
 ^Peter Chalk The Maastricht Third Pillar Fernando Reinares (Ed.) European Democracies 
Against Terrorism 2000 pp 197-8
policy? This relationship is fundamental to the aims of this thesis: to 
determine the validity of the intergovernmental approach in matters specific to 
counter-terrorism, but also in regard to general JHA co-operation.
Methodologv
It has never been the purpose of this research to take a wrecking ball to the 
intergovernmental pillar and plant the banner of supranationalism atop its 
ruins; no such predetermined agenda has existed. In researching and writing 
about policy within the EU, which can at times excite passions, it is not 
unknown for an author’s bias to develop into a definite slant. One need only 
read a few of the entries of Rodney Leach’s reference work: A Concise 
Encyclopaedia o f the European Union, to ascertain the author’s antipathy 
towards supranationalism. Being able to recognise such bias in another’s 
work is a cmcial skill for any social scientist, but if we wish to be completely 
objective, we must also excise this trait from our own work. It is true that the 
intergovernmentalist approach receives a considerable degree of criticism 
from this research, but this stems from its position as a significant suspect in 
addressing the inadequacies of the state of co-operative counter-terrorist 
policy. It should not be forgotten, however, that there are other actors and 
imperatives involved in European integration. In some cases, we will find that 
it is not intergovernmental policy, but a supranational drive that is responsible 
for certain areas of co-operation, and this too will be assessed. In all cases, the 
author has striven to present an impartial approach, with conclusions resulting 
purely from the ascertained research and analysis.
To comprehend fully the competency of the co-operative counter-terrorist 
measures employed by the EU Member States, and their future direction, it is 
crucial that analysis not be restricted to the area of JHA policy. While an 
examination of JHA issues will ascertain the cun ent efficacy of its counter­
terrorist competencies, it is of limited use in determining where co-operation 
in counter-terrorism is at this particular place in time. One must also 
appreciate the evolution of counter-terrorism over the past three decades to 
obtain an understanding of the level of progression achieved. This insight is 
attained thiough an empirical analysis of all the levels of counter-terrorist co­
operation and its improvement, providing us with an account of its 
effectiveness. Through this, the picture becomes more complete, allowing us 
to make the beginnings of a comparison between the old and current approach. 
This is still insufficient however; limiting the scope to specific co-operative 
counter-terrorist measures belies the reality of countering terrorism. Ahmed 
Ressam, an Algerian teiTorist with links to al-Qaeda, failed in his attempt to 
bomb Los Angeles in December 1999 because he was arrested by a suspicious 
customs inspector when he attempted to enter the USA via a ferry from 
Canada. No counter-terrorist operation was required, routine police and 
customs work sufficed. Counter-terrorist officers will rarely be found along 
the border of a coimtry unless they have advance intelligence of terrorist 
movement or terrorist activity is indigenous to that area. A more traditional 
employment of border policing, therefore, is relied upon to deter or apprehend 
terrorists crossing borders in pursuit of their activities. The author is sceptical 
of the ability of border-security, in a democracy, to provide anything more
than hindrance to the determined terrorist; nevertheless, the border remains an 
obstacle that transnational terrorists must cross if they are to attempt their 
attacks or escape justice. Therefore, an assessment of the various levels of co­
operation between the border-regions of the EC/EU assists in this 
understanding. Equally, we could not fully appreciate terrorist extradition 
legislation, such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
(ECST) 1977, without an awareness of the pre-existing Council of Europe 
extradition legislation. Consequently, significant emphasis is placed on the 
empirical analysis of these areas as well.
The theoretical methodology employed by this research aims to provide a 
critical analysis of the current intergovernmental approach by employing 
traditional supranational theories conducive to understanding traditional 
Community competences, specifically federalism and neo-functionalism, and 
comparing their practical benefits in facilitating counter-terrorist co-operation 
against those offered by intergovernmental policy. It is a comparatively 
simple approach, but its success lies in the recognition of the fact that counter­
terrorist co-operation, under the gamut of JHA policy, is now associated with 
the European Project and all the integrationist trappings that accompany it, 
regardless of the intergovernmental cocoon in which the Member State 
governments have attempted to place it. In the European political, social and 
economic environment, it is naïve to assume that intergovernmentalism is both 
the correct and only choice for managing internal security co-operation. It is 
for this reason that the thesis traces this co-operation back to its initial 
“fragmented” period. Understanding what drove co-operation during this
period, when European governments scarcely involved themselves in co­
operative border agreements, let alone the actual mechanics of co-operation, 
provides us with considerable insight into the type of co-operation that has 
been brought into the intergovernmental JHA fold. A significant amount of 
these co-operative border-security agreements have been initiated and 
maintained through the work of regional police chiefs, such as the Cross 
Channel Intelligence Conference (CCIC), established in 1968; often, 
government plays a passive role, as has been the case with many of the 
advanced co-operative agreements along the German and Benelux borders. 
Even in matters of counter-terrorism, government may keep its distance; the 
PWGOT, established in 1979, is entirely police officer-orientated, focusing on 
the practical needs of co-operation. If, therefore, there are other underlying 
currents responsible for driving areas of counter-terrorist co-operation, how 
sound is the wisdom of continuing to maintain them under an 
intergovernmental approach? The question continually asked in this research 
is whether intergovernmental policy encourages or limits the parameters of 
counter-terrorist co-operation.
The integrationist theories
The thi'ee different theories used to test the methodology of the thesis are 
intergovernmentalism, serving primarily as the control, with neo­
functionalism and federalism acting as contending alternatives. Neo- 
functionalism was chosen as a foil to intergovernmentalism because it is a 
theory that has a great deal of sympathy with the concept that co-operation can
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be driven by the actors at the “coalface”, rather than traditional government 
policy, moving gradually, but continually forwards. In examining the early 
forms of internal security co-operation, we see a great deal of neo­
functionalism dominating the forward drive. Moreover, neo-fumctionalism is 
also enjoying a renaissance in this regard because one of its main fault lines -  
that European integration was limited solely to economic affairs or “low 
politics” -  has now been disproved, with the metamorphosis of the EC into the 
EU, begun at Maastricht. Prior to the Single European Act 1986, proponents 
of neo-functionalism were in quiet retreat, unable to explain the period of 
integrative economic stagnation from the late 1960s onwards that slowed 
Europe down.^ Few people were paying much attention to the motivation 
behind police co-operation at this time, however. This renewed interest in neo­
functionalism and European police co-operation, in light of the integrationist 
developments sparked throughout Europe after Maastricht, is also due to it 
bearing resemblance to the neo-functionalist notion of “spillover”. This latter 
concept has been much refined from Haas’s original definition, by neo­
functionalists such as Lindberg and Scheingold, but the premise still holds -  
that co-operative or integrative growth in one area, once it reaches a certain 
point, must inevitably have integrative consequences in anotlier, thiough a 
loiock-on effect, otherwise known as “spillover”.^  In this particular case, the 
interest stems from the events established tlirough the Treaty of Maastricht; 
for example, Maastricht’s realisation of the “four freedoms” announced in the 
Single European Act focuses specifically on creating genuine and absolute 
freedom to engage in movement of persons, goods, services and capital
 ^Anderson et al Policing the European Union 1995 p 94
’ Charles Pentland International Theory and European Integration 1973 pp 118-22
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throughout Europe. Establishing this, however, has had the repercussion of 
forcing improvements in policing co-operation to cope with the increased ease 
of movement and removal of border controls -  hence the creation of Europoi 
and the Schengen Implementing Convention.
Neo-functionalism also offers us the practical concept of engrenage, which 
argues that the costs of opting out of joint policies are higher than continued 
involvement. It connotes the enmeshment of member units and the “locking 
in” of whatever integrative steps are achieved.^ We see the reality of this in 
the UK’s entrance into certain aspects of the Schengen acquis in 2000, 
acknowledging, amongst other things, that the established cross-channel police 
co-operation would be compromised if the UK held back (Chapter III).
By comparison, in choosing federalism, we are bringing into play one of the 
mighty beasts of supranationalism to contend with the intergovernmentalist 
policy. We do not live in a federal Europe, nor is there much likelihood that 
the EU will develop into a fully federalised structure in anything other than the 
very long term. From the outset, let us excise the analogy of “super state” in 
relation to European federalism. This Caliban -  perceived by the more 
voracious Eurosceptics as the EU’s end goal, captained by the Commission -  
is both crude and misleading. Federalism, rather, is a broad church, containing 
many variants. This thesis has chosen to employ a model from the classical 
interpretation of the theme of the formal division of powers between levels of 
government, illustrated through the existing archetype of the United States of
R. J. Harrison Europe in Question 1975 pp 244-255
12
America. The American system was the initial template for the EEC’s 
founding fathers such as Spinelli and Brugmans, and as such, it represents a 
legitimate comparable model. We must also acknowledge, however, that 
Europe’s experiment with supranationalism was quickly realised to be sui 
generis’, consequently, we are not making a direct comparison with the 
American model, but rather focusing on close relative interpretative themes 
within it, and how these could apply to the European situation.
While almost all the EU Member States are opposed to creating a European 
federal state, preferring instead to concentrate on a union of sovereign 
independent states, utilising the concept of subsidiarity as a means of checking 
“interference” from Brussels.^ Nevertheless, in fielding the federalist position 
we are able to identify a number of weaknesses within the 
intergovernmentalist approach, which have already been resolved within the 
federal solution, particularly in the area of improving democratic 
accountability.
The federalist approach also draws strong comiotations with some particular" 
developments within the area of JHA policy. Europol, the centrepiece of 
police and counter-terrorist co-operation, has from its very inception been
^Subsidiarity has long been held to be a guiding principle o f federalism, under the premise that 
decisions should be taken at the lowest level consistent with effective action within a political 
system; effectively curtailing the notion of “big government”. Ironically, it has been invoked 
in recent years as a means of limiting the EU’s competence. The Treaty o f Maastricht 
introduced a subsidiarity clause into the Treaty o f Rome:
“/«  areas which do not fa ll within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle o f subsidiarity, only if  and in so far 
as the objectives o f the proposed action cannot be sufficiently be achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason o f  the scale o f efforts o f the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community” (Article 3b EEC).
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dogged by the label of being a provisional European FBI, and it has been 
impossible to scotch rumour that it will one day receive full executive powers 
to operate as a European Police force rather than the support structure or office 
which it currently is. Furthermore, the removal of Europe’s internal border 
checks draws parallels with the “openness” within a federal system. It should 
be remembered that Schengen was modelled in part on the confederal 
Customs Union between the Benelux Countries. This does not imply that 
Schengen is a federalist framework, but its principles, if not its practice, are 
much closer to this supranational influence than any other type. Finally, the 
federalist model provides us with the opportunity to test the development and 
implementation of set piece structures such as the hypothetical establishment 
of a common judicial policy against terrorism against that of an 
intergovernmental equivalent, allowing us to determine which of the two 
approaches offers the best solution to the possible development of such a 
policy (Chapter IX). This latter point is particularly important, as a common 
judicial policy against terrorism paves the way for significant improvement in 
counter-terrorism policy throughout. Furthermore, could a federal approach 
be sustained and limited to this particular area, establishing a Community
approach to counter-terrorism, without fear of “contaminating” other areas of j
I
co-operation, which would otherwise be deeply unpopular throughout much of !
the EU?
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Modus Qperandi
To achieve these goals, the thesis focuses on three cardinal areas of co­
operation relevant to counter-terrorism, namely: border security, law- 
enforcement investigation and judicial policy and legislation/^ The 
significance of these focus points lies in their counter-terrorist implications 
and their conduciveness to co-operation. Co-operative border-security is 
characterised by a preventative outlook, providing a passive or sentinel 
approach towards counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, it is centrally important to 
this study, because of the significant transnational/international aspects of 
terrorism. Investigative co-operation, by contiast, is much more proactive, 
forming the backbone of European counter-terrorist co-operation, symbolised 
through the organisations of Trevi, the PWGOT, Interpol and Europol. 
Judicial co-operation meanwhile provides the backdrop to understanding 
counter-terrorist co-operation as a whole. Its early efforts at proscribing 
terrorist offences through extradition legislation such as the ECST give us 
some insight into the failure of the EU in developing a true common policy 
against terrorism; a point further emphasised, perhaps, by the reliance on 
extradition as the principal tool against fugitive terrorists, categorising it as a 
reactive, rather than proactive instrument.
Chapter II, therefore, takes up an empirical analysis of the measures outside 
the Schengen acquis taken to facilitate co-operative border security. Many of
These three areas of counter-terrorism are by no means exclusive. European co-operation 
against the financing of terrorism is a particular important component o f a successful counter- 
terrorist sti'ategy. Time and space excluded the inclusion o f this subject matter, but more 
importantly, the author felt that it did not fit well with the law-enforcement theme of this 
thesis, and consequently its inclusion could not be justified.
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these agreements remain in effect, as in certain cases these bilateral 
agreements are more advanced than Schengen. Particular attention is also 
given to the level of co-operation along the Anglo-Irish and Basque Spanish- 
Franco borders, two areas in Europe where terrorism is prevalent, and the 
border itself is strategically employed by these terrorist groups. Chapter III 
continues with this theme in its study of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention, examining the effect the Implementing Convention would have 
had on Anglo-Irish border co-operation, had both countries signed up to it. By 
contrast, both Spain and France are signatories to the Convention, and the 
difference between counter-terrorist co-operation there is marked, but to what 
extent is this connected with their Schengen membership? The analysis also 
relates the provisions of Schengen for counter-terrorism -  an area that it has 
not been designed to tackle -  and ascertains the utility of the Schengen 
Information System, the mainstay of the Schengen “flanking provisions” in 
this matter. Now familiar with the effectiveness of the relevant provisions, we 
can proceed to pass them through the analysis of the integrative models with 
Chapter IV. Here the various co-operative conventions and agreements are 
categorised according to their proximity to intergovernmentalism, neo­
functionalism or federalism. The resulting conclusions indicate that Schengen 
literally is a co-operative framework, and certainly notliing more substantial 
than that.
In the second section of the thesis, we turn oui' attention to the area of 
investigative co-operation. Chapter V begins with an historical and 
contemporary empirical examination of those areas of co-operative
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investigation outside the JHA spectrum. The co-operative counter-terrorist 
forums Trevi and the Police Working Group are important areas of study here, 
and their role in the police investigation following the bombing of Pan Am 
103 over Lockerbie in 1988 is particularly scrutinised. The roles played by 
Interpol and the security services against terrorism ar e also examined. In the 
latter case, the end of the Cold War has meant for many of these agencies an 
increased mandate against teiTorism and organised crime, but their clandestine 
outlook puts them at odds with the relative openness of police co-operation, 
even within the gamut of JHA. The analysis here becomes all the more 
relevant in the wake of the opening moves to involve them in JHA co­
operation following 11 September. Interpol, although an international body, 
has its role to play in counter-terrorist co-operation, and it remains the only 
vehicle available for police co-operation outside the EU. Furthermore, its 
international capacity places it in a significant position in the fight against 
international terrorism; an issue the significance of which al-Qaeda has so 
recently reminded us. Chapter VI turns, logically, to those aieas of 
investigative co-operation inside the EU, principally Europol. Here we 
analyse the efficiency of the EU’s flagship for police co-operation against 
terrorism, as well as outlining the threat posed to the EU by transnational 
Islamic extremism, through the case study of the Strasbourg plot and 
subsequent investigation. It is questioned why Europol was not utilised during 
this investigation, asking whether it could have contributed positively here. 
Once again, the integrative models are run through these co-operative 
structures in Chapter VII. Significant emphasis is placed on the position of 
Europol because of the ongoing debate over whether it will receive an
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executive mandate, effectively transforming into a European FBI. The federal 
connotations associated by some with Europol are therefore particularly 
important, as we question whether Europol has the capacity to operate with an 
executive mandate under current European conditions, or if a federal Europe is 
required. Would Europol, for that matter, function more effectively under 
supranational control?
The final section of the thesis relates to judicial co-operation. Only two 
chapters make up this section, rather than the troika required for the other two, 
for the simple reason that there is less to discuss because judicial co-operation 
in Europe has been less active than police co-operation. Chapter VIII focuses 
therefore on both the Council of Europe and EC/EU efforts at judicial co­
operation. For the most part this revolves around extradition agreements, and 
it is only in the late 1990s that we see an effort to move beyond this with the 
establishment of the European Judicial Network (EJN) and Eurojust, 
introducing a true co-operative structure, similar to police co-operation. 
Significant attention is given to the process of extradition against terrorists, 
because in a system of sovereign states, this remains the principal co-operative 
judicial tool against them. We also look at why co-operation in this area has 
been largely extradition-based, and examine some of the failed efforts to 
change this. Even the incoming European Arrest Warrant is still based on the 
concept of extradition, if not the traditional practice. An analysis of this 
warrant illustrates its potential to introduce a new element of proactivity into 
counter-terrorist policy, but its large mandate of offences is highly 
controversial in a Europe that lacks substantive judicial readdress at the
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transnational/community level. Chapter IX provides the integrative model 
analysis; however, because judicial co-operation is entirely 
intergovemmentally policy-orientated in origin, this chapter instead runs the 
hypothesis of the development of a supranational unified criminal policy on 
terrorism against that of an intergovernmental one. The threat now posed by 
terrorism requires that effort be made by the Member State governments in 
this direction; despite the large number of arrests made since 11 September 
2001, there has been much less progress on actual criminal trials. Both 
models make use of the cun ent structures in existence, with the 
intergovernmental model arguing for a framework to be established between 
the Member States, with derogation clauses where necessary. By contrast, the 
supranational model places greater emphasis on establishing a central 
authority to oversee the enforcement and interpretation of the common policy. 
Beyond this we also ask what potential there is for supranationalism to 
establish itself within judicial co-operation, making comparisons to the neo­
functionalism exhibited in certain areas of police co-operation, due in part to 
the interpersonal relationships that develop between individuals. Perhaps 
there is also a potential for the isolation of the judicial co-operation behind 
official diplomatic commission rogatoires to be lifted via the creation of the 
EJN and Eurojust.
In the concluding Chapter X, we bring together all the conclusions from these 
chapters, to establish the state of counter-terrorist co-operation within the 
European Union. Knowing the propensity of co-operation to be more 
favourable to supranational influence, we can determine if the case is strong
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enough on this point to argue for a communitarian approach to counter­
terrorism in Eui'ope, and the factors responsible for the slow development of 
counter-terrorist policy as a whole. Moreover, in addressing the democratic 
accountability deficit discussed throughout the thesis, we are able to determine 
the instability that this would cause to the intergovernmental approach and the 
subsequent consequences for this policy area.
The Literature
Insofar as the actual research material required to conduct this analysis is 
concerned, there is a significant dearth in the literature available. The focus 
instead concentrates on national counter-terrorist efforts, which, for the 
English-speaking reader, are heavily orientated towards the IRA and Northern 
heland. The threat posed by ETA, covered by Robert Clark and Fernando 
Reinares, is the next most closely examined area. Outside this scope, 
however, most of the literature on national terrorist campaigns has been 
dwindling since the groups themselves have disappeared. Very little has been 
written on the subject of counter-terrorist co-operation in Europe, and where 
this does appear, it does so specifically under the heading of EEC or EU 
efforts. This area itself is sparse; Lodge, together with Freestone, outlines in 
detail the work of the EEC, in particular the European Parliament, and its 
efforts to promote further developments; but this work is severely dated, 
serving chiefly now as historical interest. Even Antonio Vercher’s account
Juliet Lodge with David Freestone “The European Community and Terrorism: Political and 
Legal Aspects”, in Yonah Alexander and Kenneth Myers (eds). Terrorism in Europe 1984; 
Juliet Lodge. “The European Community and Tenorism: Establishing the Principle of 
Extradite or T rÿ \ in Juliet Lodge (ed). Terrorism: A Challenge to the State 1981.
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of European co-operative judicial measures against terrorism quickly became 
dated, after moves were made in the mid-1990s by the EU Member States to 
create a simplified extradition process/^ Simply put, there is little 
contemporary -  or even historical -  material on counter-terrorist co-operation 
in Europe. The exceptions to this are two recent publications (Peter Chalk and 
Reinares), which focus in part on the theme of counter-terrorism within JHA 
policy. Both these accounts are critical of the democratic deficit inherent 
within JHA policy and the negative effect that this implies for EU co-operative 
counter-terrorist policy in terms of civil liberties. This thesis supports these 
arguments, but moves beyond them, addressing the consequences for 
intergovernmental policy if these accountability concerns were rectified -  an 
issue insufficiently addressed in this literature.
If the literature on counter-terrorist co-operation is sparse, there is by contrast 
a wealth of material on the generalised subject of European police and judicial 
co-operation, particularly with regard to JHA matters, but also on earlier 
efforts in the decades before 1992. The European Journal o f Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice provides an array of such articles. There is much 
incisive work in this area from Monica den Boer and Cyrille Fijnaut, both 
pioneers in the area of JHA co-operation with a particular interest in the 
Schengen acquis. Although Schengen has had a great deal written about it, 
there is comparatively less on the more recent Europol; meanwhile, literature 
on Eurojust (Euiopean Judicial Office) is virtually non-existent, hi these cases 
there has been a special need to rely not just on articles, but also on the official
Antonio Vercher. Terrorism in Europe 1992
Peter Chalk. West European Tenorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic 
1996; Reinares, Op. Cit.
2 1
texts provided by the EU, particularly the Council, and the analysis of these 
documents by the non-profit making NGO Statewatch. Statewatch produces a 
bimonthly bulletin, and maintains a regularly updated website, allowing one to 
keep abreast of developments, especially the rapid expansion within JHA 
following 11 September/"^
This general material, although strong on analysis, has a tendency to avoid 
placing law-enforcement co-operation in any category outside that of 
intergovernmental policy and the JHA process/^ This is unfortunate as it 
forgoes an opportunity to attempt to comiect police co-operation to the 
phenomenon of European integration/^ We are well aware, through Lodge 
for example, that the European Parliament was very interested injudicial and 
law-enforcement co-operation during the mid-1970s/^ If, however, there has 
scarcely been any analysis outside the intergovernmental approach in terms of 
the EU and police co-operation, how secure can we be in the laiowledge that 
intergovernmentalism is the vessel most suitable for facilitating this co­
operation?*^ Consequently we need to be able to place co-operation pre-
Although Steve Peer’s EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 2000, does provide useful 
contemporary account of JHA policy, including the ramifications of the Amsterdam Treaty 
upon it.
Although police co-operation had been occurring well before 1992 in Europe, it had been a 
relatively quiet affair. The Treaty of Maastricht placed police co-operation squarely on the 
map, but because the TEU is so heavily associated with intergovernmentalism, consequently 
so is police co-operation. This is unfortunate, because much of the historical context of the 
roots o f co-operation in this area has been neglected in writings relating to the current police 
co-operation.
M. Burgess makes the argument that this “understandable if undue obsession” with 
government actions both “obscures and devalues an important rival conception of Europe” M. 
Burgess Federalism and the European Union 1988 cited in Michael O’Neill The Politics of 
European Integration: A Reader 1996 p 277 
’’ Lodge, Op. Cit., 1981.
A couple o f interesting articles that do push the boundaries beyond intergovernmentalism 
are F. Verbruggen’s. “Eurocops? Just say Maybe: European Lessons fiom the 1993 Reshuffle 
of US Drug Enforcement”, in European Journal of Crime Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
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existing JHA within an integrationist framework if we are to efficiently 
analyse the JHA process and counter-teiTorism position within it. 
Unfortunately, the literature is too heavily fixated upon policing in the JHA 
context.*^ Hebenton and Thomas, in an otherwise excellent contemporary 
analysis of police co-operation within the EU, go so far as to dismiss any 
analysis of the co-operation occurring during the 1970s and early 1980s as 
superfluous, because of its “fragmented history”; their argument is that it 
would be “resistant to analysis even if attempted”. They do however 
concede that a number of “definite themes would emerge” upon analysis.
Such “themes” are insufficient to fully comprehend the Schengen acquis, for 
example: one of the lynchpins securing the open borders policy of the 
continental EU. Schengen’s framework can be directly attributed to the co­
operative regional border agreements built and expanded upon, thi'oughout the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. By understanding how these co-operative 
agreements have developed, we are in a much stronger position to ascertain 
how European border-security will develop in the future.
Vol. 3 No. 2, 1995 pp 150 -201 and A. Cadoppi. “Towards a European Criminal Code?”,
European Journal of Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 4, Issue 1, 1996, pp 2 -  
17. Verbruggen presents a noteworthy American perspective on the emerging Europol and 
the concept of a federalised investigative agency. Cadoppi, meanwhile, offers an interesting 
account, as a jurist, o f the concept of adopting a Model Penal Code, arguing that such a code 
could be established, whilst still maintaining coexistence between the two different legal 
traditions in Europe.
An exception to this rule is contained within the Political Theory o f European Police Co- \
operation chapter in Malcolm Anderson et al. Op. Cit. This work acknowledges the neo- {
fimctionalist argument in facilitating European police co-operation, as well as investigating j
the broader role-played by European integration in this capacity. Without doubt, this is an I
essential piece of literature for providing some understanding of the developments underway 
in European police co-operation. The conclusions, however, are open-ended; nevertheless, it 
does acknowledge that supranational developments in Europe have played a role, loosening 
the relationship between policing and national polity.
Bill Hebenton and Teriy Thomas Policing Europe: Co-operation. Conflict and Contiol 1995 
pp38-39
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In term of the events of 11 September, little has yet to emerge beyond some 
general works on al-Qaeda; however Jane Corbin’s The Base does provide a 
useful chapter on related extremist activity in Europe, and the measures taken 
against it; equally of use is the work of Rohan Gunaratna/* For the most part, 
however, media sources have been the most valuable in identifying the threat 
posed by Islamic extremists. The research on the Strasbourg plot in chapter 
VI, for example, was entirely media based.
In seeking to comprehend these developments, we also need to augment our 
understanding of intergovernmentalism and the supranational themes of neo- 
flmctionalism and federalism. Aside from the general literature and textbooks 
in this field, the author has found it surprisingly beneficial to focus on the 
earlier texts relating to neo-functionalism and federalism, in addition to some 
of the more contemporaiy work. The decline of interest in neo-functionalism, 
for example, following the period of integrationist stagnation within the EC, 
between the early-1970s to mid-1980s, with its account of steady and 
continued integration discredited by this soporific period has been 
rehabilitated to an extent, as the pillars of the EU have finally incorporated 
areas of “high politics” within the scope of EU co-operation. Analysis of this 
integration from early work (such as that of Pentland, Harrison, Groom and 
Taylor) is therefore just as pertinent as it was almost thirty years ago.^  ^ No 
work in the integrationist theory field, however, as yet provides for a 
comprehensive account of JHA policy.
Jane Corbin The Base 2002; Rohan Gunaratna Inside ai-Oaeda 2002.
^  Pentland, Op. Cit.; Harrison, Op. Cit.; A. J. R. Groom & Paul Taylor. Functionalism: 
Theory and Practice in International Relations 1975.
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There is, therefore, a substantial gap in the literature relating not only to the 
empirical aspect of European counter-terrorist co-operation, but also to its 
standing within the development of the European Project. Similar could be 
said of our understanding of JHA co-operation in general. This research has 
identified this lacuna in our knowledge and has attempted to rectify it. 
Addressing this problem provides us with not only a more accurate picture of 
JHA policy, but in light of the renaissance in counter-terrorist co-operation 
sparked by the 11 September attacks, we are also able to assess the merits of 
its placement under intergovernmental control. If intergovernmentalism is an 
inhibitory factor on this area of co-operation, might a greater emphasis on 
Community activity provide greater and more democratic impetus?
Observations about 11 September 2001
When research into this thesis began, there had been no Tampere Smnmit; no 
Eurojust; Europol had yet to officially receive its counter-teiTorist mandate; 
ETA had just amrounced a ceasefire they were to break a year later; November 
17 remained at large, maintaining their record of never having a single 
member of their group arrested. Most importantly of all, the world had yet to 
arrive at the date of 11 September 2001. The consequences of this attack 
transformed the way Europe looked at counter-terrorist co-operation.
Terrorism dominated the field of law-enforcement co-operation in Western 
Europe in the 1970s, but by the conclusion of the Cold War, it had dropped its 
ranking in the threat priority table, to be replaced by drugs, organised crime 
and illegal immigration. Only after 11 September did the issue of terrorism
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again become a matter of urgent priority for Europe and governments 
throughout the world.
The author chose terrorism as a subject to test competency of the 
intergovernmental approach to co-operation, represented through JHA policy. 
It could equally have been any other area; co-operation against organised 
crime would have presented a similar test case, and represented a more 
contemporaiy threat. Terrorism was, however, chosen because of the author’s 
personal interest in the subject, and it was felt that it would offer an interesting 
opportunity to study the various integrationist influences through the initial 
counter-terrorist structure that were formed in the 1970s, together with a 
marked reluctance by some Member States to actually place terrorism under 
the remit of JHA policy.
Osama bin Laden and his terror group, al-Qaeda, through their attacks on 
Washington and New York, have transformed the nature of counter-terrorism. 
American policy has shifted to the use of pre-emptive strike to prevent 
possible terrorist attacks from occurring in the future. Only history will tell if 
the Bush administration has been justified in its policy. From a European 
perspective, however, JHA policy retains its traditional emphasis on counter­
terrorism, the only significant difference being the priority now associated 
with it. With such a serious threat looming over Europe and the world, the 
conclusions of this thesis on the judgement of intergovernmental policy have 
taken on a weight that the author never expected when he began this research.
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Chapter II
The Role of Border Security against Terrorism 
Part 1: bilateral co-operation
Modem terrorism within Europe has been highly transnational in character; 
Palestinian terrorists have long used Western Europe as a battleground against 
Israeli and American interests, while the Algerian GIA has operated in France 
in an attempt to force the former colonial power to withdraw its support from 
Algeria’s secular government. Even those terror groups indigenous to a 
particular European state have not confined themselves to operating 
exclusively in the domestic arena: the Provisional IRA engaged in a campaign 
against British military targets on the European mainland in the 1980s, as well 
as crossing back and forth between the Irish Republic and the North.
Similarly, the Basque group ETA has frequently initiated attacks against Spain 
from across the Franco-Spanish border.
Such examples illustrate the terrorist’s willingness to “run the gauntlet” of 
crossing a state’s frontier, where checkpoints are at their tightest, in 
furtherance of their cause, whether it is to execute an attack, plan 
reconnaissance or transport arms. What this chapter seeks to analyse is the 
effectiveness of border security vis-à-vis terrorism in both actual and 
prophylactic terms. Practical border security co-operation amongst EU 
Member States has advanced considerably since the advent of the Schengen 
Implementing Convention (1991), to the extent that some enthusiasts of the
27
European Project such as Germany have put forward a proposal for the 
establishment of a European Border Guard/ This latest proposal comes after 
the Shockwaves of 11 September, and is focused as much against terrorism as 
on guarding the EU’s eastern marches against illegal immigration and 
organised crime. Such co-operation has focused specifically on the regulation 
of police co-operation on the Member States’ marches in an effort to “soften” 
the limitations that the sovereignty of national borders imparts upon law- 
enforcement. Certainly, we can be in no doubt that terrorists are willing to 
cross these borders; indeed the execution of an attack on a target in another 
country only enhances the “propaganda by the deed”. Provisional IRA attacks 
in Northern Ireland before the onset of the Peace Process, which began in 
1993, would attract little media coverage in Britain unless they were 
“spectaculars”. Even a small bomb on the British mainland, however, 
generates great media interest. The same could be said for the European 
mainland campaign. The Palestinian struggle was catapulted onto the 
international stage with Black September’s attack in Munich in 1972, and 
subsequent Islamic/Palestinian attacks since. Such strategies echo the words 
of one Latin American terrorist leader: “If we put even a small bomb in a 
house in town, we can be certain of making the headlines in the press. But the 
rural guérilleros liquidated thirty soldiers in some village, there was just a 
small news item on the last page”.^  In doing so the terrorists are seeking to 
reach a wider audience than they would otherwise have done within their own 
theatre of combat, in an effort to maximise the potential leverage needed to 
effect political change. Brian Jenkins describes terrorism as “theatre” in his
’ Sunday Times News section, Al-Qaeda infiltrates Channel refugee centre, 2 December
2001, p 2
 ^Walter Laqueur The New TeiTorism. 1999, p44
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influential 1974 paper, explaining how “terrorist attacks are often carefully 
choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and international 
press”/  With transnational attacks therefore being important to the strategy of 
many terrorist groups, the issue of border security becomes all the more 
apparent as a means of deterring, if not thwarting such attacks.
From the outset, this chapter argues that border security insofar as terrorism is 
concerned is limited in its effectiveness. Individuals and small groups can 
always slip through undetected. Nevertheless the border still remains another 
obstacle for the terrorist to overcome, often through the use of forged 
documentation and passports: one more opportunity to slip up and risk 
apprehension. This challenge has been put into a radical new context since the 
removal of the majority of the EU Member States’ internal borders with the 
implementation of the Schengen Area in 1995."* Also of significance is the 
concern that terrorists are able to enter the EU under the guise of “legitimate” 
asylum seekers. From their initial entry into Schengen Area, they are then free 
to travel within this Area without the need for additional visas. A matter of 
equal concern is the influx of asylum seekers entering the EU, forming 
displaced communities that could provide “water” for the terrorist “fish” to 
hide in, and/or receive support. Such communities can also provide terrorists 
with the opportunity to recruit new members, typically through influencing 
young members of the community who have become disaffected or developed 
extreme hostile views of the host society or, indeed, of the ex-homeland. The
 ^Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode o f Conflict in David Carlton and Carlo 
Schaerf (eds.) International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975) p 16, 
cited in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 1998, p i32 
The Irish Republic and the UK are not part of the Schengen area.
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young Muslims involved in hijacking the planes used in the 11 September 
attacks represent just such a case/ Conrad employs this phenomenon in “The 
Secret Agent”, centring around a group of crackpot anarchists and terrorists in 
London, who whilst not given a particular nationality, are assumed to be either 
Russian or Central European exiles. Historical examples include the Molly 
Maguires in eastern Pennsylvania in the 1860s and 1870s, made up from Irish 
Catholic immigrant minors, who opposed the conditions and labour practices 
in the Protestant-owned coalfields.^ Meanwhile the Fenians, a group of Irish 
Catholic immigrants in New York who supported Irish independence, made 
raids into the British territory of Canada in the mid-nineteenth century, before 
extending their agitation into Ireland and England. A more contemporary 
account is the number of first and second-generation Muslim immigrants who 
were found to be members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in the aftermath of the 
Taliban regime’s collapse in Afghanistan in December 2001. In these cases, 
many relatives were shocked to hear* this news because their sons or brothers 
had given them no indication of their extreme beliefs and intentions. Is the 
Schengen acquis capable of keeping track of the movement of non-EU citizens 
within its borders? Such issues form the mainstay of an analysis into the areas 
that relate to counter-terrorism policy and its concern with border security.
In providing an effective analysis of border security within the EU the 
following areas need to be addressed. In the first instance, an assessment of 
the actual effectiveness of the security provided to the democratic state by the
 ^Jane Corbin’s The Base: In Search of Al-Qaeda -  the Terror Network that Shook the World 
2002, provides a good account of the background of these young “westernised” Muslims, and 
how they changed into fanatical extremists.
 ^Allison J. Gough The Molly Maguires ' Terrorist Campaign in International Encyclopaedia 
of Terrorism (ed.) John Pilmott 1997 pp 546-7
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border against teiTorists will be made. Having arrived at the necessary 
conclusions, one can then move on to discuss the following co-operation types 
that occur within Europe: informal bi-lateral relationships and permanent 
multi-lateral structures. The former includes the Cross-Channel Intelligence 
Conference (CCIC) (1968) and the Nebedeag-Pol Agreement (1969), which 
are essentially regionally orientated (the latter of which is covered by the 
generic Schengen acquis). By focusing on each area and correlating the 
analysis in relation to counter-teiTorism and how these areas interlink, we are 
able to present an objective overview and evaluation from the perspective of 
counter-terrorist mechanisms that exist throughout Europe to enforce border 
security and co-operation.
Terrorism and the Effectiveness of Border Controls
Terrorists have long exploited the existence of borders between states, 
utilising them to escape justice or as a staging post for launching attacks.
Such borders are usually crossed illicitly, either by a clandestine 
circumvention of border patrols or posts, or through the “front door”, using 
forged or illegally obtained documents. The likelihood of a terrorist being 
apprehended while crossing a border between democracies is minimal. 
Normally success relies on the quality of the forged documents that the 
terrorists are using. The Greek authorities arrested and put on trial a suspected 
terrorist, Avraam Lesperoglou, an alleged member of Anti-State Struggle, who 
entered Athens Airport on an Air France Flight from Amsterdam in December 
1999. He had been on the run since 1982 and was wanted for six cases of
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murder, and was finally arrested because he was caught travelling on a forged 
passport/ Ten’orists usually have a sophisticated support structure behind 
them, and reliance on poor quality forgeries is usually rare. The terrorist 
Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested by a suspicious customs inspector while 
attempting to enter the US from Canada on a ferry in December 1999 with 
bomb making equipment, was found to be in the possession of a legitimate 
Canadian passport, obtained by using a false name. Suspicion was only 
aroused through the manner in which he answered questions, and not because 
of the quality of the actual passport itself. It is also suspected that Ressam was 
connected to the Algerian GIA, and possibly obtained this passport with the 
help of Karim Said Atmani, a reputed GIA document forger, with whom he 
shared an apartment in Montreal. This case also demonstrates an increasingly 
popular strategy among terrorists of entering the target country through a 
friendly neighbour, (in this case, Canada) thereby diminishing suspicion as 
opposed to entering the country on a flight from the Middle East. By contrast, 
border controls are stricter along the US/Mexico border, due to the constant 
stream of illegal immigrants.^ Consequently, measures must now be taken to 
improve co-operation along what are perceived as “soft” borders. Such co­
operation is best manifested not through additional and costly security 
measures, but through increased intelligence co-operation, to pre-empt and 
intercept such terrorists. The Schengen Information System, as discussed in
’ Athens News Agency: Daily News Bulletin in English Suspected terrorist arrested, jailed  
for forgery 27/12/99. Lesperoglou was imprisoned for 3 and a-half years on forgery charges, 
as it could not be proven that he was a terrorist.
® As an interesting aside, on one occasion where the IRA were attempting to obtain advanced 
radio-controlled detonators from the USA in the early 1980s, their supplier considered passing 
the equipment to the IRA via a corn ier in a Mexican border town, but decided against it due to 
the fact that the area was aiea was “under watch for drug activities”. (Toby Hamden, Bandit 
Country. 1999, pp 364-365)
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the next chapter, could serve as a useful example of how to improve 
intelligence at the border for countries such as the USA and Canada who do 
not want to impose measures that would curtail trade and travel between their 
countries.
Passing through “unguarded” backdoors is an option for terrorists, especially 
if they have weaponry or ordnance to smuggle in, or believe that they are on a 
“watch list”. It is obviously much harder to police such incursions without 
significant expenditure, diverting resources from other law-enforcement 
programmes, (not to mention the economic impact) and so deterrence must be 
heavily relied upon here. The border between the Irish Republic and the North 
is frequently a crossing point for Republican terrorists. South Armagli, 
nicknamed “Bandit Country”, has been a dangerous place for the security 
forces’ patrols. The Spanish Basque/French border sees ETA members 
moving secretively back and forth through the hidden mountain passes of the 
Pyrenees. Interestingly enough, despite the removal of border controls 
throughout most of Continental Europe, ETA members continue to traverse 
the border through long mountain hikes. In this case such a mentality is 
probably derived from the continuing desire to install a quasi-military outlook 
on ETA’s membership, thereby retaining the perception of their being a 
guerrilla force rather than terrorists.^
Alex Schmid comments that “(p)rofessional European terrorists.. .are not 
impeded by present borders. They have crossed borders in Europe for a long
 ^Organised Crime and Terrorism Conference, University of St Andrews, June 2001
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time and for them the changes inti'oduced at the end of 1992 will not make 
much difference.”*** The examples of incursions above are merely an 
illustration of many such transgressions. Border controls did not stop PIRA 
Active Service Units (ASUs) targeting British Army personnel in Continental 
Europe during the 1980s, nor did they stop GAL Death Squads entering 
France from Spain to eliminate suspected ETA members. * * Indeed some 
terrorist groups have gone beyond using the border simply as a means of 
escaping justice. The IRA have employed the border as part of their 
operational strategy in South Armagh to ensure that their ASUs stand a better 
chance of evading confrontation with the security forces. On numerous 
occasions they have chosen targets close to the border, allowing the 
opportunity to flee back across afterwards. An early example of this is the 
ambush of two RUC officers outside Crossmaglen in September 1972 when 
their car detonated a mine and then came under Armalite fire.*  ^ Such attacks 
revert back to the formation of the Free State 1922, when Frank Aiken, who 
opposed the Treaty and went on to become the IRA’s Chief of Staff the 
following year, led an attack across the newly drawn border, thereby 
exploiting the difficulties for the Northern Ireland and Free State authorities of 
mounting a response in two jurisdictions.*^
More egregiously, the IRA has initiated attacks whilst remaining firmly on 
Irish soil. A number of cross-border gun battles have occurred. In December
Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism and Democracy in Western Responses to Terrorism Alex P. 
Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, (eds) 1993, pi 8
” It is believed that GAL is responsible for 29 deaths in France. Euskal Herria Journal 4 April 
2001, “France Sets up Anti-ETA Brigade”
Toby Harnden, Bandit Counti-v. 1999, pp 58-62 
Ibid., pp 133-134
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1972, three IRA teiTorists were arrested by gardai in a field at Courtbane after 
engaging in a cross-border gun battle with the British Army.*"* The danger of 
snipers has also posed a very real thieat to the security forces. The IRA has 
managed to obtain a very small number of .50 calibre sniper rifles, capable of 
accuracy at over a mile, and able to penetrate vehicle and body armour with 
ease.*  ^ Such weapons can easily be fired from the Republic into targets on the 
other side of the border, allowing the IRA a psychological weapon as well as 
one capable of making easy kills. As a psychological weapon, the sniper 
installs not only an element of fear in security force patrols, but also serves as 
a propaganda tool through the use of signs put up by the IRA in South 
Armagh, which parody road signs but warn of “Sniper at Work”. Only by 
adopting counter-sniper tactics provided by the ceasefire have the security 
forces been able to move the sniper attacks away from open patrols to more 
risky “static” attacks closer to a base.*^
By the same token, bomb attacks can also make use of this strategy. It is 
strongly suspected, for example, that the two IRA terrorists who detonated the 
Warrenpoint bombs on 27 August 1979, killing 18 British soldiers and leading 
to the most devastating attack on the security forces in the history of “the 
troubles”, did so from the safety and vantage point of the Republic Irish side 
of the border.*^
Ibid., p 63 I
Ibid., p 377 I
'U bid.,p416 I
” Ibid., p 198-216 !
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While there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the case against the 
effectiveness of border controls against terrorists, those who do support them 
point to the fact that many aiTcsts occur at the border. The reality, though, is 
that border checks are a convenient location to make an arrest, which occur 
usually as a result of advance warning or surveillance. The UK, for example, 
makes half of its seizures of drugs entering the country at its ports of entry; the 
majority of the larger seizures are the result of prior intelligence/^ One 
advantage is that if the intelligence regarding the terrorist comes from an 
informer, a seemingly “random” check at the border may mask this breach in 
the terror organisation’s security. A significant case in point of border 
controls working effectively against terrorism is the confrontation of an IRA 
ASU by SAS troopers in Gibraltar, in March 1988. Spanish immigration 
officials pass on all details of Irish passports to Madrid’s Servicios de 
Informacion's Euio-terrorism office. They in turn check the details with MI5 
in London (prior to October 1992 the police Special Branch dealt with 
Republican terrorist intelligence). Such checks enabled the British security 
forces to detect the arrival of the ASU in Gibraltar and activate counter­
measures against it.*  ^ However, this particular incident was detected largely 
because Gibraltar is so small. The ASU would have had to come across 
through conventional channels, as any other way would most likely draw 
unwanted suspicion e.g. bribing a fishing boat to drop them on the coastline.
House of Lords European Communities-Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, Schengen and 
the United Kingdom’s Border Controls, paragraphs 16-17 
James Adams, Robin Morgan and Anthony Bambridge, Ambush: the War Between the SAS 
and the IRA. (Pan Books: London, 1988) p i45
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In dealing with Irish terrorism the view of British police officers has always 
followed the line that:
...it would be totally irresponsible for the British authorities and 
the Irish.. .to abandon checkpoints, road blocks and other devices 
for assisting security against terrorism...Open borders are simply 
not a sensible option for either the British or Irish Governments.^**
The security measures of the Irish borders can perhaps be seen as an 
exceptional case to the argument that border controls do not stop terrorists. Of 
course, terrorists cross the border between the Republic and the North, but the 
border has been an open one due to a Common Travel Area agreement 
between the UK and the Republic well before their entry into the EEC in 
1973. The security measures and structures that exist here are ones whose sole 
purpose has been to counter terrorism. Take away the thi'eat and the guard 
towers and checkpoints are no longer required. The dismantling of some of 
this security apparatus as the peace process continues provides confirmation of 
this. Further to this is the fact that this border is a specific traffic cortidor for a 
large number of teiTorists and geo-politically epitomises “the troubles”. It is 
policed because of this. In the case of ETA, France and Spain re-established 
surveillance along their common border in the Basque region in August 2000, 
after renewed ETA violence. Additionally, these two authorities have 
established a number of joint police stations along the border after an 
agreement in June 1996. The following year, plans were announced for more
The views of the Scottish Police Federation in The House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee on Practical Police Co-operation in the EC (1989-901 363-1. (HCHASCR) 
(Stationary Office) p55
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such stations.^^ These stations are designed to improve co-operation on the 
ground as well as augmenting the security along the border, by attempting to 
police the routes in and out of the Spanish Basque region.^ Only the frontiers 
of regions where terrorism is endemic are worth the effort and expenditure of 
enforcing security apparatus along them. However, even in these cases, 
crossing the border for the terrorist is a relatively simple matter; indeed it has 
been incorporated into their strategies and tactics. Increasingly, the measures
Current information available puts the number of stations at a total o f seven.
^ Along the Irish border in South Armagh, the checkpoints and watchtowers established by 
the security seivices, in an effort to try to curtail PIRA activity, have actually served as a focus 
of attack for the terrorists. The Drummuckavall watchtower, for example, was attacked in 
October 1986 with seven Mark 6 mortar bombs, and again the next month with another nine; 
demonstrating the terrorists’ determination to destroy these structures (Harnden, p256). While 
May1992, saw a 2,200 lb bomb in a van with converted wheels, so that it could travel along 
the railway line next to the Cloghogue checkpoint tower, obliterated the checkpoint, killing 
one soldier (Harnden, pp 262-264). As a target they represent significant propaganda 
purposes if destroyed, as well as a strategic “military” victory. Being static structures they are 
obvious targets for the terrorists and consequently they are “hardened” to protect them and 
those inside.
By building joint police stations on the Basque border, a message is being sent in tangible 
terms that France is co-operating in earnest with its Spanish neighbour in counter-terrorist 
matters, and that these police stations serve one purpose only: to defeat ETA, and as such 
these buildings also lend themselves to the possibility o f attack. ETA has engaged in three 
gun battles with French police between November and December 2001, in each case after 
being forced to stop at a border check. The ETA leadership has tried to play down these 
events, describing them as “chance skirmishes”, despite the fact that two officers were 
seriously wounded. Such incidents have been branded as ETA opening a new fi ont in France 
by Spanish officials; certainly, given the improved co-operation in recent years resulting in a 
crackdown on ETA, such attacks could be seen as a sign o f desperation in on the part of the 
terrorists. Attacks on French police forces were an effort to deter this improved co-operation 
without actually officially declaring hostilities on the French authorities. Indeed an unsigned 
communiqué to the French media declared that these attacks were in response to the 
crackdown. This does tally when one considers that ETA are well versed in passing through 
the border undetected, and would not chance a checkpoint when there are so many other ways 
through. Prior to this, the only time a French policeman has been wounded by ETA was in a 
shoot-out in 1988. In furtherance of this argument is the fact there have been eight firebomb 
attacks on the houses of police officers in the French Basque Country in 2001, which sti ongly 
suggests that ETA has in fact attempted to warn the French off. (The Guardian. 19 November 
2001, “ETA extend armed struggle into France”; 14 December 2001, “ETA denies shooting 
French policeman amounts to a new ft-ont”)
Again, the fact that such attacks happen at the border represents the atti activeness of the 
ability to flee across to the other side afterwards, escaping any pursuing authorities. It also 
demonstrates that future attacks will be aimed at the vulnerable border region, and only an 
official declaration against France would result in a bomb attack in Paris. Therefore the 
current border campaign undergone by ETA is in itself a strategy, and if necessary more 
targets can be found along it.
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put in place by the security forces to police these areas become prime targets 
in their own right.^^
Bilateral Border Co-operation and Security
The above demonstrates that border controls are a precarious defence against 
teiTorism. Wliy should this be the case? Many of the contributing factors 
have already been mentioned; but the primary factor is that it is difficult to 
detect or prevent the terrorist entering a country without very good 
intelligence. No democracy can realistically strengthen their borders without 
encountering serious fiscal, economic and geographic difficulties. The 
alternative option is to maintain good relations with neighbouring states not 
only at governmental level, but also at the law-enforcement level. Where 
issues of border security aie concerned, such co-operation can take the form of 
bilateral agreements tailored to particular areas and geopolitical conditions.
The CCIC, for example, covers the area of Rotterdam through to Flanders 
through to Northern France, and Suffolk, Essex, Kent, Sussex and Hampshire 
on the UK side. Police forces in Devon, Cornwall and Dorset, on the other 
hand, maintain separate links with their respective counterparts in 
Normandy.^^ Where these agreements work well, terrorists and other 
criminals will find it harder to abuse the border but only in the sense o f 
utilising the border as part o f their strategic policy as ETA and the IRA do, as 
opposed to simply crossing it to reach a destination.
^ It should be noted that this is only in reference to separatist terrorism. Elements of the Red 
Brigades and the Red Army Faction fled to France when on the run fi*om the authorities, but 
they did not include border attacks as a strategy.
House of Lords European Communities-Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, Schengen and 
the United Kingdom’s Border Controls, paragraph 59
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The IRA in South Armagh have been able to utilise the border in such an 
extreme manner precisely because the co-operation between the Security 
Forces in the North and the Republic’s Garda Siochana has not always been 
the most effective. The Irish Army, for instance, does not augment the Gardai 
presence in the same way as the British Army does for the RUC/PSNI; they 
support Garda officers at checkpoints near the border areas, but not in any 
patrol capacity, thereby stretching their resources in policing their side of the 
border.^^ Disputes have arisen over incidents; Warrenpoint, for example, 
created a rift between the two police forces as the RUC perceived there to be a 
“degree of reticence in co-operating with us” at the official level, largely 
because the Irish govermnent did not wish to acknowledge the embarrassing 
fact that the initial bomb was triggered from the Irish side of the border.^^
Such co-operative travails are discussed in more detail below.^^ Conversely, a 
discussion of the fact that improved co-operation along the Basque border has 
actually led to ETA attacking it is also merited.
It should be stressed that most of the bilateral agreements on border security 
that have been established over the years are geared towards conventional 
crime rather than terrorism, focusing on facilitating general police co-
Statewatching the new Europe: a handbook on the European state Tony Bunyan (Ed.) 1993 
P51
 ^ Detective Inspector Anderson, who led the Warrenpoint investigation. Toby Harnden, 
Bandit Country, 1999, p 213 
The IRA’s success in South Aimagh also stems from the fact that the overwhelming 
population of the province is Catholic, coupled with the fact that historically South Armagh 
has always been a geographic demarcation point in the Irish Isles, due to the Mountain ranges 
straddling its south-eastern border, in particular the Gap of the North between Black Mountain 
and Feede Mountain, through which the main road to Dublin passes. This area has been rife 
with banditry, cattle raiders and Celtic and Irish heroes holding back invaders. Consequently 
South Armagh is the perfect water for the ten*orist fish: a Catholic province which has always 
regarded itself as a peripheiy, never caring for involvement of the cenfre’s authority in their 
affairs.
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operation. Indeed, some of these agreements were initiated before terrorism 
appeared on the European stage. The purpose of their study is to help provide 
an analysis of the evolution of police co-operation in this area throughout 
Europe. The CCIC, the Benelux Treaty, the Nebedeag-Pol and the 
Convention of Paris 1977 are examples of earlier bilateral agreements pre- 
1972, and represent a useful time frame from which to begin the examination.
Border Co-operation Agreements pre-1972: The CCIC, the Benelux Treatv 
and the Nebedeag-Pol
The purpose of the CCIC, established in 1968, has been to foster regional 
cross-border policing between the key areas in England, France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, and is concerned primarily with smuggling, vehicle crime, 
drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The then Chief Constable of Kent, 
Sir Dawney Lemon, a leading figure in the CCIC at its birth, stated that by 
“encourag[ing] closer personal relationships” a greater imderstanding of each 
other’s laws and procedures would develop, which in turn could lead to 
“closer co-operation”.^  ^ The Chiefs of the services (principally police and 
customs) of the regions involved meet on an annual (occasionally biannual) 
basis to discuss policy, while at the “coalface” officers are able to work with 
their counteiparts to aiTange assistance in interviewing witnesses and 
gathering evidence. Such co-operation is further facilitated by the presence of 
liaison officers seconded to one another’s respective divisions. The value of
James W.E. Sheptycki Police Co-operation in the English Channel Region 1968-1996 in 
the European Journal o f Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 6/3 1998, p 218. 
From the minutes of the CCIC’s first meeting at Police Headquarters, Maidstone, 15 May 
1968.
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liaison officers cannot be overemphasised. Regular exchange of officers 
provides a greater understanding of another state’s policing and judicial 
systems, and thereby a sound appreciation of the conditions under which they 
operate, especially with regard to dealing with terrorism. This reflects the fact 
that police forces, like many other institutions, have a tendency to perceive 
situations solely from their own perspective rather than from that of any other 
patty. Couple this with the natural belief that their force is the best, and one 
has a recipe that does little to facilitate police co-operation on a transnational 
basis, especially under the trying conditions of a terrorist investigation. The 
investigation into the Lockerbie bombing, discussed in detail in Chapter V, is 
a classic case of the fi'iction that can develop between two police forces who 
are unable to understand the means and procedures by which the other works. 
Additionally, liaison officers provide an opportunity to develop a learning 
curve of new skills and experiences, along with valuable contacts, which are 
consequently transferred to the home unit at the end of the secondment to the 
benefit of all.
The establishment of a European Liaison Unit (ELU) in 1991, based at 
Folkestone and foimied as part of a review of necessary measures required 
upon the completion of the Channel Tumiel, has further enhanced this co­
operation. Communication between the Kent police and their French 
colleagues has been greatly improved through the ELU with the development 
of the LinguaNet system, capable of email and translation in real time^  ^
(diagrams I and II -  appendix -  illustrates how this network is placed and
House of Lords, op. cit., pai’agraph 59
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developed throughout the region). It is worth giving some specific attention 
at this point to the extent of police co-operation involved within the Channel 
Tunnel. The Tunnel is unique in that it has provided the UK with a terrestrial 
border with continental Europe; being a tunnel, it simply camiot be policed at 
either end of it in the manner of a normal border. The Tunnel can also be 
regarded as a potential terrorist target; since its conception, a feared terrorist 
attack under the English Channel has always been a legitimate concern, and 
has even resulted in a number of novels having just such an attack as their 
basis.
Since the Anglo-French border is in the middle of the English Channel, a 
juxtaposed position has been taken with regard to policing controls, having 
been agreed in a Protocol between the two countries at the end of 1991 The 
co-operation is designed with speed and efficiency in mind, acknowledging 
the Treaty of Canterbury 1986, which requires that “the frontier controls shall 
be organised in a way which will reconcile, as far as possible, the rapid flow o f 
traffic with the efficiency of the controls” (author’s emphasis).^ ^ The Tumiel is 
after all a commercial venture and major artery; thus exit and entry checks are 
only earned out at the terminal of the country of departure. The Protocol 
allows officers policing the tunnel extraterritoriality powers, permitting 
officers and Customs officials to operate at both Folkestone and Frethun with 
authorisation to exercise their national powers of arrest, search and detention 
within the control zone. Equally, “breaches of laws and the regulations
A Protocol between Great Britain and France Concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, 
Co-operation in Criminal Justice, Public Safety and Mutual Assistance Relating to the 
Channel Fixed Link 1991 
Roy D. Ingleton Mission Incomprehensible. 1994, p 70
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relating to the frontier State which are detected in the control zone located in 
the host state shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the adjoining 
State, as if the breaches had occurred in the latter’s own territory” (Article 5, 
Protocol). This means that an individual passing through the control point in 
France in possession of a forged passport may be dealt with as if he were in 
England and even returned to the latter to face judicial proceedings.^^ 
However, when an offence not connected with frontier control regulations is 
contravened, the State that has juiisdiction will be the one in whose territory 
the offence occuned, including that part lying within the Tumiel.
At both ends of the Tunnel, a Major Incident Co-ordination Centre (MICC) 
has been set up for use by the emergency services in the event of a major 
incident in the Tunnel. This can handle the cross-language communication, 
along with a Bi-National Emergency Plan (BINEP), which is capable of 
establishing a required plan with a “lead" and “support” nation, according to 
the circumstances, through consultation between the Préfet for the Pas de 
Calais départment and the Cliief Constable of Kent. This system of co­
operation for policing the Tunnel is designed to remove the confusion and 
ambiguity of jurisdictional matters in everyday policing affairs as well as in 
the event of a major incident, rather than simply augmenting security in itself. 
By ensuring the smooth running of co-operation, the Tunnel hinders attempts 
at individuals or terrorists expecting to take advantage of an uncoordinated 
response.
Exfradition is not required because of the special classification of this territory. 
Ibid., Chpt. 4
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Nevertheless, security flaws in the “Chunnel” have been publicly 
demonstrated on a number of occasions. Specifically, these have been 
revealed not by determined or fanatical terrorists, but by desperate, ill- 
equipped asylum seekers. The weakness lies in the system of freight transport. 
Asylum seekers have been able to penetrate the fieight depot at Calais, and 
stowaway aboard the freight containers after breaking into them. In May 
2002, for example, 45 illegal immigrants were arrested at the Freight Depot in 
Kent, but many others like them are not caught. The following June, police 
apprehended fourteen from a group containing around thirty stowaways. It is 
quite conceivable that a teiTorist could masquerade as an asylum seeker in this 
way. Pressure from Britain has forced France to improve security at Calais, 
with the French rail company, SNCF, announcing an injection of €7.3 million 
(£5 million) on security measures to prevent illegal immigration.^"  ^ In this 
regard, the additional closure of the Sangatte refugee camp in Calais will 
remove a concentration of would-be stowaways; however, the fact remains 
that the Chunnel has been and can be penetrated. How far the new security 
measures will deter a determined terrorist remains to be seen.
The CCIC enjoys a high level of co-operation -  one beyond that seen, for 
example, along the Irish border.^^ However, it is one that has been eclipsed 
with the advent of the Schengen acquis. Border co-operation now operates 
through formal channels throughout “Schengenland”, while the CCIC 
continues to operate on a less formal basis than Schengen. Because the UK 
has not been party to the full acquis, some problems have arisen particularly
BBC News Hunt continues for Chunnel stowaways 10 June 2002 
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. Report, Chapter 18
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with regard to new initiatives relating to cross-border co-operation on the 
Schengen Convention. Belgian colleagues actually informed Kent Police, 
unofficially, that they could only foresee future co-operation with Kent if it 
was based on a stronger legal basis, either through an intergovernmental 
agreement, Schengen or Interpol.^^ The UK’s partial joining of the Schengen 
acquis by signing up to elements of the Schengen Information System in 
March 1998 (joined May 2000) met these Belgian concerns. Consequently, the 
CCIC gained access to this pooled information -  infoimation that was 
previously unavailable without undergoing a convoluted process of bilateral 
enquiry for data of a comparable nature, as opposed to the CCIC members on 
the continent who can use a “one-stop shop” approach.^^
The Benelux Treaty 1962 includes the level of police and customs co­
operation necessary for the facilitation of the Benelux Economic Union of 
1960. The dissolution of the three countries’ internal borders, creating a 
common trade area, consequently provides a more sophisticated example of 
police co-operation at this level in Europe than has been seen until the advent 
of the Schengen Implementing Convention. It serves as a useful illustration of 
the potential for co-operation when borders have been dissolved between 
states which do not face the problems generated by serious transnational 
criminal activities such as an ongoing terrorist campaign and thus do not have 
their border security bolstered by pressure. Amongst the usual measures of 
border co-operation, two in particular' stand out as unusually progressive. 
Under Article 26, Paragraph 1, officers may be deputised, allowing them to
House of Lords, op. cit., paragraph 62 
”  Ibid., paragraph 64
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operate on another state’s territory with the permission of that party’s 
prosecution service. Article 27, Paragraph 1, meanwliile deals with the issues 
of “hot pursuit”, i.e. the pursuit of a suspect across a state border to prevent 
him/her from escaping. Under the Article’s conditions, the pursuant officers 
must inform immediately the competent authorities of the transgressed territory 
of the situation. The relevant authorities may then attempt to stop the suspect 
in order to establish identity and if necessary arrest him/her. The limitations to 
this are given in Paragraph 2, which states that if the pursuit is unintenupted 
and the need for urgency prevents the ability to contact the local authorities, 
then the pursuant officers may, provided they are within ten kilometres^® of 
the border, attempt to apprehend the suspect and bring him before the local 
authorities. However, the use of force is not permitted save in the direst of 
circumstances, and only then within the conditions as permitted to the officers 
of the party on whose temtory the action is occurring. Under no 
circumstances may the pursuant officers attempt to arrest and return the 
suspect to their own jurisdictional territory. If the suspect is arrested, then 
extradition procedures must begin.
Under the remit of these two articles, cross-border observation is pemiitted; 
however, the actual relevant articles are “rather mysterious on this point”^^ . 
Fijnaut concludes that while the text is ambiguous, Art.26’s provision allows 
the officers of another party to assist in the detection of an offence. Fijnaut is 
more concerned with how freely such action should be taken. Consider
This ten-kilometre limitation applies only to municipal police, and not with respect to the 
Judicial or state police.
Cyrille Fijnaut Police Co-operation Along the Belgian-Dutch Border in Cyrille Fijnaut The 
Internationalisation of Police Co-operation in Western Europe. 1993 p 119
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observation actions that are not designed to track criminals or help in the 
detection of offences, but rather to effect strategic observation, pure and 
simple. In such a case Article 26’s conditions are not fully satisfied.
In terms of dealing with terrorists, these conditions offer considerable benefits 
to the law-enforcement authorities. Crucially, they remove the vulnerability 
that the border casts on the security forces who guard it; certainly it can still 
remain a target in its own right, but the responses available to its defenders are 
markedly increased. Such provisions work at their best with the active co­
operation of the neighbouring partner-states; it is their decision as to whether 
or not an anested suspect’s case is suitable for extradition. It is at this point 
that the terrorist invariably attempts to play the political car d or even 
intimidate the state detaining him/her with ten orist repercussions if they 
proceed with extradition. The Benelux countries have been plagued with 
some serious terrorist campaigns such as that of the South Moluccans in the 
Netherlands during the 1970s and the seizure of the French Embassy in The 
Hague on 13 September 1974 by the Japanese Red Army, but never by a 
group that exploited the sovereignty of borders. When discussing the co­
operation between the RUC and the Garda Sfochana below, however, referring 
back to the provisions of this Treaty brings to light some interesting 
comparisons.
Rather than move now to study an example of border co-operation that goes 
beyond that of the Benelux countries, a move sideways instead will give an 
illustration of co-operation between the established Benelux union and a third
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party: the FRG. The Arbeitsgemineinschaft der letter der Polizeidienstellen 
im Belgisch-Niederlandisch-Deutschen Grenzegebie, otherwise known as the 
Nebadeag-Pol Agreement 1969, focused on police co-operation centred 
between the areas around the Rhine and the Meuse, where Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany meet.
The Nebadeag-Pol increased co-operation in the usual manner, through 
investments in communications such as the direct telex link connection 
between Maastricht, Eupen, Verviers and Aachen and a permanent radio 
connection between a number of police headquarters."^® Likewise, liaison 
officers were appointed and language courses made available for them. The 
co-operation extends even further beyond this to allow liaison in the actual 
fieldwork of crime detection due to the attachment of the German-Dutch 
Agreement of 3 June 1960, which permitted the involvement of officers to 
assist in the investigation of serious crimes perpetrated on foreign soil, 
especially di'ug trafficking, in what became known as “duty tours”."^^
One border agreement that originated directly from terrorist events is the 
Convention of Paris between Germany and France in 1977. The Convention 
was the result of negotiations initiated by the FRG government at the 
beginning of the 1970s in response to growing concern about the activities of 
the Baader-Meinhof gang."^  ^ Essentially the Convention concentrates on 
provisions that encourage and oblige police officers in the common border
Lode de Witte The Belgian Perspective on the Internationalisation o f Police Co-operation 
in Fijnaut Op. Cit., p 91 
Fijnaut, Op. Cit., p 125
P. Cullen and W. Gilmore (eds.) Crime Sans frontières 1998, p 40
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area to co-operate. Article 7, for example, states that the senior officers of the 
Landespolizei, police nationale eæÂ gendarmerie nationale should meet 
regularly and discuss common police measures if the circumstances so require.
In practical policing terms, the Convention aims at developing organisational, 
tactical and technical conditions that will facilitate co-operation against trans- 
ffontier crime rather than attempting to regulate cross-border police co­
operation between France and Germany per se. Principally this is developed 
through the direct exchange of infoimation concerning (potential) criminal 
offences and their perpetrators, tlie development of uniform investigative 
methods and procedures, the framing of plans for emergency cases and the 
deployment of common communication lines.
In practical terms, although it has its origin in a teiTorist situation, the 
Convention itself is limited in what it can achieve against terrorism. While it 
improves police co-operation, nothing really stands out in relation to counter­
terrorism. Cross-border pursuit and observation are not provided for, thereby 
denying a useful tool against those terrorists who utilise the border for 
strategic or tactical purposes. As has already been mentioned, Europe’s “Red
Terrorists” never focused on the weakness of borders, and judging by the fact
!that a number of RAF terrorists sought refuge in France, these provisions were |
of little use. The crime would have to be recognised as non-political to permit j
police intervention, and as Chapter VIII emphasises, the removal of the non- I
political definition for terrorist crimes has been problematic tliroughout the j
i
Ibid., p 50 I
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history of European counter-terrorist co-operation. The “get out clause” of 
Article 4 permits either party, should it be:
of the opinion that the support that should be given, might jeopardise the 
sovereignty, the safety, the public order or the essential interests of its 
country, it is empowered to withhold that support, partially or 
completely, or to make its provision dependent upon certain conditions.
The existence of such clauses, as will be discussed in later chapters, provides 
an Achilles Heel against their raison d’être. Events concerning terrorism can 
have a tendency to test a government’s will, and by evoking such a clause 
political expediency takes precedence over jurisprudence.
Although now outdated by the Schengen acquis, a study of these latter tliree 
examples is merited not merely as an example of police co-operation, but to 
illustrate that the co-operation witnessed here can rightly be seen as a template 
for the police co-operation measures implemented by the Schengen 
Convention. Before closing this chapter to discuss Schengen, a final study is 
required of examples of bilateral cross-border collaboration that relate 
specifically to terrorism. Interestingly, neither bears much resemblance to 
Schengen.
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Police Co-operation along the Anglo-Irish Border
Having given due attention to the IRA’s strategic use of the Anglo-Irish border 
it is now necessary to explore exactly why they have been able to exploit this 
so successfully. The level of co-operation between the Garda Siochana and 
the RUC is one of the keys to understanding this. Observing the incidents that 
have occurred along the Anglo-Irish border involving the IRA, one may find it 
difficult to appreciate the fact that the Garda-RUC relationship enjoys a high 
degree of co-operation, galvanised against a common enemy: the IRA.
the present relationship between the Garda and the RUC is, as 
both services described it to us, a good one. There are frequent 
meetings, both regular and ad hoc, at various levels, from the 
operational level to the top ranks. There has long been a good 
exchange of information and good operational co-operation, 
especially against terrorism."^ "^
Co-operation as a whole is good, but border police co-operation lacks written 
protocols covering this. Consequently the co-operation that does exist is very 
much at the ad hoc and personal level. Such an approach has its merits, 
returning to the earlier example of the political fallout after the Warrenpoint 
bombings, whilst the co-operation between the Garda in Dublin and Newry’s 
RUC was stretched “at local level with established contacts in Ne wry RUC 
station there appeared to be a more congenial relationship and at least a little
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. Report. September 1999, Chpt. 
18 Para. 18.5
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more assistance was forthcoming”/^ Additionally, the period between the 
declaration of the Republic in 1948, which exacerbated the North’s 
suspicions, and 1968 has been one characterised as drift and neglect with 
regard to the official channels of co-operation (save the period of co-operation 
over internment during the 1950s IRA border campaign). With their common 
enemy neutralised, the need for greater collaboration fell by the wayside, 
allowing the latent feelings of hostility within the organisational structure to 
resurface."^  ^ Those officers operating along the periphery were in a sense 
inoculated against this suspicion, and were able to continue to foster a co­
operative culture within certain parameters. With the return of the IRA, co­
operation between the Centres was once again united against a common 
enemy. However, without sufficient protocols border co-operation can never 
really be truly effective against terrorism. The degree of co-operation 
required for the unique circumstances of the border equals that of generalised 
co-operation. The particular nuances developed between localised co­
operation, effective against the IRA thirty -  even twenty -  years ago, quickly 
become obsolete in an age of greater governmental and media scrutiny. 
Ruralised policing, necessary when communications were primitive and 
communities lacked a decent infrastructure, has disappeared. Incidents where 
one side’s officers once stiayed onto the other, either deliberately or not, can 
no longer be so easily dismissed by averted eyes. Centralisation does not 
permit such infringements of sovereignty; consequently security force 
personnel caught by the Garda on their side of the border would be detained or
Hamden, op. cit., p 213 (DI Anderson’s words)
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences Sept 1998, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp267-277, 
Jason Lane, “Police Co-operation and Internal Conflict Resolution Strategies: The Case of 
Ireland”
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arrested. One famous incident involved the arrest of eight SAS troopers by 
the local Garda at Cornamucklagh on the night of 5 May 1976. Freed on bail, 
they were tried the next year in Dublin on charges of possessing arms with the 
intent to endanger life. They were acquitted, because the prosecution could 
not prove that the soldiers had crossed the border intentionally."^  ^ Another 
occasion in November 1986 involved the arrest by the Garda, for possession 
of an illegal firearm, of a soldier who, due to the particular circumstances of 
the situation, had pursued the ASU involved in attacking the Glasdrumman 
watchtower only a few metres over the border."^ ®
Some of these incidents are innocent, but the Security Forces, the British 
Army particularly, are not unknown to have blithely ignored the Anglo-Irish 
border, and deployed SAS snatch squads across the border to apprehend 
wanted terrorists and deposit them on the Northern side where RUC officers 
are waiting to arrest them. Harnden, for example, mentions that both former 
and serving SAS men informed him that deliberate incursions occurred 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. One of the first occasions was in March 
1976 when Sean McKenna was taken from his bed in Edentubber in the early 
hours and transported to Killeen to be airested."^ ® The incident at 
Cornamucklagh in 1976 would also seem to have resulted from such a 
mission.
The alternative to these obviously ineffective informal arrangements is to put 
in place a formal bilateral agreement or protocol. This is one of the
Mark Urban Big Bovs’ Rules: The Secret Struggle against the IRA. 1992, pp 9-10 
Harnden, Op. Cit., pp 256-7 
Ibid.,pp 163-5
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conclusions of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
(Chapter 18 paragraph 7), which recommends something akin to that of the 
CCIC, due to the fact that the “scale of cross-border criminal activity is at 
least as significant as that between Kent and France or Belgium and probably 
larger”/® Such protocols could contain articles relevant to “hot pursuit”, 
which at the moment is currently limited only to helicopters (probably 
because it is difficult for the pilot to judge exactly when or where they have 
crossed the border)/^ Provisions could also be made for officers carrying 
arms across the border, which presently is illegal and the security forces of the 
North are treated as individuals carrying illegal weapons (the common travel 
area means that they are free to cross as private citizens). This is not to 
suggest that these firearms would be employed in the same way as they are in 
the North; no border co-operative treaty in Europe permits firearms to be 
discharged except in self-defence. Additionally the Report notes that no 
liaison exchanges occur between the two police forces (18.9) despite earlier 
decisions made at the intergovernmental Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 (Article 
9) for such arrangements, and points out the lost opportunities for enhancing 
co-operation because of it.
Harnden is critical of the co-operation that exists between the Garda and 
RUC, but his book’s focus is on South Aimagh and the cross-border incidents
Smuggling is part of a way o f life in border regions, and is not perceived to be a significant 
crime by many of those who live in these periphery regions. Smuggling has a much more 
serious dimension in Northern Ireland as the significant brunt of it is earned out by the IRA as 
another source o f filling their war coffers. Police on both sides of the border estimate that the 
Real IRA has earned more than £40 million since 1999, from smuggling tobacco and diesel, as 
well as from donations. One smuggling operation in the North of England netted the 
dissidents £7 million alone. (Observer Real IRA makes millions from smuggling deals 6 
February 2002, p 5 
Harnden, Op. Cit., p215
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involving the IRA that occuiTcd there. Such border co-operation will remain 
problematic until a more structured approach is taken to the policing of the 
Anglo-Irish border. The necessary changes are now beginning. The British 
and Irish governments, after the recommendations of the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland’s Report, drew up a document 
to be implemented in January 2002, along with Protocols between the Garda 
Siochana and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (formerly the RUC), 
which were agreed upon from February 2002 onwards. These protocols were 
supported by a British/Irish intergovernmental agreement in April 2002, 
which immediately came into effect, demonstrating the importance which 
both governments placed upon these co-operative enhancements.^^ The 
protocols introduce a structured approach to co-operation between the two 
forces, including the recommendation of long-term secondment of officers 
with full policing powers (Recommendation 159); the pooling of investigative 
teams after major incidents with a cross-border dimension (163); liaison 
officers at both central headquarters and/or border headquarters (160); and the 
improvement of radio links and establishment of compatible IT systems 
(164)/"
Such an increase in co-operation will greatly enhance relations between the 
two forces, resulting in a greater compatibility between the two, but whether 
or not it will include the widening of “hot pursuit” remains to be seen -
Agreement between the Government o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government o f Ireland, April 2002, Northern Ireland Office Online: Key 
Issues, Policing
The Implementation of Recommendations Concerning North/South Co-operation on 
Policing Matters, Lateral Entry and Secondments —A Joint Timetable by the British and Irish 
Governments
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although judging from the recommendation for secondments with full police 
powers, one suspects that in due course it will/"^ This will put in place a more 
proactive policing stance, which will improve the measures against the IRA 
splinter groups, where a large majority of the ASUs live, in South Armagh 
and across the border. This co-operation is important in countering the cross- 
border activities of the organised crime elements of the paramilitaries. It is 
equally important that both governments give support to their police forces, 
the Irish in particular, because even with the best will in the world, the Garda 
units policing the border cannot cover it as effectively as the Security Forces 
in the North can, who have army support. This is precisely why co-operation 
is essential to make up the shortfa l l .The Gaida have protested in the past 
that the RUC “were asking too much of them on the border, yet when the BSE 
crisis came there were suddenly vehicle checkpoints every night of the week 
and more security than ever before”. This was the view of an RUC Special 
Branch Officer.Resources for such extensive policing can only be 
authorised from the centre. This secur ity would be expensive for Dublin and 
one could not expect to maintain it in the long term; in reality, a serious blow 
to the Republic’s cattle farming would damage its economy far more than the 
ongoing IRA campaign has.
See Chapter III for fuller discussion of “hot pursuit” in this case.
With eventual peace in the province however, the British Army’s presence will no longer be 
required, and law and order will again be upheld solely through a police presence.
Harnden, Op. Cit., p2I6
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Police Co-operation along the Franco-Snanish Basque Border
The current wave of co-operation against terrorism along the Franco-Spanish 
Basque border is extremely good. Increased surveillance, joint police stations, 
and an aggressive stance towards ETA by the French authorities has led to a 
series of arrests since the end of the ETA ceasefire in December 1999. The 
US State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001” congratulates the 
authorities on “dismantling a dozen important terrorist cells”.O v e ra l l ,  since 
the collapse of ETA’s ceasefire, 158 arrests have been made against ETA and 
its support network in France and Spain, including a number of its leadership 
(see table II for a breakdown of these figures.) As has already been shown, 
the level of co-operation has caused ETA consternation enough to react 
against it. Co-operation however has not always been this fruitful. Co­
operation with the French authorities was dogged with disappointment until 
1986 when Jacques Chirac brought a conservative administration into Paris. 
Chirac reversed the previous policy of simply expelling wanted ETA members 
to third countries such as Algeria, Gabon and the Cape Verde Islands who 
would endorse their behaviour, favouring instead the immediate expulsion of 
all those who crossed the border back to Spain itself. Over the period between 
July 1986 -  May 1988, around 200 Basques were handed over to Spanish 
police,^® with October 1987 witnessing the largest ever police action against 
ETA in France with over 120 homes raided in the French Basque area and 
eighty-tliree aiTested out of a list of ninety-two ETA suspects wanted by Paris
US State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001 Europe: Spain 
Euskal Heixia Journal Extradition, Deportation, and Expulsion, p 1 (http://osis.ucsd.edu/- 
ehj/htl/extrad.html)
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and Madrid/® Such a policy was partially due to intimidation from the GAL 
Death Squads and their incursions across the border, and partially because of 
the Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua’s hard-line policy to “terrorise the 
terrorists”. However, this process was itself stopped when a French socialist 
government retook office in 1988, although some ETA members were still 
expelled under the “reconduction to the border” law. Nevertheless, this was 
still an improvement on the levels of co-operation pre-Chirac and Pasqua.
France’s reticence in improving co-operation with Spain on this matter has 
been tied very closely with the Spanish record on torture. Torture of ETA 
members did occur during the Franco regime, and even in its immediate 
aftermath. The Council of Europe sponsored international conference on 
terrorism in 1980 concluded that suspects should not be extradited to countries 
that practiced torture, and cited Turkey and Spain as examples.^®
Investigations by Amnesty International, however, into claims of torture and 
mistreatment have sadly coiToborated that such practices have in fact 
continued into the present day.^  ^ The Spanish government itself has not 
denied the existence of torture, which has been frequently corroborated by 
prison doctors. The government has undeniably prosecuted and convicted 
officers and sentenced them, but the sentences are typically short, usually only
Euskal Herria Journal, (date and issue unknown) France’s Campaign against the Basque 
Resistance
Mark Kurlansky The Basque History of the World. 1999, pp 285-6 
See for example Amnesty International Spain: A briefing for the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture October 2002 AI Index: EUR 41/12/2002
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two or three months long, or they were pardoned, released early or in some 
cases, did not even serve the sentence/^
Be that as it may, co-operation began to improve into the 1990s with the return 
of a Gaullist administration in 1992, although much of this co-operation has 
been based on reciprocity. Pasqua and the Spanish Minister of Justice and the 
Interior, Juan Alberto Belloch, agreed at a meeting in Madrid in late 1994 on a 
package under which Spain would control and place under surveillance 
Islamic fundamentalists in return for French collaboration against ETA.
France was concerned that members of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front 
who had been expelled from France were entering Spain illegally. The 
Spanish authorities responded by increasing the border controls and strictly 
applying the provisions of the Law on Aliens.^^ Co-operation has become 
much more active in the past few years, with reciprocity less of an issue due to 
the growing anathema of the Spanish public to ETA, sparked into mass 
demonstrations after the kidnap and murder of Miguel Angel Blanco, a young 
local councillor in the Basque country in July 1997. After such displays even 
the return of a Socialist government under Lionel Jospin in 1997 (a 
cohabitation government as Chirac was still President) was in no position to 
return to its softer style policy regaining ETA. This co-operation, however, 
was strained recently, when France perceived Spain to be easing the pressure 
on Islamic extremists in the months preceding 11 September 2001
The conclusions of a 1997 UN Human Rights Committee report; Mark Kurlansky The 
Basque History of the World. 1999, pp 295-6 
Statewatch Spain: Police Co-operation Vol. 4 No. 6, Noyember-December 1994 p 3 
See chapter VI and details o f the Strasbourg plots.
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The actual policing of the Franco-Spanish Basque border on the Spanish side 
is carried out by the Guardia Civil and the Basque Autonomous Police Force, 
the Ertzantza (although the latter is more orientated towards the urban 
communities). Both forces have counter-terrorist units attached to them: the 
UEI {Unidad Especial de Intervencion) and the GAR (Grupos Antiterroristas 
Rurales of the Guardia Civil); and the Guardia Civil, in addition to its 
mountain units, can be supplemented by a helicopter unit. The Basque region 
itself is heavily policed with approximately 15,000 uniformed police officers 
to the 2.1 million inhabitants of the Spanish Basque region -  more than seven 
police officers per 1,000 citizens, making this the most policed population in 
Western Euiope.^^ As has already been emphasised however the Pyrenees 
make the Basque border one of the most difficult to patrol, thereby negating 
the effectiveness of the increased number of units who operate along the 
border. Two Guardia Civil officers, for example, were killed by a bomb near 
the Pyrenees border area in August 2000.^®
ETA has made the police its primary target, demonstrating its contempt for 
Madrid’s authority (the Guardia Civil are seen as a foreign occupation force 
by Basque nationalists, whether they are conservatives, leftists, or 
moderates)®^(See table I below). The rural areas of the Basque Country can be 
especially dangerous for the police, on a par with South Armagh in Northern 
Ireland. Consequently, the Guardia Civil operate in armoured patrols in rural 
areas to lessen the chances of an ambush, although as the example above
Kurlansky Op. Cit., p 292
CNN.COM 8 September 2000, Spain Moves against ETA
Kurlansky Op. Cit., 1999, p 301
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illustrates, that, they, like their colleagues in Northern Ireland, are still 
susceptible to bombs and mines.
Table I Classification of Fatalities caused by ETA terrorism, 1968-1991
PERCENT
Police 45.1
Military Officers 13.0
Citizens 34.9
ETA members 3.9
Local politicians 2.0
Industrialists 1.0
National politicians 0.1
The responsibility for policing the French side of the border lies primarily with 
the gendarmerie nationale who are responsible for rural policing, whilst the 
police nationale focus on urbanised areas, although the Criminal Investigative 
Department of the latter is responsible for the actual investigation of terrorist 
incidents. Like the Guardia Civil, the gendarmerie is a paramilitary police 
force and is equipped to deal with border duties. Additionally this has been 
supplemented with the newly formed Brigade de Recherche et d'intervention, 
BRI, to deal specifically with ETA activities, but also to deal with the growing 
confrontations between French Basque youths that have become an increasing 
concern as resentment grows in the French Basque region over the growing
^ Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context. 1995, p 441
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number of ETA activists arrested by the French. The BRI reports to the 
Judicial Police of Bordeaux, and is comprised of tlnee operating groups, of 
around twenty members each, whose tasks include surveillance, airest and 
prosecution.^^
Most of the actual co-operative examples between these two police forces over 
the past few years have already been mentioned, but what has yet to be 
discussed is how the actual cross-border co-operation itself works. 
Collaboration is working effectively and efforts are being made to augment 
the measures at the border in sympathy with the removal of internal borders. 
Both countries are signatories to the Schengen acquis and since March 1995, 
the Schengen Implementing Convention can be considered the minimum 
standard of co-operation in this area. However, all the cases of ETA suspects 
and members arrested on the French side of the border have been due either to 
luck -  the arrests of Joaquin Etxebeina Lagiska, one of ETA’s leaders in 
August 1991, or those of two members arrested outside Pau (near the border) 
who were found in possession of arms and false documents, were in both cases 
as a result of routine traffic checks -  or due to co-operation. An example of 
the latter is the arrest by French officers of ETA’s “maximum leader” since 
1992, Ignacio Gracia Arregui, in September 2001, in collaboration with the 
Spanish authorities.^^ No instance of any form of “hot pursuit” has been 
documented, demonstrating instead a co-ordinated, intelligence-orientated 
approach to dealing with ETA. While Schengen allows for the secondment of
Euskal Herria Journal 4 April 2001, “France Sets up Anti-ETA Brigade”
BBC News ETA leader arrested in France 2 August 1999; BBC News France Arrests ETA
Suspects 25 October 1999,
Voice of America 16 September 2001
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liaison officers and cross-border surveillance (see Chapter III), it is more than 
apparent that the Spanish and French authorities are tackling ETA through 
enhanced bilateral co-operation rather than relying on Schengen alone. 
Nevertheless, the increased surveillance of the border in the wake of ETA’s 
ceasefire collapse undoubtedly finds support in the Schengen provisions.^^ 
Where cross border hot pursuit would have been effective in the cases of the 
firefights between French police and ETA at the border in November and 
December 2001, the officers did not pursue, most likely because they were 
either wounded themselves or giving assistance to their injured colleagues 
instead. No arrest profile matches the conditions of a high-speed chase.
One can see a marked difference in the level of co-operation between the 
Anglo-Irish border and the Franco-Spanish one. Ironically, this is 
comparatively weak in the case of the former, where the terrorists manipulate 
it fully to their advantage; whereas it is the stronger in the latter, where the 
terrorists have only recently began to change their sti’ategy towards it, using it 
more offensively rather than as a simple passage point. The following chapter 
examines how effective the adoption of a standar d template for border co­
operation fares in counter-terrorism terms.
BBC News France and Spain Tighten Border Security 18 August 2000
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Conclusions
The borders of a democracy are a particular weakness in attempting to fight 
terrorism. The forces of law and order are restricted to operating on their own 
side of the border, and consequently terrorists and other criminals have 
manipulated this to the best of their abilities, not only to escape justice, but 
also employing it strategically as a staging post. Improving airport security 
and screening within the United States will have little effect on terrorists 
entering it from its most vulnerable point: the US/Canadian border. Equally, 
while the attempted attack on Strasbourg in December 2000 was chosen as a 
target primarily for its symbolism, its close proximity to the Franco/German 
border would have allowed the terrorists a greater chance of escaping justice.
Borders are notoriously difficult to police, and this is one of the reasons for 
most of the EU Member States implementing the Schengen acquis and 
removing their internal borders, sliifting the emphasis of security onto greater 
co-operation tlirough flanking measures and improved intelligence sharing via 
the Schengen Implementing System. This chapter has shown bilateral border 
co-operation to be for the most part ineffective against terrorists. These 
agreements have been designed to focus on countering other ar eas of criminal 
activity more localised to the area. Terrorists can pass through these nets 
without too much difficulty. Even along borders where terrorism is inherent 
to the local conditions, co-operation has been, for the most part, surprisingly 
poor. Political conditions were a major inhibitory factor to improving co-
See chapter VI for more on this attempted attack.
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operation along the Franco/Spanish-Basque and Anglo/Irish borders. Only 
when the political conditions improved has co-operation really been allowed 
to take off. Spain is reaping the rewards of collaboration with France against 
ETA, with enhanced border co-operation as part of the new “get tough” 
strategy. Again, it should be pointed out that much of this success stems from 
a general enhancement of collaboration against terrorism, rather than 
specifically focusing on improving border security. Intelligence co-operation 
is responsible for far more arrests and smashing of cells than the odd car-chase 
along the border area. Meanwhile co-operation is finally developing at a rapid 
pace along both sides of the Anglo-Irish border because the terrorist thi eat has 
diminished. Only in the “through the looking glass” world of Northern Irish 
politics could this not be construed as irony.
The post-11 September environment has illustrated that no state is safe from 
tenorist attack. Traditional border security has been shown to be ineffective; 
therefore, it is important that a new approach is pursued. The emphasis within 
the EU on acknowledging the limits of border security, replacing them with a 
universal minimum level of co-operation, for the security of all, and supported 
by new innovative measures as well as incorporating bilateral enhancements, 
is the direction in which Europe is heading. Attempting to raise the 
drawbridge will not work.
The EU approach is conducive, for the most part, to the inclusion of bilateral 
co-operation (consider the problems associated with the CCIC before the UK’s 
partial joining of the SIS). Bilateral co-operation has not halted because of
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this; rather it has continued to grow. The common border between Britain and 
France created by the Channel Tunnel has produced an innovative policing 
system allowing officers from either side to execute their duties on the other 
side’s soil. Diagram II (appendix) illustrates the co-operation between the 
police forces bordering the sea areas around the English Chamiel not only in 
terms of co-operative ties, but also the installation of tangible structures for 
facilitating communication to support these. Police authorities are regarding 
sea-borders as no different from land-borders in terms of co-operation, and 
this may have great significance for the future stance that the UK adopts 
towards Schengen. For the most part, however, the EU/EC’s role in bilateral 
co-operative border security has itself been distant. Nonetheless, it is evident 
that the growing ties between the European States, facilitated by membership 
of the Council of Europe, NATO, and the Common Market and its associated 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have helped produce co-operation 
where none existed before. Indirectly, therefore, and in its raw form, 
integrationist theory has played its part, even at the bilateral level, in 
enhancing co-operative border security, by bringing groups together. As we 
move on to examine an area of co-operation where the EU has had a more 
direct role, it will be interesting to observe the differences between these two 
areas of border security co-operation.
Law-enforcement co-operation has advanced a long way, but in terms of 
countering terrorism, policing the border is akin to Canute attempting to hold 
back the tide. The border provides a commonality that should allow a greater 
level of co-operation to develop than between the central authorities, but
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terrorism hampers this, as both sides must wait for the sanction from the 
Centre before engaging in advanced co-operation. If the Centre is not 
prepared to support their police forces in this regard then counter-terrorism 
can only suffer. Northern Ireland and the Basque Region demonstrate this in 
both similar and later parallel ways. The question to ask is can Schengen, with 
its universal approach, transfer this braking power away from the centre to the 
periphery, and what would the consequences be for counter-terrorism?
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Chapter III
The Role of Border Security against Terrorism 
Part 2: multilateral co-operation -  Schengen
The Single European Act 1986, so famously criticised by the Economist 
newspaper, contained within it the seed that would change the way Europe 
viewed its internal borders/ The SEA’s pledge of achieving “Four Freedoms” 
within Europe, namely the free movement of goods and persons; freedom to 
provide services; and the free movement of capital, ultimately meant a new 
approach would be necessary towards policing these borders. The mélange of 
existing bilateral agieements were, however, in no position to consolidate the 
security repercussions of establishing a “Emope of the Citizens”.^  A 
regulated, if not quite centralised approach was therefore required to shore up 
this security deficit, and ensure that the new system would work.
As the Economist rightly put it, producing the SEA was long in labour, so 
much so, that some Member States despaired of the EC ever breaking out of 
neutral and making headway towards the realisation of the four freedoms.
With the negotiations dragging, France, Geimany and the Benelux countries 
decided to take matters into their own hands and force the pace, signing the 
Schengen Agreement in June 1985.
 ^The magazine argued that Europe’s leaders had laboured long and hard “to produce a 
mouse”. (7 December 1985 pp 57-8)
 ^Roland Genson The Schengen Agreements -  Police Cooperation and Security Aspects in P. 
Cullen and W. Gilmore (Eds.) Crime Sans Frontières. 1998 p 133
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The Agreement consisted of a number of short-term measures designed to 
come into force on 1 January 1986, dealing mainly with the free movement of 
goods and services, and laying the general foundations for an implementation 
agreement to make this a reality/ The Schengen Implementing Convention, 
also known as Schengen II, was therefore signed in June 1990, This was 
concerned with long-term measures, primarily dealing with the free movement 
of persons and the necessary compensatory security measures.
The Schengen Five saw their Agr eement as one sympathetic to the European 
Project and legislation, rather than an actual regional agreement, and 
consequently a blueprint for future European integration. Schengen was 
therefore open to all Member States to join, and once the entire membership 
had signed, Schengen would be incorporated into EU legislation.
Membership gradually grew to include every Member State of the EU with the 
exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland.^ The go-ahead, however, to 
transfer national powers regarding immigration and asylum policy to the EU, 
coupled with the realisation that the UK and Ireland’s non-membership was 
going to prove a long-term issue, made it evident that the incorporation of 
Schengen into EU legislation could not be postponed indefinitely. 
Consequently, incorporation went ahead at the Treaty of Amsterdam (coming 
into effect on 1 May 1999) with the proviso of “opt-ins” for both the UK and
 ^Monica den Boer Working Paper V: Schengen: Intergovernmental Scenario for European 
Police Co-operation” 1991, p 3 
Ibid., p 3
 ^Italy signed the agreement on 27 November 1990, Spain and Portugal joined on 25 June 
1991, Greece followed on 6 November 1992 (although because of Greece’s geography in 
relation to the rest o f the EU, the full benefits o f Schengen are not currently applicable to 
Greece), then Austria on 28 April 1995 and finally Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined on 
19 December 1996.
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Ireland i.e. the acquis would not apply to them until they actually signed up to 
the agreements.^ Both countries chose to enter partially into the Schengen 
acquis through membership of elements of both the Schengen Information 
System and Implementing Convention (the UK govermnent applied in March 
1998, joining on 29 May 2000), concerning the sharing of intelligence, due 
primarily to pressure from the UK’s police chiefs.
Does the adoption of a communitarian approach to border security, however, 
improve counter-terrorist capability within the Union over that of the 
traditional methodology? If this can be proven, it would strengthen the case 
for an enhanced internal security role for the EU tliroughout, as well as forcing 
us to reconsider our attitude towards the border as a defensive wall, and the 
outdated drawbridge mentality which accompanies this. The recognition that 
international/transnational crime demands a transnational confrontation has 
ramifications well beyond Europe, forcing us to confront how we secure our 
internal security in the globalised West. The weak point in this approach, 
however, is that in a Union of states, internal security becomes pegged to the 
member whose security is weakest rather than strongest. This is contrary to 
the traditional style of security arrangements offered by the likes of NATO. 
The issue then becomes one of whether we are prepared to accept this 
Achilles' heel as a necessary condition, or does the traditional national 
approach offer greater consolidation of security?
 ^ Reticence in joining the Schengen area lies with the UK only. Ireland would be keen to 
join, but cannot, without annulling the Common Travel Area that exists between the two 
countries. Additionally the Schengen Area incorporates Iceland and Nomay, who although 
not EU Member States, joined Schengen to safeguard the Nordic passport Union (Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark being EU Member States). Whilst they may attend, debate and submit 
proposals to such meetings, they may not vote, and must decide independently whether or not 
to accept later decisions and declarations made by the Committee.
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It is therefore the Schengen Implementing Convention with which this chapter 
is concerned, in order to provide an appraisal of Schengen’s effectiveness in 
tackling terrorism and terrorist-related issues, including arms and drugs 
ti'afficking, along with the movement of non-EU citizens within the Area.
How effective is Schengen’s emphasis on employing new technology, vis-à- 
vis computerised databases, as a flanking measure? Can it equate its original 
aim of tackling illegal immigiation with the threat posed by terrorism, or has 
the current trend of associating terrorists with immigrants and asylum seekers 
become a validation of its raison d ’etrel Does Schengen shift more 
responsibility to the periphery, and how does it equate with Article K.5 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (K.2.2 of the Treaty of Maastricht), which states clearly 
that:
This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance 
of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.
By adopting a model of the Schengen Implementing Convention at work in 
policing the Anglo-Irish border, it becomes possible to identify some of the 
pros and cons of such a shift towards a periphery notorious for its frequency of 
terrorist attacks. Does the argument of maintaining national control of its 
borders against terrorism therefore substantiate the UK’s refusal to enter fully 
into Schengen, in light of both the Northern Irish model and situation, and the 
threat posed by Islamic extremism?
72
The Schengen Implementing Convention
The Schengen acquis can best be summarised as an overarching sti'ucture 
regulating cross-border co-operation at both the vertical and horizontal level 
throughout EU legislation. It ensures that the level of security lost from the 
removal of internal border controls is compensated through a series of 
“flanking” measures designed to improve cross-border law-enforcement. 
Interestingly, neither the term “terrorism” nor any of its derivatives are 
mentioned at any point within either the Schengen Agreement or the 
Implementing Convention. The most likely explanation of this relates to the 
problems associated with the political connotations of terrorism and until 
recently, the lack of any authoritative definition of the phenomenon (see 
below). Schengen however provides a workable solution simply by ignoring 
the concept of terrorism and concentrating instead on issues of serious crime, 
acts which in any event are the sine qua non of terrorism. Terrorism is simply 
“crime, is crime, is crime” to the Implementing Convention; a straightforward 
solution, but one that has yet to be fully tested. The “flanking” measures are 
contained within the 142 Articles of the Implementing Convention, of which 
more than eighty are devoted to police and security co-operation, categorised 
into four main fields/
• Police co-operation designed to improve prevention and detection 
of criminal offences
• Extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters
Genson, Op. Cit., p 135
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• Repression of crime in the field of narcotics and drugs
• Control of purchase, and possession of, and control of transaction 
in, weapons and ammunition
Being areas that have been targeted for additional co-operation due to their 
transnational aspect, all four of these categories demonstrate a particular 
relevance to terrorist-related activities. This chapter focuses primarily on the 
direct aspects of police co-operation relevant to this field, while Chapter VIII 
focuses on the judicial aspects; however, because of the significance of 
narcotics trafficking and illegal arms to terrorists, a discussion of these also 
becomes viable. It is also important to consider the policy that Schengen 
adopts for keeping track of immigrants and other third paity nationals once 
they have entered the Area.^
Title III of the Implementing Convention deals with the issue of police and 
security and defines the regulation of police co-operation as such:
The Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their police 
authorities shall, in compliance with national legislation and 
within the limits of their responsibilities, assist each other for the 
puiposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences, insofar 
as national law does not stipulate that the request is to be made to 
the legal authorities and provided the request or the 
implementation thereof does not involve the application of
® This does not in anyway place implication o f association between terrorism and 
immigration; rather it is a simple acknowledgement that non-indigenous terrorism has at times 
been initiated by individuals who have entered Europe through asylum application -  the case 
of the 11 September attacks being a case in point.
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coercive measures by the requested Contracting Party. Where the 
requested police authorities do not have Jurisdiction to 
implement a request, they shall forward it to the competent 
authorities.
(Title III, Article 39.1)
Articles 40 and 41 deal specifically with cross-border observation and “hot 
pursuit” respectively, which are particulaily important in relation to countering 
teiTorism. Provisions relating to cross border surveillance are borrowed from 
the Benelux Treaty, and confer on police and customs officers the right to 
cross a border to continue an observation begun in their own territory. 
Authorisation is required prior to the observation by the Contracting Party, but 
if urgency dictates, then it must be obtained afterwards without delay. The 
main criteria permitting such extraterritorial observation are: that the 
observation may only occui' when it already forms part of a criminal 
investigation; that there must be reasonable suspicion of involvement in the 
commission of the crime; and the offence must be an extraditable one. Under 
these conditions, the observation may also be proactive in the sense that a 
crime has yet to be committed. The crimes permissible for such are: 
assassination; murder; rape; arson; counterfeiting; armed robbery and receipt 
of stolen goods; extortion; kidnapping and hostage taking; traffic in human 
beings; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; breach of 
the laws on arms and explosives; use of explosives; and illicit carriage of toxic 
and dangerous waste (Article 40.7).
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This focus on observation introduces a much-needed proactive element into 
border co-operation. This is followed up by Article 4Ts right of pursuit which 
attempts to develop some sort of commonality on the issue of “hot pursuit”. 
Unlike the Benelux Treaty, the diversity of Schengen’s membership has made 
it impossible to reach a common standard in this area; should, for example, a 
distance of ten kilometres be the limit of pursuit as in the case of the Benelux 
Treaty, or should a time limit apply? A ten-kilometre limit would last only a 
couple of minutes before pursuit would have to be abandoned. A Dutch 
initiative therefore left this Article open to bilateral agreement on whether or 
not a state’s agents should have the right of pursuit, what offences justify 
pursuit and what time and/or distance limitations apply. Germany, for 
example, allowed unfettered access in terms of distance of pursuit and arrest 
powers (it is the only Member State to allow its Schengen neighbours’ police 
officers the right to arrest a suspect on its soil). By contrast, Belgium and the 
Netherlands followed Article 27 of the Benelux Treaty (the ten-kilometre 
rule), while Spain and Portugal permitted a fifty kilometre or a two-hour time 
limit on pursuit -  whichever is reached first. General conditions, though, that 
do apply to this Article are that the offence must be an extraditable one, 
subject to reciprocity and most importantly of all, the offence must have been 
witnessed by the pursuing officers. Within this fall the usual parameters that 
pursuant officers must inform the relevant authorities of the Contracting Party 
upon crossing the border, and are only permitted to detain the fugitive and 
must await arresting officers from the Contracting Party, after which 
extradition procedures must be enacted.
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How advantageous are such provisions within the remit of counter-terrorism? 
Cross-border surveillance has useful benefits, especially in permitting the 
proactive surveillance of suspects. The import of obtaining permission first 
through filing a request for mutual assistance implies that this Article is not 
intended simply for the purpose of undertaking observations that are 
threatened with abortion simply because the suspect crosses the border. 
Premeditated suiweillance, having been permitted, has the practical advantage 
of not eating into the resources of the Contracting Party’s law-enforcement 
authorities (i.e. the host state), and one can immediately see the advantages 
this lends to the Anglo-Irish border, where the Garda’s resouices are already 
stretched. The end product of this surveillance (it must be executed within the 
laws of both parties) is also advantageous in its utilisation for judicial 
proceedings, as it is intelligence that has neither been obtained by nor 
belonged to another state party, hence circumventing judicial technicalities 
that would have incurred had it been obtained from such a source. Cross- 
border surveillance, however, is limited in its effect in a border area not 
associated with terrorism, as tenorists are unlikely to be in such an area for 
any reason other than to cross it. It is particularly significant, though, that the 
Irish Republic decided not to participate in Article 40 when applying for 
paiticipation in the Schengen acquis, while the UK abstained from entering 
into the conditions of Article 41. The House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Select Committee deduced this to be because of the sensitivity of relations 
between the two countries in this area.^ Discussion in relation to the Anglo- 
Irish border is to an extent moot; this aside. Article 40 can be seen as a useful
 ^House of Commons European Scrutiny Select Committee 24* Report Irish Application to 
take part in elements o f the Schengen acquis 5.1-5.8,24 July 2000
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provision should the need arise, although it is of course governed by the 
willingness of the Contracting Party to grant permission on a case by case 
basis.
The advantages provided by hot pursuit have been discussed to some extent 
above. In some respects though, their application is more limited where 
terrorism is concerned than cross-border surveillance for the simple reason 
that the counter-terrorism operations rarely conclude with a hair-raising chase 
across a national border. Rather, teiTorist arrests are usually the result of 
intelligence and surveillance, and any arrests at a border are either due to luck 
or for convenience only. The exception is where the terrorists employ the 
border strategically, as addressed in the previous chapter. This type of co­
operation within Schengen’s acquis is governed through bilateral agreements; 
however none exist in any form between Ireland and the UK, other than to 
allow helicopters to engage in hot-pursuit, and this (the lack of policy) is 
detrimental to an effective counter-terrorist policy. Were an agreement to 
have existed, issues that have caused friction between the Garda and the 
Security Forces in the past would have been diminished. Soldiers and RUG 
officers who “strayed” onto the Republic’s side of the border were arrested on 
charges of carrying illegal weapons (the Common Travel Area means that they 
ai’e free to cross as individuals). By contrast, Schengen permits officers to 
cross a national border carrying service firearms, with the proviso that they
Indeed, “hot pursuits” as a whole are particularly uncommon affairs. During the period |
between 1997-1998, there was a slight increase from 36 to 39 pursuits. Council o f the |
European Union 1998 Aimual Report on the Implementation of the Schengen Convention |
10846/1/99 (LIMITE) CATS 23 ASIM 36 COMIX 223 j
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can only be employed in self-defence (Article 41.5(e))/ ’ Cross-border 
pursuit would have had the potential to seriously undermine Republican 
terrorist strength in South Armagh because the border could no longer be 
regarded as a defence for retreating terrorists. This would have caused 
significant upset to IRA strategy, along with making it less attractive to 
execute an attack from the Republic across the border. Potentially, this would 
have provided an opportunity to end the “no-go zone” which South Armagh 
had become. Certainly the local population may well have retained their 
antipathy towards the security forces, but the IRA would have been curtailed. 
Their route to a southern bolt hole would have become hazardous, and in 
theory, with a less dangerous border, Security Force patrols would then have 
been in a position to return, putting greater pressur e on the South Armagh 
IRA.^  ^ Such a context rests on an unproven premise, but one can be certain 
that a “hot pursuit” provision would have allowed a more aggressive approach 
to be taken by the Security Forces. Although “hot pursuit” typically applies to 
car chases, a number of terr orists have been pursued by the Security Forces on 
foot -  there is no reason why such a pursuit need be limited to a vehicle.
Within the context of Northern Ireland, some problems exist with a cross- 
border agreement of this type, especially in relation to the position of the
” Abstention from this particular clause without abstention from the Article itself would be 
impossible without undermining the Article, as it would effectively deny the officers of most 
European states the ability to engage in pursuit across a border simply because these police 
forces carry weapons as standard.
Whilst the past tense has been adopted for discussion of this particular area in recognition of 
the Peace Process and current paramilitary ceasefires, one could just as easily adopt the 
present tense because of the splinter groups that are not on ceasefire. Of these, a significant 
number of the disaffected Republicans belong to the South Armagh brigades, which have been 
more hostile to the Peace Process than their colleagues in Belfast or Derry.
There is nothing in the Implementing Convention’s provisions to suggest that pursuit by 
foot across a border is not permissible.
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British Army. The Implementing Convention refers to police and customs 
officers, but where would the army fit in, representing as they do an important 
aspect of British counter-terrorist policy within Northern Ireland? Could army 
personnel undertake cross-border surveillance or feasibly cross the border in 
pursuit of a suspect; would carrying standard SA80 rifles (the standard British 
Army service weapon) be considered an overextension of the term “service 
weapon” in relation to the “less offensive” firearms carried by civil police 
forces? "^* One would also arrive at the problem of the British Army in 
Northern Ireland not having the same policing powers as their RUC/PSNI 
colleagues. Their purpose is rather to serve in a support capacity to the police.
Such an issue would obviously have to be negotiated at the bilateral level. If 
the issue were to prove seriously contentious, it would significantly impede 
the practical effectiveness of this area of co-operation. As it is, the army 
patrols the rural areas because of the greater danger there; the police presence 
has been secondary to that of the army. The second point is that pursuing 
officers must be in uniform, and must be able to show proof of their 
professional capacity, thus removing undercover units from the equation, such 
as elements of the SAS, unless they are capable of identifying themselves with 
some form of insignia such as an armband or vehicle markings.
That neither the UK nor the Irish Republic have in place provisions for “hot
t
pursuit”, either through the opportunities provided by the areas that they j
signed up to in Schengen or tlirough bilateral initiatives, speaks volumes on !
The Garda Siochana has traditionally been a largely unarmed force, but the standard 
weapon, when used is a .38 revolver (although they also have access to Uzi sub-machine 
guns). Peter Klerks Police Forces in the EC and EFTA countries in Tony Bunyan (ed). 
Statewatching the New Europe: a handbook on the European state 1993 p 50
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their co-operative policy on teiTorism. The explanation interpreted by the 
Commons’ Select Committee above was that the sensitivity of the situation 
prevented such measures. How far is this the case? The previous chapter 
notes the current sanguine relationship between the two police forces as 
concluded by the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland’s 
report, but the report did not cover the past relationship. The chapter also 
noted Hamden’s criticism of the level of co-operation, but much of this is due 
to the lack of a structured co-operative agreement -  a more detailed 
observation of their relationship paints a more positive picture.
The Garda and RUC have maintained cordial relations thi'oughout their 
history. Even in the immediate post-1922 period with the creation of the Free 
State after the Anglo-Irish War, one would have expected the relationsliip 
between the newly formed Garda, comprised mainly ft om IRA men, and the 
RUC with its influx of officers from the disbanded Royal Irish Constabulary, 
old enemies on either side, to be hostile. This was not the case. In a 
particularly illuminating article, Jason Lane points to a much more amicable 
relationship between the two forces. Unofficial contact has been recorded 
from 26 September 1922, through the Vice-regal Lodge in Dublin, even before 
the final British evacuation on the subject of mutual assistance dealing with 
criminals taking refuge on either side of the border. This archive showed that 
the Free State Quartermaster for Donegal was quite willing to assist in the 
capture of such criminals, provided it was a reciprocal agreement. Officers in 
plain clothes could, by prior arrangement, cross the border to identify
Jason Lane, Police Co-operation and Internal Conflict Resolution Strategies: The Case o f  
Ireland  Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences Sept 1998, Vol. 11 No, 3, pp 
267-277
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criminals. Interviewing a former Garda officer, Lane asks a concluding 
question: “So relations would have been very friendly between the Guar ds and 
the RUC?” to which the answer was “Very friendly. Not “very” friendly, but 
it’s as well.. .As far as duty was concerned they were very friendly and they 
were very dependent on that line”.^  ^ Lane does make clear that there have 
been troughs in the relationship, such as Warrenpoint and the Dowra Affair, 
but these are not illustrative of the relationship as a whole.
If the lack of such co-operative provisions cannot be attributed to the 
individual police forces, then perhaps the answer lies in the political sensitivity 
of the environment. The Anglo-Irish Agi eement 1985 (which included co­
operative police measur es) proved unpopular among the majority of the 
Unionist population of the North who saw the Agreement as the beginning of 
the end of Unionism, and felt that the British government had sold them out. 
The Unionist MPs of all parties renounced their seats in the Commons and a 
civil disobedience campaign, although ultimately futile, was initiated to 
attempt to sabotage the Agreement. Both governments might have feared that 
the Unionists would have viewed a reciprocal Agreement allowing Gardai to 
cross the border in pursuit of suspects or establish suiweillance operations as a 
further encroachment of Dublin into the North. Continuing this rationale 
explains why co-operation has not developed to the same extent as it has 
between other Member States’ police forces within the wider EU framework: 
the peace process and David Trimble’s standing as leader of the Ulster Union 
Party, which are interlinked, have been in a precarious position for a number
Ibid., p 270
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of years now. To increase co-operation in such a direct way may have been 
thought to risk the undesirable effect of bolstering the opposition to Trimble’s 
leadership. Opinions on this matter, however, would seem to be changing.
The Patten Report 2001, in its review of the restmcturing of the RUC, 
recommended the introduction of liaison officers and fixed-term secondments 
between the two forces, The secondments would be in specialist fields 
where most needed, in areas such as drugs and training. Both governments 
have been exploring the possibility of expanding the potential here and have 
introduced legislation (summer 2002) that will provide these seconded officers 
with full police powers. Such a move, concluded a recent Commons’ Select 
Committee, is a significant policy shift from the previous cautious approach 
taken by both governments.^^ The obvious conclusion to this is that both 
governments believe that the situation now permits progress to be made on 
police co-operation. No timetable, however, has yet been produced by either 
government that makes provision for cross-border observation or “hot 
pursuit”. The assumption would be that such measur es will soon be proposed, 
but it is curious that measures allowing secondments with police powers, an 
advanced form of co-operation rarely seen on Continental Europe, would be 
introduced before basic measures such as “hot pursuit”. It may well be that a 
Garda patrol car chasing a suspect into the North is, in qualitative terms, more 
likely to inflame opinion than a Garda officer accompanied by Northern Irish 
police on a drugs raid.
The Patten Report Updated Implementation Plan August 2001 Recommendations 157, 158, 
160, 162, 163 and 165. The liaison officer implementation is also covered by Article 47 of the 
Schengen Implementation Convention, to which both are party.
The Implementation of Recommendations Concerning North/South Co-operation on 
Policing Matters, Lateral entry and Secondments -  A Joint Timetable by the British and Irish 
Governments Northern Ireland Office, (publication date unknown)
House of Commons Op. Cit., 5.1-5.8,24 July 2000
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The less obtrusive aspects of the Implementing Convention, however, do 
remain open to both police forces. Article 46, for example, is highly 
significant in that it allows for the exchange of information “without being 
asked” to prevent “future crime and offences against or threats to public policy 
and security”. This goes beyond the traditional “reactive” style of co­
operation covered by Article 39, which manages the exchange of information 
between police authorities on a requested basis. Article 46 actually introduces 
an approach conducive to co-operation.
The sectarian divide within Northern Ireland has been responsible, as the 
Commons Select Commission concludes, for holding back greater police co­
operation. Whether this is still the case is debatable. What can be concluded, 
though, is that if the police are unable to work to the best of their ability 
against the terrorists who exacerbate these rifts, a vicious circle is inevitable.
Dealing with terrorist support networks?
An area covered by the Implementing Convention worth noting is the section 
containing provisions dealing with drug trafficking (Chapter 6). The 
relevance to terrorism here is that increasingly terrorist group funding is 
derived in part from the sale of narcotics. The terrorist groups in Northern 
Ireland, for example, have retained significant control of this highly profitable 
market whilst maintaining the dubious façade of the traditional socio-political 
values of their “struggle”.^ ® Extortion, loan sharking and fraud, especially in
See chapter IV.
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the construction trade, are other typical methods of racketeering employed by 
the terror groups (although none are as lucrative as narcotics). It is with good 
reason that the British government has referred to these groups in the past as 
“gangsters” and “godfathers”. Alison Jamieson also points to a clear link 
between drug trafficking and the financing of Islamic terrorism, citing the 
example of a major drugs and terrorist operation dismantled in Milan in 
1998.^  ^ The Basque terror group ETA receives its funding not only through 
the traditional method of extortion or “revolutionary taxes” and bank 
robberies, but also through narcotics. Much of the explanation behind this 
trend rests with the end of the Cold War, and that rapprochement with 
traditional Middle-Eastern proponents of state-sponsored terrorism, typically 
Iran, Libya and Syria towards the West, left some terrorist groups orphaned. 
Faced with the harsh realities of the Market Economy these terrorist groups 
were left with the choice of going to the wall or embracing the opportunity of 
the free market and the lure of the high mark-up associated with trading in 
proscribed goods.
The relationship between terrorism and organised crime has continued to grow 
with the expansion of globalisation. Some black marketeers have found a 
novel way of increasing their profit by selling the arms required by terror 
groups along with a package of dmgs. The two are part and parcel of the deal 
and non-negotiable. If the terrorists accept the deal, they have to sell the drugs 
to recoup their losses. A vicious circle is entered into: the aims dealer has off­
loaded a sizeable quantity of drugs to a customer that has the means to sell
ibid.
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them, and is often able to ensure that it has no rival competitors in its market 
area. Alex Schmid cites the example of ETA having to accept such a package 
in the past. The group then stai*ted to kill drug dealers to give the impression 
that its credo was anti-drugs, whilst at the same time ensuring a secure market 
for its p ro d u c t . I t  is no coincidence that today many arms dealers are also 
involved in drug trafficking. Denied the support from state-sponsors, these 
illicit groups have no option but to accept such terms if they wish to continue 
to exist. One of the IRA’s main arms suppliers, General Ivan Andabak of the 
Croatian Defence Council was tried in Zagreb on drug running charges.^^ 
Andabak was responsible for supplying what was believed to be the Real 
IRA’s biggest gunrunning operation, which was seized in Split, Croatia, in 
July 2000. The weapons seized were ex-Yugoslav, Russian and Chinese arms, 
including rocket launchers, automatic rifles, and detonators, more than 4,000 
rounds of ammunition, grenades and about 40 kilograms of commercial 
explosive.^"^
The Schengen Implementing Convention does contain provisions for dealing 
with firearms and ammunition (Chapter 7), but for the most part it focuses on 
regulating national laws on registration and licensing, listing those firearms 
which require authorisation and the permanent marking of serial numbers 
rather than actively engaging in tackling smuggling of such ordnance. Chapter
^  Alex Schmid, The Link between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorist Crimes in 
Transnational Organised Crime. Vol. 2, No. 4 1996, p 70 
Ostensibly, Andabak was charged on these crimes. He does have connections with 
European terrorist groups dating back to the 1970s via the “black underground” -  a network 
through which these groups exchanged weapons, ideas and support. Andabak’s fall from grace 
lies with the fact that he fell foul o f the post-Tudjman regime in Croatia that was increasingly 
sidelining the hardliners. tSundav Herald. 17/9/00, Croatian war criminal led Real IRA gun- 
running p 10)
Ibid.
6, however, is more aggressive in its attitude towards drug smuggling, and has 
been termed by den Boer as a “joint war against drugs’’/^ Aside from making 
a concerted effort to prevent and punish illegal trafficking. Article 70 provides 
specifically for the establishment of a permanent working party to draw up 
proposals for the improvement of the practical and technical aspects of co­
operation. In relation to border security, Article 73 is particularly interesting, 
because it allows “controlled delivery” (delivery under surveillance) of 
narcotics, as long as it is in line with the national legal system. Prior 
authorisation of each Contracting Party is required to initiate Article 73, 
although “each Contracting Party shall retain the direction and supervision of 
the operation in its territory and shall have the right to intervene”. At this 
point a little should be said about the concept of “controlled delivery”. Its 
purpose allows law-enforcement agencies the ability to collect information 
about a particular criminal group through long-term surveillance, rather than 
arresting individuals immediately, and even allowing some to complete their 
activity if it means garnering important information on a larger group. Police 
authorities have long since recognised that simply arresting couriers or 
“mules” is not conducive to preventing the trade of illegal narcotics; those at 
the top need to be arrested in order to have any real effect, or at the very least 
the guts of the organisation torn out. Aiticle 73 illustrates recognition by the 
Schengen members of the necessity of this strategy, by actually providing for 
it in international legislation. This is a particularly significant development in 
the world of international co-operation against drug trafficking, as previously 
“controlled delivery” has usually not been legally prescripted, relying on
den Boer, Op. Cit., p 18
87
individual sanctioning by prosecutors and members of the judiciaiy/^ The 
Implementing Convention now provides legal prescript throughout the Area. 
One should be a little wary, however, of the phenomenon of “forum 
shopping”, where, through the exchange of information, drugs officers 
intervene in a drugs transport when the trafficker passes through the country 
with the severest penalties.^^ This potentially risks the success of an operation 
if it is continued beyond necessary in order to allow the trafficker to continue 
onto a “high penalty” country, equally an operation may be terminated 
unnecessarily early for similar reasons.
Controlled delivery also has its part to play against terrorism: arrest a suspect 
too early and it may be that there is not enough evidence for a conviction, or 
even worse the group goes to ground, setting back the investigation. Indeed 
the investigators may never even find out exactly what the group’s plans were. 
Two months prior to the bombing of Pan Am 103 in December 1988, the 
German BKA arrested a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -  
General Command cell (PFLP-GC) believing that they were planning to bomb 
an airline, but despite the strong suspicions, all the suspects were released 
because of lack of secure evidence. The suspects then promptly disappeared, 
“going to ground”.^  ^ The alternative view is the one put forward by 
Dostoevsky’s investigating magistrate, Porphyrins Petrovitch:
Les Johnston Transnational Private Policing: The impact of global commercial security in 
James W. E, Sheptycki (ed.) Issues in Transnational Policing 2000 pp21-2 
den Boer, Op. Cit., p 19 
^ Chapter V provides a fuller account of Operation “Autumn Leaves”.
supposing I have this gentleman arrested prematurely, although 
I am positively that he is the man, yet I deprive myself of all 
future means of proving his guilt” but "if I do not have him 
arrested, if I in no way set him on his guard” and "that I do not 
lose sight of him either by night or by day.. .he will provide me 
with ample evidence against himself.^^
The concern with taking this approach to terrorism is that it is open to the 
possibility of backfiring. The decision by the French authorities to place 
under surveillance the close associates of Djamal Beghal, a French-Algerian 
businessman suspected of being A1 Qaeda’s senior recruiting officer in 
Europe, following his arrest in Dubai for passport irregularities six weeks 
before 11 September, rather than detaining them, is now viewed by analysts as 
a grave error. It was later discovered that these suspects included a number of 
high profile figures within Islamic extremism, and that Beghal was in fact 
returning to Europe with the final orders for initiating a substantial terror 
campaign against US targets. In this particular case, acting “aggressively” 
may have provided warning of the 11 September attacks. Terrorism is a much 
more volatile issue to risk controlled delivery than is the case with drug 
trafficking. Ultimately a call of judgement is required for deciding when to 
make the arrest, but if it is not made at the right moment then lives hang in the 
balance in a more immediate manner that differs from those lives threatened 
by the more insidious natui e of the illegal drugs trade. It is a dangerous 
balancing act.
Fedor Dostoevsky Crime and Punshment Chapter 5, 1951 I
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The Schengen Information System
One of the most innovative features of the Implementing Convention is 
undoubtedly the Schengen Information System (SIS) -  a vast computer 
database capable of holding information on up to eight million people and 
seven million objects on its initial set-up.^^ The SIS is a major “flanking” 
measure, shifting the emphasis away from the concept of internal borders to 
that of a heavily sentinel orientated one. All Schengen members’ border 
checkpoints are linked to their National SIS database (NSIS), which is capable 
of rapidly communicating infoimation requested by officers at these 
checkpoints, as well as those responsible for police and customs checks 
carried out within the country, and the co-ordination of such checks.^ ^ The 
system is designed to allow these officers to check individuals entering or 
leaving the Schengen area, running their name thi'ough the system to ascertain 
whether or not there is any alert tagged to that individual. The types of 
individuals who are subject to SIS reports are:
- persons to be arrested for extradition purposes, on the basis of an arrest 
warrant or a sentence
- aliens who ai e reported for the purpose of being refused entry on the
basis of a national decision *
1
- persons having disappeared or persons who, in the interest of their own j
1:security, need to be placed in a secure location i
Benyon et al Police Co-operation in Europe: An Investigation. 1993, p 237 
As noted this was the SIS’s initial capacity, based on the original membership of five. 
Article 101(1). This refers to the mobile units permitted to operate m the border area. See 
below for a discussion on this.
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- persons required to be located for the purpose of judicial proceedings, 
because, for example, they are witnesses who have to appear before a 
judicial authority
- persons required to be subject to discreet surveillance or specific 
checks for crime prevention purposes
(Articles 93-101)
Article 99(2) is interesting in this regard, as it permits the addition to the list of 
individuals who pose a “thieat(s) to public safety”. In effect, this permits data 
to be included on those whom the authorities believe may pose a risk at some 
possible future date. Whilst a useful clause, especially in relation to terrorist 
suspects, it does appear to run contrary to the spirit of a person being imiocent 
until proven guilty, and has ramifications for the enforcement of data 
protection legislation.. The conditions for this are:
a) where there are real indications to suggest that the person intends to 
commit or is committing numerous and extremely serious offences, or
b) where an overall evaluation of the person concerned, in particular on 
the basis of offences committed hitherto, gives reason to suppose that 
he will commit extremely serious offences in future
Information holding parameters
The information that may be held regarding such individuals above is not 
related to criminal intelligence due to the fact that the SIS works by means of
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a common pool to which all the Schengen members contribute; consequently 
information related to criminal activities would be incompatible with the 
divergent data protection laws of the individual members. As such the data is 
limited to defined categories: real and assumed names; physical distinguishing 
marks; initial letter of second forename; date and place of birth; sex; 
nationality; indication that the person is armed or violent; reason for report and 
action to be taken (Article 94.3). Article 99(3) however permits the state 
security authorities to request that a report, beyond that permitted for SIS 
information on individuals, should be included if the said individual represents 
a “serious threat to internal and external security”. This is subject to the 
authorities’ possession of “concrete evidence” and the proviso that all other 
Contracting Parties are contacted beforehand. It is clear that such a provision 
is aimed directly at terrorist suspects, but equally one can include drug barons 
and organised crime bosses, who are always careful to ensure that they cannot 
be directly linked with their criminal activities. It is in the interest of all states 
to be aware of their less salubrious visitors and for what purposes they are 
visiting. The obvious fault with this system is that one must have a suspect in 
the first place to put on a watch list; many terrorist groups employ 
“unknowns” to circumvent a state’s security network. The IRA have 
demonstrated this with their ASUs on the British mainland employing “lily 
whites”; more recently the teiTorists involved in the 11 September hijacks 
were all “clean skins” as far as the US authorities were concerned.
The information accessible through the SIS is succinct, briskly addressing an 
enquiry within five minutes; however sometimes more detailed information is
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required. This requirement was initially addressed by the Supplementary 
Information Request at the National Entry (SIRENE), a system incorporated 
within the SIS to deal with such enquiries as quickly as possible. There is an 
emphasis on speed because the requester may often be working under time 
restrictions -  information may be needed for an arrest warrant, for example. 
Equally a magistrate may need additional information to extend an extradition 
detention, as a person can normally only be detained for 24-48 hours (although 
terrorist suspects can usually be held beyond this depending on the anti­
terrorist legislation of the individual Schengen member), requiring the 
description of the criminal offence and the maximum possible prison 
sentence.^^ SIRENE was staffed not only by representatives of the national 
police authorities, but also customs officials -  and crucially, legal experts.
The latter’s purpose is not only to answer enquiries regarding the judicial 
system, but also to act as a safeguard against SIRENE replying to a request 
that would be technically illegal in the requesting country. This SIRENE 
procedure therefore aims at preventing a prosecution case or extradition 
hearing being thiown out or falling apart simply because procedures were 
followed incorrectly.^^ One particularly infamous example of such an 
occurrence is Belgium’s refusal in 1988 to extradite IRA suspect Patrick Ryan 
because of an incorrect drafting of the initial extradition request from the 
UK.^ ^
SIRENE was replaced in August 2001 with the more advanced SISNET as 
part of the overhaul necessitated by both technical advances and the
Benyon, Op. Cit., p 230
For statistics on SIRENE “hits” see tables iv and v
34 See chapter VIII for more details and similar examples.
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recognition that the SIS was never designed to handle the capacity required by 
so many states after the Nice accession. The new system required not only 
efficiency but also flexibility in adapting to new technological advancements 
and new applicants, in addition to being legally applicable in all Member 
States. The new system maintains all the functions of the old one, but also 
serves as a single input and output data exchange network, resulting in more 
efficient service provided by a “one-stop shop”. Rapid electronic transmission 
of photos, fingerprints, ballistic images, identikit profiles, DNA profiles (the 
EU plans to create an international DNA database) and direct linlcs with 
diplomatic missions outside the EU allowing the “exchange of data on the 
issuing of visas” are all functions available through the SIRene Picture 
Transfer (SIRPIT).^^ Additionally, real-time video images and sound are also 
transferable, and this can prove especially useful in the context of Articles 40, 
41 and 99 (surveillance of suspect vehicles) although the entire system will not 
be fully operational until 2006.^^ A DNA database would offer some 
assistance in tackling the present problem faced by European law-enforcement 
agencies in identifying the numerous Islamic extremists originating from 
North Africa. Many of those arrested have possessed as many as forty forged 
identity documents, making it impossible to correctly identify them.^^ If they 
camiot be identified, it makes it much more difficult to arrest accomplices.
The problem, however, is that it would require the incorporation of DNA
The ti'ansfer of fingei-prints and photographs by fax for speed, followed by the later sending 
of the original copy for accuracy often results in too poor quality to permit automated 
comparison, while the latter regularly leads to delays which may result in the release o f a 
suspect. (European Report. 25 March 2000)
^^European Report EU: Schengen Convention — New technical and institutional developments 
in the offing cited in University of Exeter website: www.ex.ac.uk/politics/pol- 
data/undergrad/paterson/sis/html 
See chapter VI for more on this tlu eat.
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samples from Third Party governments, which stirs up a cauldron of legal 
issues. Moreover, the majority of these suspects come from poor countries 
where DNA profiling simply does not exist,
Europe’s law-enforcement authorities have enthusiastically welcomed the SIS, 
registering an increase of recorded “hits” from 5.9 million at the end of 1997 
to 8.7 million at the end of 1998, and regarding it as a crucial flanking 
measure.^^ Michel Pinauldt, a Préfet on the K4 Committee took the view that 
the SIS “has been extremely useful” and “is proving its use more and more 
day by day”.^  ^ A senior UK official meanwhile believed, in preparing the 
British entry into parts of the Implementing Convention, that “it will 
considerably expand the UK’s ability to tackle crimes”.^ ^
The SIS plays an important part in policing the external border of the 
Schengen Area, serving as one of the main flanking measures required for 
augmenting its peripheral security. By maintaining a quantitative database, all 
those entering the Schengen Area will be checked and their details run through 
to determine whether they are an undesirable or wanted by a Schengen 
member. So runs the theory. Examining how the external border is policed 
determines the secuiity of Schengen as a whole.
Council o f the European Union 1998 Annual Report on the Implementation of the Schengen 
Convention 10846/1/99 (LIMITE) CATS 23 ASIM 36 COMIX 223 
House of Lords European Communities - Seventh Report Session 1998-99. The Schengen 
Svstem and UK Policv on Frontier Controls, paragraph 53 
The Herald 29/5/00. p 6
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Policing Schengen’s External Border
Schengen operates on the concept of collective trust. Each member must feel 
secure regarding the competence of its neighbour’s internal security policy 
before they will remove their internal border controls. The UK’s subdued 
confidence regarding the competence of its fellow EU Member States in this 
matter provides one explanation for its reticence to fully enter into the 
Schengen Area'^^ Fundamentally, though, this trust can only be achieved 
through the augmentation of Schengen’s external border. The mainstay of this 
rests with the SIS, although it is interesting to note that the Schengen States 
view this system as one orientated towards the control of immigration than 
towards that of crime, the latter being the primary reason as to why British 
police chiefs pushed for the UK’s association with the SIS. The security of 
the external border is also supported by the transfer of additional units from 
the internal to the external, with the addition of mobile units to exercise 
surveillance on external borders between crossing points, and on border 
crossing points outside normal opening horns (Article 3). However the 
Convention stresses that this type of “surveillance shall be carried out in such 
a way as not to encoumge people to circumvent the checks at crossing points”. 
In other words, it is a warning not to employ heavy-handed or blatantly overt 
tactics that would push this policy in the direction of “Fortress Europe” -  a 
terminology with “iron curtain” connotations, which the architects of 
Schengen and its members have been at pains to avoid. Whilst the 
maintenance of the integrity of the external border is left to the responsibility
House o f Lords. Op. Cit., paragraph 11
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of the individual state, the Schengen Common Border manual provides 
stipulations as to how this shall be practised, effectively establishing a 
communitarian approach."^^
Does the UK’s reluctance to be part of this communitarian approach imply a 
lack of confidence on the part of British authorities towards Schengen? The 
UK’s argument against Schengen rests on the premise that its sea borders 
provide a natural and far more effective protection than a land border, and 
thus while it is sensible for Continental Europe to restracture its border 
security, it makes less sense for the UK to do so. Therefore, the UK’s position 
rests on what it sees as practical points -  to join Schengen entirely would be to 
dilute its security. The UK has cited terrorism as one of its main reasons for 
this policy. Its security forces were concerned that “the elimination of 
internal border checks in the rest of Europe would also greatly assist the IRA, 
making it easier for IRA terrorist cells to carry out attacks against British 
targets on the Continent and to find safe haven in neighbouring European 
States.”"^  ^ The Irish govermnent, however, no friend of the IRA, has made it 
clear that its opt-out from full participation on Schengen is due only to its 
commitment to maintaining the Common Travel Area with the UK."^ "^
Equally, with the commitment to the peace process, the IRA argument for 
determining policy is now redundant. To use al-Qaeda as an excuse would be
This manual has remained classified, unavailable even to legislative committees such as the 
House of Lords Select Committee on European Communities Seventh Report, but a non­
classified version o f it has recently been made public in October 2001, following an 
application under the rules on access to documents, the Council has released the English text 
in an on-line format. (Common Manual Council o f the European Union Brussels 22 June 2001 
(23.08) OR (Fr) 8248/01 LIMITE FRONT 32 COMIX 309)
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 7^ '^ Report. Practical Police Co­
operation in the Eui’opean Communitv Session 1989-90, 363-1, p 55 
House of Lords. Op. Cit., paragiaph 10 (Introduction)
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contemptible when Britain’s European partners have long regarded it as a 
haven for Islamic extremists."^  ^ On these grounds, one must question the 
validity of such an argument, accepting the premise that border security 
measures have little effect in preventing terrorism.
Sustaining this argument are developments occurring in the traditional 
methods of policing entry into the UK. This is conducted through the “funnel 
points” of airports and ports (plus the Channel Tunnel), which provide a 
managed approach to observing, if not actually checking, every entrant into 
the UK if so required."^  ^ The UK security forces therefore favour the retention 
of these controls over Schengen, even if they allow only a slim chance of 
detecting a terrorist. However, with the ever increasing volume of traffic into 
the UK, cuiTently approximately 100 million per annum -  90 million of whom 
arrive from within the Schengen Area -  growing at a compound eight per cent 
each year, one might view such a policy as wishful thinking."^  ^ Indeed when 
one takes into account the fact that whilst the number of passengers arriving in 
British ports has risen by fifty per cent, staffing levels rose by only ten per 
cent over the past five years,leading to the July 1998 White Paper Fairer, 
Faster and Firmer -  A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum warning 
that:
without modernisation and greater flexibility, so that resources
are targeted more effectively on tackling abuse and clandestine
Jane Corbin The Base 2002 Chapter 16
House of Lords. Op. Cit., paragraph 20 (Introduction)
Ibid., paragraph 16 (Introduction)
White Paper Fairer, Faster and Firmer — A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum 
July 1998 paragraph 6.2
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entry rather than routine work, it will become increasingly 
difficult to maintain effective frontier controls, cope with 
passenger growth, deliver the kind of service standards that 
facilitate trade, tourism and education, and maintain the United 
Kingdom’s position as an international hub,
(Paragraph 6.5)
Such concerns, taken in conjunction with the fact that, as far as drugs are 
concerned “the majority of the seizures are as a result of prior intelligence”, 
question the validity of maintaining the cuiTent system. Changes are required, 
but should the UK adopt Schengen as its solution?
Most of the Schengen members maintain an identity card system, which serves 
as a definite supplement to the “flanking measures”. Whilst the Implementing 
Convention does not require such a system, it would be regarded as a strong 
fallback position by the UK if it did choose to enter fully into Schengen. Yet 
the controversial nature of identity cards, sceptically viewed by the British 
public, make such a decision doubtful, even in the post-11 September 
environment. Opposing this argument is the fact that although eleven EU 
Member States maintain identity cards, thi ee of the Schengen members, France, 
Italy and Portugal, operate it as a voluntary system, which almost everyone 
carries. While the majority -  Belgium, Germany, Spain and Greece -  maintain a 
compulsory card,^  ^the fact that two Schengen Members, Sweden and Denmark,
John Abbot, Dkector-General of the National Criminal Intelligence System; House of 
Lords, Op. Cit., paragraph 17 (Examination o f Witnesses, Questions 1-19)
^  Bill Hebenton and Terry Thomas Policing Europe: Co-operation. Conflict and Control 1995 
p 108; Migration News Vol. 8 No. 11 November 2001 “EU: Terrorism, Harmonisation”.
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do not operate such a system, whilst another three do not operate compulsory 
cards, does question the validity of an identity card system representing a 
natural fallback position for the UK government in the event of Schengen entry. 
The UK’s partial acceptance of Schengen was driven by its police chiefs and 
policing needs, and not political expedients. In this light British policy is 
therefore determined by practicalities rather than politics.
The British decision of opposing full membership places the issue of terrorism 
squarely with that of Schengen, unlike its fellow Member States who associate 
Schengen primarily with immigration issues. Spain, the other EU state to have 
suffered a sustained terrorist campaign, sees Europol as the favouied tool for 
fighting terrorism at a European level. Such a difference of viewpoint, while 
serving as yet another example of Britain being out of kilter witli the rest of 
her EU partners, demonstrates a doubt about Schengen that is not 
acknowledged by the rest. The Spanish recognise that Schengen was not 
designed to tackle terrorism, and excluding France’s initial raising of the 
drawbridge in response to the Islamic fundamentalism in 1993 and a GIA 
campaign in 1995, have not initiated Article 2.2 on terrorist matters. The open 
border between Spain and France has not been sealed because of the thieat 
posed by ETA; rather, renewed co-operation between the two states against 
ETA has proven far greater in worth. Nevertheless, the UK is in the unhappy 
position that were it to open its internal borders, it would not have the same 
availability of flanldng measures open to the other Schengen members.
Because entry to Britain is thr ough the “fumiel points” of ports and aiipoils, 
border security has never been required outside these points; indeed the point
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to make is that security has been contained within these areas. Schengen 
provides for mobile patrols in compensation, but because the UK has no 
border areas, it has no tradition of policing such ai'eas, unlike Germany for 
example, which maintains the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS), a federal border 
police numbering 3 0,300 in 1991 ^  ^  Moreover, Germany maintains a 
“security zone” extending thirty kilometres into Germany along its eastern 
border where the BGS and customs officers have the same powers as the state 
police.^^ Would mobile patrols operate within a twenty-kilometre diameter of 
each British port and airport, and how does one equate this to the UK’s lack of 
border policing tradition (the obvious exception being Northern Ireland)? 
Exacerbating these concerns is the fact that “stop and search” remains a 
controversial issue in a society that does not employ identity cards.^^ Such 
problematic circumstances indicate that Schengen does have difficulty 
accommodating the EU island Member State’s security considerations with 
those of the initial continental core members, but they fall short of causing 
what could be described as a security deficit for the UK. What would be more 
problematic for the UK is the introduction of a system of mobile patrols 
focused around the points of entry into the country, moving Britain away from 
its traditional decentralised policing system and bringing it closer towards an 
operational national policing methodology, and all the structural changes that 
this would induce.
Klerks, Op. Cit., p 48 
2^ PPM Bordereconomies “Living Near the Border” 
(www.moneynations.ch/topics/border/titelbord.htm)
A point that relates to the UK government’s decision to retain border controls because they 
“match both the geography and traditions of the country and have ensured a high degree of 
personal freedom within the UK”. House of Lords. Op. Cit., paragraph 13 (Introduction)
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The previous chapter makes clear the limited extent to which border security 
can be effective against terrorists. It is equally important, however, to discuss 
the ramifications linked to the free movement of individuals within the 
Schengen Area for counter-terrorism, especially in relation to the fact that this 
permits asylum seekers and refugees belonging to third party states the same 
freedom of movement, once inside the Area. The European states have been 
victim to numerous terrorist attacks perpetrated by non-indigenous groups, and 
it is worth remembering that it was such a group who entered the USA on 
tourist visas to carry out the 11 September attacks. How effective is Schengen 
in separating the “goats from the sheep”, and is it in a position to keep track on 
all who pass its external border?
The Implementing Convention makes the important distinction between EU 
Member States who are outside the Area as “Third Parties” and non-EU 
Members as “Aliens”, a significant differentiation in how each party is treated 
upon entry into the Area.^ "^  It is mandatory, for instance, for each entrant to be 
subject to at least one check, making it possible to establish their identities 
based on their presentation of travel documents (Article 6(b)). Aliens, 
however, in addition to providing documentation demonstrating their ability to 
support themselves during their stay and return trip, as well as their reasons for 
staying, are also subject to exit checks “in the interest of all Contracting 
Parties under the law on aliens. This is done in order to detect and prevent 
threats to the national security and public policy of the Contracting Parties” 
(Article 6(c)), ensuring that any such malefactor may be apprehended before
For the purpose of continuity the Schengen terminology shall be adopted here, but the term 
“Alien” shall be considered interchangeable with the term “non-EU national”.
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leaving the Area. Again, this relies on the assumption that a terrorist would 
enter through a legal conduit, travelling under false identification which is 
either known to the authorities or detectable as a forgery.
The employment of mobile patrols and surveillance aims to protect the non­
authorised crossing points along the border. Such patrols have been found to 
be extremely useful by the Schengen members -  internally, as well as along 
the external border. Michel Barnier, the French European Affairs Minister, 
stated that these “could be more effective than fixed controls”.^  ^They were 
inti'oduced internally at a meeting of the Schengen Executive Committee in 
October 1995 after a proposal by Germany to recognise their creation under 
bilateral agreements between Schengen members, leading to a network of 
agreements throughout the Union. Their purpose lay in raising the threshold 
required by a Schengen member before it would initiate the Implementing 
Convention’s derogation clause. Article 2(2) permits border controls to be 
reinstated at any time if “public policy or national security so require” for a 
“limited period”, as derogation clauses inliibit the spirit of a treaty. France, for 
example, was the first to make use of this in April 1993 to prevent “illegal 
immigration and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism”^^  and again following 
a series of Armed Islamic Group (GIA) bombings in Paris after the summer of 
1995. The efficacy of merely reverting to traditional controls against the GIA 
is questionable considering the general porosity of borders. In a similar vein, 
French hostility to the liberal drugs laws of the Netherlands has caused it to 
maintain border controls along its Belgian and Luxembourg borders, ai'guing
Statewatch. Schengen: “Mobilefrontiers” introduced\o\. 5, No. 6, 1995, pp 5-6 
Statewatch. France: new immigration laws Vol. 3, No. 3, 1993, p 1
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that these are transit countries for drugs leaving the Netherlands. France did 
however lift its border controls with Germany following an announcement on 
18 April 1996, after reaching an agreement to maintain “mobile border 
controls” instead. The Belgian Interior Minister, Johan Vande Lanotte, agreed 
that “mobile” or “surprise” checks were much more effective than fixed 
points, although France has yet to revise her policy regarding this border. 
Because these mobile checks are exactly that, and not fixed, they do not 
contravene the Implementing Convention, and typically may be employed 
within twenty kilometres of the border, although not actually on it.^  ^ Their 
effectiveness lies in much the same respect as that of police patrols in mban 
areas. Again, good luck plays an important part in apprehending a terrorist in 
such a catchment area. To what extent, for example, were ETA’s 
confrontations with French checkpoints in November and December 2001 due 
to the terrorist’s bad luck or intent? The primary importance of mobile units 
where counter terrorism is concerned is that they can act as “chance” 
encounters to mask the role played by an informant in the same manner used 
at conventional fr ontier checks. The importance of this cannot be overstated. 
Only by protecting informants through such means can law-enforcement 
agencies reduce the possibility of a “mole” or “tout” hunt within the group 
following an arrest.^^ It is also important to note that mobile units provide the 
state with the additional means to provide an element of individual 
responsibility over and above that of the collective response devised by the 
Implementing Convention. This last point is particularly significant because it
Statewatch. SCHENGEN: “teething” problems, expansion and first annual report Vol. 6, 
No. 3, 1996, p 19 
House of Lords. Op. Cit., paragraph 11 
See chapter V for a greater discussion on the use of informers.
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does provide the state with the opportunity to augment its security at an 
individual level, thereby partially alleviating concerns regarding the 
competence of other Member States’ internal security policy. Mobile units 
provide a means of ensuring a necessary degree of flexibility within the 
Implementing Convention in terms of security, which is perhaps essential in 
reducing the employment of the derogation clause.
The effectiveness of these “flanking measures” is important because once 
inside the Schengen Area, Third Party nationals and aliens enjoy free 
movement with no further need for a visa (non-EU nationals or aliens are 
limited in their movement through a three-month visa), with their substantive 
rights in such matters as movement and residence being governed by 
Community law, to which the Implementing Convention is subservient.
Within this context, a Schengen state is obliged to refuse an individual entry if 
he or she does not fulfil the minimum requirements for entry. Therefore, 
decisions made at the national level take effect throughout the Area. The 
exception is that a Schengen State may admit, onto its own territory only, any 
alien who has failed to satisfy entry conditions, on national interest or 
humanitarian grounds, or because of international obligations (Aiticle 5(2)).
This area of the Implementing Convention was put to the test during a trying 
three months that began in November 1998 when the Kurdish FKK leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan arrived in Rome on 12 November as an international persona 
non grata, wanted only by Turkey, who had filed for his extradition. Italy’s 
courts turned down the extradition request, but hoped that Ocalan would leave
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of his own accord. Ocalan’s strategy, however, was diametrically opposite to 
the EU Member States; he reftised to leave Italy unless it was for a country not 
too far from Western Europe with good security and a sizeable Kurdish 
community. No EU state wanted Ocalan, even Germany, which had initiated 
an extradition warrant for him after his arrest by the Italian authorities but had 
then declined to act on it for fear of provoking trouble between the Turkish 
and Kurdish communities within Germany. Despite being regarded as a 
terrorist by most Western governments, Ocalan’s detention by the Italians was 
lifted following Germany’s decision not to pursue its international arrest 
warrant for him. Technically a free man and within the Schengen Area,
Ocalan could, in theory, have moved within the Area were it not for the fact 
that he was regarded by those states as a “threat to public policy, national 
security or the international relations of any of the Contracting Parties”
(Article 5(e)). Consequently, he could not travel across these internal 
borders.^^
The Implementing Convention is equally concerned with matters pertaining to 
asylum (Chapter 7) -  once an applicant has been granted the right of asylum, 
he or she is free to move within the Area. Contracting Parties need only share 
information on such individuals if it is necessary to establish which state is 
responsible for processing the application. In both cases such exchange occurs
The Observer Can’t stay, won’t go: Italy’s difficult guest 3/1/99 p 17 
In addition to concerns regarding the Kurdish and Turkish communities within their 
borders, Ocalan’s presence in Italy soured relations with Turkey. Mesut Yilfnaz, the Turkish 
Prime Minister, criticised Germany for backing away from legal action against Ocalan, and 
Turkey criticised Italy over letting him go, resulting in a boycott o f Italian goods. The 
relationship between Turkey and Greece (Ocalan found sanctuary in the Greek Embassy in 
Nairobi) was also put under intense strain because o f this issue, leading not only to the 
resignation o f the Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, but also criticism from some 
of Greece’s allies. (BBC News Ocalan fallout hits Greece 18 February 1999)
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prior to granting asylum status. Decisions made at a European Council 
meeting in December 1998 stressed the need for “an overall migration 
strategy” to be “established in which a system of European solidarity should 
figure prominently”.^  ^ Such a system would require a greater exchange of 
information and statistics on asylum and immigration policy as well as the 
status of aliens, possibly lending itself to SISNET’s expansion plans on 
immigration data. A move has also been made to limit the “secondary 
movements” by asylum seekers between Member States (Article 36 b (iv)).
As it presently stands though, asylum seekers are free to move within the 
Schengen Area provided that the application process has begun, unless 
prohibited by specific national legislation (Implementing Convention, Articles 
33(1) and 34(1)).
The events of 11 September have placed new emphasis on the issue of asylum, 
since many of those involved had been granted visas or asylum to stay in 
Europe, allowing them to plan and train for the attacks. Ramzi Yousef, who 
was responsible for the first terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in February 
1993 had entered the USA in 1992, claiming political asylum upon aiTival.
The controversial Egyptian born cleric. Sheik Abu Hamza, who preached at 
Finsbury Park Mosque in London (which has also been associated with 
alleged meetings of al-Qaeda supporters) and who was questioned by Scotland 
Yard in 1999 on suspicion of terrorist offences, remains a source of 
contention. It has been alleged that he may have played an indirect role in 
connection with al-Qaeda. These concerns pressed the EU Member States to
Action Plan of the Council and Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treatv establishing an area of freedom, securitv and justice European Council 4 
December 1998, Articles 32-38
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make changes to the current procedures. On 27 December 2001 the Council 
of the EU adopted four acts by written procedure/^ one of which (Council 
Common Position on combating terrorism. Article 16 (of 11-17)) takes the 
position that:
Appropriate measures shall be taken in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of national and international standards on 
human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of 
ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or 
participated in the commission of teiTorist acts.^ "^
Such measures are essentially pragmatic, although how far they will actually 
be able to determine a terrorist suspect’s past is questionable. All asylum- 
seekers and refugees will become subject to vetting by the police and security 
services before their status can be granted. Article 4 of the EU Common 
Position covers “any form of support, active or passive” for terrorist activities, 
which while perhaps useful against terrorist support networks, is also capable 
of being detrimental to someone who does not consciously assist those 
involved with terrorism. This is because the common position no longer 
differentiates between these two groups, and neither for that matter between a 
terrorist and a liberation group: a person, for example, who had helped raise
Number 2 is concerned with the application o f specific measures to combat terrorism; 
Number 3 is concerned with the freezing o f funds and resources to terrorist groups; and 
Number 4 lists the persons, groups or entities covered by the freezing o f funds and the ban on 
the supply of resources.
Statewatch analysis no 8 New EU measures on terrorism criminalises all refugees and 
asylum-seekers Online edition www.statewatch.org
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funds to support the humanitarian needs of PKK prisoners in Turkish gaols,
could therefore be refused refugee or asylum status 65
These measures are useful in prohibiting the entry of individuals who have 
been clearly associated with terrorist activities outside the EU Member States. 
However, it is the final arrival at a common definition by the JHA Council, in 
December 2001, of “terrorism” and “terrorist acts”, as well as a list of 
proscribed groups and individuals, which marks a significant development. 
The EU definition follows the principle of subsidiarity, accepting the primacy 
of national terrorist legislation, thus allowing the Schengen area to operate as 
smoothly as possible by introducing a number of agreed upon offences which 
can be regarded as non-political. Utilising Article 99/3, these lists could be 
entered into the SIS database as individuals and groups who threaten the 
public s a fe ty .S uch  an enhancement would improve the counter-terrorist 
potential of Schengen. However the fact remains that such measures can only 
be effective when that particular information is known about the individual in 
question; equally, the authorities must be capable of apprehending or 
detaining the said individual. Again, the SIS is only as useful as the 
intelligence it receives.
Statewatch Observatory In Defence of Freedom and Democracy, Reports on analysis no 8,
New EU measures on terrorism criminalises all refugees and asylum-seekers January 2002 
As the history o f European co-operation in counter-terrorism demonstrates, arriving at a 
common definition has been no easy matter; what is a political offence and what is not.
Witness the problems associated with the Council o f Europe’s Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism 1977, discussed at length in Chapter VIII. The matter of recognising terrorism as 
a criminal offence in national legislation was finally resolved by the establishment o f a 
common definition on terrorism throughout the EU, at the 6 December 2001 Council meeting. I
The definition covers terrorist offences, as well as those linked to them, including incitement !
and abetting (Articles 1, 2 and 3). Prior to this definition only Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain i
and Portugal incorporated any such definition into their national legislation. The EU began j
work on this issue in 2000, but the al-Qaeda attacks in September 2001 accelerated the |
process. I
(Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings; 7 December 2001, Proposal for a j
Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism. 14845/1/01 Rev 1 Limite). |
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Conclusions
From a practical perspective, Schengen’s provisions for protecting its external 
border inspire little confidence in the protection of the Area against terrorism; 
but then that has neither been a primary nor realistic goal for the 
Implementing Convention. No type of border control is much of a guarantee 
here. Rather Schengen’s concern has been to prevent both an influx of 
immigrants across its Eastern and Mediterranean borders, and the smuggling 
associated with organised crime across these borders, hence the intention to 
expand SISNET into immigration data. From the mid-1980s up until the 11 
September attacks, these two concerns have been regarded by the EU Member 
States as the principal internal security threat. However, with the emerging 
threat of Islamic extremism, concerns over immigration have taken a new 
direction, with the possibility of terrorists hidden amongst the thousands of 
legitimate asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. The Schengen machinery is 
in a position to provide some relief to this problem by policing entry into the 
EU, effectively establishing a “Domesday Book” or database of every non-EU 
national within the Union. Unfortunately, the resourceful and determined 
terrorist should be able to circumvent this with relative ease. This problem 
could be partially addressed by the introduction of an EU-wide “smart” 
identity card. All but two Schengen states operate some form of identity card 
system, and Sweden is now considering implementing such a system. If all 
Schengen or EU citizens were issued with such an “un-forgeable” card, along 
with every legal entrant into the Schengen Area, the policing of illegal 
immigrants and terrorists who crossed the border illicitly would be made
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easier, to an extent. Of course there are flaws: besides the obvious one of a 
“clean skin” being granted a card, a typical cursory inspection of identity 
could be thwarted by a terrorist employing a legitimate card belonging to, or 
stolen from, someone else. It would not be difficult for a teiTorist support 
network to obtain a legitimate card from a sympathiser or through blackmail 
or bribery. If the terrorist then altered his/her appearance to look similar to 
the original owner, and bearing in mind traditional racial stereotypes, the 
terrorist could pass with this identity unless subjected to a more detailed 
inspection. Such identity cards might therefore introduce a dangerous element 
of false security, unless sophisticated teclinology incoiporating biometric data, 
e.g. a thumbprint, was employed.
The Implementing Convention is much more effective, however, in serving to 
remove some of the obstacles towards practical police co-operation along 
border regions, while also encouraging the passing of intelligence on a 
proactive basis. This can have a useful effect in policing, as the acquisition of 
seemingly uncomiected or random intelligence may be a missing piece of the 
jigsaw in someone else’s investigation. It should also be noted that Europol 
provides a more effective service in these terms, especially with regard to 
serious crime investigations such as terrorism (see Chapter VI). The 
Implementing Convention does allow for much greater scope in terms of co­
operation, permitting bilateral agreements that enhance this. This is less a 
feature associated with the policing of the external border, as Schengen’s 
provisions are much more rigid here due to the uniform approach required. 
Amiex 3 of the Common Manual on External Borders provides only for
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bilateral agreements on local border traffic. Bilateral agreements concerning 
the external border are therefore ones between a Schengen signatory and a 
non-EU member. Co-operation in this sphere is a necessity in preparing the 
accession candidates for membership, but because Schengen does not regulate 
this, the Schengen minimum requirements are not mandatory.Indeed, in 
this respect Schengen’s requirements for policing the external border are not 
remarkably different from the philosophy of policing national borders; there is 
nothing dynamically new here, simply provisions for augmenting this area of 
security. Thus the regulations managing the internal borders are the more 
original and innovative of the two, for the reason that policing the open 
internal borders provides much scope for co-operation. However, a major 
criticism of this approach is that those countries with external borders are 
expected to foot the bill for securing the standards required by the External 
Borders Manual, with no recompense for this increased outlay of funds. 
Establishing a centml pool of funds available for Schengen to compensate 
these states would not only be fair, but would also help ensure the required 
level of security -  something which would benefit all Schengen members.
Crucially, Schengen’s achievements in dealing with terrorism lie in the 
practical measures it can provide against terrorists engaged in a border 
campaign. Much of this so far remains a theoretical approach, as it cannot be 
accurately demonstrated how far the general open borders policy has 
contributed towards the recent flourish of co-operation between the Spanish
There is much to be said, however, for introducing the Schengen system to the candidate 
members prior to actual accession. Although these countries will not actually be able to 
remove their external borders until thek security arrangements match the requirements o f the 
JHA Council, a regulatoiy approach would benefit security arrangements, especially between 
candidate members.
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and French authorities against ETA. Confidence in the level of co-operation 
however has been such that there has been no invoking of Article 2.2; even 
when ETA activity reached an initial height in the summer of 2000, the 
authorities introduced only increased surveillance and checkpoints along the 
Basque border. From a holistic perspective, recognition of the existence of 
the Third Pillai' and the EU involvement in this area aie also deemed to be 
contributing factors to the improved co-operation in this area.*^ ^
Despite the weaknesses inherent to Schengen in terms of policing against 
terrorism, it does give an indication of confidence in the flanking measures 
that no Member State attempted to reinstate border controls after the 11 
September attacks. The realisation that co-operation with neighbours is a 
more effective defence against terrorism appears to be sinking in. It is 
evident, though, that Schengen has significant potential against some 
particular terrorist campaigns, but this has remained largely untapped. 
Schengen’s universal regulatory scope would certainly have helped in 
countering terrorism along the Anglo-Irish border, in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement, but its enforcement, unless carefully maintained and monitored, 
could have exacerbated the situation. Although how fai' the “Europeanness” 
of the legislation would have facilitated de-escalation because the Unionists 
could not legitimately claim it to be an Anglo-Irish deal is another matter.
Lane, Op. Cit.,
Wliilst Lane’s article refers to law-enforcement co-operation between the North and South, the 
premise holds true for co-operation in general throughout this area in Europe as this thesis 
hopes to make clear.
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Can we see Schengen as a legitimate security continuum, or is it merely 
another forum for police co-operation? Schengen goes well beyond a simple 
forum. It is a framework of the minimum co-operation required by the 
Member States to ensure that they can maintain a “borderless” Europe. The 
framework contains a sophisticated computerised database, and looks set to 
make inroads into immigration control. Beyond this, the framework 
encourages further bilateral co-operation, and one can expect Schengen to 
raise its co-operative minimum when the bilateral level is profuse throughout 
the framework. This almost symbiotic relationship has important 
ramifications on how we have traditionally viewed co-operation within the 
JHA sphere. Without the initial bilateral border co-operation in Europe, 
Schengen and the Implementing Convention would have had great trouble in 
getting off the ground. However, Schengen’s origins lie with “The Six”, 
many of which had enjoyed advanced security co-operation along their 
borders for some time, particularly along the Franco-German and Benelux 
borders. This pre-existing co-operation, together with the integrationist drive 
associated with the original six Member States, who were able to manifest 
their enthusiasm for deeper integration through the construction of the 
Schengen Area, directly shaped the form and standards by which cross border 
security co-operation would operate. Schengen was designed as a European 
template, not a regional one; as such, neo-functionalism has had little effect on 
it. Rather it has been the intergovermnental construction of Member States, 
establishing it initially outside the parameters of the EC, and it is this 
integrationist drive which has developed this particular framework. The 
regulatory order required for such a large encompassing framework implies
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that neo-functionalist co-operation can have little place in its construction, 
although as we shall see, this need not necessarily be reflected in its actual 
functioning. Schengen currently dominates European border security co­
operation, but in encouraging further bilateral co-operation, it will eventually 
become eclipsed unless it is updated to reflect the new developments.
We now need to address where border security co-operation is taking the 
European Project; after all, if this supposition is coiTect, then there must be a 
point at which enhanced co-operative border security reaches saturation point 
in a borderless Europe Union.
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Chavter IV
The Position of Border Security within the European Integration Process
Of the many debates and discussions regarding the JHA gamut initiated after 
the 11 September attacks, one of particular interest where border security is 
concerned is that of establishing a common Eur opean Border Guard. This 
policy, already under discussion before 11 September, centres on bolstering 
the border security of the accession states along the EU’s eastern border. It 
does so in preparation both for the entry of these candidate countries and to 
alleviate the financial burden imposed by the need for heightened security at 
the external border on those countries that have such exterior borders. * 
Discussion has ranged from the placement of individual officers from differing 
Member States to a fully-fledged European border guard.^ However, the EU’s 
JHA Commissioner, Antonio Vitorino, mooted such discussion, arguing that 
better training, computerisation and simple improvements such as waiting 
rooms and restaurants for border-crossers would be of greater benefit for 
improving the efficiency of candidate countries in these matters.^ In the 
aftermath of 11 September, this issue has received renewed interest from 
Schengen states concerned about their security. A meeting in held in Brussels 
on 13 October 2001, by states interested in this matter (Belgium, Spain,
’ European Voice The EU Must Start Thinking Enlarged Volume 7 Number 45, 6 December 
2001 Online Version.
 ^Centre for European Policy Studies: Report and Policy Recommendations from the 
Conference on New European Borders and Security Co-operation Reshaping Europe’s 
Borders: Challenges for EU Internal and External Policy, Annex II Friendly Schengen 
Borderland Policy on the New Borders o f an Enlarged EU and its Neighbours by Joanna 
Apap, Jakub Boratynski, Michael Emerson, Grzegorz Gromadski, Marius Vahl and Nicholas 
Whyte, 6-7 July 2001, Online Version
 ^Financial Times Back to the Wall August 1 2001, Online Version
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France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Finland) focused informal political 
discussion on the possible creation of a common border guard to enhance 
security in preparation for the next accession period, in 2004/ Whilst not 
directly connected with terrorism per se, it is quite clear that concern about 
terrorism has propelled a policy previously regarded by most as unrealistic or 
unnecessary into a matter of genuine consideration.
Acts of terrorism, such as Munich 1972 or the assassination of the British 
Ambassador to The Hague in 1979, have been responsible for several 
significant advances in law-enforcement and judicial co-operation, and 11 
September has proven no exception. The EU has already instigated a number 
of meetings and policies regarding refugees and visas. Such policies are 
unmistakably intergovernmental in origin; conversely, the concept of a 
common border guard does not comfortably fit into this category. It would 
involve creating what in effect would be a supranational unit, with its own 
funding, training, and esprit de corps. The creation of such a unit would 
however be out of kilter with the cunent progress of EU internal security co­
operation by finally placing “clear water” between the intergovernmental and 
the supranational approach in an area of JHA policy. Traditionally the 
approach taken by the Member States with regard to the Third Pillar has not 
been sympathetic to adopting supranational solutions to enhance co-operation. 
A Belgian Interior Ministry official suggested that the most likely outcome of 
a common border guard policy would take the middle ground between those 
favouring increased training and co-operation and the outright establishment
Reuters Hard Core o f  EU States Weigh Common Border Police 5 October 2001 (Online 
Version)
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of a fully integrated unit, typically standardised joint training, common 
equipment procurement and the harmonisation of external EU border 
checkpoints/ However, meetings of EU Justice and Interior meetings during 
the months of May and June 2002 indicated agreement, in principle, to 
creating a European Corps of Border Guards, with the European 
Commission’s work in producing a blueprint for such a corps, which would 
eventually become a force with operational powers/
By providing this example of the common border guard discussion it is 
discernible that policy discussion regarding both co-operative border security 
and JHA policy in general need not be limited to matters that are solely 
intergovernmental in constitution. Intergovernmentalism is, however, the 
favoured approach of the Member States to these matters. This chapter 
questions the validity of the intergovernmental approach in co-operative 
border security, arguing that Schengen is a facilitating, albeit regulatory, 
framework, rather than an entirely new structure. This framework actively 
encourages bilateral developments, but with its foundations established upon 
the bilateral regional border agreements -  a patchwork of different 
integrationist building blocks -  one should not assume that contemporary co­
operative border security within the EU is developing entirely along 
intergovernmentalist lines. If border security is not entirely aligned with 
intergovernmental methodology, does this have an adverse affect on the co-
 ^ Ibid.
 ^BBC News EU Force to Tackle Illegal Immigration 30 May 2002; BBC News EU Ministers 
Agree to Fortify Border 13 June 2002; Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union. Commission o f the European Communities, Brussels 
7.5.2002 Com (2002) 233 fmal. See in especial Provision No. 50, which provides an insight 
into some examples of these operational powers.
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operative approach, especially in relation to the symbiotic relationship 
between the Implementing Convention and bilateral collaboration, or is there 
accommodation instead, and how does this approach relate to counter­
terrorism? These answers are determined through the analysis of the bilateral 
border agreements, and with this knowledge of their integrationist makeup, we 
can compare the level of intergovernmental co-operation here with the JHA 
orientated Schengen Implementing Convention.
Another issue that requires address is the increased use of teclinology, 
specifically computerised databases, within co-operative border security, and 
the effect that these are having on our data protection and human rights 
legislation. The SIS, considered a cardinal flanking measure, has seen its 
powers increased since 11 September; however, the appropriate accountability 
measures have not been adopted to match this.^ Is this problem with 
accountability endemic to the intergovernmental approach?
The Intergovernmental Natui’e of EU Border Securitv Co-operation
In placing the Schengen Implementing Convention under the integrationist 
microscope it becomes readily apparent that the Convention has the flavour of 
an intergovernmental bargain. Numerous bilateral clauses have been attached 
to the articles, demonstrating difficulties in reaching consensus on common 
denominator politics.^ To provide a compelling account of the
 ^Martin Baldwln-Edwards & Bill Hebenton Will SIS Be Europe’s Big Brother? in Malcolm 
Anderson & Monica den Boer (eds) Policing Across National Boundaries 1994 pp 140-141 
 ^Hot pursuit, as codified by Article 41, with its numerous bilateral subsidy clauses is 
illustrative o f this, as is Aiticle 40 (surveillance).
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intergovernmental policy regarding border security, scrutiny cannot be 
focused on Schengen alone: it is also necessary to ascertain the strength of 
intergovernmentalist policy within other co-operative border security 
arrangements, in particulai* the provisions of the 1962 Benelux Treaty, which 
are believed to have had significant influence on the architects of Schengen/
Intergovernmentalist co-operation has been a dominant theme in co-operating 
against specific terrorist threats. The political challenge to the state demands 
govermnental involvement; no government can pretend that their police forces 
alone are capable of dealing with terrorism. Admittedly, however, most of the 
co-operative border agreements have not had to deal with an ongoing terrorist 
problem. It has not been concerns about terrorism that have shaped the present 
Schengen arrangements concerning border security. Consequently, the degree 
to which these are linked to intergovernmental policy and their relationship to 
Schengen may well have implications for the manner in which such states 
might tackle a future terrorist crisis under the Schengen aegis.
The 1962 Benelux Treatv
Despite the confederal overtones associated with aspects of the Benelux Union 
of 1960, the 1962 provisions concerning security co-operation along the 
internal border have remained largely entrenched within intergovernmental 
remit. The provisions apply only to the regulation of police co-operation in 
the common border area -  specifically to those forces responsible for this -
 ^E.D.J Kruijtbosch Benelux Experiences in the Abolition o f Border Controls in Henry G. 
Schermers et a! Free Movement of Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences 1993 
p37
120
thereby providing inoculation against any neo-functionalist spillover beyond 
this geographic area, outside of which national policing continues unaffected. 
Regulation within the area is particularly strict, emphasising the sovereignty of 
the state: cross-border executive action for example is prohibited; neither are 
officers permitted to carry firearms in the event of cross-border meetings.
This is further emphasised by the Dutch Secretary of Justice, informing the 
attorneys-general and the public prosecutors in December 1984 that the 
Benelux Treaty prohibited action on foreign territory. This included 
observation without prior permission from the competent authorities of the 
party concerned, after a dispute with the Belgian government over the actions 
of a Dutch observation group on Belgian soil. Consequently any agreements 
at the police level alone are insufficient.*^ This “reminder” was aimed at 
curbing the numerous unsolicited actions of police officers acting outside the 
parameters of the Treaty i.e. stopping and searching suspects beyond the ten 
kilometre “hot pursuit” limit, carrying firearms, not possessing a rogatory 
commission when engaged in cross-border observation, or even interviewing a 
suspect on the other side of the border.*^ Previous lack of strict enforcement 
implies tliat governmental concern was sufficiently relaxed in its attitude 
believing that a “hands-off’ approach could be adopted and that the Treaty’s 
regulations alone were sufficient to maintain the behaviour of their police 
force’s co-operation. Such an attitude can be supported by the fact that police 
co-operation has not “grown spectacularly, to say the least” The “hot
Cyiille Fijnaut Police Co-operation Along the Belgian-Dutch Border in Cyrille Fijnaut The 
Internationalisation of Police Co-operation in Western Europe 1993 p 122 
'4b id .,p  119 
Ibid., p 123
Cyrille Fijnaut Co-operation within Western Europe in Frances Heidenson & Martin 
FaiTell (eds). Crime in Europe 1991 p 118
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pursuit” clause for example was not defined in any great detail until 1976, and 
even then it only applied along the Dutch and Belgian provinces of Limburg. 
Fijnaut points out that little effort has been made at harmonising the police 
organisations involved in co-operation, with no satisfactory procedure 
establishmg the rules for mutual co-operation in an emergency or major 
investigation, despite the need for such regulation having been felt for 
decades.*'* Co-operation does itself var y tremendously tliroughout the various 
border provinces; some such as the Limburg-Limburg area are particularly 
advanced, but regardless of this disparity the co-operation is guided by 
common regulations, with the governments leaving their forces to work within 
this remit as they see fit.*  ^ Additionally, like the Schengen provisions, the 
Treaty allows bilateral accords to enliance specific areas of co-operation, such 
as regular consultation concerning criminal investigation between Belgium 
and Holland demonstrating that the Benelux Treaty is one aimed at a definite 
purpose and area.
Following intergovernmentalist tradition, the Benelux Treaty permits 
derogation from its open borders policy (Article 12), although significantly 
this has never been invoked.*^ However, the Dutch government came close in 
1983 when it reinstalled some internal controls through the use of a mobile 
police brigade and increased controls on trains between Roosendaal and
Ibid., p 117
Fijnaut, Op. Cit., 1993 p 124
Exactly why Article 12 has never been invoked remains a matter for speculation. We can 
infer however, that derogation is less likely to be invoked within a smaller group of 
signatories such as the Benelux members than in a larger group (Schengen) on the premise 
that it is both more manageable, and subject to less external variables. The security of both 
Schengen and the Benelux members ai e dependent, to a large degree, upon the measures of 
their weakest member. Equally, the commitment to the Treaty and developed commonality 
between tiie Benelux Countries, many also have had its part to play in refusing to invoke the 
derogation article.
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Rotterdam after immigrants from Surinam were able to exploit a leak in the 
southern border between Belgium and France, allowing them to join friends 
and relatives in Holland after arriving in France and passing through Belgium 
by minibus. The Belgian response, after some procrastination, of reinforcing 
its checks on the Southern border allowed the Dutch to remove their internal 
controls.*^
This is a particularly interesting aspect of policy making amongst the Benelux 
countries in that problems can be more readily addressed because of smaller, 
and thus more manageable, membership. The reticence to reinstall border 
controls, suggests an approach akin to communitarian intergovernmentalism, 
unlike the Schengen example, where France for example continues to maintain 
its controls along the Belgian-Luxembourg border.*^ E.D.J Kruijtbosch, a 
former Secretary-General of the Benelux Economic Union, has argued that 
freedom of movement has never been halted, and that when changes in the 
common visa policy have been required, unanimity has always been reached, 
if sometimes slowly.*^ Fijnaut however argues that such unanimity is reached 
because frequent dialogue is required between the governments to keep 
problems as manageable as possible. Political, governmental and financial 
reasons prevent a common border patrol service (one can cite the above border 
problem as an example of national policy conflicting with common Benelux
E.D.J. Ki'uijtbosch Op. Cit., p 36
Belgium did however restore its border controls on three occasions during 2000, over fears 
of immigration flooding. This argument, however, has more to do with the movement of 
immigrants thi oughout an open Schengen area than within the confines of a small Benelux 
Union.
Kruijtbosch, Op. Cit., p 35
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policy)/** Kruijtbosch would undoubtedly agree with this point, but the high 
rate of dialogue made possible due to the small and localised nature of the 
Benelux countries is not compatible with that of the larger membership of 
Schengen. Continued intergovernmental negotiation has been the key to 
problems arising in the Benelux countries.
The Terrorist Border Campaigns: The Anglo-Irish and Franco-Spanish 
Borders
As already noted above, the manner of co-operation engaged by the police 
forces in these border areas has been one closely regulated by governmental 
concern. Independent action between forces has always been restrained, 
although where possible, Anglo-Irish co-operation has always aimed at 
reciprocity, with the initial informality of border policing disappearing before 
the advancement of governmental centralisation and modernisation in 
conjunction with the pressures brought to bear by the seemingly never-ending 
“Troubles”. Similarly, Franco-Spanish police co-operation has been governed 
by the overall political situation. French police action against ETA members 
on French soil was limited until 1986 when new conservative policy no longer 
regarded them as political freedom fighters. Moreover, when co-operation 
finally began in earnest in the 1990s it was heavily based on reciprocity. In 
both cases however the British and Spanish governments have placed national 
policy as the primary means of defeating terrorism; co-operation, where
Fijnaut, Op. Cit., 1993 p 116
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occuiTing, has never been seen as anything other than another string to this 
bow.
The influence of Schengen, however, on Franco-Spanish co-operation does 
seem to have modified this approach somewhat, with French co-operation now 
regarded as instrumental in defeating ETA. With both countries being party to 
Schengen, the Spanish authorities have forgone any attempt to reintroduce full 
border controls in the wake of ETA’s renewed campaign following its 
collapsed ceasefire in January 2001. The controls that have been reintroduced 
in the Basque region’s border are aimed at surveillance rather than a return to 
traditional controls. In seeking not to derogate from Schengen the logical 
alternative for Spain has been to focus on enhanced co-operation instead. The 
French response can be measured not simply in terms of solidarity against the 
terrorists, but because the reinstallation of border controls would also slow 
dovm the benefits brought about by creating domestic mai'ket conditions by 
the “four freedoms” that crossed the Franco-Spanish border here.
The approach taken by France and Spain within the Schengen paradigm has 
been squarely intergovernmental, utilising the bilateral approach. ETA is 
regarded as a common enemy, but is policed in the tmditional manner by each 
country’s police forces, thereby consolidating the national approach with a 
communitarian outlook, in the loosest sense.
The British and Irish authorities also regard the terror groups as a common 
enemy, particularly the IRA and its splinter groups. Their co-operation has
125
been strictly regulated through intergovernmental agreements such as the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985, designed to control police co-operation, walking 
a very thin green line to avoid antagonising the prevalent sectarian paranoia 
and hatred from which the terrorism stems. This practise has altered 
somewhat, however, because of the ongoing peace process and ceasefire of the 
major terrorist groups. The restructuring of the RUC recommended by the 
Patten Report and subsequent governmental reports emphasises the necessity 
of greater co-operation with the Garda Slochana, not just to facilitate more 
efficient policing, but also to distance the newly named Police Service of 
Northern Ireland from the connotations of its Protestant dominated RUC past, 
a bugbear of Republican ideology whose continued existence was seen as a 
stumbling block in the peace process. A closer relationship with the Garda 
would additionally provide the revamped police force with greater degree of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the aggrieved Catholic community. The 
intergovernmental drafting, sanctioning and stewardship of these 
recommendations for greater co-operation is essential, as a relationship 
perceived to be too close with the Garda by the Unionist community could be 
equally precarious for the peace process.
The co-operation recommended, though, is advanced, especially in its use of 
seconded officers with full policing powers (see previous chapters II and III 
for details), illustrating the need of both police services to catch up with the 
benefits of practical co-operation practised by many of their European 
colleagues that have previously been denied them by the political situation 
within Northern Ireland. However as the previous chapter points out, whilst
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advanced, it is also selective, tailored to the politics of the Province as much as 
to its policing needs. The Patten Report’s recommendation of secondments, 
for example, places them only in specialist fields where most needed, such as 
drugs and training.^* Counter-terrorism, however -  the most prominent 
policing role in Northern Ireland -  is not mentioned. Neither government is 
yet willing to allow a seconded officer from the other’s police force an 
operational role specifically tackling terrorist issues. The agenda of terrorism 
appears to remain at heart very much a national issue. However, while 
terrorism per se remains off the agenda, the reality is that officers seconded to 
drug duties would in all likelihood be engaged against the terrorist groups.
This is because these terror groups are associated with over half of the 
organised crime groups in Northern Ireland, of which sixty-nine per cent are 
engaged in drug related activities, and approximately half of this activity 
contains “paramilitary” involvement.^^ Consequently co-operation through 
secondment will have a direct effect on the terrorist gangs. Such an effect 
however is aimed at the criminality of these groups, not their political 
connotations. Units with seconded officers would be dealing with them 
because of their criminal associations, not their “paramilitary” ones. Thus, the 
British and Irish governments effectively retain sovereign control of 
counterterrorist strategy, tactics and operations on either side of the border 
respectively.
Recommendation 159 - The Implementation o f  Recommendations Concerning North/South 
Co-operation on Policing Matters, Lateral Entry and Secondments -  A Joint Timetable by the 
British and Irish Governments 
The Northern Ireland Office’s Organised Crime Task Force identifies 43 out of the 78 
known organised crime groups as being associated in some aspect to the various terrorist 
organisations.
Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force “Confronting the Threat; Strategy 2001-2” p 8; 
“The Threat to Northern Ireland Society fr om Serious and Organised Crime” Northern Ireland 
Threat Assessment 2001” p 5 & p 14
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These two examples of terrorism associated with a common border illustrate 
that the pace of co-operation ranged against it is one very much associated 
with the will of the governments concerned. Co-operation was limited while 
the French authorities refused to see ETA as terrorists or if it would produce 
political repercussions amongst the communities involved, as along the Irish 
border. It is left to the govermnents to forge a path, enhancing co-operation 
when the political background permits it. Only a change in French 
governments, from the political left to right, moved France towards closer co­
operation with Spain against ETA. Similarly the change in the internal 
political situation in Northern Ireland has created the conditions permitting co­
operation between the Garda and the RUC/PSNI to progress.
It would seem, then, that co-operation against teiTorism is only forthcoming 
under an intergovernmental agenda. Police co-operation in Europe is not 
exclusively intergovernmentally orientated, but in matters relating to terrorism 
any other form of co-operation would be at best incompatible with policy, and 
at worst, potentially dangerous or inflammatory. Taking Northern Ireland as a 
case in point. Lane’s research demonstrated that traditionally the Garda and 
RUC have maintained strong connections, especially at the local level, away 
from both Belfast and Dublln.^^ The neo-functionalist supposition argues that 
co-operation can be actor driven, thereby implying that the border area would 
be particularly conducive to local neighbouring forces initiating localised 
agreements to facilitate co-operation on common matters, not necessarily
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences September 1998, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp 
267-277, Jason Lane, “Police Co-operation and Internal Conflict Resolution Strategies: The 
Case of Ireland”
1 2 8
restricted to terrorist matters. Following this rationale let us suppose that 
following the 1974 Warrenpoint bombing, the RUC in Newry began to 
develop closer links with their Garda colleagues across the border in Dundalk. 
Issues of “hot pursuit”, cross-border surveillance and the exchange of liaison 
officers, all areas of co-operation occurring throughout the continent, were 
now given serious consideration at local level. At the practical policing level 
these issues make nothing but sense, but politically they are potentially 
explosive. Intergovernmental control of border co-operation prevented the 
RUC locally, and as a whole, from developing closer co-operation with the 
Garda. Neo-functionalist policy however does not focus on the whole, rather 
its approach enables integration to occur at a gradual pace, particularly 
between the elite-actors within Europe, be they bureaucrats or police officers, 
whose ongoing communication and co-operation is necessary for the 
functioning of a Europe moving ever closer. Being elite-actor rather than 
politically driven, neo-functionalist integration -  as a means of police co­
operation -  can be criticised for being less than democratic, in that the views 
of the citizens of Europe are largely ignored. Instead, this integrative drive, 
like intergovernmentalism, has a propensity for advancing the level of 
integration beyond that with which the population feel comfortable, thus 
leading to alienation with the European Project. Integration executed through 
intergovernmentalism is equally guilty in this regard; the crucial difference 
however is that it cannot neglect either populations or communities that feel 
particularly egregious towards such policy. Hence the New Labour 
government, for example, despite the Prime Minister’s desire, is unable to
129
assimilate UK monetary policy into the common Euro currency whilst the 
majority of the population remain hostile to such a move.
By contrast, a federal system with a strong emphasis on subsidiarity could 
avoid these problems associated with neo-functionalism. If the level of 
available subsidiarity negotiated between the Centre and the Member States 
permitted the latter with primacy in maintaining the secuiity of their own 
borders -  while respecting the continuance of the Four Freedoms -  there is no 
reason why a bilateral policy could not be negotiated between the two Member 
States, sympathetic to the regional political climate. Interestingly, the 
intergovernmental approach differs little fr om the federal perspective, save 
that the latter would require the enforcement of a mandatory minimum level of 
co-operation between all Member States, to ensure the security of the Federal 
Union as a whole -  something not entirely um elated to the role of the 
Schengen acquis. However, this statement is qualified only through a 
sufficiently permissible level of subsidiarity. We should remind ourselves that 
the federal model employed by the USA regards not only terrorism as a 
federal offence, but also cross-border crime. Therefore, within a federal 
Europe should we expect a Central authority to respond to cross-border 
terrorism?
The European project has long been acknowledged as sui generis; 
consequently, any end-point terminus based exactly on the US federal model
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is highly improbable/'* Instead, while one would expect to see the Centre 
taking some role in counter-terrorist affairs within a federal Europe (see 
Chapters VII and IX in particular), its role in targeting the tloreat aimed against 
specific Member States would be marginal This statement is qualified 
through the almost certain fact that the Centre would be inexperienced in the 
sophisticated political nuances and counter-terrorist practicalities of policing a 
border area utilised by terrorists as part of their strategy. This would be a 
political quagmire for such a novice. Moreover, federalism, in European 
terms, has few connotations with the creation of a superstate. The Centre’s 
power has never been expected to rival that of Washington’s; consequently, its 
desire to become involved in counter-terrorist affairs would be highly 
unlikely.^^
Unlike neo-functionalism, both a federal — when qualified together with 
sufficient subsidiarity -  and a governmental approach aie equally permissible 
for developing counter-terrorist co-operation. Both are capable of respecting 
the political and social minefields of policing the border region in an area 
associated with indigenous terrorism. However, does this rule differ outside 
such especially sensitive ai*eas?
24 Michael O’Neill, The Politics of European Integration: A Reader 1996 pp 2 3 - 2 5 ;  E. 
Wistrich, A federal democracy’’ from After 1992: The United States of Europe, London 1988 
pp 97 -  105, cited in O’Neill Op. Cit pp 185 - 6 
Two particularly identifiable strands of European federalism focus on either on the classical 
model with a federation of European nations, with the Member States deciding how much 
sovereignty to cede to the Centre, or a Europe of the regions, where massive decentralisation 
occurs, with regional administrations making as many decisions as possible, through a stress 
on subsidiarity. This latter model has closer connections to the Continental European 
conception o f federalism with its social Catholic connotations than the classical Anglo-Saxon 
model. In neither model is there room for a strong super-state and Centie. See: Nicolas 
Emilioiu, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf hi David O’Keeffe and Patrick Twomey, Legal 
Issues o f the Maastricht Treatv 1994 pp 6 6 - 6 7 ;  Charles Pentland, International Theoiv and 
European Integration 1973 pp 181-4
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Supranational led Border Securitv Co-operation
While policing is a concern for national governments, it is incorrect to imply 
that they have absolute control over the methods by which their law- 
enforcement agencies co-operate. Inteipol, for example, is an organisation 
whose membership consists not of governments, but of law-enforcement 
agencies. Governments, at least insofar as Western democracies are 
concerned, have very little influence in the day-to-day rurming of its operation, 
beyond that of holding the purse strings -  a privilege which is itself limited, as 
Interpol’s membership is based upon subscription, meaning, theoretically at 
any rate, that failure to pay will result in that police agency’s suspension from 
the organisation until it pays its dues.^^
Far from the political Centre, the affairs of Europe’s border regions differ 
dramatically. The population of these areas have everyday contact with one 
another, with regular traffic crossing from one side to the other for 
occupational, shopping or family reasons; for example 100,000 people cross 
the Rhine on a daily basis.^^ Long before the Europeanisation of political life, 
border regions adopted solutions reflecting the close economic and social co­
operation inherent to them. Markets, for example, have traditionally been a 
cross-border affair in these areas. Populations living on the periphery 
generally have more in common with their neighbours than with their fellow 
citizens within the country’s interior, culturally and even linguistically.
In practice though, a police authority is not expelled for defaulting on subscription 
payments.
 ^European Journal of Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice “Policing Across a 
Dimorphous Border: Challenge and Innovation at the French-German Border” Detlef Nogala 
Vol. 9 No. 2 2001, p 135
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Consequently the mutual collaboration that occurs between them may not 
necessarily reflect the official policies advocated by the Centre. Indeed in 
many border areas the traditional demaication of a line between two distinct 
territories is now seen increasingly as a “zone”: a grey area where there is no 
abrupt “end” to one territory. Instead, both sides merge into one another, and 
the type of law-enforcement co-operation that exists there reflects this 
fusion.^^ From an intergovernmental approach, such co-operation requires 
sanction through the drafting of a treaty or agreement; the examples of the 
various levels of co-operation along the Dutch-Belgian border under the 
Benelux Treaty illustrate how a loose form of intergovernmental policy is 
capable of securing the individual measure of co-operation required for 
specific local conditions by leaving it in the hands of local police chiefs. For 
example, there is a high level of co-operation in the Limburg area because 
collaboration has not been placed directly under the control of a higher 
authority, thereby leaving the police authorities free to set the pace, subject to 
national law. By contrast, co-operation has been impaired in the Schaerbeek 
and Saint-Josse municipalities in the Brussels gard de nord where left and 
right wing local governments respectively obstructed any co-operation 
between their police forces for fear that this may have led to loss of the 
traditional values and methods of their forces.
28 Ibid.
Lode de Witte, The Belgian Perspective on the Internationalisation o f Police Co-operation 
in Western Europe in Fijnaut, Op. Cit., 1993 p 88
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Neo-functionalism and the Nebedeag-Pol
The Nebedeag-Pol serves as a co-operative arrangement between German, 
Dutch and Belgian police forces stationed around the Rliine and the Meuse 
where the three countries meet. It is tremendously important as it represents 
one of the most successful examples of territorially based co-operative 
agreements created during the 1960s and 1970s, with co-operation occurring 
on a daily basis.^ ** Moreover it stands as a significant source of experience 
from which bilateral agreements, made possible under the Schengen 
Convention, may be drawn up, and can be seen as the potential starting point 
from which police co-operation at the Euro-regional level began, dating back 
to the 1920s.^*
The influence of the police chiefs (elite-actors) has been instrumental in 
developing the co-operation within the Nebedeag-Pol, enhancing its post- 
World War II form when officers from Verviers, Aken and Vaals developed 
contact to fight professional and violent smuggling gangs. The German- 
Belgian and German-Dutch agreements of June-July 1960 concerning police 
co-operation strengthened these arrangements, introducing a stmcture, as did 
the Benelux Treaty 1962, but on the whole the co-operative connections in this 
area were still loose ones. It was the police president of Aken, E. Dundalek 
who, by inviting a meeting of the local police chiefs around the border area,
One particular example supporting this is the creation of a hand plasticised instruction card 
developed for daily use documenting a résumé of the “hot pursuit” regulations. Fijnaut, Op. i
Cit., 1993 p 128 !
Ibid., p 125 I
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developed these connections into a more formal basis, with the official 
establishment of the Nebedeag-Pol.
As with the Benelux Treaty, intensive consultation was highly important in 
developing the co-operation, especially against drug smuggling. However this 
consultation occurred at the police level, not the political. Co-operation has 
developed more or less at a continuous pace, remaining true to the gradualist 
approach advocated by neo-functionalists, reaching the point where the parties 
know each other well and pursuit actions which end on foreign territory rarely 
result in problems for the pursuant officers. Indeed, because the existing 
agreements have been “silent” on the subject of cross-border observation, the 
parties have had to establish agreement on the issue among themselves, with 
structural discussions and annual exercises exposing tactical and technical 
problems and contributing to their resolution.^^ Equally, though, the neo- 
functionalist approach has on one occasion, significantly, albeit temporarily, 
hampered co-operation, in an example of “spill-back” -  the negative form of 
spillover. The police chief for Aken, F. Fehrmann’s effort to make “hot- 
pursuit” across the German-Dutch and German-Belgian equate with that of 
Aificle 27 of the Benelux Treaty in the mid-1970s failed because for some 
Dutch officers, the memories of German occupation still remained vivid.^^ It 
was for similar reasons that an attempt by Fehrmann failed to enable officers 
to interview suspects, search premises and confiscate goods on foreign 
territory along with ability, following the permission and presence of local
Ibid., p 127 
”  Ibid., p 126
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authorities. In this particular case, an intergovernmental approach might have 
been able to overcome the residual suspicions of the Dutch officers.
Neo-functionalism and the Cross-Chamiel Intelligence Conference 1968
Like the Nebedeag-Pol, the CCIC is also a co-operative arrangement 
instigated and developed by its elite-actors. It was the brainchild of 
individuals such as Kent’s Chief Constable, Sir Dawney Lemon and the Chief 
Commissioner of the Bruges Police Judicare, J. Matthys. Interestingly 
enough very close co-operation occurs along this border area despite the 
obvious geographic banier of the English Chaimel. It is a little ironic to think 
that a natural divide capable of thwarting the ambitions of the likes of Philip 
II, Napoleon and Hitler actually serves as a conduit for facilitating closer co­
operation between police and customs officers. Just as interestingly, this co­
operation predates Britain’s entry into the EEC, with the initial negotiations 
occurring during a period when de Gaullist obduracy was making itself felt 
throughout Europe. De Gaulle vetoed British entry into the EEC in January 
1963, and would do so again in 1967 when the CCIC was first tabled, leading 
to cool relations between the two countries. In 1966 De Gaulle pulled France 
out of NATO, and the previous year had brought the EEC to paralysis with the 
Empty Chair crisis. At this stage, though, transnational policing was not an 
issue of much concern to politicians '^*, otherwise it is doubtful as to whether or 
not the CCIC would have got off the ground.
James W.E. Sheptycki, Police Co-operation in the English Channel Region 1968-1996 
European Journal of Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol.6 No. 3 1998 p 219
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Sheptycki’s research into the CCIC has identified the development of a 
“sti'ong sense of mission” amongst the collaborating authorities/^ Although it 
would be pushing matters to equate such feelings to a neo-functionalist-driven 
transference of loyalties away from a national authority to that of a 
supranational one, it does demonstrate that a sense of purpose in policing 
something beyond the nation state has developed. Loyalty transfer under neo- 
fimctionalist logic is not an overnight process; it occurs slowly and steadily 
until reaching the point whereby, having worked in some supranational 
capacity, the elite-actor’s labours no longer relate directly to their nation state, 
but rather to the supranational whole or structure. Hence a police officer of 
the Kent Constabulary, attached to the CCIC, would perhaps, if he had or, 
having worked in that capacity long enough, come to regard him or herself as 
“belonging” more to the CCIC than his/her actual Constabulary. Their 
working ethos would be more attuned to issues affecting both sides of the 
Channel rather than exclusively national policing issues. This, of course, is 
the weakness in this theoiy: there are few officers left in the same capacity or 
position over a long-term period; secondment, transfer and promotion provides 
new blood as a matter of course. Loyalty transfer is therefore not a strong 
featur e within transnational policing, at least as long as the current method of 
staffing is maintained. This is not to diminish integrationist connotations of 
the “sense of mission” achieved by the CCIC, but as things currently stand this 
is as far as this aspect of neo-functionalism can travel in this particular 
direction. The point to make, then, is that the CCIC is open, in theory at any 
rate, to the concept of this particular aspect of integration.
Ibid., p 225
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Neo-functionalist thought and practices have been particularly suited 
facilitating transnational police co-operation along (non-terrorist campaign 
strategic) borders, and can be said to be just as instrumental here as 
intergovernmental policy in ensuring its effectiveness. In the case of the latter, 
this policy operates at its most efficient when the outlying conditions are at 
their most conducive: typically a withdrawal of political interference, and a 
toleration of co-operative autonomy as long as it does not out step national 
law. The above two examples demonstrate this “partnership” at its most 
effective. A neo-functionalist orientated collaboration also has significant 
ramifications in terms of accountability, which will be discussed later.
Border security tends to become more effective when law-enforcement does 
not suffer from political interference (in its negative sense). Instead, co­
operation has the opportunity to develop at a localised level, providing 
collaboration specific to the needs of the area. Schengen, whilst an ambitious 
project, is still one tied to the politics of common denominators because of its 
broad membership. By comparison, developments within the Nebedeag-Pol 
are more advanced -  producing a common police alarm system, something 
outside of the Schengen Convention -  because they can be more specific. 
Localisation, though, is not the only explanation as to why these arrangements 
have a tendency to be as advanced as they are. Co-operation between law- 
enforcement authorities cannot simply spring up over night; these localised 
arrangements are, in many cases, decades old. The co-operation, as dictated
Fijnaut, Op. Cit., 1993 p 127
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by neo-functionalist theory, increases gradually. By comparison, Schengen is 
a mere sapling, but one which has had the most dramatic effect. It is 
encouraging both neo-functional and intergovernmental co-operative growth; 
indeed it is accelerating it.
Schengen’s Effect on Co-operative Growth
As it stands the Schengen Implementing Convention functions as an 
intergovernmental structure establishing a basic framework of law- 
enforcement co-operation and other “flanking” measures to ensure European- 
wide facilitation of the Single Market goals through the free movement of 
individuals. Because of its basic framework, owing to the nature of 
intergovernmental bargaining over a wide membership, some members have 
been keen to develop it further, employing bilateral measures to enhance co­
operation as the Implementing Convention urges. The Mohndorf Treaty 1997 
between France and Germany establishing the PCCC is highly illustrative of 
the desire of these governments to take such enhancing steps.^^ Equally the 
Schengen framework should, in theory, function as an arbour, providing and 
encouraging bilateral intergovernmental and neo-functional orientated co­
operative growth while at the same time dictating its scope and direction, 
precisely because the framework upon which the co-operation is based is 
intergovernmental in policy. The flourishing law-enforcement co-operation 
that has occurred within the Benelux countries since the 1962 Treaty, elite-
See Nogala Op. Cit.
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actor led under the umbrella of intergovernmental association, provides us 
with a blueprint.
The creation of the Implementing Convention should also serve as a catalyst 
for collaboration because it has provided a blanket co-operative minimum 
throughout the majority of the EU Member States. Areas that previously had 
little co-operation will have suddenly had to play catch-up, but in doing so, 
they are establishing greater co-operative links, and in neo-functionalist theory 
co-operation begets co-operation through spillover. It is also notewoiihy that 
Schengen has had a particular effect on neo-functionalist co-operation through 
its regulatory powers beyond that of ensuring a minimum common standard of 
co-operation. The UK’s partial entrance into the Schengen Information 
System was due to pressur e from some of its Chief Constables, especially 
Kent’s, who were aware that the future of the CCIC had become untenable 
without either an intergovernmental agreement between Britain, France and 
Belgium on the issue of information exchange or UK entrance into Schengen 
itself. The UK’s solution was partial entry into the Schengen Implementing 
Convention, especially the SIS, in 2000 tluough the “opt-in” clauses provided 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Implementing Convention then, as an 
intergovernmental device functions as a co-operative framework or arbour 
encouraging further growth, whatever its integrationist makeup, is 
nevertheless incompatible with co-operative agreements which cannot meet all 
its basic criteria, regardless of how advanced they may be in some areas, 
particularly those concerned with the exchange of data collated from the 
centralised SIS databanks. Those agreements not meeting Schengen’s
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requirements must either adapt or be in infringement of the Implementing 
Convention?^ In this way, the intergovernmental Implementing Convention 
has introduced a regulatory element into what has, the Benelux Treaty aside, 
previously been laissez-faire. In doing so it demonstrates an ability to shape 
the direction of subsequent growth.
It is important to ask at this stage whether, aside from its regulatory features, 
Schengen represents a novel departure in terms of policing borders, or is 
simply an old formula in new packaging with some added gimmicks. Its 
encompassing nature can be welcomed as an admirable achievement, but there 
are other aspects that also draw admiration. Cyrille Fijnaut salutes the 
Implementing Convention’s provisions defining the legal position of officers 
who cross the border, along with enabling technical and operational police 
action -  issues which have not been universal amongst the numerous localised 
agreem ents.B ut Fijnaut also points to the fact that research focused on 
existing police data and the review of current police literature demonstrates 
that the border controls in the Schengen area make no important contribution 
to the internal security of the relevant states."^ ® Fijnaut’s research, however, 
centres on Schengen in its infancy, when it was comprised of only nine 
members; nevertheless, the argument holds that there is little qualitative 
difference for those areas which have already adopted co-operative border
It is a little uncertain, however, as to what, if  any sanction the confonning Parties to the 
Implementing Convention would impose for non-compliance, because the penalties have not 
been laid down.
Cyrille Fijnaut, The Schengen Treaties and European Police Co-operation European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 1 No. 1 1993 p 47 
Ibid., p 39
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security agreements?^ Equally however, his research does not argue that 
Schengen compromises security; rather the status quo is maintained. In 
practical terms, though, such a status quo cannot compete against the continual 
onslaught of organised criminal activities entering the EU from its eastern and 
southern borders. The collapse of Yugoslavia has exacerbated the situation, 
with the destabilisation of civil war and the transition period to democracy, 
causing the exploitation of a law and order vacuum by a growing criminal 
class. The UK Home Secretaiy, David Blunkett, said at a press conference in 
November 2002 that: “the Balkans have become the gateway to Europe for 
organised criminals”."^  ^ The 1988 EU Organised Crime Situation report makes 
for disheartening reading. Among its conclusions was the fact that the level of 
organised crime was intensifying thr oughout the EU, with the threat from 
Central and Eastern European countries clearly viewed by the Member States 
with growing concern. The increased use of technical developments by 
organised criminals has also risen dramatically, enabling these groups to stay 
ahead of law-enforcement and expand their activities. Noticeably there has 
been a marked increase in the influence of foreign OC groups within the EU, 
compared to the activities of indigenous OC groups."^  ^ These groups are 
typically much more aggressive than their indigenous rivals, which also 
accounts for their enhanced influence.
Much criticism has been levelled at Schengen’s subservience to 
intergovernmental political bargaining, typically resulting in a diluted form of
Membership was comprised o f the Core in 1990, Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991) 
and Greece (1992).
BBC News UK warning over Balkan gangs 25 November 2002
House of Commons Select Committee on European Security Tenth Report 1997 and 1998 
Organised Crime Situation Reports 9 March 2000
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the original conception, and therefore differing little from other co-operative 
border agreements. Such criticism however loses sight of the fact that 
Schengen can be nothing other than a framework for co-operation. To impose 
anything greater in co-operative substance would be to make the 
Implementing Convention incompatible with Schengen’s embracing 
encompassment. The practicalities of the “hot pur suit” provisions having to 
be left to bilateral agreement illustrate the difficulties present in achieving 
consensus in the current agreement, as for that matter does the Convention’s 
difficulty in consolidating the security of the EU’s island Member States with 
its flanking measures. Tabling a more advanced version would have led either 
to it falling from the table or more bilateral agreements, establishing a 
patchwork of agreements rather than a single authoritative one, and thereby 
defeating the idea of an encompassing Schengen in the first place.
Geo-politics make it a simple reality that no single agreement can possibly 
guarantee the security of each Member State’s borders. Even a federal Europe 
would require individual bilateral agreements between Member States to 
adequately tackle the particular' nuances of their geo-politics.' '^  ^ Schengen 
accepts this and consequently encourages bilateral agreements which will 
accommodate the particular nuances of individual borders. The case of the 
Anglo-Irish border illustrates the difficulty of fully applying the Implementing 
Convention to the sectarian politics of the troubled region. Advanced bilateral 
agreements are becoming more noticeable throughout Europe; the Franco- 
German border, greater co-operation along the Franco-Spanish border, the EU 
eastern borders, even the Anglo-Irish border is rapidly advancing its co-
The example of the Anglo-Irish border being a case in point.
143
operation, albeit primarily because of the Peace Process conditions, but 
nonetheless it is still part of the overai'ching process of progressive co­
operative border security.
To re-emphasise a point, the Implementing Convention also acts as a kick-start 
for those authorities whose co-operative measures were less than adequate. It 
not only brings everyone up to a minimum level, but additionally “deepens” 
the process through bilateral encouiugement, which is possible precisely 
because the authorities are working together. Intergovernmental or neo­
functional, it makes no difference how the authorities develop the co-operation 
further; they must abide by the regulatory conditions of the Convention. 
Successful co-operation can only engender further co-operation. This is a 
highly significant side-benefit of the Implementing Convention aimed at long­
term fruition rather than irmnediate results. The implication is, then, that the 
instigation of Schengen will lead to a better class of co-operative border 
security.
The other innovative feature of the Implementing Convention is the Schengen 
Information System."^  ^ While the previous chapter focused on the specific 
strengths and weaknesses of the SIS, it is now necessary to observe the extent 
to which the SIS may influence the growth of co-operative border-security.
The SIS as alluded to earlier has had a most profound effect on the integrative 
growth in this area, serving as the lodestone upon which all co-operative 
actions are dependent, because the security provided by the flanking measures
André Potocki, Police Co-operation, Judicial Co-operation in Mireille Delmas-Marty 
ted.).What Kind of Criminal Policy for Europe 1996 pi 88
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is hamstrung without this technologically sophisticated information network. 
Yet the SIS itself is dependent upon information input from its members’ 
authorities, the content of wliich must remain within the parameters of the SIS 
regulations (Title IV, Implementing Convention). Because of these conditions 
subsequent bilateral agreements are always going to have an association with 
the SIS; certainly a more detailed information exchange can be achieved at the 
bilateral level, but the data must be kept separate from the SIS. The reason for 
doing so stems from the collective security provided for by the Implementing 
Convention, of which the SIS is a key component. One cannot forgo the SIS 
simply because a more comprehensive data sharing system has been 
established with a neighbour. Certainly such a system would be permitted, but 
it could only seiwe in a supplementary capacity; the collective security aspect 
must be maintained. Consequently the collective security characteristics of 
the Convention form the most important contribution to the compensatory 
measures to the dissolution of the internal border controls, and the SIS is the 
key to this. Without the SIS Schengen could effectively function as a series of 
bilateral agreements as long as certain standards were maintained, but it is the 
SIS which necessitates a collective approach. It is the heart of the Convention.
The SIS also stands isolated from any neo-functionalist inspired integrative 
drive that might occur at a bilateral level, because of this need for collective 
equality within its gathering and administration of data. Because the SIS is so 
important as a flanking measure, it must remain a practical part of all co­
operative border-security agreements. No neo-functional (or 
intergovernmental) co-operative measure must be allowed to develop a data
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exchange system capable of bypassing the SIS without at least providing the 
same level of data input into the SIS as it would otherwise have done; 
accordingly data exchange regarding border security will remain centralised 
until such time as the Member States decide and agree otherwise. If neo­
functional theory is unsuitable for dealing with a regulatory system along with 
the maintenance and utilisation of a centralised database, is intergovermnental 
co-operation therefore the best approach?
Problems with the Intergovernmental Approach
The present intergovernmental approach adopted by the Member States in 
their dealings with Third Pillar issues has come under heavy and sustained 
criticism from civil liberty groups, the European and national parliaments, and 
academics for the secrecy and lack of accountability prevalent thioughout the 
JHA structure-building.'^^ Schengen’s Implementing Convention is no 
exception. However at this point I do not wish to address the debate in its 
entirety; that I shall broach at the end of this work when the issues relating to 
the K.4 Committee and the Third Pillar have been more fully discussed and a 
comprehensive analysis then becomes both possible and relevant. Rather at 
this stage a simple raising and discussion of issues specific to Schengen will 
adequately serve our immediate purposes whilst also drawing attention to 
these matters in prepar ation for a final analysis.
See Peter Chalk, The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Co-operation, Anti-terrorist 
Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Accountability in F.Reinares (ed) European 
Democracies Against Terrorism 2000 for an excellent overview of this issue.
146
All Accountability Deficit?
The SIS is the Implementing Convention’s most puissant instrument by virtue 
of its monopoly on information accumulation and transfer, and its most 
desirable flanking measure. As with any other mechanism within the Third 
Pillar structure, though, the Schengen acquis is let down by poor watchdog 
provisions. They exist certainly; Schengen has a codified convention that 
includes detailed regulation on the use of computerised data, monitored by a 
Joint Supervisory Authority comprised of representatives of the national 
supervisory bodies (two from each national SIS) (Article 115). Its two 
responsibilities are to ensure that the Convention provisions with respect to the 
central SIS are properly implemented, and to examine and mediate on 
problems arising fiom the application of the SIS.'^  ^ Additionally Article 
115(1) dictates that this supervision must be in accordance with the Council of 
Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, taking into account 
Recommendation R (87)/15, 17 September 1987 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe regulating the use of personal data in the 
police sector, and in accordance with the national law of the Contracting Party 
responsible for the technical support function. Impressive as these safeguards 
appear, they neglect that of an effective parliamentaiy control. Under Third 
Pillar provisions the European Parliament’s role is a limited one, far removed 
from the powers of co-decision and veto which it possesses in legislative and
Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Bill Hebenton Op. Cit., p 142
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financial matters in economic and social policy?^ Rather the EP is restricted 
to being informed of police and judicial co-operation decisions, though 
Member State governments need only actually report on their Third Pillar 
activities on an annual basis (within the context of a yearly debate). The 
MEPs may make recommendations to the Council and the Presidency may 
consult them “on the principal aspects” of activities under Title VI but there is 
no requirement to follow any conclusions through.'^  ^ The internal security 
activities of the Third Pillar occur outside the formal structures of the 
Community legal framework and therefore outside its system of checks and 
balances. Consequently the role of the European Court of Justice is also 
limited. While the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties affirm the ECJ’s right 
to interpret and make preliminary rulings on disputes regarding the application 
of conventions made within the Third Pillar, neither Treaty obliges the 
Council of the Interior and Justice Ministers to grant full legal competence to 
the ECJ with regard to actions and decisions taken with the Third Pillar; it is 
merely affirmed that the Council may grant jurisdiction to the Court if it so 
wishes, and then, essentially, only over issues of interpretation.^^
National parliaments, though, are equally hampered, as the workload of their 
parliamentarians grows ever greater as new spheres of co-operation open up 
throughout the EU. Under current conditions, this effectively dilutes the 
democratic accountability aspect as Ministers cannot be expected to have a 
thorough understanding of the Byzantine complexities of EU legislation, so 
more and more of the task must be delegated to non-elected officials. This,
^ Malcolm Anderson et al Policing the European Union 1995 p 254 
Ibid.
Peter Chalk Op. Cit., 197-8
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though, is the inevitability of progress: governing the national sphere is 
workload enough. Adding a transnational sphere to the equation is a necessity 
if co-operation is to continue, and nothing short of a radical overhaul of the 
national electoral and constituency systems responsible for returning MPs to 
parliament can redress this loss in accountability. What should be remedied 
though is the offhand manner adopted by the intergovernmental decision­
making process responsible for Third Pillar issues towards the role of national 
parliaments. Intergovernmental policy decisions predominantly neglect 
parliamentary input until the agreement or treaty has been signed and then put 
before the parliament for ratification. Lord Tordoff, chairing the House of 
Lords European Communities Select Committee -  Twelfth Report 1998, put a 
wonderfully laconic rhetorical question to Ms Joyce Quin, a Home Office 
Minister, on the issue of the UK joining the Schengen acquis, which sums up 
parliamentary scepticism with intergovernmental decision-making:
How far and in what way do you anticipate involving Parliament in 
the discussions on these things as the pattern emerges or are you 
going to come to Parliament and say, this is what we have decided, 
take it or leave it?^ ^
Beyond the tendency towards the fait accomplis approach there is the fact that 
much of the day-to-day administration of Third Pillar issues remains outside 
parliamentary remit, controlled ultimately through its executive co-ordinating 
committee, the K4 Committee. No effective provisions exist for publishing
House of Lords Select Committee on the Eui’opean Communities - 12*^ ' Report. Session 
1997-98 “Evidence by the Minister of State, Home Office, on the United Kingdom Presidency 
Work Programme on Justice and Home Affairs, paragraph 5
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the decisions of the K4 Committee; neither is it accountable to an electorate, 
as its members consist essentially of senior civil sei*vants. “Policies will be 
drawn up in secret by unelected bureaucrats, police, immigration, customs and 
internal security officers. These will then be presented to the Council of 
Ministers for ‘rubber stamping’ and only after this will they be made 
public.”^^
It is fair to say, then, that the intergovernmental approach does have its 
discrepancies, primarily due to its reliance on an institutional and treaty-based 
methodology for administering the Third Pillar rather than parliamentary ones. 
Specific to the context of the Schengen Implementing Convention, this 
somewhat cavalier approach to accountability has produced a structure whose 
data protection provisions are riddled with numerous loopholes. Among the 
more significant ones are: the SIS’s limited ability to induce hai'monisation 
amongst the various national data protection laws; the lack of minimum 
guarantees regarding information transfer; the consequences of derogating 
from parts of the Implementing Convention; and the difficulty in removing 
obsolete or inaccurate information from the SIS.
The lack of any progress towards a genuine EU data protection legislation is 
responsible for many of the problems related to this area. Article 117, for 
instance, requires a minimum level of commonality in data protection thiough 
subscription to the 1981 and 1987 Council of Europe Acts (as mentioned 
above). However, most Member States employ national legislation that
Peter Chalk Op. Cit., p 200
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surpasses this in content. The result is that individuals will invoke their 
national rights (where they exist) rather than rely on the weaker international 
legislation. Consequently the individuals’ data protection rights aie wholly 
dependent on national legislation, and the provisions of Article 117 have little 
meaning with regard to die SIS (indeed some Member States have yet to ratify 
the Council of Europe legislation relating to this). The variance within 
national legislation creates difficulties in arriving at any precise procedure in 
how data procured for transnational purposes can be regulated.
The ability of a state to derogate from aspects of the Implementing Convention 
has serious consequences for data protection as the “purpose limitation” 
principle is designed to ensure that information gathered may only be used for 
the purpose for which it was obtained (although it is not clear whether this 
refers to an individual’s data record under “reason for report” e.g. criminal 
prosecution, or to the more general six categories of date file).^  ^ States can 
derogate from this principle where it can be justified “by the need to prevent 
an imminent serious threat to public order and safety, for serious reasons of 
state security or for the purposes of preventing a serious offence” (Article 
102). Information regarding terrorist suspects obviously has a very high 
chance of being isolated fr om the “purpose limitation” principle. David 
O’Keefe, who has made a detailed study of data protection under Schengen, 
comments: “derogation... could render guarantees about the use of data 
nugatory”.^ '^  Such provisions permitting derogation are fairly wide in their
This is not the only example o f lack o f clarity existent within the Implementing Convention. 
David O’Keefe “The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration” 
Yearbook of European law 1992, 11 pp 185-219, cited by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Bill
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interpretation: football hooliganism, for example, is an ongoing concern for 
Europe’s police forces, and one that could be interpreted as a threat to public 
order. Consequently the scale of derogation is large, especially if one includes 
members of anarchist and anti-capitalist groups (which have in recent years 
provided much concern for governments around the globe, and more recently 
have been classified as “anarchist terrorism” by a Europol report in 2001, 
charged with setting up an analysis file on the issue).
One particular concern in dealing with computerised data is that mistakes will 
inevitably occur. Inaccurate information occurs at the national level, but the 
difficulties associated with this are compounded when this is transferred to the 
transnational level. To cite one particular example, there is the case of the 
wrongful arrest of Rhys Boore, a Welsh football fan, in November 1992 by 
Belgian police. Rliys’ and his brother, Gwilym’s names had been supplied to 
the Belgian authorities by the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service, 
which in turn had received the information from the Luxembourg authorities, 
who had incorrectly claimed that the two had “caused disorder” during a 
security check carried out in 1990.^  ^ Aside from the obvious distress caused 
by the incident, is the fact that neither of the Boore brothers were aware that 
their names existed on an SIS watch list. Still more egregious was the fact that 
it took a six-year campaign (with the help of Liberty, a UK NGO) to remove 
their names from Belgian, British and Schengen records, and it is still possible 
that the UK Foreign Office has passed their names on to third countries from
Hebenton Will SIS Be Europe's Big Brother? in Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer 
(eds.) The Agenda for Police Co-operation 1994 p 142 
Statewatch Analysis No. 10 EU Definition o f terrorism: Anarchists to be targeted as 
"terrorists ” alongside Al-Qaeda
^ Statewatch. Football fans taken off records July-August 1996 Vol. 6 No. 4 p 5
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its separate database?^ Such a lengthy process does not correspond with 
Article 106 which requires that data that is “legally or factually inaccurate” 
must be corrected or deleted by the Contracting Party “without delay”. The 
Boores were eventually successful in enforcing their rights under Article 110 
(Any person may .. .have legally inaccurate data relating to him deleted) 
through invoking Article 111, which allows the individual to bring the matter 
before the courts or a competent authority under national law. That it took six 
years of pressure before the Contracting Parties responsible acquiesced is 
worrying. This was due in part to the lack of any direct legal remedy for the 
individual offered by the Convention at either the national or supranational 
level.^ ^
Such problems are not restricted to the SIS; information transfer within the 
Implementing Convention generally also contains ambiguities. The exchange 
of information permitted under Article 46, for instance, to help prevent or 
solve crimes, does not provide adequate guarantees regarding the transmission 
of information obtained “illegally”, referring only to national law which 
varies, thereby giving varying levels of protection. The Amsterdam Treaty 
offers some relief to the situation, but it is restricted. Article 41 provides for 
an Ombudsman to look into cases of maladministration within JHA affairs, 
although its powers are limited.
Steve Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 2000 p 188
Under Article 106 only the Contracting Party that reported the information in the fii'st place 
is permitted to make any amendments or deletions to it. Other Contracting Parties may only 
request that errors be amended or deleted, since it does not serve their interests to have false 
information in the system. If however the Contracting Parties are unable to reach agreement 
on this, then the matter is taken before the Joint Supervisory Authority for its opinion.
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Many of the problems stem from the chaotic mess of the various data 
protection laws that have difficulty serving a transnational system. Clearly the 
introduction of EU-wide data protection legislation superseding that of the 
national is required to rectify the irregularities in the system. None has of yet, 
however, been forthcoming.
Paralleling these concerns of accountability within the intergovernmental 
approach are those relating to human rights. The principal concern is that the 
data being incoiporated into Schengen is becoming increasingly focused 
towards the policing of immigrants as well as criminals. The expansion of 
SISNET to include such information moves the Implementing Convention in 
this direction, and consequently becomes negatively skewed against ethnic 
minorities. Peter Chalk warns of the dangers of associating immigration with 
the serious criminal activities covered by the Implementing Convention, as it 
will most likely lead to the unwarranted harassment and surveillance of 
foreigners. Aside from the obvious abuse of human rights, the identifying “of 
non-EU nationals as a major thieat to internal security will merely serve to 
promote and reinforce a negative perception of these communities, so 
facilitating an increase in racist tendencies and sentiments.”^^  The security 
measures taken by the EU governments in the post-11 September environment 
include a strong emphasis on immigration and asylum issues, thereby 
immediately associating these issues with terrorism. Certainly these issues in
relation to terrorism must be addressed; the “global reach” of the al-Qaeda j
Inetwork illustrates the urgency of this, but Chalk is correct to draw attention to i
Chalk, Op, Cit., p 201
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the dangers of overlooking human rights in pursuit of security, arguing that 
such discrimination will make these groups:
extremely vulnerable to extremist propaganda and rhetoric. Such a 
development is not only likely to furnish subversives with a ready­
made recruiting ground for activists...it is also liable to provide a 
passive pool of support that is capable of supplying sanctuary, 
information and logistical assistance.^^
This is a lesson that should not be lost on those who study terrorism; the 
injudicious policy of internment in Northern Ireland (1971-75) for example, 
served as a powerful recruiting sergeant for the IRA, dispensing as it did with 
certain fundamental human and civil rights.
This growing association between immigration and terrorism is one for 
serious concern. There is a genuine link between the two, and this cannot be 
ignored. The Implementing Convention currently serves as the most efficient 
tool for administering routine screening on third parties entering the EU, but it 
requires greater accountability. Specifically, it must be accountable to 
elements outside of the Third Pillar. Parliamentaiy scrutiny at both the 
national and supranational level would adequately provide this. Such an 
anchoring would move this important area of security concern away from 
solely in-house watchdogs, affording it the democratic accountability 
necessary to guard against it abusing the human rights of both EU citizens and 
visitors.
Ibid., p 201
155
The Federal Solution
If the current intergovernmental approach can be said to exhibit a certain 
lackadaisical attitude towards accountability (as does the elite-dominated neo- 
functional approach), does the federal alternative provide for enhancing co­
operative border security?
As the example of a federal application towards terrorist-haunted border areas 
has shown, federalist policy is quite capable of matching the security 
commitments currently provided by the intergovernmental-based equivalents. 
Consequently, we can readily assume that the federalist approach will work 
equally well in tackling border security in general. Indeed, Fijnaut’s argument 
above that Schengen’s flanking measures make little difference to the internal 
security of the Member States, presents a strong case against those who would 
argue that a federal Europe would be detrimental to this security.^^ The 
premise of subsidiarity ensures that individual Member States are in a position 
to enhance security beyond the necessary mandatory minimums, through 
additional bilateral agreements. The Schengen Implementing Convention 
makes an almost ideal framework for ensuring such mandatory minimums 
within a federal Europe. The significant difference is that the Implementing 
Convention, under intergovernmental policy, lacks any enforcement powers to 
prevent a Member State unilaterally derogating from the Convention and 
raising their border controls. Within a federal Europe, no Member State could 
unilaterally reinstall such controls without the express permission of the 
Central authority.
Cyrille Fijnaut, Op. Cit. {The Schengen Treaties) p 47
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The EU’s current progress in establishing a European border guard for its 
external eastern borders has significant implications for a federal Europe. A 
supranational border guard, under Central control, weakens the notion of 
subsidiarity. The purpose of such a corps is to secure these more porous 
borders adjoining third-party states, where criminal activity is more prevalent. 
The value of such measures is immediately obvious, as it shores up the 
security of the Union by bolstering the security capabilities of its eastern 
members, especially as many of the new accession states are not yet capable 
of producing the same calibre of security measures as the established Member 
States. A fully operational European border guard corps could only be 
permissible within a federal Europe; no intergovernmental system of co­
operation would brook such a breach of sovereignty, unless a Member State 
within which such a corps would operate was offered significant incentives. 
However, the issue of subsidiarity could be addressed by providing those 
Member States where such a corps would be deployed with additional 
financial benefits, specifically for the purposes of augmenting external border 
security, together with training courses for officers and other teclinical 
incentives. This returns us to the JHA Commissioner, Antonio Vitorino’s 
vision for such a corps, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Actually 
establishing such a corps, with its own “permanent headquarters staff structure 
charged with its operational command” and “the management of its personnel
Equally, though, a poorer Member State might be quite happy to allow the EU to foot the 
bill for helping to secure its external border.
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and equipment”^^  within a Europe co-operating intergovernmentally would 
create a legal and operational minefield.
In addressing the specific issue of problems associated with accountability, 
created by constant demand for computerised data to feed modern security 
structures, a federal policy towards border security would resolve the 
problems currently exhibited by the current intergovernmental course. 
Accountability is not a matter for subsidiarity; in maintaining a centralised 
database such as the SIS, it would be under the control of a central authority, 
representing as it does a pooling of the information provided by all the 
Member States. Indeed, all such common databases, such as Europol’s TECS 
(see Chapters VI and VII), would be under direct Central authority. Placing 
such reservoirs under federal authority allows them to be maintained beneath 
the umbrella of a single and specific piece of data protection legislation, rather 
than the hotchpotch of national legislations cun'ently in place. While this 
would not guarantee the accidental input of erroneous information, it would at 
least offer an improved system for expunging such details. Federalism’s 
precondition to establish checks and balances would ensure greater powers for 
supranational bodies such as the European Parliament and Court; equally, in- 
house watchdogs would probably be replaced by external ombudsmen and 
watchdogs.
Critics of a federal approach argue that it would give rise to tlie sort of delays 
and inefficiency inherent to a system that separates the functions of co-
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States o f the 
European Union. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7.5.2002 Com (2002) 
233 final, paragraph 30
158
operation and co-ordinating devices?'^ In terms of dealing with a terrorist 
threat, this becomes a significant danger, as a fast response is usually required 
in such cases. This argument, however, can be effectively negated by the fact 
that federal states maintain emergency provisions in the event of a terrorist 
incident, just like any other state. Secondly, although a greater separation of 
powers can lead to problems, it should be remembered that every political 
system faces similar difficulties. Consider, for example, the problems created 
by the existence of two police forces in France, and their residual hostility 
towards each other. Thirdly, greater accountability guards against repressive 
measures that would infiinge human rights, which, as illustrated above, has 
some practical as well as moral benefit in dealing with terrorism.
Federalism offers few additional secuiity benefits over the intergovermnental 
approach, other than as an improved regulatory system for managing the SIS 
database. Border security can never be one hundred per cent effective, and it 
remains especially porous where terrorism is concerned. Rather, it is the 
advances in technical innovation such as CCTV technology (see below) and 
the SIS that can offer support to border secmity systems, and here federalism 
provides for the greater accountability necessary in operating and maintaining 
such systems.
^ In a society faced with the need for rapid change, “federalism seems like an invitation to 
political frustration”. Sawer argues, however, that this “freedom to delay, to think twice and to 
compromise” is an “unheroic virtue” capable of avoiding friction and relegation o f opposing 
viewpoints within the populace and political system. (William H. Riker Federalism: Origin, 
operation, significance 1965 p i83 -  4 cited in R. J. Harrison Europe in Question 1975 p 63
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Conclusions
Co-operative border security in Europe is something of an amalgamation of 
different forms of integrationist collaboration. Even the introduction of the 
regulatory Schengen Implementing Convention has had little effect on altering 
this situation. Rather it has enforced a minimum level of co-operation 
throughout, guaranteed by means of intergovermnental collaboration. As we 
have seen, however, many of the earlier bilateral agreements had effectively 
reached this minimum, and in some cases, surpassed it. Admittedly most of 
these were intergovernmental in origin, but in the very loosest sense of policy. 
The regional agreements along the German-Dutch-Belgian border illustrate 
how far elite-actors and regional authorities have been able to push co­
operation. Schengen does not do away with this; instead it actively 
encourages further co-operation, and in turn has set the wheels in motion to 
achieve this through ensuring that border co-operation occurs as a matter of 
course throughout the Contracting parties. This will bring new groups 
together, and can only lead to an eventual increase in pressure on the Centre 
from the elite-actors at the periphery for greater co-operation. As such the 
Implementing Convention does not alter the original approach taken to border- 
security co-operation before its arrival, it only encourages it. Where the 
Schengen Implementing Convention does enforce intergovernmental control is 
over the SIS, which is something entirely new in the tradition of co-operative 
border security. Attempting to establish a regional system for enhanced 
bilateral agreements would be a waste of expenditure, as it is the 
encompassing nature of the SIS that makes it so attractive to the law-
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enforcement bodies of the EU Member States. Moreover, without centralised 
control, the SIS would cease to function effectively. At present, the 
intergovernmental-orientated JHA gamut guarantees this regulatory 
centralisation, although a federal alternative would work equally well here.
Arguably, co-operative border security is something of a curious hybrid. It 
operates under an intergovernmental pillar, but is not disagreeable to other 
types of co-operation developing; indeed the structure itself is quite 
harmonious. Even a strong dose of supranationalism into the structure, 
through the possible introduction of a European border guard corps, would not 
alter continued use of the SIS by all concerned, nor for that matter would an 
all out transformation into a federal Europe. Centralised control remains a 
necessary condition for maintaining such databases, regardless of the 
integrative methodology, hence neo-functionalism’s unsuitability for 
developing policy along this area. This is also applicable to the necessary 
exertion of national central authority over co-operative border security in 
areas of extremely high political sensitivity -  in this case. Northern Ireland. 
Centralised national control has been critical in order to prevent co-operation 
between the Garda and RUC from actually aggravating the political situation. 
Federalism is an acceptable alternative, subject to the proviso of subsidiarity.
In the last chapter we concluded by asking the question of where co-operative 
border security was going within the European Project, and what effect it 
would have on it. At this stage it might be a little premature to answer that 
directly; let it suffice instead to mark some signposts. We cannot isolate the
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developments within border security from the ongoing JHA events -  indeed, it 
is most important that we consider them. Co-operation along the border at the 
regional level, although often left to the practitioners’ own devices, still grows 
within the parameters set by the individual governments. As co-operation 
increases within other areas of police work, and the judiciary, these parameters 
must ultimately expand, acknowledging the new developments. The bilateral 
growth is therefore linked directly to other developments within the JHA field. 
These bilateral agreements are the building blocks upon which border security 
is based, with Schengen being the framework that encourages this.
Turning to the more practical developments within co-operative border 
security, we can see that the developments in technology have had a profound 
effect on its implementation. The SIS has changed the way borders are 
policed, employing information that effectively serves as an advanced warning 
or “lookout” approach throughout the EU. Increasingly CCTV technology is 
also being adopted at borders, and is capable of licence-plate recognition. 
Developments in applying this same technology to facial-recognition helped 
British police identify and arrest David Copeland, the neo-Nazi responsible for 
three nail-bomb attacks in London during April 1999. This technology is 
costly, however, and therefore limited to those authorities that can afford it. 
Consequently, increased technical security in one area is unlikely to deter a 
terrorist beyond rerouting him/her to an entiy area that is less technologically 
protected.^^ The fact to which we repeatedly return is that without forewarning 
provided by high-quality intelligence or a watch-list included within a
Indeed the same could be said concerning border areas with advanced co-operation.
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common databank, even the most sophisticated co-operation at a border is 
effectively useless against a terrorist.
The issue of technology raises the most problematic concern for co-operative 
border security: that by addressing the security deficit through technology, the 
accountability deficit is raised in turn. The current intergovernmental controls 
are simply not adequate to manage the irregularities that are thrown up by the 
SIS; a greater level of openness is required to rectify this. Unfortunately, the 
fallout from the 11 September attacks has exacerbated this thi ough the 
introduction of measures enhancing the SIS’s powers, not least the possibility 
that Europol may be granted access to SIS II records, including the powers of 
amending them, thereby effectively doubling the current problems with the 
system in this area. The checks and balances required for addressing this 
deficit would, however, impinge upon the secrecy enamoured JHA gamut, 
which remains reluctant to open itself to the full glare of public scmtiny. Here 
the intergovernmental approach is flawed. The federal alternative addresses 
these contentious issues through its characteristic methodology of power 
separation. We must acknowledge, however, the difficulty in reaching a 
federal accommodation within the EU as the political climate remains, in both 
the short and medium terms, non-conducive to a federal outcome. Even its 
long-term potential is unforeseeable. Nevertheless, it would be possible for 
some Member States to engage in a federal union if they so chose, and still 
work effectively with their intergovermnental partners under the umbrella of 
Schengen, as long as the SIS was maintained equally by all Member States, or
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rather the Central authority belonging to the federal union and the remaining 
Member States.
Co-operative border security, as this conclusion stated at its beginning, is 
conducive to all tlu'ee of the types of integrative methodologies under 
examination within this thesis. A federalist policy would be able to address all 
the issues associated with border security, assuming that the Member States 
are prepared to cede their right to unilaterally reinstate their border controls if 
they feel threatened — as France has done, concerned about incoming drugs 
from the Netherlands. We have also found that intergoveinmentalism is more 
relaxed than we might have expected in many of the examples given of border 
co-operative agreements. Here we see a form of symbiosis between neo­
functionalism and intergovernmental practice, resulting in border authorities 
being the driving force of co-operation in this area, acknowledging the 
importance of national sovereignty. Only with Schengen have the national 
govermnents overtaken these units to control the pace of border control. It 
should also be noted, that even under a federal structure, neo-functional co­
operation would still be able to occur, with refinements made by local and 
national bodies to individual bilateral agreements.
Border security will never provide an effective prophylactic against terrorism; 
nevertheless, the EU governments continue to take measures that will harden 
their frontier defences. Fundamentally, border security is sentinel-orientated 
in its approach, yet studies of terrorism show that static defences are 
inappropriate responses to the thr eat -  they are easily overcome. The most
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effective response is proactive policing and intelligence, as opposed to 
reactive. Border security must be seen as the last line of defence, not the first.
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Chapter V
Co-operative Investigation against Terrorism 
Part I; outside the EU structure
Crossing a state’s frontier undetected is an essential trait of a successful 
terrorist group. Those groups capable of this enjoy the option of opening up a 
new front as part of their strategy if necessary, as well as seeking training from 
other terrorist groups or sympathetic regimes; rest and recuperation or “lying 
low” for members; and the buying and transportation of weapons and 
ordnance amongst others. Travelling undetected is a key survival skill for any 
group. Even indigenous groups, such as the IRA, have operated beyond 
Ireland and the British Isles: targeting British targets on the European 
mainland; engaging in training-camps in the Middle East; sending IRA 
members “on the rim” into the Irish community of the United States; and 
advising the FARC in Colombia -  thus exemplifying why strategy cannot be 
limited exclusively to the “front line”, even in cases of national separatism. 
Groups capable of developing an international or transnational dimension are 
proficient in penetrating a state’s border. The realisation of the precarious 
security provided by that border has induced law-enforcement authorities to 
co-operate beyond the augmentation of their common frontiers, developing a 
proactive response against the transnational/international make-up of these 
groups.
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The title of this chapter is perhaps something of a misnomer, as it is only 
within the Europol structure that any true co-operative investigation occurs; 
for the most part the co-operative structures deal with the sharing or transfer of 
information tluough a variety of means, along with occasional meetings and 
seminars to discuss strategic or operational matters. Nevertheless these types 
of co-operation serve as proactive measures against teiTorist activity through 
their capacity for facilitating the exchange of intelligence, particularly at a 
more sophisticated bilateral level than is possible via the SIS due to the often- 
personal nature of the information and its delivery. This information need not 
always be raw data; both Interpol and Europol are capable of providing an 
analytical service, whilst fragmentaiy data obtained by a department, 
seemingly unconnected to anything in particular, may reveal itself to be a 
missing “jigsaw piece” in an ongoing investigation. Because this level of co­
operation is particularly conducive to proactive measures, it provides a 
superior level of counter-terrorist measures to that available to the sentinel 
approach.
Acute intelligence and its delivery have proven to be a valuable weapon 
against terrorism; it is the cardinal asset of the counter-terrorist officer, 
providing a window into the operations and structure of a terrorist group or 
cell. The state possesses the precision firepower necessary to deal with 
terrorists, but it is good intelligence that is required to direct this offensive 
arm. Without adequate intelligence, the state’s counter-terrorist capabilities 
lose any proactive capacity, and must wait upon events or luck. For this 
reason it is so important that strong co-operative ties exist between law-
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enforcement agencies to facilitate the exchange of this precious commodity 
generated by the transnational aspects of terrorism. The stronger the ties, the 
easier it is for a law-enforcement or security organ to pass on sensitive 
information. Such linkages are important beyond the transfer of information -  
active co-operation in investigations is also required. The Lockerbie 
investigation, for example, spanned 16,000 witnesses in fifty-three countries 
over four continents\ demonstrating the importance of good working relations 
between the police forces of the EU Member States, despite the difficulties 
induced by the problematic relationship between the German BKA and the 
Scottish Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary.
The close relationships enjoyed through membership of the EU have yet to 
provide for a common perception of terrorism as hostis Europa civis. Rather 
most groups have been perceived as enemies to specific Member States (or 
indeed a state outside of the EU, as much of the Islamic-orientated terrorism 
that has occuiTed on European soil has been aimed at Israeli targets).^ Wliile 
this view persists, teiTorists are free to move in another Member State as long 
as there is no outstanding Inteipol arrest warrant or a Member State decides to 
prohibit entry or carries out expulsion. The movement of teiTorist suspects, 
however, is one in which the authorities of the Member States take a close 
interest, regardless of who the groups profess to be their enemies. A state has 
a right to be concerned when terrorists enter their soil. The IRA’s continental 
European campaign in the 1980s demonstrated their flagrant disregard for the
’ David Leppard On the Trail o f Terror: The Inside Story of the Lockerbie Investigation 1991 
pl05
 ^The 11 September attacks have begun to challenge the old view, with international opinion 
becoming more hostile against terrorism in general, whilst Western States have been quick to 
recognise al-Qaeda as a common tlneat.
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laws of supposedly “neutral” countries. It works the other way, too: a meeting 
between a known terrorist suspect and an unknown foreign guest for example 
might remain inscrutable unless the national authorities of the “unknown” are 
contacted, leading to a possible insight into why such a meeting or contact 
occurred for both parties concerned. The arrest in Colombia in August 2001 
of three suspected IRA members developing links between the IRA and FARC 
was due in part to a warning from Spanish intelligence at the beginning of 
June 2001 that FARC had been attempting to recruit help from ETA. This 
consequently led to a greater scrutiny of visiting Europeans entering the 
country, particularly towards a trio of visitors (two men under a British 
passport, and one under an Irish) who arrived two weeks later (Niall Connolly, 
Edward Monaghan and John McCauley).^ The Colombian army were 
suspicious of the men’s journey into FARC controlled territory and contacted 
the British embassy -  which also represents Irish diplomatic interests -  asking 
for help in establishing any political affiliations or outstanding warrants. It 
was discovered that all three were travelling on false passports, and on 
emergence five weeks later from the guerrilla held territory they were arrested 
on arrival at Bogota airport, charged with entering the country illegally. The 
repercussions of this are significant across both sides of the Atlantic, 
questioning the IRA’s commitment to the Peace Process, as well as having 
allowed it the opportunity to test and modify its weapons in an secure area 
away from the attentions of any security forces (Monaghan and McCauley 
have been described in security circles as highly skilled weapons experts). 
From the Colombian authorities’ perspective it introduces the worrying
Sunday Times Focus Rumbled in the Jungle 19 August 2001, pp 14-15
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possibility that the IRA suspects were training the FARC in new mortar 
weapons technology, tactics, and improving their accuracy,"  ^allowing them the 
force projection, for example, to destroy rural police stations rather than, as 
has often been the case, the civilian homes around them. This training was 
recently put into devastating practise with a mortar assault on the Presidential 
Palace during the swearing-in of the new president, Alvaro Uribe, in August 
2002, which left fifteen dead, and bore the hallmark of IRA tactics.^
In this particular example surveillance of the foreign suspects was “lost” when 
they entered the demilitaiised zone -  42,000 square kilometres of rugged 
hinterland from which the Colombian army withdrew in November 1998 as 
paii of an attempt to encourage peace talks, leaving it effectively under the 
control of FARC -  allowing them a unique advantage in enabling them to 
easily avoid surveillance.^ Despite the five-week gap, the authorities were, if 
not able to actually prevent the damage created by this liaison, at least aware 
of the probable type of terrorist collaboration occurring, thanks to the co­
operation occurring between the authorities of both countries.
It is this willingness to co-operate with other agencies involved in counter- 
teiTorism which proves so important in raising the effectiveness of the work 
concerned. This chapter is concerned principally with the structines and 
organisations outside the direct scope of JHA affairs that have been put in
Ibid.
 ^BBC News Deadly welcome fo r Colombian head 8 August 2002; BBC News Colombian 
attacks "have hallmark o f IRA ” 11 August 2002
 ^The demilitarised zone was revoked by President Pastiana in Februaiy 2002, following 
FARC’s kidnapping o f Senator Jorge Gechen Tuihay, president of the senate peace 
commission, along with a nationwide campaign of bombings, leading to the collapse of the 
peace process. The Guardian Colombia Bombards Rebel Enclave 22 February 2002
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place to facilitate greater co-operation between the EU Member States’ police 
forces at the investigatory level, observing not just the degree of co-operation, 
but also the co-ordination of efforts which these structures are capable of 
inducing. In ascertaining the effectiveness of these structures one is able to 
discern the extent to which the Member States judge it necessary to refrain 
from a more comprehensive integrated European approach. When compared 
with the analysis of the next chapter, which focuses on structures within the 
JHA sphere, one should be able to determine whether one area holds more 
sway over the other in terms of policy.
To this end, a chronological approach to the analysis has been adopted in this 
chapter, continuing the evolutionary analytical theme, so necessary to a 
comprehensive understanding of JHA co-operation today. We therefore open 
with an account of Interpol’s role in counter-teiTorism, followed by the 
European structures of Trevi and the Police Working Group on Terrorism, and 
the Security Services. Although the latter are not strictly law-enforcement 
bodies, they do play a key role in the investigatory co-operation against this 
threat, the gathering of intelligence being one of their most basic features, and 
it is interesting to observe how exactly they fit, or do not fit, into the bigger 
picture of JHA co-operation.^ Providing an account of these co-operative 
options available to the EU Member States outside the JHA gamut allows us 
not only to compare them with the structures offered by the EU in the next
’ Stella Rimington’s pushing o f the UK’s Security Service into the open with a public lecture - 
Security and Democracy -  Is there a Conflict? The Richard Dimblebv Lecture 1994 -  
provides an acute insight into this organisation’s desire to engage organised crime, following 
the receiving o f its mandate against terrorism.
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chapter, and consequently rate the EU’s efficiency, but also to understand the 
EU measures through the template provided by these initial structures.
Interpol
The International Criminal Police Organisation, more commonly loiown as 
Interpol dates back to 1914. It is not an international organisation in the usual 
sense, but rather an international police association. Its primary purpose is to 
serve as a forum to facilitate the exchange of information and requests from 
other members, undertaking police and judicial enquiries as long as these 
remain within the parameters of Interpol’s constitution (the present 
constitution having been laid down in 1956). No operational role is assigned 
to Interpol, and it was initially seen as a “talking shop” or “post box”, unable 
to undertake any self-appointed initiatives or judicial enquiries. This 
perception is somewhat outdated now, as recent years have seen the launch of 
additional services such as DNA profiling, a fingerprint database, a stolen 
travel documents database and a terrorism watch list as well as analysis 
capabilities.*
The investigation of a criminal incident that requires information or assistance 
from another state’s police agency will require a point of call to the National 
Central Bureau or NCB of Interpol located in the country concerned. The 
NCB, of which there are currently 179, represents Interpol in that country.
Interpol website homepage www.interpoI.com
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linking the national police force to Interpol, and thereby to other member 
police forces, and is commonly known as Interpol: Washington, Interpol: 
London etc. Its purpose is to serve as the conduit for information transfer and 
requests, as long as these remain within the parameters of its Constitution. 
Information is inputted into the Interpol’s Headquarters at Lyons where it can 
be stored.
Interpol has had a somewhat chequered role in counter-terrorism. Initially 
prohibited due to Article 3 of its 1956 Constitution forbidding involvement in 
Climes of a religious, racial or political nature, Interpol was unable to assist in 
terrorist investigations. This finally changed in 1984 following an amendment 
to Article 3 permitting Interpol’s involvement in cases where terrorists were 
acting outside their home territory. While not perfect (it does not for example 
provide for incidents occurring inside the conflict area, i.e. a British citizen 
killed in the UK by Northern Irish related teiTorism), it is recognition by an 
international organisation that terrorism is not necessarily equated with 
legitimate political struggle.^ However, the fact that Interpol was prohibited 
from involvement in tenorist incidents did not attract much enthusiasm from 
its members. Being an international organisation, Interpol’s membership 
includes some countries that share an unsavoury past when it comes to 
terrorism -  Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria being prominent examples. During the 
Entebbe crisis, it was alleged that Israel, having asked Interpol for help, 
forwarded information to Interpol’s then Headquarters in Paris, later 
discovering that some Arab members had got hold of this information and
 ^Such international recognition was the first o f its kind, predating the United Nations decision 
to tackle terrorism directly in 1994 -  Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism.
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passed it on to Arab terrorist groups. Members such as the UK would be 
especially reluctant to pass on information about the PIRA when members 
such as Libya have provided significant sponsorship to the terror group. 
Indeed, one British officer was quoted as saying that he would as soon hand 
over operational information to Interflora as to Interpol.*® Such 
preconceptions stem from the days when Interpol relied upon card indexes and 
Morse code as a means of functioning. This cannot correlate with the 
introduction of secure telecommunications and encrypted computer databases 
in the mid-1980s and the subsequent advance in computerised cryptology 
which ensures that information tiuvels only between the NCBs concerned, and 
that no third party may observe the material. Despite these advances Interpol 
unfortunately remains tarnished from a past that it has attempted to put well 
behind it.
The other particular criticism within counter-terrorist circles is that staff of the 
NCBs are not of a high enough calibre to be entrusted with such sensitive 
information. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch in its submission to the 
Home Affairs Committee Enquiry concluded that “Interpol staff ar e not 
experienced in affording proper protection to classified material, do not 
possess the requisite security clearances, and the politics and motives of some 
of its member agencies are, to say the least, questionable in this context”. This 
security concern is a legitimate grievance, but one that is not the responsibility 
of Interpol, but rather its NCBs. The Member States staff these, not Lyons,
R. Woodward, “The Establishment of Europol: A Critique” paper presented to the Cyprus 
Police Academy International Seminar, Nicosia 20-22 April 1990 (CSPO: Leicester 
University 1993) cited in Transnational Organised Crime Vol. 2, No. 4 1996 pp 106-130 Paul 
Swallow “Of Limited Operational Relevance: A European View of Interpol’s Crime-Fighting 
Role in the Twenty-First Century” p 117
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therefore it is their responsibility to employ sufficiently qualified personnel to 
process such intelligence. Here, therefore, is an opportunity for the EU 
Member States to establish an agreement between themselves, affirming that 
each will provide fully qualified operatives for NCB work.
Interpol has taken measures to address these concerns by establishing the “TE 
Group”, a specialist Anti-Terrorist Group set up in January 1987: a small unit 
based at Lyons whose purpose is to act as a safeguard filter on incoming 
information regarding terrorism, and as a threat assessment centre. Composed 
of a small group of counter-terrorist experts and operatives, the TE Group 
manages a computerised database of terrorist related data provided by 
Interpol’s members, who will have consulted Interpol’s Terrorist Manual for 
the detailed procedures required for the input of such data, helping them to 
deal with the constituent aspects of terrorist acts vis-à-vis the amended Ailicle 
3.** By collating such regulated data, the TE Group has been able to provide 
warnings to members of potential terrorist attacks or activity. In 1989, for 
example, the TE Group sent out eighteen alerts or warnings relating to attacks 
on aviation, embassies and diplomats.*^ After a member has approached the 
TE Group for assistance, its records are searched and if they find that an 
incident has a number of matching points with one in another country, they 
can then suggest that the enquiring NCB might wish to get in touch with the 
NCB of that country and discuss the incident fuither.*^ By operating in this 
way, Inteipol does not divulge any investigative information, leaving that
The fii'st manual released in March 1987 to the NCBs at 62 pages long and officially 
entitled “Guide for Combating International Terrorism” Fenton Bresler Interpol 1992 p 257 
Ibid., p 260 
Ibid.
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decision to the requested NCB, and thereby not infringing on sovereignty. In 
furtherance of this point the TE Group may, if asked to do so, offer one of its 
officers to the requesting police force to assist them in an investigation. One 
successful case saw an Italian officer of the TE Group seconded to assist the 
French police in tracing down Italian terrorists hiding in Southern France. 
Actual arrests, however, are left to the local police, as the seconded officer has 
observer status only.*"*
As the example shows, Interpol’s record in terrorist cases is not one that 
should inspire gloom. It has had numerous successes in facilitating co­
operation in this area. In the wake of the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel in 
Brighton for example, the UK NCB made around 1,000 enquiries to 
approximately forty countries, including Libya, with only a one per cent 
failure rate to these requests.*^ Interpol’s role in the Lockerbie investigation 
has also been important. It was able to link the fragment of the lED’s timing 
device to Libyan intelligence agents through a request for help put out on the 
network by Scotland Yard in accordance with Interpol’s anti-terrorist manual. 
This put detectives onto the trail after the NCB at Dakar in Senegal, reported 
that two Libyan nationals had been arrested after they disembarked from an 
Air Afrique flight on 19 February 1988 from the nearby sate of Benin. They 
were using false Lebanese passports and carrying nine Idlos of Semtex and ten 
digital timers of the same Swiss manufacture found in the Lockerbie 
wreckage.*®
Ibid., p 266
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 7* Report Practical Police Co-operation in 
the European Community Session 1989-90 363-1 p 31 
Bresler, Op. Cit., p275
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Interpol also organises symposia on terrorism through the TE Group. These 
meetings began in 1988, later becoming annual events. The symposia tend to 
focus on regional issues, new directions in terrorism, and recent crises. It was, 
for example, at the thirteenth symposium in Palma that the General Secretariat 
gave a preview of the new guidelines to the revised Interpol Terrorist Manual, 
reflecting the changes that had occurred in terrorism, especially the closer 
linkage between terrorism and other international criminal activities, and 
hence the need for a multidisciplinary approach. The sixteenth symposium in 
October 2001 naturally gravitated to the events of 11 September. 110 
experts from fifty-one countries discussed long-term anti-terrorism initiatives, 
such as:
• Interpol's plamied new identity/travel document database designed 
to help customs, border patrols and immigration services share 
police infoimation and verify the authenticity of documents;
• the feasibility of setting up a special aviation database;
• the financing of teiTorism -  expansion of anti money-laundering 
measures and studies of alternative remittance systems such as the 
Hawala/Hundi system. * *
Essentially the symposium utilised the international repugnance of the 11 
September attacks to enhance Interpol’s counter-terrorist powers, however it
16* Annual Interpol Symposium on Terrorism, 22-23 October 2001, France, Lyon, Opening 
remarks by Willy Deridder, Executive Director of Interpol, 
www.interpol.com/Public/ICPO/speeches/20011022b.asp 
Both words refer to the same system, which originated in India and is designed to ti'ansfer 
monies across continents to individuals, avoiding costly banking by operating on an informal 
basis. Consequently, it is a very useful procedure for terrorist groups, as no records of 
transactions are left behind.
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should be stressed that elements international assistance remain dependable 
upon political will, which ebbs and flows according to the international 
climate. As we can therefore see, much of this symposium’s work is aimed at 
developing new structures for Interpol, which can weather changes in such the 
fickle international climate.
Interpol’s financial situation, however, has been a continuous problem in the 
implementation of its services.*^ Ronald Noble, who became Secretary 
General of Interpol in 2000, wrote a scathing article in the New York Times in 
September 1998 after the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Noble 
criticised the lack of funding provided for Interpol, which invariably hampers 
its efforts against terrorism, pointing out that the Headquarters in Lyons could 
only afford to operate on regular business hours.^® Interpol operates a 
subscription service based on a unit block system corresponding to each 
country’s GNP, with a cunent annual budget of €30 million ($28 million).^*
In real terms this provides only limited resources for Interpol’s international 
requirements. Interpol’s Automated Finger Print System, for example, had to 
be put on hold in 1996, as it could not be funded entirely from the budget; 
instead, the General Secretary had to ask its members for voluntary 
contributions to complete the project. The situation is further complicated by 
the problem of some members backsliding on their subscription payments. 
Theoretically, this should lead to a suspension of membership, but this has
Interpol was seriously under-funded up until 1987, when an influx o f American funding (10 !
million Swiss Francs) for a 5-year modernisation plan.
New York Times, Ronald Noble A Neglected Anti-Terror Weapon 9 September 1998 *
Interpol Fact Sheet Interpol -  an oveiview 
www.interpol.com/Public/Icpo/Factsheets/FS2GG 1G1 .sap#5 |
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never been enforced, as it would be detrimental to all concerned?^ Current 
projections by Interpol illustrate a slow rise in income combined with a falling 
reserve position driven by future NCB and General Secretariat capital 
expenditure commitments (see table VI)/^ While this expenditure has 
dramatically increased the services available to the membership, it also raises 
concerns over Interpol’s dwindling reserves and how it might replenish these 
before it overreaches itself.
TABLE VI
Projections developed from Interpol’s current proposed budget provide insight 
into future trends in costs and existing funding arrangements.
Current and projected funds and cash reserves in current budget projection
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From the perspective of criminal analysis, Interpol’s databanks are now seeing 
relatively new usage through the decision in 1993 to establish a fully
The exact amount of Interpol’s debt is unpublished, as is the identity o f the non-payers, but 
it an increase of debt by 765,952.58 Swiss Francs (£400,000) was reported in the 1993 
financial year. Paul Swallow O f Limited Operational Relevance: A European View o f  
Interpol’s Crime-Fighting Role in the Twenty-First Century Transnational Organised Crime 
Vol. 2, No. 4 1996 p 122
^ Interpol’s Strategic Development Plan (Final Report 1999) Part 4 Strategy, Options and 
Recommendations 4.1 www.interpol.com/Public/icpo/sdp/default.asp
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operational criminal intelligence analysis capability at the General Secretariat 
-  the A.C.I.U or Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit -  as a means of further 
enhancing co-operation?"* In doing so Interpol offers its members a new and 
quality product: operational short-term and strategic long-term analysis. The 
A.C.I.U adopts the European approach (see below) of breaking down each of 
the two types of analysis into three groups depending on the focus, which 
could be:
• criminal incident(s),
• offender(s) or victim(s) or
• the methods of controlling crime.
Technicalities aside, Interpol’s placing provides it with a potential wealth of 
information from which to work. Its product no longer remains essentially a 
reactive one, but one of proactive analysis, beyond that of the putting out of 
simple alerts. International crime is increasingly reliant on modern technology 
to facilitate its activities; Interpol is now reacting accordingly. Analysis is 
more important than ever today, representing as it does proactive policing.
This, then, is the current model of counter-terrorist activity within Interpol. It 
is not designed as a means of tackling terrorism in itself, nor even as a co­
ordinating body, but rather as a regulated channel for the transfer of 
information. It is however only as good as the information put into it by its 
membership. Its global membership places it in a unique position for
^  Criminal Intelligence Analysis; The technique of criminal intelligence analysis as used 
within ICPO-Interpol, www.interpol.com/Public/cia/default.asp
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providing assistance to an investigation involving international terrorism, as 
demonstrated through the Lockerbie incident. Interpol’s advances with 
teclinology ensure that it has finally moved beyond being a sophisticated 
operator service. The stolen travel document database, Interpol’s most recent 
innovation, is of significant use in counter-terrorism, as these documents are 
often key components in the planning and implementation of terrorist 
missions. Details of stolen passports may be recorded directly into the 
database by the issuing country, which can be accessed twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week by member countries.^^ The problem that it has 
always faced has been in shaking off the old image of a leaky system, under 
which only the least sensitive information was passed, which is not conducive 
to the maximisation of co-operative performance. Ironically, the 11 September 
attacks may finally have laid this ghost to rest because tackling the global 
network of al-Qaeda requires co-operation at an international level. No other 
structure exists which is capable of facilitating this requirement, thereby 
placing Interpol in a unique position: it has to be used. Greater traffic in 
information on terrorism is now passing between the world’s law-enforcement 
agencies than at any other time, and Interpol serves as a principal conduit in 
this. By utilising this service, its members’ awareness of the product offered 
by Interpol is raised. Concurrently if Interpol can also maintain a high degree 
of quality in the services it offers, it will have gieater reason for justifying its 
claim to have moved on from its past.
Interpol Press Release 26 June 2002 Interpol launches new database on stolen travel 
documents
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Trevi
Interpol’s reluctance to address the issue of terrorism until 1984 was 
fundamentally responsible for the European Council meeting in Rome, 
December 1975, where a British proposal was put forward that “Community 
Ministers for the Interior (or Ministers with similar responsibilities) should 
meet next to discuss matters within their competence, in particular with regard 
to law and order”?® Concern was growing regarding the increasing number of 
terrorist incidents throughout Eur ope and the lack of any effective co­
operative mechanism to address this. If Interpol, as the most suitable vehicle 
available, was unable to deal with the issue, then the Europeans would develop 
their own instrument. The fruition of this meeting was the invitation of the 
EC’s Ministers of Justice to Luxembourg on 29 June 1976, in what was to 
become loiown as the Trevi Group. Essentially this was an informal body 
operating at an intergovernmental level, composed of Interior and Justice 
Ministers, and police and intelligence officers of the EC Member States, 
designed to “advance co-operation on the ground”.^ ^
Trevi was designed very much as an informal organisation that promoted a 
“club type” atmosphere. Douglas Hurd, a former British Home Secretary 
described “much of Trevi’s value is in its ability to foster contacts and expose 
national delegations to each others’ problems and preoccupations,” and that 
“the exchange of timely, quick, efficient information is the key to the whole
^  Timothy Bainbridge with Anthony Teasdale The Penguin Companion to the European 
Union 1995 p 450
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 7* Report Practical Police Co-operation in 
the European Community Session 1989-90 363-1 p 5
1 8 2
thing”?* Trevi maintained a secure telecommunications system via the Trevi 
Secure Fax Network (TSFN) established in 1987 (although towards the end of 
Trevi’s existence, this was in need of replacement due to the rapidity of 
technological advancement), which helped improve the “gathering of 
information on terrorist movements and the immediate exchange of 
information following a major terrorist incident”?^ With the rapid exchange 
of accurate information, the French authorities were able to intercept the 
Panamanian ship, Eksund, containing some 150 tonnes of weaponry for the 
IRA, from Libya in 1987. Additionally Trevi provided for regular joint 
analysis meetings of the terrorist threat within and outside the EC, which gave 
an overview of counter-terrorist tactics and strategy. By drawing attention to 
potential thi'eats, the Trevi machinery was particularly effective in reacting to 
the IRA’s campaign of operations in Europe 1988-89.
Principally, though, it was the informality within Trevi, breeding a particular 
bond of trust between the participants, which has proven so influential when 
dealing with the political controversies of terrorism. Trust is a fundamental 
factor when sharing sensitive information. This becomes all the more 
important when one considers that by incorporating a blend of both ministerial 
and operational personnel into Trevi’s structure, it brings political weight into 
the organisation.
The EC Member States judged Trevi a success and were keen to expand its 
mandate beyond the terrorist concerns of its initial working group. In all, four
^ Ibid., p 43
Lisa Riley Working Paper X: Counterterrorism in Western Europe. Mechanisms for 
International Co-operation A system of Police Co-operation in 1992, 1992 p 37
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Working Groups were formed: WGI (1976) focused on terrorism, WGII 
(1977) on public order and technical training, WGIII (1985) on serious and 
organised crime and narcotics trafficking, while WGIV or Trevi ’92 (1989) 
was concerned with policing issues in Europe once the TEU came into effect. 
So attractive was membership that Trevi expanded beyond the EC Member 
States to include regular* contact with the “Friends of Trevi”: Austria,
Morocco, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA and Canada. Its dissolution 
came at the end of 1992, making way for the fledgling Europol Drugs Unit, 
which was initially under Trevi’s stewardship via the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Europol, established in 1992, with its work being shadowed in the interim 
period by the K4 Committee, until the TEU itself came fully into effect in 
1993.
Criticism of Trevi has been aimed principally at its lack of democratic 
credentials, with a veil of secrecy ensuring that few of its deliberations were 
made public, along with a lack of affiliation to any EC institution. This latter 
issue was rectified, to a point, in 1985: the Euiopean Parliament discovered 
the existence of Trevi, and complained, resulting in the decision that once 
every Presidency the minister currently chairing meetings of Trevi would have 
to report to the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. This 
was clearly a sop thrown to the EP, who had no jurisdiction in internal security 
matters; in any event, because Trevi was not an official Community body, the 
Ministers were not obliged to answer the questions relating to their Trevi 
activities. In 1987 the European Commission was also afforded an insight into 
Trevi when it was granted observer status to the bi-annual meetings; again
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however, while the Commission may have been given a voice, that voice 
could easily be ignored. Trevi would remain entirely under intergovernmental 
control.
In providing a critical assessment of Trevi, one can see that it was instrumental 
in providing the co-operative foundations necessary for establishing the more 
advanced Europol structure. Trevi’s network of contacts and meetings on 
terrorism provided the first steps of any real co-operative efforts between 
Euiopean States in tackling terrorism. Its informal style was conducive to the 
passing of sensitive intelligence in these early days of co-operation; however 
as we shall see later, this could also be very limited in its effectiveness. Trevi 
was not seen by all as a sufficiently adequate tool to counter terrorism; many 
police officers regarded it as too political, having to “operate from the top 
down” -  this, they felt, hindered their work.^® Their solution, therefore, was to 
create a more infonnal structure providing a “needs-orientated forum” which 
would cater to the operational requirements of police officers. The 
assassination of Sir Richard Sykes, the British Ambassador to the Netherlands 
and his Dutch footman, in the Hague, 22 March 1979, by the IRA, prompted a 
meeting of representatives of the Special Branches of the Belgian 
Gendarmerie, the Metropolitan Police, the BKA and the Dutch criminal 
bureau, in the H a g u e . I t  was at this meeting that the decision was taken to 
create the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT).
Ibid., pp 40-45
The shock o f the death o f a high ranking British official illustrated to the continental 
Europeans the ferocity o f “The Troubles” and that the IRA was no longer content to restrain 
its attacks to the Province or the British mainland. Sykes’ murder was the catalyst for the 
creation of the PWGOT, following a serious of high profile terrorist events on the continent 
including the kidnapping and subsequent murder of the former Italian Prime Minister and
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The Police Working Group on Terrorism
The PWGOT is comprised of the fifteen Member States and Norway, who 
meet every six months in a different European capital, The PWGOT operates 
as an informal “alliance of Western European Special Branches, similar police 
agencies or security services with the police powers to hold national, executive 
counter-terrorist responsibilities within their own countries”?^ Chiefly the 
PWGOT focuses on the practical and operational aspects of counter-terrorism, 
able to operate independently of Trevi. Indeed, it was the successful 
employment of its coded facsimile system in 1988, providing regular, rapid 
and secure exchange of information, which caused Trevi to apply it to its own 
network. Like Trevi, its most important attribute lies in its informal nature. A 
European Liaison Officer^^ of the MPSB stated:
I cannot stress too much the importance of the police-working
group across the whole field of terrorism in Western Europe,
Chi-istian Democrat Party leader, Aide Moro, in the spring of 1978, traumatising European 
society. Eight days after Sykes’ murder, the IRA assassinated the British Government’s 
Spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave MP, with a car bomb in the underground car 
park at Westminster. Such attacks, so close to the heart o f government, demonstrated the 
urgent need for a reassessment of this problem.
House o f Commons Op. Cit., 363-11 p 43
The European Liaison Section of the MPSB was established in January 1976, and in 1977 it 
was formalised with its incorporation into Trevi. The ELS was given the responsibility of 
liaising with UK Constabularies, the Special Branch equivalents and security services in other 
EC countries, after Scotland Yard’s Anti-Terrorist Branch found that there was no easy 
mechanism for contact with other EC police forces in its investigations o f international 
terrorist incidents: “It was then decided to set up a dedicated unit, staffed by linguists, which 
could liaise directly with Special Branch or equivalent agencies on the continental mainland in 
order to obtain speedy responses to anti-terrorist matters” (HCHASCR 363-11, p42). Being 
police officer-orientated, the ELS works in closer tandem with the more informal PWGOT. It 
was responsible for the first instance o f Spanish and French police officers giving evidence in 
a British terrorist trial involving the PIRA, when it aided RUC officers to interview witnesses 
in these countr ies in relation to the murder o f two British army corporals in Belfast on 13 
March 1988. The ELS network includes the EU 15 plus Gibraltar, Norway, Malta and 
Switzerland.
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including Northern Ireland. We know these people, they come 
here to the Yard when they happen to be in London. We make 
contact with them when we go abroad, regardless of what we are 
going for. It has become a solid group of working colleagues.
We trust each other implicitly and pass information to each other 
without question "^*
Like Trevi, the PWGOT is fiimly wedded to the concept of informality; the 
question to ask is why these early facilitatory structures against terrorism were 
so enamoured with this methodology, and to question the wisdom of 
establishing a second structure (PWGOT) of such similar standing to the first.
For the first part, informality builds up the level of trust conducive to passing 
intelligence related to terrorism, and it is important to remember that this was 
the first type of structure to be devised capable of facilitating this type of 
transfer. Membership does not commit governments to any particular policy; 
even Trevi’s political input was not aimed at establishing ministerial 
commitments.^^ Rather, Trevi’s purpose, aside from building up its contact 
network, was to discuss teiTorist related issues and propose new ideas. The 
summit meeting of 21 June 1985, for example, discussing the outbreak of 
international terrorism that troubled Europe in the mid-1980s led to the 
drawing up of new proposals for counter-terrorist co-operation. However,
Bresler, Op, Cit., p i62
Membership of Trevi’s Working Group I resulted in only one policy commitment of any 
true political note; that was the commitment of refusing to make concessions to terrorists, a 
commitment which was reaffirmed at a meeting in London on 25 September 1986, convened 
at France’s request, concerned as she was with a spate of recent bombings in Paris. Lisa Riley 
Op. Cit., p 36
187
none of these represented any change in policy. The Member States viewed it 
as important to avoid political commitments in their co-operative dealings 
against terrorism because terrorism was seen solely in terms of a problem 
requiring a national response. No government wishes to be in the position 
whereby “undue” influence could be placed on their counter-terrorist policy.
A more permanent body dealing with these issues would also require 
alterations to the judicial systems of the Member States, and in this early stage 
of European Political Co-operation (EPC), integration was not yet advanced 
enough to be able to accommodate moves in this direction. Such matters 
remained the sovereign concern of the state, recognised by The Treaty of 
Rome and the European Union Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.^^ 
The informal nature of Trevi and the PWGOT effectively precludes any 
possibility of such infringement of sovereignty. Neither the PWGOT, which 
concerns itself with operational matters and tactics, nor Trevi, which was seen 
as a type of “old boys club”, were of any threat to the status quo.
Although the regulations of the European Union treaties emphasise the 
sovereignty of the state in these matters, the Member States have come to 
recognise that co-operation has become essential to countering terrorism rather 
than serving merely as a useful tool. Consequently, most Member States 
agreed to provide the new flagship of European police co-operation, Europol, 
with a mandate in counter-terrorist matters.^^ The incorporation of such a 
structure into the European Union sphere, as opposed to maintaining it
“This title shall not effect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security” Article K.2(2) TEU; Article K.5 Amsterdam and Article 33 Nice.
See Chapter VIII for a more detailed discussion.
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outside, illustrates the perceptual change that has occurred over the past 
twenty-five years. There is a recognition that a more formalised, permanent 
and regulated approach is required, although this in no way implies an 
infringement upon the actual policing of a Member State’s internal security. 
Europol, as we will see in the next chapter, does not have this capability. 
However, whilst discussing this matter it should be remembered that the 
Member State’s ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights 
does place parameters on its policing methods. This was demonstrated when 
the European Court of Human Rights, on 18 January 1978, found the British 
Government guilty of breaching the Convention through its interrogation 
techniques on IRA suspects which they found to be “inhuman and degrading 
treatment”.
With the dissolution of Trevi, European co-operation has moved steadily 
towards greater regulation, although with the PWGOT still in existence, a 
degree of informality still exists. The negative aspects of the informal 
structures stems from their fiagility; a senior British police officer within the 
International Association of Police Officers commented: “If I’d drop dead 
now, the chain would break”. T h e  obvious problems with this philosophy 
are that a new individual filling such a gap, or indeed just taking over, would 
take time to reach the same level of trust perpetuated by his or her 
predecessor. Consequently, the chain could not operate at one hundred per­
cent until this maturation period; a formalised system, on the other hand, has a
This verdict overturned that o f the earlier 2 September 1976 ruling by the European 
Commission on Human Rights, which also found the government guilty of torture. Peter 
Taylor Brits: The War Against the IRA 2001 pp 73-74 
Benyon et al Policing Co-operation in Europe 1993 p 38
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network of support preventing it from suffering this problem to the same 
degree. When, for example, the term of the head of Europol’s Counter-terrorist 
Unit is due to expire, he will spend around tln-ee weeks briefing his successor, 
to facilitate a smooth transition."^®
This heavy reliance, though, on a dual co-operative system based on an 
informal network revealed its Achilles Heel dur ing the investigation into the 
bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, 21 December 1988. These 
structures, designed to facilitate co-operation, were unable to prevent the 
relationship between the investigating Scottish Lothian and Borders 
Constabulary and the German BKA becoming severely strained over the issue 
that the lED might have been placed onboard the Maid o f the Seas at Frankfurt 
Airport, before continuing its journey to Heathrow and from there onwards to 
John F. Kennedy in New York. This thinldng stemmed from the fact that two 
months previously, the BKA’s Operation “Autumn Leaves” had arrested 
sixteen suspected Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -  General 
Command (PFLP-GC) members, whom it was believed were preparing to 
bomb an airliner. Despite strong suspicions, all sixteen were released due to 
lack of secure evidence, despite the discovery of “weapons of warfare and 
explosives”"^ \ The suspects then promptly disappeared, “going to ground”. 
After the Lockerbie bombing this event was discovered by the Scots and the 
FBI, but the BKA were hesitant, and delayed handing over copies of the
Personal interview with Mariano Simancas, Head of Europol C-T Unit, 30 May 2001 The 
Hague.
Dr Chi*istine Rinne, the investigating judge, at the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe, who 
deliberated the charges made by the federal prosecutor against Marwan Abdel Razzack 
Khreesat (a highly-skilled bomb-maker), following his anest as a result of Autumn Leaves, 
Leppard, Op. Cit., p 13
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Autumn Leaves files to the point that the Scottish Senior Investigative Officer, 
Detective Superintendent John Orr, suspected deliberate obstruction."*^
Marring the co-operative relationship were rifts caused by a variety of factors: 
from the different mindset and investigative techniques employed by each 
police force, which neither could comprehend, to the fact that the BKA could 
not accept that the bomb may have placed in Frankfurt, and therefore focused 
their side of the investigation around this concept. The Scots were particularly 
riled by the debacle concerning Khreesat’s (the PFLP-GC bomb-maker) 
hidden lEDs and the length of time it took the BKA to discover them, despite 
continued urging from Scotland to search Hashem Abassi’s apartment in 
Neuss"*^ . Moreover, the accident, which occurred at the BKA headquarters in 
Wiesbaden, whereby one of these two devices exploded whilst they were 
attempting to disarm it, killing one technician and seriously injuring the other, 
further exacerbated the situation."*"* This tragedy was compounded by the 
BKA destroying the remaining device, fearful that it too might explode. In 
doing so, ignorance destroyed this important piece of evidence. Despite 
having only one remaining device in their possession, the BKA produced a 
“scientific” report, entitled “Comment on the Ignition Devices”. This was
42 Ibid., p 98
Khreesat’s Autumn Leaves statement indicated that he was certain that he had made five 
bombs, and that they were probably still in Abassi’s apartment. Abassi’s apartment had been 
under sur veillance during Autumn Leaves, because o f his houseguest, Hafez Dalkamouni (a 
senior figure in the PFLP-GC going under the name o f Hafez Mohammed Hussein). 
Consequently, both the Scots and FBI saw Abassi as a prime lead, and made their initial 
request for the apartment’s search in late February (the BKA had already searched the 
apartment twice) along with seven other locations where the devices might have been hidden. 
Two lEDs were eventually discovered in the cellar of his grocery shop where on April 13, 
having been stored there by Dalkamouni following his arrest. Steve Emerson and Brian Duffy 
The Fall of Pan Am 103 1990 pp 140,204-5,238-9  
Personal interview with John Boyd QPM CBE, former Chief Constable of Dumfiies and 
Galloway Constabulary 1 March 2001 Lochwinnoch. Boyd was the outgoing Chief Constable 
when the bombing occurred, having been promoted to the post of Inspector o f Constabulary 
for Scotland, and took up the post in June the following year.
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seen by the Scots and FBI as a “compendium of fudge and obfiiscation” which 
concluded that all three devices had a time delay of between thirty and forty- 
five minutes (despite the fact that the two others were destroyed) thereby 
concluding that the bomb must have been placed onboaid at Heathrow, not 
Frankfurt."*^
International co-operation was essential in bringing those responsible for the 
bombing to justice, but a reluctance to be fully open with intelligence hindered 
the investigation, and caused a serious rift to develop between the Scottish 
police and the BKA that would take time to heal. To this day, the BKA 
remains sensitive regarding the failure of Autumn Leaves (the most expensive 
counter-terrorist investigation ever cai'ried out on German soil) and the 
subsequent co-operative problems with their Scottish colleagues. Political 
reasons go part of the way to explaining the friction that developed; it was a 
major international incident, so consequently international politics were 
involved. Boyd also felt that the problems associated with a divided Germany 
were manifesting themselves, accentuating the fervent need to dissociate 
Frankfurt from anything to do with the terrorist bombing. Politics and 
policing became interlinked, and this created difficulties. Pressure was being 
placed on Orr ftom the Cabinet Office’s joint intelligence steering group, 
which co-ordinated British intelligence and security policy to resolve this row, 
because Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, MI6"*®, needed the amicable co­
operation of its German counteipart in hunting IRA ASUs on the Continent,
Leppard, Op. Cit., p 144
SIS is the official acronym of the more commonly known MI6, but to avoid confusion with 
the Schengen Information System, this thesis will adopt MI6 throughout.
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and the dispute between the two police forces was not helping matters/^ Poor 
relations were further exacerbated by significant differences between the two 
forces. The Scots were unschooled in the complexities of the German judicial 
system, which could appear overly bureaucratic, neither were they proficient 
in the Gennan language. The BKA for their part spoke English fluently, but 
they had great difficulty in understanding the Scottish brogue. Both sides had 
a different philosophy to work:
The BKA men consistently refused to speculate when no hard 
facts presented themselves. For many Scots, both at 
Meckenheim and Lockerbie, this went against the grain. The 
Scots, even more than their counterparts in England, liked to 
work on hunches and instinct. Their instinctive reaction to the 
early lack of progress and hard evidence in the inquiry was to 
enhance their dependence on guesswork"*^
The facilitatory mechanisms witliin the Trevi and PWGOT systems were 
unable to resolve these problems because of the fact that they were, in a sense, 
highly centralised structures, as opposed to localised ones. For example, the 
MPSB and the BKA had mutual contacts, and understood one another’s 
working style, but this counted for little when a terrorist attack occurred over 
Scottish soil, far from London. A debate was raised between the Lord 
Advocate of Scotland, Lord Fraser, and some members of the Cabinet as to 
whether primacy should be given to the small Dumfries and Galloway
Leppard, Op. Cit., p 146 
Ibid., p 93
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Constabulary, who had no experience in this type of crime, or the MPSB. 
Ultimately, because the crime had oecuiTed over Scotland, and Scotland had a 
separate judicial system from the rest of Britain, Lord Fraser won his case. 
With this decision the investigation became effectively isolated from these 
facilitatory structures. Certainly, Trevi and the PWGOT were both involved 
in the investigation, as indeed were all possible avenues, but Boyd did not sit 
in on any of their meetings; instead, he simply received intelligence from 
them."*^  Had the bombing occurred over another European country things 
might have played out differently, with these structures able to influence 
events to a greater extent, as investigations into terrorist attacks are conducted 
on a more centralised scale. If it had occurred over one of the German Lander 
states, the BKA would have been the principal investigating agency; if it 
occurred over England or Wales, the MPSB’s argument for primacy would 
have been a much stronger one. Nevertheless the political pressure fi*om Bonn 
to ensure that the BKA proved that the bomb could not have entered the 
system at Frankfurt, to the point of denying even a possibility, would still have 
placed stress upon the investigation regardless of these facilitatory structures.
The Lockerbie investigation was a particularly arduous one, and one that the 
bombers did not expect. A twenty-five minute delay in PAN AM 103’s 
departure meant that the lED detonated over land and not the Atlantic.^® In 
doing so it ensured that evidence would be available for a criminal enquiry. In 
some respects, the investigation might be viewed as an aberration because it 
was never supposed to happen, and the odds of it succeeding were forlorn.
Personal interview with John Boyd QPM CBE, former Chief Constable of Dumfries and 
Galloway Constabulaiy 1 March 2001 Lochwinnoch.
Emerson and Duffy, Op. Cit., p 12
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Lockerbie in this respect can therefore be viewed as unique. The structure in 
place, while not failing, was very hard-pressed. Overall, the co-operative 
system was not fully prepared for such an event; then again, terrorists rarely 
play a straight ball.
Intelligence Gathering
The role of intelligence gathering is a fundamental mainstay of counter- 
teiTorism policy, allowing officers to operate beyond a reactive capacity. 
Obtaining such a precious commodity can be achieved simply by the passing 
on of information from one force or agency to another. Increasingly however, 
analysis is being utilised by law-enforcement agencies, supplementing their 
investigative capacity:
Over the last few years, police activity has shifted its centre of 
balance away from the reactive investigation after events, 
towards targeting active criminals on the balance of intelligence.
We have investigated much in developing new intelligence 
practices and skills in analysis.
The UK, for instance, has established a centralised structure to provide 
strategic intelligence to its law-enforcement agencies -  the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS) -  against serious and organised crime. NCIS was 
established in 1992 (operational 1994) as part of the UK’s quasi-centralisation
David Phillips QPM, Chief Constable of Kent (National Intelligence Model, March 2000, 
published by NCIS)
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of its policing but also to serve as the contact point or “gateway” for UK law- 
enforcement enquiries to international police bodies such as Europol and 
Interpol/^ NCIS’s aim is to standardise the way intelligence work is done 
throughout the UK^  ^and serves as a useful commodity in the fight against 
organised crime. Its release of a National Intelligence Model in February 
2000, for example, creating an integrated intelligence system, was endorsed by 
the UK’s senior police officers.^"* However, its mandate does not extend to a 
counter-terrorism capacity; rather this remains under the amalgamated remit of 
Special Branch, the Security Service, the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
and the Army.^^ By comparison, the German equivalent of NCIS is part of the 
BKA and consequently does have a role to play in counter-terrorism. The 
BKA also has an operational mandate, unlike NCIS, and the latter’s frustration 
of it being “under-funded, under-used and ineffective” led to a formation of an 
operational arm in October 1995 via the National Crime Squad.^® It is, 
however, a ease of the Member State’s individual preference as to who has 
what role and what powers.
The UK was one of the first o f the EU Member States to construct such an NCIS. This was 
a requirement o f all Member States in an effort to further facilitate JHA co-operation (Aiticle 
4.1 of the Europol Convention requires Member States to establish or designate a national unit 
to serve as the liaison body with Europol), and is one of only four purposely designed units 
(Germany’s BKA; the Dutch Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst CRl, and the Irish National 
Criminal Intelligence Office). More on NCIS’s role with Europol can be seen in the following 
chapter.
NCIS Website “Inti'oduction to NCIS” www.ncis.co.uk/business.asp 
NCIS Press Release UK Police Chiefs Hail NCIS’s National Intelligence Mode 25 Februaiy 
2000
www.ncis.co.uk/PRESS/03_00_2 .asp 
These latter two organisations insofar as the Northern Irish terrorism limited to the Province 
is concerned.
1994 Home Office Report, Observer Police Demand Their FBI to Fend Off MI5 14 
November 1994.
Due to accountability reasons, NCIS has been limited to the collation and analysis of data 
provided by law-enforcement bodies. It may ask regional crime squads or individual police 
forces to cany out surveillance operations on its behalf, but limited resources have restricted 
the possibility and utility of such operations. Michael Smith New Cloak. Old Dagger: How 
Britain’s Spies Came in from the Cold 1996 p 241
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Analysis has become an important feature of law-enforcement activity over 
the past twenty-five years (originating in North America in the 1960s), 
although it is only in recent years that it has become recognised as an 
important additional support for international co-operation in police matters. 
The EU Member States adopted the following definition of criminal 
intelligence analysis as:
the identification of and the provision of insight into the 
relationship between crime data and other potentially relevant 
data with a view to police and/or judicial practice.
Analysis, then, affords law-enforcement agencies the ability to predict, or at 
the very least, understand the nature and growth of a particular strand or 
pattern of organised crime or terrorism. In turn this permits the establishment 
of enforcement priorities in respect of these crimes. In the shorter term this is 
aimed at immediate impact, typically arrests and seizures.
The most productive (and most common) intelligence utilised by those 
involved in counter-terrorism however is the tactical intelligence produced by 
informers. According to Commander John Grieve, Director of Intelligence at 
Scotland Yard (1996):
Adopted (also by Interpol) in June 1992. Interpol website: Criminal Intelligence Analysis -  
Frequently asked questions. www.interpol.com/Public/cia/ciafaq.asp 
Interpol website: Criminal Intelligence Analysis -  Frequently asked questions. 
www.interpol.com/Public/cia/ciafaq.asp
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Paying informants is very cost-effective, providing that you 
manage all the risks -  all the moral risks, all the physical risks, and 
all the legal risks. Economically it is a very, very cost-effective 
way of doing it if you compare the price of one of my mobile 
suiweillance teams, an eight-hour day for them, and then compare 
that with how much you pay an informer. With an infonner, we 
have got somebody inside the tent looking out. With a surveillance 
team, you are outside the tent looking in. There are very few jobs 
with the category of people that I deal with that two or three days 
work by a surveillance team will get a result. Very usually you 
will barely be off first base.^^
Informers afford the most efficient means of providing first-hand intelligence 
as well as insight into a terrorist cell or organisation. They are potentially the 
most devastating weapon available to law-enforcement agencies: beyond the 
mere supplying of information, some aie capable of causing intense dismption 
to a terrorist group. It is suspected that fear of informers was responsible for 
the Abu Nidal Group’s murderous purge of half its numbers during the late 
1980s.^ ® The IRA meanwhile adopted a more pragmatic but equally ruthless 
approach to informers, when it came close to being “closed down” by the 
security forces in the early 1970s. After its transformation from a brigade to a 
cellular structure, the IRA imposed an automatic death sentence on informers
Smith, Op. Cit., (author’s personal interview) p 242 
Patrick Seale Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire 1992 p222 
The numbers murdered amount to several hundred. The reasons behind Nidal’s order will 
perhaps never be known, but it is known that he suffered acutely from paranoia and feared 
plots against himself. There was some degree of internal tension within the organisation, but 
not to the extent to warrant the action taken. Whether or not the Israelis were able to 
orchestrate and play on these divisions is unknown.
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or “touts”: the “execution” of Joe Fenton on the night of 26 January 1989 is a 
typical example of terrorist housekeeping.*^* The IRA, however, has on 
occasion issued amnesties to encourage informers to repent, and in some 
instances they have imposed a sentence of exile rather than death to encourage 
other informers to reveal themselves.®^ On the European continent the Red 
Brigades were decimated by the pentiti legislation that actively encouraged 
defection (although in this particular case, the legislation worked tluough what 
the repentant terrorists already knew from the relative safety of a prison cell, 
rather than sending them back into the group).
Police and law-enforcement agencies run informers and agents as part of their 
counter-terrorist efforts; however it is the labours of the security services, by 
nature highly adapt in this area of expertise, that we now turn to. The security 
services of the EU Member States, for the most part, maintain a role in the 
state’s counter-terrorist policy, employing their clandestine skills to the best 
effect. Their actual effectiveness is difficult to ascertain, however, because of 
their secretive nature. The British Security Service (MI5) works in co­
ordination with the MPSB as it does not have any powers of arrest; 
consequently its role in an'ests and operations is often obscured by its 
background presence -  it will let another agency take the credit in order to 
maintain its preferred standpoint of a low key profile. In most cases the 
security seiwices do not wish the teiTorists to know that they have been 
involved in penetrating their organisation as this risks compromise on future
Martin Dillon The Dirtv War 1990 pp 315-327 
“  Ibid., p 310
To this day, despite the advances made under the Peace Process and the Good Friday 
Agreement, those exiled by the IRA fear reprisals if they return. Todav BBC Radio 4 ,29  
March 2002, Interview with Joseph McCluskie.
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operations, because the group will invariably take whatever actions they can to 
remedy their weakness. One can argue, however, that the role of the security 
services is double-edged. On the positive side they are well suited to 
employing their penetrative abilities through surveillance, “turning” of group 
members, and running agents, who are usually considered more effective than 
informers; however, the line between this role and agent provocateur is 
decidedly fine.®^  The security services have access to cutting edge equipment 
for surveillance purposes, but most important of all is their access to lai ge 
sums of money:
...the FRU had a great advantage over Special Branch in that 
they had more money to offer informants.. .whenever I needed to 
recruit a source, I could get the cash... If I wanted £250,000,1 
could have had it ®"*
The case o f Brian Nelson, a former loyalist terrorist, who was recruited by the British 
Anny’s most secret intelligence wing -  the Force Research Unit (FRU) -  under orders to 
supply the unit with intelligence on the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) (Nelson rapidly rose to |
become the UFF’s Senior Intelligence Officer) but also to encourage the UFF death squads i
away targeting from innocent Catholics, and instead target suspected republican terrorists in I
1983. His involvement in facilitating loyalist murders, whilst also saving many lives, led to 
his trial and imprisonment in 1992, pleading guilty to five charges of conspiracy to murder.
Taylor, Op. Cit., pp 286 -296. '
Nelson’s case illustrates the precarious line involved in infiltrating a terrorist group where I
suspicion is often only avoidable by engaging in the same activity as the group: “Any lack of |
enthusiasm would be an instant pointer for men already alert for infiltration. The agent must, ;
if discovery is to be avoided, join enthusiastically in the activities of the organisation, even if :
they are seriously criminal... Subversive organisations will always be on the look-out for !
agents. In Ireland, the consequences of discovery are final and very painful.” !
A former intelligence officer discussing the Brian Nelson case to the author: Smith Op. Cit., p 1
270 I
Peter Taylor’s interview with a FRU “handler”: Taylor, Op. Cit., p 287 î
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The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the French agency 
responsible for internal security,®® quickly paid over the million francs 
requested by a Tunisian living in Tours in February 1987 in return for 
information on a Iranian-sponsored cell in France (along with granting him a 
new life in the USA). Intelligence is after all the key to defeating terrorists, 
and one whose price is comparable with the lives that it saves.
The most negative attribute associated with security services is their lack of 
accountability. The French external security service Direction Générale de la 
Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) has traditionally been seen by its citizens as a 
group of unaccountable cowboys, and its role in the rogue and botched 
operation of sinking the Greenpeace ship. Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland 
harbour on the night of 10 July 1985 illustrated the relationship between the 
state and its intelligence services.®® Britain’s intelligence agencies have also 
suffered from this lack of accountability. It is now acknowledged that Peter 
Wright’s memoirs of “bugging and burgling his way across London” were 
exaggerated, but the Security Service, through the initial Security Service Act 
1989, only paddles in the waters of accountability. The Act places MI5 on a 
statutory basis for the first time, introducing an element of oversight, such as 
the appointment of a commissioner responsible for controlling the issue of 
warrants for the planting of bugs or searching of property. However most of 
the bugging carried out by British intelligence is done so by GCHQ, which is 
not covered by the act, as the govermnent was unable to legally define or 
restrict what GCHQ does. Instead, an honour code is relied upon to prevent
The result led to a wave of arrests. Douglas Porch The French Secret Services: A Historv of 
French Intelligence from the Drevfus Affair to the Gulf War 1995 p 452 
Ibid., chapters 18, 19 and 20
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GCHQ from using any of the information it obtains against British citizens.®  ^
The oversight commissioner does produce an annual report, but in reality, this 
records little more than the number of warrants issued and the “barest details 
of any case investigated”,®^ More authoritative, perhaps, is the Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC), established as part of the Intelligence Services 
Bill 1994. The ISC is an all-party committee providing scrutiny and regular 
reports into the expenditure, administration and policy of the UK intelligence 
agencies. Its weakness, however, lies in the fact that it is accountable to 
Downing Street rather than parliament, where its reports may be first vetted 
and censured of anything puiported to be confidential or prejudicial to national 
security.®  ^ Many of its critics, including a former MI5 director, believe that 
the ISC must have the power of a select committee instead. This way it can 
request documents and persons for interview, and enforce sanctions if these 
are not forthcoming or the committee is lied to.^ ®
These accountability issues stem from the Intelligence Services’ involvement 
during the Cold War, in what Count Alexandre de Marenches, a former head 
of the SDBCE (the DGSE’s predecessor) has referred to a as the “Fourth 
World War”.^ * In Europe this war was not fought with armies but through 
subversion. The Intelligence Services spent a great deal of time infiltrating 
virtually every leftwing organisation in their effort to contain the “red 
menace”, hunting down spy-rings, both real and imagined. Combatants
James Adams The New Spies 1995 pp 94-95 
Ibid., p 95
Chapter VII contains a more detailed discussion of accountability.
Mark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding Defending the Realm 2000 p 253 
™ Ibid., p 254
Count de Marenches & David A Andelman The Fourth World War: Diplomacv and 
Espionage in the Age of Terrorism 1992
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engaged in war seldom have time for the niceties of democratic practice, and 
neither did those involved in the war described by Marenches. Much criticism 
has been made of the logic, or lack thereof, regarding some of the target 
choices and the zeal displayed in their execution: MI5’s effort to undermine 
the trade union during the 1978 pay dispute at the Ford plant at Dagenham, for 
example, or its continued of targeting the factionalised left-wing groups and 
parties for at least five years after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989. A 
former F Branch operative regarded this as a “ridiculous waste of time and 
money”, while another operative saw it as having “nothing to do with 
subversion and everything to do with status”. These criticisms against 
subversion pale by comparison with the methods adopted by the Italian 
Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID) and the Servizio Informazioni Forze 
Armate (SIFAR) both of whom were structurally reformed in 
June 1976 after leaks demonstrated the extent of their compliance with right- 
wing terror groups. Their successors, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la 
Sicuezza Democratica (SISDE) and the Servizio per le Informazioni e la 
Sicurezza Militare (SISMI) have a far greater degree of democratic 
accountability, but the taint of corruption and fascist sympathies remained.
The heads of both these organisations were found, in 1981, to be affiliated to 
the powerful right-wing Masonic Lodge, Propaganda 2 (P2), which was 
banned along with all other secret organisations in July 1981. Several other 
leading security officials have been imprisoned for crimes such as illegal arms
Hollingsworth and Fielding, Op. Cit., pp 87-90 
F Branch (now defunct) was the anti-subversion section o f MI5. 
Internal and military security services respectively.
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trafficking, corruption, embezzlement, associating with organised crime, and
subversive association/"*
The efficacy of the intelligence services in this area is also open to question. 
François Mitterand sacked his DGSE Director, Pierre Marion in 1982, for 
reasons partly explained by personality clashes, but mainly because the 
President was unhappy with the results achieved against terrorism. The DGSE 
had shown itself to be ill prepared and incapable of competing with other 
police bodies within France. Criticism was specifically focused on the 
inability to forecast possible operations of groups scattered throughout the 
country.^® Admittedly the DGSE was very much a new body at this time 
(Marion had only taken over the year before and much of his energy had gone 
into the reform and transformation of the SDECE into the DGSE rather than 
operational issues). In-house criticism has also been directed at the 
competence of MI5 on counter-terrorist issues. David Shayler, an erstwhile 
intelligence officer who had worked in T Branch (responsible for countering 
Irish and domestic terrorism) claims that the entire structure of MI5 is ill- 
suited to its counter-terrorist role, “handicapped by...over-bureaucratic and 
inflexible management”.^ ® In the wake of the IRA Bishopsgate bombing in 
the financial heart of London in April 1993, Shayler discovered that but for a 
breakdown of communications between MI5 and GCHQ, the mainland ASU 
could have been arrested six months before the bombing. Shayler argues that 
the bureaucracy of MI5 has remained grounded in cold war strategy and
Peter Klerks Security services in the EC and EFT A countries in Tony Bunyan (ed) 
Statewatching the new Europe 1993 pp 77-8 
Roger Faligot & Pascal Krop La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944 1989 pp 
286-7
Hollingsworth and Fielding Op. Cit., p 4
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tactics; thus the emphasis was placed on analysing intelligence on paper rather 
than adopting a more aggressive and innovative stance against this new 
enemy, so different from the “predictability” of the old KGB and subversive 
threat.
It was farcical. There I was with a fast-moving target -  the IRA were 
planting bombs down the street and our Security Service remained 
obsessed with pedantic redrafting of documents.. .1 questioned whether 
time would be better spent investigating these IRA targets.. .1 could see 
no point in spending days poring over the wording of routine 
documents”
(David Shayler)
This condition echoes that of the DGSE’s problems in tackling terrorism:
It is difficult to infiltrate terrorist networks that are very tenuous, 
mobile both in time and in space, very scattered, and capable of 
sudden disappearances. To take only one example, to
I
disentangle the Shiite connections in the Middle East requires >
!
long and minute preparation, as well as luck, and the DGSE has j
still not mastered this. II
These faults suggest that intelligence services in their traditional capacity are 
ill suited to the new challenges presented after the Cold Wai\ due to an inertia
Ibid., p 135
Faligot & Krop Op. Cit., pp 287
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developed through fifty years of “playing chess” with the Soviet adversary. 
The Great Game has been replaced by a new game, one that is both aggressive 
and fast-paced, with little respect for gentlemanly mles. Simply changing the 
mandate to accommodate these new threats is not enough; a radical 
restructuring is required. MI5 was able to adapt and improve its techniques 
over time, aided by better utilisation of GCHQ intelligence, and by the mid- 
1990s the IRA’s mainland campaign was “feeling the heat”.^  ^ However 
during the sixteenth-month IRA ceasefire from August 1995, MI5 became 
complacent, transferring the T2 Branch officers responsible for the successes 
against the IRA in 1993-4 to other departments as part of their policy of 
posting officers to a maximum of two years in any particular section. 
Consequently they were not in place when the ceasefire ended, despite the fact 
that MI5 had always suspected that it would collapse.^®
The abrupt end to the Cold War sent intelligence agencies around the world 
into a frenzy of report writing as they looked for new tlireats that would justify 
their existence before their political masters downsized their budgets. 
Terrorism and organised crime were now seen as threats against the state, 
replacing the old Soviet one, and accordingly these agencies moved into areas 
previously regarded primarily as police matters. MI5, for example, has 
relocated its resources to accommodate these changes: thirty-tliree per cent of 
its budget was allocated to international terrorism, and thirty-nine per cent to 
Irish and domestic terrorism in 1996.^* Immediately prior to the 11 September 
attacks the 2001 budget allocated twenty-eight per cent and thirty-three per
Hollingsworth and Fielding, Op. Cit., pp 139-40 
“  Ibid., p 138 
Smith, Op. Cit., p 73
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cent respectively/^ Graph I (appendix) illustrates the changes in tlireat 
assessment since the collapse of the USSR.
Continuing with the British example, MI5’s manoeuvrings for a greater role in 
counter-terrorist affairs proved successful in 1992 when it took over the lead 
role against the IRA from Special Branch, much to the chagrin of the police/"* 
By contrast the French interior security service. Direction de la Surveillance 
du territoire (DST), which already held a secure anti-terrorism mandate, found 
itself facing a reduction in personnel and resoui'ces, and resorted to 
approaching France’s high-tech companies, attempting to persuade them that 
they needed the DST to protect their industrial secrets.^® Germany’s Federal 
Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) which also has a 
counter-terrorist mandate, is also undergoing significant downsizing, reducing 
its staff from 6,500 to 4,500.^® However, the events of 11 September have 
acted as a brake on much of the scaling-down of intelligence resources 
throughout the EU as the Member States reassess the level of the terrorist 
threat. In many cases, recruitment levels are rising; MI5 and MI6, for 
example, have both begun a significant recruitment drive after the UK 
government’s decision that its intelligence services were “insufficient to 
guarantee national security”. By moving the resources of the intelligence
agencies further towards the tackling of criminal activities such as terrorism,
MI5 The Security Service 4^ ' Edition 2002 p 11 
^ FAS Intelligence Resource Programme Website Budget and Staff -  Security Service MI5 
www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/mi5/budget.htm
^ MI5 already had a role in Northern Ireland countering terrorism, although not on the British 
mainland.
Klerk, Op. Cit., p 71 
^ FAS Intelligence Resource Programme Website BND -  Budget and Personnel 
www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/budget.htm 
Eve Spy MI6 Increasing Strength to Combat Terrorism Issue 8 2002 p 71
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one does create a paradox between the cloak of secrecy worn during the Cold 
War and the requirements of the criminal justice system. During the most 
recent incarnation of the Great Game it was not necessary for such an 
official/officer to appear before a magistrate and argue a case for the expulsion 
of an Eastern Bloc diplomat, the decision being a political and not a judicial 
one. By focusing on terrorism, however, the methods and techniques 
employed by these agencies are subject to scrutiny from defence lawyers and 
magistrates under judicial trials. Under the British legal system, for example, 
the defence must have access to any evidence collected by the prosecution. As 
it stands police reluctance to disclose evidence that would reveal intelligence 
sources leads to an average of one court case a week being aborted. A 
similar system in Germany enabled the lawyers of RAF defendants who 
sympathised with their cause to force the prosecution to reveal exactly how 
evidence was collected, allowing the terrorists to develop counter-measures.
To cite one particular case involving evidence relating to fingeiprints within 
an RAF safe house: the RAF were always very careful about ensuring that 
they left no fingerprints in such houses, consequently the defence lawyers 
demanded to know exactly where these were discovered. This revealed that 
the BKA had found them under a toilet seat. The RAF consequently never 
made this mistake again.
Their particular methods of collection of evidence means that intelligence 
agencies have a harder time than police in this respect. Stella Rimington, a
Smith, Op. Cit., p 246 
Ibid.
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former MI5 director-general described the issue of open court as sometimes 
acting:
as a constraint on our investigations,., There is an inherent 
uncertainty in judging how the courts may view individual 
operations and methods which we regard as sensitive. Many 
such sensitive techniques have to be protected at all costs, 
because they cannot be replaced. This sometimes means that we 
are unable to use the most effective investigative methods in 
cases which may result in prosecution. In some cases, rulings by 
the judge may cause the prosecution to be discontinued because 
the material information is so sensitive that it is not possible to 
disclose it in any form.^®
Rimmington’s disclosure suggests that MI5 has yet to fully comprehend the 
strategic differences associated with the mandate for which it had lobbied so 
hai'd. Preserving the secrecy of techniques and equipment is a both a strategic 
and tactical necessity, but the validity of maintaining an agency in the lead 
role in counter-terrorism affairs which is unable to effectively bring some of 
its cases to trial because its methods cannot be revealed in open court does 
become questionable. One cannot use the example of MI5’s role in Northern 
Ireland to counter this argument as any evidence it put before a court would be 
before the closed session of a Diplock Court (introduced in 1973 under the 
1973 Emergency Powers Act). A coming to terms with the changing
Ibid., p 247
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envil’onment is necessary, and this requires the development of new strategies 
and tactics compatible with the criminal justice system. In a sense this would 
actually bring intelligence agencies into closer resemblance with their police 
counterparts, blurring the differentiation between them where criminal 
mandates are concerned, and moving them towards a scenario akin to the 
internal security mandate held by the American FBI. The alternative scenario 
is a return to police primacy in the area of counter-teiTorism, with intelligence 
agencies reverting to their support function. In this way, their methods of 
intelligence gathering are less likely to compromise investigations and trials; 
additionally this preserves the intelligence agency ethos, retaining its unique 
identity and capabilities rather than causing it to mutate mto a variant of a 
police agency. Police agencies have become familiar with the use of 
intelligence gathering and analysis over the past years, so one would question 
the usefulness of what, in effect, would be a mirror agency. In the long-term, 
though, this might be a move towards the establishment of a more powerful 
police force within some Member States.
The level of Co-operation
In accepting the reality that terrorism is a transnational issue requiring 
transnational solutions, the EU Member States have allowed for the 
enhancement of police co-operation to target this thieat. However whereas 
numerous agreements and structures exist at the police level to facilitate co­
operation, the intelligence agencies prefer a more spartan approach. With the 
absence of the Trevi Group only three other forums exist specifically to
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facilitate co-operation between European intelligence agencies: the Club of 
Berne (established 1971), the Kilowatt Club (1977) and the new EU Task 
Force of Security Service Chiefs (2001)/* All three operate through an 
informal and ad hoc structure typical of Trevi and the PWGOT, and only the 
latter has some comiection to the JHA process. Each group was established to 
focus on a particular problem or issue: the Club of Berne initially concentrated 
on espionage and state security, but with the end of the Cold War it has begun 
to look at other issues such as terrorism, and also the role of intelligence 
agencies within the context of European integration® .^ The Kilowatt Club, 
meanwhile, was established to focus on international tenorism, (although its 
membership is not exclusively European)® ,^ and the Task Force exists as a 
reaction to the 11 September attacks.®"* Consequently all three have a role to 
play in matters of counter-tenorism.
These structures facilitate co-operation thiough the traditional means of 
exchanging intelligence on a voluntary basis. Unlike their police colleagues, 
however, the secretive nature of their work inhibits the volume of this 
exchange. Intelligence services need to be certain that any information they 
exchange is kept secure and will not compromise the source.®® Equally the 
capricious nature inherent to intelligence agencies has its role to play. 
Traditional rivalries between the internal and external agencies of a state
Bilateral links are very extensive, however; MI5 for example boasts links with over 100 !
services worldwide (MI5 The Securitv Service Fourth Edition p 26). Such links allow states 
and/or agencies with close relationships to continue in this vein, as is the case cited below
between MI6 and the DST and DGSE. ;
^ Tony Bunyan (ed.) Statewatching the new Europe 1993 p 174 & intelforum Mailing List |
Archive Club o f Berne threads http://lists.his.eom/intelforum/msg04402.html j
Ibid., (Bunyan) p 174 ;
Statewatch Post September 11 analyses: No. 7 EU anti-terrorism action plan: "operational 
measures” www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/anal7.pdf |
Smith, Op. Cit., p 244
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stretch the definition of “competitiveness”, leading to turf wars and 
occasionally a “beggar thy neighbour” attitude. Porch describes the 
enthusiasm of the DST in dealing with a request from the New Zealand police 
investigating the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, gleeful in the 
embarrassment that this would cause their sister agency.®® Hollingsworth and 
Fielding meanwhile recount an anecdote relating to the relationship between 
MI5 and the MPSB, after the former had taken over primacy in countering the 
IRA and had began to exclude the MPSB from certain covert operations: 
During the height of the IRA’s mainland campaign in mid-1993, a 
group of MI5 and regional Special Branch officers met for a drink in a 
pub. “By working closely together, we will beat the common enemy,” 
said one. “Yeah, the Met,” quipped another, much to the merriment of 
all those present®^
Such rivalries are detrimental to countering terrorism. Recent criticism 
suggests that the lack of communication between the various intelligence and 
law-enforcement agencies within the USA permitted the attacks to 11 
September attacks to occur.®  ^ Ironically, though, it was MI5’s reluctance to 
embarrass the MPSB over inaccurate and outdated telephone tapping warrants 
which caused it to be slow in pursuing certain leads, a consequence of which 
was the failure to arrest the IRA ASU before the Bishopsgate bomb.®® 
Peiwersely, relationships with external agencies tend to be warmer than
Porch, Op. Cit., p 461
Hollingsworth and Fielding, Op. Cit., p 129
BBC News Row deepens over terror warnings 17 May 2002; BBC News VS intelligence 
efforts fractured 18 May 2002 Eve Spy 11 September The Prelude Issue 8 2002 pp 26- 33 
^ Mark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding Defending the Realm: MI5 and the Shavler Affair 
2000 p 4
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intrastate ones. The relationship between MI6 and the DGSE and DST are 
particularly friendly, fostered by common experiences -  in particular World 
War II, and the Falklands War -  but also by working against Irish terrorism 
(the Eksund for exam ple).C ountries bordering one another sometimes have 
common problems; hence a particular level of co-operation may develop. For 
example, Spain's CGI, whose main task is to combat ETA terrorism, has an 
external intelligence brigade that exercises surveillance over the movements 
of foreign terrorist gi oups and collaborates with allied services, particulaiiy in 
France. This collaboration also occurs in connection with migratoiy 
movements.
Nevertheless, the same level of camaraderie experienced by police officers is 
not shared by intelligence officers, principally because intelligence agencies 
symbolise an area of sovereignty that surpasses that represented by law- 
enforcement. They embody both the means to defend the state against often 
unseen external enemies, and also the offensive reach of that state, capable of 
proactive measures, for example, Israel’s “Wrath of God” policy following 
Munich 1972). Consequently, governments are extremely loath to 
compromise what they see as particularly puissant instruments of state with 
enhanced co-operative structures, recognising that the intelligence pooled into 
a multilateral “pot” would not be of any particular revelation; rather, the 
informal ad hoc system best facilitates the transfer of useful information as 
this guarantees who will receive it. The EU Member States are close, but
FAS Intelligence Resource Programme Intelligence e-Prints The Search for a European 
Intelligence Policy Charles Baker www.fas.org/irp/eprint/baker.html
Assembly of the WEU Document A/1775 The Ne^v Challenges facing European 
Intelligence -reply to the annual report o f the Council. Paragraph 52. Submitted on behalf of 
the Defence Committee by Mr Lemoine, Rapporteur
213
some are closer than others, and this also extends to their intelligence 
agencies.
In military matters, however, intelligence co-operation is significantly more 
advanced due to the structures within both NATO and Western European 
Union (WEU). It is at this level that Franco-German proposals for an EU 
intelligence service as a “core element” necessary to supplement the European 
rapid reaction force were made in December 1999.^ ®^  While this proposal 
generated some hostility, it was significantly less than that directed at the 
German proposal in 1991 for a Europol with operational powers.*®  ^ The UK, 
traditionally sceptical about such plans, was pragmatic in its response, 
admitting that it was “logically true” that an EU defence force would 
eventually require access to its own high-grade intelligence, but declared that 
its government was not interested in pooling intelligence across the board, 
only in improving the flow of tactical battle-field in telligence.T he recent 
creation of an intelligence division within the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS)^^^ illustrates this predilection. This division is staffed by 
approximately thirty officers who assist with situation assessments and early 
warning, and provide operational support in the event of a European 
engagement, although they cannot handle documentary evidence. Its officers 
are, however, able to contact their own Member State intelligence agencies to 
request and/or receive information from them.^ ®^  Such measures are more
102 The Sunday Times Europe plans its own spy agency 5 December 1999 p 24
See Chapter VI for a detailed discussion of |Europol.
The Sunday Times Europe plans its own spy agency 5 December 1999 p 24 
The BUMS was created following the Council of the European Union decision on 22 
January 2001.
Assembly o f the WEU. Op. Cit., paragraph 64
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advanced than those in the arena of counter-terrorism, but again this is due to 
the type of threat and response: a joint military force requires joint 
intelligence, and the instability of the eastern Adriatic coast has been seen, 
until the events of 11 September, as a much more serious threat to Europe 
than terrorism.
If many of the measures instigated by the EU Member States in the wake of 
11 September were simply an acceleration of the JHA Tampere Summit 
conclusions of October 1999, the changes undergone in terms of intelligence 
co-operation represent something entirely new. The Joint Intelligence Chiefs’ 
Task Force, established post-11 September, contributes little of novelty, 
maintaining as it does the traditional informal co-operative style. However a 
meeting of the JHA Council on 20 September 2001 provided the EU with a 
degree of organised intelligence co-operation amongst the Member States:
The Council would reiterate how important it is for the quality of 
Europol analyses that the police authorities and also the 
intelligence services of the Member States should quickly pass 
on any relevant information on terrorism,... The Council has 
decided to set up within Europol, for a renewable period of six 
months, a team of counter-terrorist specialists for which the 
Member States are invited to appoint liaison officers from police 
and intelligence services (author’s emphasis) specialising in the 
fight against terrorism
107 Ibid., paragraph 57
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Such a measure, whilst small, will for the first time place an element of the 
intelligence services under the partial jurisdiction of an EU intergovernmental 
body.
The European Council supported the JHA Council’s conclusions in this area, 
calling on it to:
undertake identification of presumed terrorists in Europe and of 
organisations supporting them in order to draw up a common list 
of terrorist organisations. In this connection improved co­
operation and exchange of information between all intelligence 
services of the Union will be required. Joint investigation teams 
will be set up to that end.^°^
The political will behind both these decisions illustrates the determination of 
the Member States to take steps to ensure that their agencies are working 
together in this matter. In effect this is a declaration of policy. The 
establishment of joint investigative teams takes co-operation beyond the 
simple exchange of information and into a new and proactive area. This is 
avant-garde thinking in terms of European intelligence, and its outcome will 
prove very interesting.
One should ask why the Member State governments have finally chosen to 
involve their intelligence agencies within the JHA sphere. The 11 September
Conclusion and Plan of Action of the Exti'aordinary European Council Meeting on 21 
September 2001 page 2
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attacks crossed the Rubicon, finally bringing home the concept of “New 
Terrorism” in no uncertain terms; fear has become one of the driving forces. 
However, one can also argue that these steps are ultimately symptomatic of 
the European integration process. If intelligence agencies are going to involve 
themselves in areas traditionally the concern of police authorities, then they 
too are inevitably going to be brought into the process at some point; from an 
integrationist perspective 11 September provided the raison d'etre for their 
inclusion. The European Council meeting in Ghent on 19 October 2001 
recognised this connection when it called for increased co-operation between 
the operational services responsible for combating terrorism: Europol, 
Eurojust, the intelligence services, police forces and judicial authorities.
Joint investigative teams bring these elements together, establishing through 
Europol a multi-pronged European approach. This, though, remains some 
distance fi'om the declaration made at the Franco-German summit 30 
November 1999, in which the two countries committed themselves to work 
together to enhance their intelligence capability: “we are determined to 
federalise the existing or future means...in order to create common European 
capacities” It does, however, indicate the first steps of an EU response to 
terrorism utilising intelligence capabilities outside that of the military 
spectrum.
Ghent European Council, Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the 
European Union and the President of the Commission Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks 
and the Fight Against Terrorism Brussels October 19 2001 SN 4296/2/01 page 2 
The Sunday Times Europe plans its own spy agency 5 December 1999 p 24
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Conclusions
The facilitatory structures pursuant to investigative co-operation outside the 
JHA field, although differing in capabilities, represent an understanding of the 
template employed within JHA. The methodology of the informal European 
structures has been eschewed by the JHA approach, preferring instead the 
more structured Interpol model. In developing this structured approach, the 
EU has learned from the flaws within the informal system, most pointedly 
demonstrated during the Lockerbie investigation. The informal approach, so 
valuable in establishing and nur turing the initial stage of European co­
operation against terrorism through its building of the trust required to pass on 
sensitive information, is one incapable of advancing co-operation beyond the 
structures’ competencies. It was because of these limitations that Trevi 
dissolved itself to make way for Europol. The new European Union presented 
too many challenges for the old style of co-operative policing. Equally, 
Interpol’s model could not simply be transposed onto the EU, as doing so 
would induce duplication. Rather what Interpol offered, as a model, was the 
capacity for information retention and a known port of enquiry. Both of these 
areas are significant features that have been expanded to create the leitmotif of 
Europol. The open EU, with law-enforcement co-operation now a security 
necessity rather than simply a tool for enforcing justice, requhes a known 
focal point for that co-operation. The informal structures were too small and 
secretive to offer the necessary public persona, neither were they capable of 
maintaining information on the scale that Interpol and the emphasis on 
analysis that it and Europol have developed. The EU required a European 
Interpol, under the control of EU machinery.
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This is not to say that the role of integrationist influences can be ignored in 
this area; again, as with regional border co-operation, collaboration has 
occur red in Europe precisely because of the closeness and integrative ties that 
have been developing since the end of World War II. These ad hoc structures 
were built, in part, by “catching the wind”, created by the drawing together of 
Europe. Their lack of true regulation is suggestive of a “natural” harnessing of 
integrative scope to achieve their desired ends; therefore we may well find that 
the emphasis on co-operation occurring at the coalface, as in the case of the 
PWGOT, has greater resemblance to neo-functionalist theory. However, the 
lack of actual regional commonality has activated a diluting effect, with co­
operation singularly occurring against a specific threat, and less emphasis 
placed on any additional “common neighbouring” threat. By moving towards 
the JHA regulated approach, however, we can expect to see increased control 
via intergovernmental policy, building upon what has been developed outside 
the EC/EU.
Nevertheless, the informal ad hoc structures have not been entirely discarded; 
they are the preferred tool of the intelligence agencies and the PWGOT. By 
retaining this ethos whilst also embracing the regulated approach, the best of 
both worlds remains available to the EU Member States. Counter-terrorist 
intelligence sharing in some cases still requires the back-door approach, due to 
particular* political sensitivity and the sometimes illicit means of intelligence 
acquisition. Consequently, gaps in the formalised Europol structure are 
compensated by the retention of the informal approach, and vice versa. The
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successes in smasliing al-Qaeda related cells thi'oughout Europe since 11 
September illustrate how the system has improved since Lockerbie. Indeed, 
by November 2001, over thirty significant arrests had been made in Europe.^ 
Curiously, these two systems are not mutually exclusive; both approaches 
operate within the JHA gamut. Although the PWGOT remains outside this 
field, thereby isolated from any regulatory tendencies of the European Project, 
intelligence agency co-operation has tentatively entered into exploratory co­
operation. The agencies have retained their informal approach within the JHA 
field through the Joint Intelligence Chiefs Task Force, whilst also reconciling 
the JHA’s regulatory approach with their involvement in Europol’s counter­
terrorist teams. How this will play out for the future of intelligence agency co­
operation, though, remains uncertain. What we may be seeing now is the 
emergence of a Trevi-equivalent structure, more regulated than the traditional 
intelligence agency co-operation, and possibly one which will evolve in a 
manner similar to Trevi. In any event, though, the co-operative methodology 
of the intelligence agencies is changing.
Let us not forget, though, the international dimensions of terrorism, once again 
so brutally reinforced through al-Qaeda’s attacks in America and possible 
links with the Bali bombing in October 2002.^^  ^ The development of Europol 
was always a contentious issue for its critics, who argued, rightly, that many of 
the thieats facing the EU were external to it, and therefore outside Europol’s 
remit; consequently why not concentrate on developing Interpol and its
BBC News Looking for European al~Qaeda 11 December 2001 
BBC News The Bali bombers ' network of terror 5 December 2002
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European Liaison Branch?^ This argument however detracts from the 
exclusive services that Europol is able to provide for the Member States, as 
well as what it represents from an integrationist standpoint. In building its 
European Police Office, however, the EU has not neglected its international 
commitments. Neither has Interpol played a secondary role to Europol; indeed 
co-operative data-sharing links have been developed between the two.
Interpol remains the co-operative arm through which the EU member States 
must work with when dealing with external issues. Without the part played by 
Interpol, with its newfound counter-terrorist role, the Lockerbie investigation 
could never have resulted in a trial. Neither would the high number of arrests 
of al-Qaeda suspects within Europe have been possible without Interpol’s 
involvement, as North African police files are a fundamental addition to the 
tracing and identification of suspects.
The post-11 September environment, though, has introduced some interesting 
changes to the overall system, perhaps the most surprising of which has been 
the introduction of intelligence agency officers into the Europol structure. The 
Council conclusions define this as a temporary measure, hence its review 
every six months. This should be thought of, however, as a more or less 
permanent measure, due to the fact that the “war on terrorism” is going to be a 
long-term issue and therefore this, or something similar, will likely remain in 
place for sometime to come. Additionally the JHA Council’s issuing, if not 
orders, then statements as to what is required of the intelligence agencies in 
the new environment demonstrates a European framework being brought to
Cyrille Fijnaut Police co-operation within Europe in Frances Heidenson and Martin Farrell 
(eds.) Crime in Europe 1991 pp 106-7
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bear on these agencies. Such a framework should prove to be as workable as 
that introduced into the policing system, due to the fact that the intelligence 
agencies are engaged in areas traditionally associated with policing, such as 
terrorism and drug trafficking -  and these are ones which require a 
transnational solution.
The lack of accountability associated with informal co-operative structures 
remains one of concern. Trevi, as the model for Europol, was particularly 
lacking in openness. To what extent has this “character defect” been 
transposed onto its JHA sibling? Equally, how will the accountability-lacking 
intelligence agencies fare in the new JHA approach? Elements within the JHA 
spectrum have a tendency to lose national accountability through working in 
the transnational sphere; it is worrisome therefore that these agencies may 
actually become less accountable than they already are. These arguments 
provide ever more ammunition to the call for a greater input fiom national 
parliaments into the JHA field to address this deficit.
Recognition of the need to adapt new approaches to crime led to the 
introduction of a regulated structural approach supporting the old informal 
style. This same approach is now beginning for the intelligence agencies. It is 
definitely too early to start talking about a European Intelligence Agency, but 
as we discuss Europol in the next couple of chapters, it quickly becomes 
apparent that its ultimate future remains questionable. Could it become a 
European FBI?
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Chapter VI
Co-operative Investigation against Terrorism
Part 2; The Third Pillar Gamut
As the EU grows ever more influential, there has been speculation that it will 
attract the attentions of terrorists who perceive it as an institutional target, just 
as left-wing European terrorists targeted NATO. Discounting the handful of 
bombings canied out by the xenophobic left-wing November 17 against EU 
buildings in Greece, this became reality with the revelation that German police 
foiled an attack by an al-Qaeda cell planning to release sarin gas into the 
European Parliament during a parliamentary session in February 2001. ’ This 
thwarted attack illustrates in stark terms the transnational capacity of 
teiTorism: a successful attack would have murdered MEPs and staff from all 
Member States. This episode should also serve as a warning that if the EU 
institutions can be targeted once, they can be so again. From this perspective, 
one sees the necessity of a co-ordinated European response to such threats.
This EU orientated response, such as it exists, is more actively illustrated 
through investigative co-operation rather than the sentinel designed Schengen 
approach. The European Police Office -  Europol -  is the showcase of 
European police co-operation, and unlike Schengen, it includes a specific 
mandate against terrorism. The JHA sphere also includes a number of other
 ^Daily Telegraph Bin Laden British cell planned gas attack on European Parliament 16 
September 2001: BBC News Terror cells “operating in the UfC 16 September 2001 
The date of the attack was planned at some point between 11-14 February 2001.
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elements conducive to co-operation: liaison officers, discussed briefly in 
Chapter II, are becoming a predominant feature within European policing, 
serving to strengthen the bonds between police forces throughout the EU, 
especially where the benefit of common experience provided for by a common 
border does not exist. The Police Chiefs’ Task Force established as part of the 
Tampere conclusions operates as a working party to facilitate co-operation. 
The European arena is also where the Member States have chosen to co­
ordinate their principal efforts against terrorism in the post-11 September 
environment. To this end, the Justice and Home Affairs Council, in September 
2001, made it clear that Europol would be considered the centre of EU’s 
counter-terrorist programme.^ This is no minor task. The successfiil co­
ordination of transnational counter-terrorism at both the strategic and tactical 
level is something that has continued to elude European governments.
This chapter is principally concerned with the development of Europol, 
because much of the EU’s counter-terrorist initiatives centre on it. 
Fundamentally, the issue to address is whether Europol is capable not just of 
providing a service for requesting law-enforcement bodies, but also of acting 
as an agent able to induce co-operation between these bodies across the board. 
Europol represents a significant break from the traditional informal style of 
law-enforcement co-operation, introducing regulations where none have 
existed before. Does the introduction of a permanent body further co­
operation or has it stymied the benefits of an informal system? To this end, 
the chapter’s analysis of Europol will expand to cover these other areas, noting
 ^Statewatch Post 11,9.01 analyses: No. 1 The “Conclusions” o f the Special Justice and Home 
Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 and their implications for civil liberties.
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in paiticular the level of co-operation between the Member States and 
Europol. This is important as it denotes the significance attributed to Europol 
as a counter-terrorist institution within the JHA gamut. Such attributes in turn 
would have some inference on Europol’s future direction; as the previous 
chapter concluded, this could have far-reaching connotations for European 
integration. Europol looks set to become a much more important player in the 
post-11 September enviromnent; consequently it is necessary not only to 
analyse its effectiveness in this chapter, but also to prepare the ground for the 
next, which discusses the directions towards which this area of co-operation 
should head.
Europol
Europol is not a European FBI; neither can it request the arrest of an 
individual. Rather Europol is a support structure without operational powers, 
designed to both facilitate and co-ordinate law-enforcement co-operation 
between the Member States. Implementation occurs through its headquarters 
in The Hague and its ELOs (European Liaison Officers) who provide linkage 
to each Member State’s law-enforcement body. Europol’s concern lies 
squarely with serious criminal activities that pose a threat to “two or more 
Member States in such a way as to require a common approach.. .owing to the 
scale, significance and consequences of the offences concerned” (Article 2.1, 
Europol Convention). Essentially this refers to international and organised 
crime in the form of trafficking drugs, vehicles, people (especially the sex 
trade) or radioactive material, paedophiliac rings, forgery of monies and
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terrorism. It opposes these threats thi'ough its principal tasks (as defined by 
Article 3 of the Europol Convention) which are:
1. To facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States.
2. To obtain, analyse and collate information and intelligence.
3. To notify the competent authorities of the Member States without 
delay via the national units of information concerning them and of any 
connections identified between criminal offences. ^
4. To aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant 
information to the national units.
5. To maintain a computerised system of collected information containing 
data.
The Schengen Implementing Convention’s purpose is to facilitate co-operation 
and provide an information system to ensure that the compensatory flanking 
measures necessary for open borders remain functional. Europol provides 
similar facilitatory measures; is there, then, an element of duplication?
Europol’s Computer System (TECS) obtains its data through the same 
voluntary input as the SIS; consequently, it has the same potential access to a 
vast host of information, and as such contains a massive database. Here 
similarities end. The TECS, unlike the SIS, holds criminal intelligence, 
thereby noting an immediate difference in its utilisation purpose, especially in 
terms of analysis. The Implementing Convention itself is primarily concerned
Europol’s equivalent o f Interpol’s NCB’s
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with regulating the behaviour of law-enforcement officers at the border points, 
facilitating co-operation at this level. Europol is not as “technically” 
orientated. It is not an agreement detailing the mechanics of co-operation; 
rather it is an organisation, capable of independent judgement.
Unlike the traditional informal approach, Europol is designed as a permanent 
structure, and hence has the capacity for “memory retention” inherent to most 
institutions. Information is not merely passed along; it can be retained for 
analysis by Europol’s staff. This transnational analysis is a particularly rare 
product by traditional co-operative law-enforcement standards. Before 
providing an analysis of EuropoTs competence however, a brief outline of its 
history is required.
A brief historv
The decision to begin work on a European Police Office began with 
Chancellor Kohl’s tabling the motion for the establisliment of such an office at 
a European Council meeting on 28-29 June 1991. The Europol project 
embodied EU co-operation and integration, hence its incorporation into 
European legislation via Chapter VI, Article K. 1 of the Third Pillar of the 
TEU 1992. It became functional earlier than planned, on 1 January 1994, in a 
single-issue capacity as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU). A meeting of the 
EU’s Justice and Interior Ministers, on 2 June 1993, decided that although 
work on Europol was far from complete it was felt necessary that something 
be put into the field due to “the ui'gent problems posed by international drug
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trafficking, associated money laundering and organised crime”/  During this 
interim period, the EDU’s mandate was limited, unable to utilise any 
“personal data” in its analysis, because no Convention existed for the EDU. 
Rather it relied on its utility as a forum for information exchange and its 
secondment of liaison officers to Member State police and custom authorities. 
Its remit, though, was extended in March 1995 to include trafficking in 
radioactive and nuclear substances, illicit vehicle trafficking, clandestine 
immigration networks, and all associated money-laundering activities.^ The 
extension was due to pressure from Germany, which was concerned about the 
increasing attempts to smuggle radioactive material from the Baltic States into 
Gennany.^ The increased rate of car crime was also cause for concern, with 
expensive cars such as Mercedes and BMWs stolen from Germany and 
transported eastwards to the lucrative new market in the former USSR.
Europol proper became functional after the signing of the Europol Convention 
on 26 July 1995. However, it was not until 10 October 1998 that it was able to 
subsume the EDU, as a three-month waiting period was required following the 
final Member State’s ratification of the Convention. During this period 
Europol continued to expand its role, obtaining a mandate against all forms of
Willy Bruggeman Europol: A Castle or House o f  Cards? in Alexis Pauly (ed.) De Schengen 
à Maastricht vole royale et course d’obstacles 1996 p20,
Work proper on Europol had only recently begun. At the Maastricht Summit in December 
1991, the European Council asked the Trevi Ministers to take, in co-operation with the 
Commission, the measures necessary for the rapid establishment of Europol. As a result of 
this decision, a project group was formed in Strasbourg, September 1992, to prepare 
implementation of the EDU.
 ^Willy Bruggeman Policing Europe: A New Wave in Monica den Boer (ed.) The 
Implementation of Schengen: First the Widening. Now the Deepening 1997 p 119 
 ^It has since been revealed, however, that some of the aiTests in radioactive material 
smuggling cases were BND stings, and a subsequent report concluded that of the 182 
smuggling cases recorded between June 1993 and may 1995, none had produced any 
information regarding potential employers. Aside fi-om the BND the market only had a supply 
side at that time.
Michael Smith New Cloak. Old Dagger 1996 pp 264-5
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human trafficking, including the sex trade in women and children, in 
November and December 1996, following the notorious Dutroux case in 
Belgium/ Its mandate against tenorism came into effect on 1 July 1999, but 
only after political pressure from Spain and Greece, despite the concept having 
already been agreed during the November 1993 JHA Council.
The Treaty of Amsterdam provided another significant development for 
Europol when it was agreed that its powers should be augmented to include 
the granting of “operative powers” to the fledgling police structure. This 
“operative” mandate is distinct from “operational” powers, to which countries 
such as France and Britain are inherently hostile. Rather these “operative” 
powers permit Europol employees to accompany national police forces on 
joint operations in an advisory capacity. Amsterdam allows Europol to 
request information from national police authorities, and if necessary, to 
conduct investigations on their behalf.
How Europol operates.
Europol receives its information from its ELOs -  police officers seconded by 
national forces -  who travel between The Hague and their respective National 
Bureaux. These serve as the collection point of data input, as well as for 
requests to Europol. In many ways, this is reminiscent of how Inteipol
’ This mandate was clarified at a JHA Council meeting on 3 December 1998 following the 
shocking revelation o f a number of paedophile rings operating in Europe the previous year. 
Traffic in human bemgs now encompassed the “production, sale or distribution of child 
pornography material” (paragraph 3). The characteristics of this abhon ent trade revealed 
networks criss-crossing the Member States, making it a crime well suited to the remit of 
Europol.
229
operates. Indeed, some Member States have centralised this aspect of co­
operation, placing both their ELOs and ILOs under one roof, as the UK has 
done with NCIS, By placing a human element at this point, the Member 
States not only have some control over the information that is entered, but the 
ELO is in a position to establish personal contacts which facilitate the passing 
of sensitive intelligence that they would not otherwise have direct access to.^
The information passed on by the ELO is stored in the TECS, which is 
comprised of an information, an analysis and an index system, capable of 
informing authorised individuals about the existence of specific data.^ Like 
Interpol, its members can request information from Europol, and Europol can 
issue alerts. However, the main benefit to this information is the heavy focus 
Europol places on investigative analysis at both the operational and strategic 
level. Unlike traditional methods of handling the exchange of information, 
Europol provides concrete measures relating to such exchanges and enquiries 
on a parallel to Interpol’s specifications for teiTorist intelligence as stipulated 
in Title VI of the Convention (Articles 13-25, along with 7-12 from Titles II 
and III). By employing a “collection plan”, Europol’s analysts adopt the 
principle of only selecting the information that is required, as opposed to what 
may be useful in the future, thereby saving time and energy.EuropoTs 
analysis is therefore very much service-orientated, generating a product for
® Didier Bigo Liaison Officers in Europe in James Sheptycki (Ed.) Issues in Transnational 
Policing 2000 p 79
 ^Technical delays have meant that the information system is currently in a provisional 
operational phase (1 January 2002) with a more advanced system linked to all Member States 
and accessable in all these languages to follow (Fact Sheet on Europol. 1 January 2003, 
Europol Website).
Jürgen Storbeck Co-ordinating the Flow o f European Intelligence: Europol’s 
Accountability Mechanisms in Monica den Boer (ed.) Undercover Policing and Accountability 
from an International Perspective 1997 p 118
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requesting national authorities. The concern here, however, is that in adopting 
this approach Europol may well discard “dormant” intelligence that could be 
useful only at a later date, tliereby possibly failing to prevent a future attack or 
threat, due in part to the client-consultant approach it has adopted. However, 
EuropoTs analysts are also trained to focus on missing information, as well as 
the intelligence that they already have; consequently, some gaps and 
weaknesses in the information can at times be filled in.
The best analysis of course requhes the best intelligence, and trust is often a 
prerequisite in obtaining the most sensitive information. The ELOs are 
capable of building a certain element of trust; ultimately, though, this is 
defined by EuropoTs utilisation of it. Criminal intelligence entering a 
common pool certainly attracts a great deal more concern from its donors than 
non-criminal information. Europol has approached this by placing partitions 
within this common pool.
When Europol conducts an investigation, the analysis produced is derived 
from the information provided by individual Member States. However, that 
information cannot be disclosed to any other investigation concurrently 
underway within Europol, even if it might be relevant. To provide an 
illustration of this: suppose an investigation by EuropoTs Organised Crime 
Unit contains information provided by France, Italy and the UK (Group A) 
and an investigation by the Terrorism Unit contains information provided by 
Spain, Portugal and Germany (Group B). Both investigations contain 
information provided by different groups of Member States, and because of
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this there can be no cross-contamination of evidence, even if it were suspected 
that there was a common link between the two cases (in any case all 
investigations are run separately). The outcome of the investigation is a 
product for the agencies of Group A only (and vice versa). The single 
exception to this is that of the unit dealing with financial crime, which may 
pass on any relevant information that it uncovers to a counter-terrorist 
investigation, because the methods used to fund terrorist groups aie sometimes 
unearthed in investigating the irregularities behind financial fraud. This rule 
may not make for common sense, but there is a necessary logic behind it. By 
maintaining these strict paiameters. Member States and their law-enforcement 
agencies can be assured that they are retaining an element of control over the 
often-sensitive information that they input into Europol. Europol currently has 
the Membership of fifteen sovereign countries; none of these members are 
recklessly going to throw sensitive information relating to security into a 
common pot, especially when that information is connected to terrorism. It 
need not always be a case of how far you trust your neighbours either; often 
information is dealt with on a “need to know” basis. This system does help 
gainer trust, but as one can see, the price paid impedes the benefits of 
interfacing between different imits, thereby reducing the potential of an 
internal intelligence exchange that could otherwise aid an investigation. One 
suspects however that these barriers may become more porous as Europol and 
European integration develops. Euiopol faced much initial scepticism from 
European police agencies when it was first established, and the barriers were 
necessary to encourage these agencies to provide worthwhile intelligence. 
However, with Europol now the JHA Council’s main instrument against
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terrorism, these barriers could be relaxed -  altered so that any linked 
information that is discovered in one investigation can only be provided to 
another with the express permission of the contributing Member State. In this 
way, highly sensitive information relating to terrorism, and moreover, how it 
was obtained, could still be protected.
The TECS
The TECS plays an important role in EuropoTs analysis capabilities, collating 
intelligence gathered from soui'ces such as the police and intelligence agencies 
of the Member States, as well as Third Party sources such as states and 
international organisations. This information strictly relates to:
1. persons who, in accordance with the national law of the Member 
States concerned ai e suspected of having committed or having taken 
part in a criminal offence for which Europol is competent under 
Article 2 or who have been convicted of such an offence;
2. persons who there are serious grounds under national law for 
believing will commit criminal offences for which Europol is 
competent under Article 2
(Article 8)
It is noteworthy that Clause Two gives grounds to include members of 
proscribed groups, even if they have yet to commit an actual offence beyond 
that of membership. This is further enforced thiough Article 8.3, which
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contains a number of devices useful against organised criminal groups; .the 
information system may also be used to store, modify and utilise the following 
details concerning the persons refened to in paragraph 1”:
1. Criminal offences, alleged crimes and when and where they were 
committed.
2. Methods which were or may be used to commit the crimes.
3. Departments handling the case and their filing reference.
4. Suspected membership of a criminal organisation.
5. Convictions, where they relate to criminal offences for which 
Europol is competent under Article
Perhaps most interesting is the novel approach taken by Articles 8.3(1) and (4) 
which allow for the inclusion of inconclusive data. This data includes the 
details of individuals whom the police “know” to be guilty but are unable to 
prove before the judicial system. This is particularly characteristic of 
terrorism and organised crime, where the individuals concerned take 
precautions against being associated with particular incidents, but is also 
because intelligence sources/and or sui veillance techniques are too sensitive to 
be revealed in court. Such incorporation provides a level of intelligence 
previously unavailable on a Europe-wide level, but one essentially limited to 
researching a background on a suspect; however in doing so it would 
undoubtedly help trigger “alann bells” were that suspect engaged in any 
similar or associated activity. A hypothetical example of the practical usage
Article 8.2 provides for basic information on details such a names and aliases, sex, 
nationality, place and date of birth and physical characteristics.
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provided by this system is that of a Spaniard in France suspected of drug 
smuggling. A request to Europol by the French police would reveal that the 
suspect also had suspected links with ETA. At this point, the French police 
would contact their Spanish colleagues and inform them of these 
developments, and some form of co-operative procedure could be set in 
motion. Furthermore, these clauses introduce the potential to provide a 
reference pool that would be extremely useful to a police authority, where a 
terrorist group, of whom they have no prior experience, has begun to operate 
on their soil.
One potential problem of including inconclusive data is the different operating 
procedures of law-enforcement bodies. If one observes how differing 
operating styles led to tensions between the BKA and Scottish police during 
the Lockerbie investigation, one can equally ascertain that with no regulations 
determining what is an “alleged crime” or “suspected” membership of a 
proscribed organisation, each agency can input data determined through 
divergent styles of policing. The BKA for example is less likely to include 
inconclusive data, as their style of policing centres around determining hard 
facts; but how will they view information from other sources that may be 
associated more with conjecture?
The second area of concern again relates to the sensitivity of terrorist- 
associated intelligence entering a common pool. The barriers placed within 
the analytical process refer solely to the analytical service and not the common 
database in general. While this information can be accessed only by an ELO,
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this does not guarantee which agencies may examine it. One could question 
for example how far Member States are prepaied to place information on 
Turkish or Middle Eastern terror groups into the TECS pool when this can be 
accessed by Greece, whose role in counter-terrorism has, until the recent 
decimation of November 17 in the summer of 2002, been abysmal. The US 
State Department has described Greece as “one of the weakest links in 
Europe’s efforts against terrorism”. Greece was also the European country 
most sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, while her mutual animosity to 
Turkey has also led her to develop sympathies with the PKK.*  ^ The most 
practical solution to this has been to mark particularly sensitive information 
for country X, Y and/or Z only. This of course creates a tiered system, even 
within the commonality of Europol, ensuring that some Member States will 
not be in a position to receive the full array of benefits available from Europol. 
In certain respects, one can see paiallels with the informal style of co­
operative information exchange emerging here. Greece however, in her desire 
to host the 2004 Olympic Games, together with the international pressure that 
was brought to bear on the authorities following the murder by November 17 
of the British defence attaché. Brigadier Stephen Saunders, in Athens on 8 
June 2000, has recently developed a more aggressive attitude towards 
terrorism, including close co-operation with the UK and American 
authorities.*"  ^ In this respect, one might see the closed information circle
US Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 Europe Overview: Greece. It 
has been widely speculated that elements within the Greek government and security structure 
have protected November 17, as it is difficult to comprehend the ineptitude capable of 
producing zero aiTests over a twenty-seven year period. Perhaps the forthcoming trials of the 
group’s members might now reveal the truth.
 ^Pati ick Seale Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire 1992 p 265 
BBC News Viewpoint: Greece’s anti-terror troubles 19 June 2002
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opening to the Greek authorities because of this, especially after its success in 
crushing November 17 during the summer of 2002.
lED Database
EuropoTs bomb database also serves as an important analytical tool against 
tenorism. The database functions as a directory of technical details relating to 
explosive devices. It works on the principle that terrorist bomb makers have 
distinctive signatures in their construction styles, and consequently it is 
possible for a counter-terrorist explosives expert to determine who designed 
the bomb, or at the very least the group responsible for it. The database allows 
a national authority to input teclinical information regarding lEDs, which can 
then be cross-referenced by another police authority entering details of an lED 
that they wish to identify.
The role of liaison officers
Liaison officers, seconded to the law-enforcement authorities from another 
Member State serve as the “human” or personal element of co-operation 
within the ongoing development of co-operative structure building:
We put people in contact with one another, overcoming cultural 
and procedural differences and language problems. We are 
privileged intermédiaires between our home and host
Personal interview with Mariano Simancas, Head o f Europol C-T Unit, 30 May 2001 The 
Hague.
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countries.. .People come to see us as soon as they have to contact 
someone from our side.^^
Some are seconded on a bilateral basis to other national authorities such as 
counter-terrorist officers between the BKA headquarters in Wiesbaden and the 
Unité de la Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terrorism (UCLAT) in Paris or the 
Metropolitan Police Headquarters (Scotland Yard) in London for example. 
Didier Bigo estimates that France currently has nineteen bilateral liaison 
officers seconded to six other Member States and is preparing to cover all 
fifteen, as well as increasing the number of officers in each country. At the 
multilateral level, they are provided to structures such as Interpol and Europol. 
Their purpose is essentially to facilitate co-operation between the national 
authorities of the Member States. Being the interface point for information 
transfer is an important aspect of this. The development of trust between such 
contact points, permitting the exchange of sensitive information has already 
been described; equally important, though, are the skills developed by these 
officers in quickly finding the information and sending it were it can be most 
readily utilised.
Beyond these practical concerns, however, is the role played by these officers 
in the globalisation and Europeanisation of policing. Secondment of liaison 
officers, while only a sideline issue to the central mission of their respective 
agencies, does much to introduce a cosmopolitan element into certain areas of 
policing. These officers experience new outlooks on issues, generate new
Bigo, Op. Cite., p 78.
Ibid., p 77
Ibid., pp 77-8
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ideas, develop new contacts; these are then transferred back to the home 
agency (and of course are imparted by the guest to the host). One senior 
officer described the importance of secondments for the officer concerned as 
well as the home force. Fresh ideas and outlooks are necessary to prevent 
stagnation within a force, and to help it keep apace with ongoing 
developments in crime. This cosmopolitan influence does not directly affect 
the average officer “on the beat”; it is directed towards the higher spectrum of 
policing, where policy decisions are taken. Officers, so seconded, have 
invariably been marked for fast-track promotion and their European 
experiences will mean that within a decade or so, a new generation of police 
officers with, if not a European outlook, then at least an appreciation of it, will 
have taken their places within the senior decision-making ranks. This outlook 
of course varies from individual to individual. Some officers remain “national 
police officers abroad”, who remain untouched by any “Europeaness”, 
viewing the experience as one limited to increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of tackling transnational crime.^° Surprisingly, counter-terrorist, 
officers have a greater tendency to fall into this category, despite the fact that 
it was this discipline, along with that of narcotics officers, which made the 
first imoads into European co-operative policing, and by the nature of the 
crime, have been involved in it ever since. One of Bigo’s contacts described 
their function as “sales representatives, selling the image of our police force 
abroad”:
Personal interview with John Boyd QPM CBE, former Chief Constable o f Dumfries and 
Galloway Constabulary 1 March 2001 Lochwmnoch.
Bigo, Op. Cit., p 79
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Too many things keep us apart...We’re also competing to sell 
our police model outside Europe. You can make a packet that 
way. Criminal investigation police officers are often less aware 
of national interests than we are.. .when it comes to 
terrorism...it’s a lot less straightforward.^^
Certainly, an officer involved in counter-terrorism will soon appreciate the 
national interest because of the significance of the political connotations. 
However, does this account for a more cynical approach towards European 
co-operation? Governments do put great stock in their counter-terrorist 
systems, as these are designed to confront those who directly challenge their 
legitimacy to govern. Both Trevi and the PWGOT were the products of a UK 
approach to counter-terrorism, and the UK’s desire to retain the latter as the 
single vehicle for police co-operation against teiTorism strikes resonantly with 
the counter-terrorist officer’s words above.
If counter-ten'orism is heavily involved in the national outlook, then its 
competitiveness at the European level does in fact serve to enhance its 
efficiency, as it is continually looking to hone itself against competitors. If all 
the European counter-terrorist systems follow this same logic then they can 
only ever improve. The danger arises only if some systems actually start to 
lose the “race” and a foreign system takes over. A single generic counter­
terrorist template could not sufficiently account for the nuances of individual 
policing systems within Europe; ultimately there is a risk of stagnation. This
21 Ibid., p 79
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competitive edge, then, is actually a positive feature among counter-terrorist 
liaison officers.
Europol’s European Liaison Officers (ELOs) are an important aspect of the 
structure, as they serve as the approachable face, facilitating information 
transfer from the Member States to Europol and vice-versa. Additionally 
Europol operates a policy whereby the ELO handling a case continues to see it 
through from beginning to end, rather than transferring it to another ELO or 
another body. This procedure ensures continuity in case-handling. The ELOs 
are also required to provide twenty-four hour availability, thereby helping to 
reduce the possibility of an investigation failing simply because there was no 
one at the other end of the phone. This ensures for an element of continuity 
and professionalism, encouraging a build-up of trust between Europol and the 
national authorities.
The co-ordination of counter-terrorist co-operation
The importance attached to a co-ordinated effort against terrorism cannot be 
emphasised enough. If the willing transfer of intelligence and analysis 
provides the authorities with the missing piece of the jigsaw, the evidence for 
a conviction in a court of law, or simply a greater understanding of a group or 
individual, then the co-ordination of efforts represents the strategic and/or 
tactical co-operation. At a simple level, the British Army’s adoption of its 
patrol strategy to reflect that of the IRA’s sniping teams led to the introduction 
of co-ordinated patrols, operating to deter the sniper tlrrough minimising their
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ability to successfully escape if they were to fire on one of the patrols.^^ At 
another level, law-enforcement agencies will, where possible, co-ordinate 
simultaneous arrests against a criminal or terrorist group, to prevent alerting 
the other targets to the aiTests.^  ^ “Operation Twins” below, illustrates how 
such efforts can be transferred to the transnational level.
The transnational aspect of much of the terrorism in Europe demonstrates the 
necessity of a co-ordinated transnational approach. This approach, however, 
goes beyond the arrest of terrorist suspects on a co-ordinated transnational 
scale. The development of a co-ordinated strategy is as important as co­
ordinated operations. Al-Qaeda’s achievement in developing a global network 
is tmly staggering, illustrating in the starkest terms that tactical co-operation 
alone is insufficient to tackle the threat. Strategic co-ordination involves the 
co-operating bodies determining a co-ordination of efforts beyond that of 
immediate arrests; specifically the considerations of the longer-term goals 
become equally as valid. Will the execution of a series of arrests, for example, 
lead to a significant hampering of the group’s operations, or would continued 
surveillance generate more fruitful results later on? Alternatively, is a new 
approach required? Essentially this relates national counter-terrorist issues 
and considerations to the transnational level as well as the national. The 
achievement of such a strategy is by no means easy, as it may require a 
Member State to take a decision that is contrary to immediate national
^  C.J.M Drake Terrorists’ Target Selection 1998 pl28; Toby Harndem Bandit Country 1999 p 
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^ Such arrests often take the form of “dawn raids”, occurring in the early hours o f the 
morning, when the targets are usually asleep and too disorientated to put up effective 
resistance. Spam’s arrest, for example, o f what it described as “almost the entire political 
leadership of the group (ETA)” occurred in a series of pre-dawn raids on 13 September 2000. 
(BBC News Basque arrests hailed as a "victory” 13 September 2000)
242
interests. Both British and German authorities were involved in the series of 
arrests that thwarted the sarin gas attack on the European Parliament. The 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch, however, subsequently released the six 
Algerians arrested in London within days after a request by the Security 
Service, who had uncovered evidence of further atrocities and wanted to 
monitor the group. Accordingly, MEPs were not informed of the details, and 
only an email was circulated warning about lapsed security in the building.^"  ^
Being involved in this operation, the consent of the German authorities would 
have been required to allow the withholding of this information, especially as 
German MEPs had been equally at risk. Here we see the complexities of 
“controlled delivery” applied to counter-terrorism.
Successful Franco-Spanish co-operation against ETA illustrates the merits of a 
co-ordinated approach. France aggressively targets ETA as a group at both 
the unilateral and bilateral level. This level of co-operation goes beyond the 
French implementation of Spanish arrest requests. It has developed a strategic 
quality that acknowledges ETA as a threat to Spanish security that requires 
active French assistance to counter it. France, therefore, can be considered a 
partner rather than merely a sympathetic state. The level of co-operation 
requires French involvement in the discussion of Spain’s long-term goals on 
the problem of ETA. France’s current level of commitment against ETA 
would be far lower if it considered its strategic involvement to be insufficient. 
This sti'ategy is demonstrated not only through the wave of arrests that have 
followed since the termination of ETA’s ceasefire, but also in the systematic
Daily Telegraph Bin Laden British cell planned gas attack on European Parliament 16 
September 2001
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approach taken. Many of the arrests occurring in France in September 2000 
were aimed at suspected explosives experts and key technicians, imperative in 
order to neutralise ETA’s ordnance capabilities.^^ Transferring this successful 
example of co-ordinated bilateral co-operation to a broader transnational 
theatre, however, is an altogether more complicated process.
European co-ordination efforts, for the most part, have focused on combating 
dmg trafficking and paedophile rings rather than tenorism. Partially this may 
be because the mechanics of a successful counter-terrorist operation are rarely 
divulged, since it is in no one’s interests to make life easy for terrorists. 
Primarily though it is because of the prevalent perception of terrorism being 
largely an issue requiring address at the national, rather than the transnational 
level. This is certainly the case regarding Basque and Irish nationalism, or 
movements similar to the left-wing ideologies of the Red Army Faction and 
Red Brigades, who essentially restricted themselves to attacking the 
authorities of their own state.^^ Regrettably, this has also been the approach 
commonly taken against transnational terrorists. Although the Member States 
have engaged in establishing information exchange and processing structures 
over the years, little has been accomplished at the actual enforcement level. 
Transnational/international terrorists are dealt with by Member States on an 
individual basis, reflecting policy motivations. Italy’s handling of the Achille 
Lauro hijackers in October 1985 succinctly illustrates this prerogative. While 
the four Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) hijackers were tried and sentenced,
Guardian Unlimited Arms cache seized as Spain moves to crush Eta 20 September 2000 
^ While the Spanish, British, French and Irish governments have become much more attuned 
with the concept of in-depth co-operation to counter these nationalist groups, it is still correct 
to emphasise the priority o f the target state to address its own internal security problems and 
solutions.
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the Italian authorities refused America’s extradition warrant for the suspected 
orchestrator, Abul Abbas, granting him instead safe passage from Italy, Italy’s 
motives here stem from a deal she had struck with the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) promising it non-interference and moderate political 
support in return for a guarantee exempting Italian citizens and territory from 
PLO operations?^ The Italian authorities were able to overlook this event 
despite the Achille Lauro being an Italian liner, for tliree reasons: firstly the 
PLO had not been directly involved, and secondly the passenger who had been 
murdered, Leon Klinghoffer, was an American citizen, not Italian. The third 
is the most important in terms of realpolitik: Abbas, although leader of the 
PLF, was also a close associate of Yasser Arafat and a senior member of the 
PLO’s Executive Committee.^^ To hand over such a senior figure to the US 
might have jeopardised the agilement or invited retaliatory attacks, especially 
when Abbas was seen to have negotiated the surrender of the hijackers at Port 
Said in Egypt. Reasons of State therefore may also have a role to play in such 
events, circumventing territorial law. A co-ordinated co-operative 
investigation is more predisposed than the sharing of intelligence to producing 
circumstances at odds with a sovereign Member State’s right to deal with 
internal security thi eats as it sees fit. Lockerbie provides a potent reminder of 
the obstacles that can arise. Traditionally, co-ordinated investigations have 
never been a particularly strong feature of European co-operation against 
terrorism, but this is changing.
Peter Chalk West European Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic 1996 
p l l
George Rosie The Directoiv o f International Terrorism 1986 pp 37-40
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Europol’s co-ordinating ability
Europol is not limited to processing information; it has the ability to co­
ordinate joint operations with the co-operation of Member States as part of its 
support capacity (Article 5.4). A recent example of this is “Operation Twins”, 
a UK-led operation that smashed a major Internet paedophile ring. Europol 
played a central role in supporting and co-ordinating the twelve-month 
intelligence-led operation, processing the information on a daily basis from the 
participating states -Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and the UK -  ultimately leading 
to simultaneously executed dawn raids in seven countries, with fifty ai’rests.^^
Europol has demonstrated its ability to co-ordinate operations against drug and 
people smuggling, and child pornography rings. With a mandate granted to it 
against terrorism in May 1999, it has been able to offer this same service. To 
date however, Europol has yet to issue a press release providing evidence of 
its involvement in a counter-terrorist operation. This is not because of any 
desire to keep its involvement secret due to security reasons; it is simply 
because it has not been involved. Certainly Europol would not release 
evidence of involvement in an ongoing operation, but there is little evidence of 
any such involvement prior t o l l  September. This supposition is based on the 
transnational co-operation occumng before 11 September surrounding the 
Strasbourg Plot, where the evidence demonstrates a lack of Europol 
involvement in co-ordinating an investigation that clearly required it (see
29 Europol Press Release Internet Based Paedophile Gang Smashed in Worldwide Police 
Swoop 2 July 2002
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below). Rather Europol’s role in this capacity has been more limited to its 
custodianship of the Terrorism Skills Directory. This directory was 
established in October 1996 as a means of maintaining a register of 
“specialized counter-terrorist competences, skills and expertise in the Member 
States”, and it is updated biannually to ensure relevancy. Initially it was held 
by the Presidency of the EU (after a preliminary interim year under the UK), 
but to allow for continuity, Europol was later given these competences. In 
practical terms, the directory has proved a useful tool in the crisis management 
of a terrorist situation. The siege of a kindergarten in Wasserbillig, 
Luxembourg at the end of May 2000 by a lone Tunisian gunman illustrates the 
practical utilisation of the directory. Upon being alerted to the incident, the 
authorities did not know if they were dealing with a terrorist incident; but in 
any event, Luxembouig is too small to justify maintaining a specialist hostage- 
negotiating team. Consequently, the directory was consulted to see which 
Member State had such a team, and one suited to the particular circumstances 
i.e. with translators, but above all, which was nearest.^^ The Luxembourg 
Gendarmerie were not equipped or trained to the same professional standards 
as their European colleagues in the event that “intervention” should prove 
necessary. Accordingly, an anti-terrorist unit from Germany assisted in the 
siege.^ ^
In fairness, however, one should also consider the relatively short period in 
which Europol has been involved in counter-teiTorism, weighing that against 
the actual number of cases of transnational terrorism where its co-ordinating
Personal interview with Mariano Simancas, Head o f Europol C-T Unit, 30 May 2001 The 
Hague.
BBC News Disguised police shoot gunman 2 June 2000
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role could have been utilised. Relatively few such cases have emerged: the 
arrest in Naples in October 2000 of eleven Algerians belonging to Al hidjra 
wal takftr, on charges of association with and arms smuggling to terrorist 
groups in Algeria; and the arrest of six North Afiicans in Geimany and Italy, 
in April 2001 on charges of arms and explosives smuggling and forging 
documents.^^ In both cases, these arrests revealed interlinkages with similar 
groups throughout Europe, along with suspected links to al-Qaeda. The 
prosecutor’s office in Naples described this as “part of a Euiope-wide network 
operating in Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland”.^  ^ In the case of the 
latter, it is believed that the group were involved with the planned Christmas 
bombing of Strasbourg, which was aborted after a tip-off to the police. In 
Italy, these arrests had followed similar operations by police against suspected 
Islamic extremist groups in the country, demonstrating the prolificacy of these 
groups. Gerardo D Ambrosio, an investigating magistrate, believed that the 
Milan cell miglit have had contacts with forty or fifty other Islamist recruiters 
in Europe.^"  ^ The comiections that these groups had beyond Italy illustrates an 
opportunity for Europol to test its counter-terrorism mandate in an active role. 
The measures taken, however, in following up these connections were left 
very much to the traditional spirit of law-enforcement co-operation against 
international terrorism.
BBC News Eleven Algerians arrested in Italy 17 October 2001 ; BBC News Police seize 
"Islamic guerrillas 5 April 2001
One other ongoing investigation was that into Djame Beghal’s revelations of a plot to bomb 
the US Embassy on 13 September in the days leading up to 11 September. However, this was 
primarily carried out by security services of co-operating Member States rather than their 
police agencies. (Jane Corbin The Base 2002 pp 202-3)
 ^BBC News Eleven Algerians arrested in Italy 17 October 2000 
Los Angles Times U.S. Sees New Terrorist Threat From N. Africa 8 July 2001 (online 
edition)
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The Strasbourg Plot
A North African terrorist cell with links to al-Qaeda planned a bombing 
campaign in the heart of the French border town of Strasbourg in the run-up to 
Chiistmas 2000, with targets including the Christmas market and the European 
Parliament?^ A tip-off led German police to raid an apartment in Frankfurt, 
arresting four suspects and discovering weapons, chemicals for making 
explosives and a video of suspected targets in Strasbourg?^
A series of investigations and arrests occurring throughout Europe in the 
following months illustrated the interlinkage between these cells. The co­
ordinated arrests in April 2001 between Geiman and Italian police led to the 
arrest of a number of those suspected of involvement in the Strasbourg plot. 
The thwarted sarin gas attack against the European Par liament by the British 
and Germans also demonstrates the determination of these terrorist groups to 
target this institution and the symbolism they have attached to it. The British 
followed this up with “Operation Odin” in February, aimed at suspected 
militants involved in the Strasbourg plot, along with a London based group 
believed to serve as a contact point for terrorist operatives in Europe and as an 
al-Qaeda recruitment centre.^^ These investigations against international 
terrorists have proved better than past ones in terms of co-operation.
D'Ambrosio stated that Italy had received exceptional co-operation ftom
BBC News Spain to extradite bin Laden suspect 25 June 2001 ; Wall Sti eet Journal Foiled 
Strasbourg plot underscores obstacles to fighting terrorism 24 October 2001 
The Guardian Al-Qaeda cell in UK "planned attack" 26 October 2001 
Corbin, Op. Cit., p 198; Los Angles Times U.S. Sees New Terrorist Threat From N. Africa 8 
July 2001 (on line edition)
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police and justice officials in other EU countries in their investigations?^ 
AiTests have occurred in waves in the ten months following the thwarted plot, 
primarily in Italy, France, Germany and Spain. However the investigations 
against these terrorist cells throughout these Member States have occurred 
separately, with a lack of trust quick to pervade, leading to the re-emergence 
of old divisions after an initially promising start. One particular 
manifestation of this obstacle was after the Italian police informed their 
Spanish colleagues of an earlier visit to Spain in March by Essid Sami Ben 
Khemais, one of the Tunisians whom they had arrested in Gallarate. The 
Italians’ grievance was that their Spanish colleagues had not passed to them 
any information about acquaintances made by Khemais during his time in 
Spain; indeed, no intelligence was communicated until the Spanish authorities 
arrested these acquaintances some six months later. Another aspect of the 
investigation thr eatened the amiable Franco-Spanish co-operation against ETA 
when Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s leading anti-terrorism magistrate, 
threatened to halt all assistance in this area if Spain did not assist in tackling 
Islamic groups, after Spanish authorities did not follow up on one of his 
Muslim-related investigations.
These particular examples illustrate a lack of Europol involvement in any form 
of co-ordinating capacity; otherwise the problem would not have been as 
extensive. Prima facie, the evidence does suggest a reverting to type, but this 
does not take into account the fact that all four countries involved in the
BBC News Police seize "Islamic guerrillas 5 April 2001
Wall Street Journal Foiled Strasbourg plot underscores obstacles to fighting terrorism 24 
October 2001 
Ibid.
250
investigations are attempting to iron out some of the co-ordination issue 
through Pro-Eurojust (whose powers have been increased in the wake of 11 
September)?^ Their involvement with this agency rather than with Europol 
suggests that it was judicial problems, not policing ones, which were 
responsible for the breakdown in co-operation. Belgium’s refusal to extradite 
Tarek Maai‘oufi, an Islamic preacher, to Italy on terrorism charges, on the 
grounds that Belgium does not have any legislation specifically tar geting 
terrorism, and that Maaroufi possesses Belgian citizenship"^  ^has led to much 
misgiving from the Italians who argued that Maaroufi is a central figure in the 
Strasbourg plot. Pro-Eurojust will find this particular case difficult to 
detangle because European states are not obliged to extradite their own 
citizens. Complications regarding judicial co-operation clearly have played 
their part here; beyond this, however, the evidence is indicative either of crass 
indifference or a rivalrous outlook set upon national priorities and pride and a 
disdain towaids “interference” in matters. Spain’s refusal to provide the 
Italians with information about Khemais’ contacts, for example, could be 
construed as an attempt to arrest these individuals without the Italian 
authorities requesting information or extradition, which they may see as 
somehow compromising their investigation. Alternatively, it could have been 
glory seeking or simple incompetence. The lack of Europol’s involvement at 
a grass-roots level suggests that the four Member States still perceived these 
investigations as essentially national ones, and certainly not problems 
requiring a transnational solution despite the interlocking nature of the North
See Chapter VIII for details o f Pro-Eurojust.
Wall Street Journal Foiled Strasbourg plo t underscores obstacles to fighting terrorism 24 
October 2001
See Chapter VIII for a discussion o f extradition and this case.
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African cells. Under such conditions, Europol would also be regarded as an 
unnecessary or unwelcome addition to the investigation. Taking these 
considerations into mind, it would appear that counter-terrorist efforts against 
international threats have remained problematic for European law- 
enforcement co-operation. However, it is possible to discern a reversal and 
redress of these problems in the ensuing global co-operation in the aftermath 
of the 11 September attacks.
Co-operation and co-ordination in the post-11 September environment
The al-Qaeda attacks against America and the revelation of subsequent 
planned attacks in Europe have significantly eroded the traditional outlook 
associated with international tenorism. There has been “unprecedented co­
ordination among European security services and police forces” in the months 
following 11 September." "^  ^ Numerous arrests have occuned throughout the 
EU Member States, many of which have been due not only to the increased 
sharing of information, but also to the number of investigations operating at a 
transnational level. The arrests on 10 October, in a joint operation between 
Germany and Italian police, of four men (thi ee arrests in Milan, one in 
Germany) suspected of being a recruiting cell for al-Qaeda is an eaiiy example 
of co-ordinated efforts against this “new” terrorist thieat."^  ^ This co-ordination 
of efforts has continued, including a joint seven-month Spanish, American, 
French and Gennan investigation leading to the arrest in Spain on 13 April 
2002 of Ahmed Brahim, a suspected al-Qaeda financial chief in Europe, and
BBC News Looking for European al-Qaeda 11 December 2001 
BBC News Police move against Bin Laden suspects 10 October 2001
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leading planner behind the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 
August 1998?^ Indeed solid co-operation was occuiiing prior t o l l  
September against al-Qaeda. A co-ordinated German and Italian police 
operation arrested six North Africans (five aiTests outside Milan, one in Hesse) 
believed to be have been part of a cell which planned an attack against the US 
embassy in Rome in January and had been involved in planning the bomb 
attack in Strasbourg the previous December.'*^
The investigations into these North African cells has taken on a transnational 
dimension previously unseen in Europe with governments and law- 
enforcement agencies being extremely commodious in their co-operative 
efforts. Co-ordination of efforts, however, remains a refined skill, and one 
missing from the action taken in the immediate post-11 September 
environment, where re-assuring the public was of key importance. The 
breaking-up of two interlinked cells by Belgian and Dutch authorities on 13 
September 2001 vexed the French who had been trying to infiltrate the groups 
with inforaiers to generate long-term intelligence; France complained that the 
Belgians and Dutch had failed to co-ordinate their activities with French 
efforts."^  ^ As diagram III illustrates, this hindered the detection of other cells 
in contact with the two that had been located. InteiTogation rather than 
intelligence then becomes the only, often unsubtle, option open to 
investigators to determine if, and where, other cells exist.
BBC News Spain holds al-Qaeda finance suspect 14 April 2002 
BBC News Police seize "Islamic guerrillas 5 April 2001.
Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror 2002 pp 127-8
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Diagram III
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This example demonstrates the need for a more centralised platform co­
ordinating these operations. Had Europol been consulted by all the parties 
concerned, even without operational powers, a greater transnational ethos 
might have been generated, isolating the national ethos that inevitably 
overtook the operation at the end. Diagram IV illustrates such a case showing
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the greater lines of communication between the French and their Dutch and 
Belgian colleagues because of the transnational emphasis, possibly leading to 
a different ending. It should of course be made clear that even in this 
situation, the sovereignty of the Netherlands and Belgium supersedes all other 
factors, and they would be well within their rights to take any action they saw 
fit against terrorist cells operating on or living in their territory.
Diagram IV
Belg.
Police
Dutch
Police
French
Security
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Co-ordination of efforts against international terrorism in Europe has therefore 
made some headway since 11 September. The danger of the emerging 
network of North African terrorist cells throughout Europe demonstrates the 
need for a greater co-ordination of efforts at an EU-wide level. As a structure, 
Emopol is ideally placed to provide such a role, especially as the al-Qaeda 
thi'eat clearly represents the requirement for “a common approach.. .owing to 
the scale, significance, and consequences of the offences concerned” (Aificle 
2.1, Europol Convention). The increase in EuropoTs powers in the wake of 11 
September (see below) is an illustration of the Member States’ recognition of 
EuropoTs potential role in the post-11 September environment. That in this 
new milieu, no press release from Europol has been issued demonstrating 
involvement in successful counter-terrorist operations implies a possible 
distance still being kept by the national authorities of the Member States. The 
public edition of EuropoTs annual report for 2001 (published April 2002) does 
make reference to the newly enhanced co-ordinating body of an Operational 
Centre, created on 11 September, providing 24-hour service in the exchange 
and co-ordination of information and intelligence, along with the production 
of daily briefing papers. However, beyond this, the report says little."*^  How 
successful, then, have been the JHA Council’s attempts to augment EuropoTs 
counter-terrorist role, and put it at the heart of the EU counter-terrorist 
programme?
Europol Annual Report 2001, The Hague, 16 April 2002 p 14
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Europol augmented
A number of events have significantly increased the scope and powers of 
Europol over the yeai's. Amsterdam and Tampere enhanced two particular 
areas: the ability to instigate an investigation and the capacity to request 
information from national police forces?^ Under this remit, Europol has been 
able to open an analysis work file on “extremist Islamic terrorism within the 
EU, with the aim of constructing an operational analysis of all information on 
actual and potential suspects, witnesses, victims, associates and informants”?  ^
Additionally suspected and alleged offences; modus operandi and suspected 
membership of a criminal organisation; convictions, and references to 
investigations by national police forces are also included. As the Strasbourg 
plot indicates, however, requesting information and receiving it from a 
national police force are two very different things. Nevertheless, EuropoTs 
Counter-terrorist chief, Mariano Simancas, was sanguine on the issue of joint 
investigative teams, pointing out that the initiatory steps were underway, 
approximately six months after Tampere .These  enhancements present 
Europol with the option to take a more proactive role than was previously 
possible. However, as has traditionally been the case, a terrorist event was 
responsible for the significant leap in European law-enforcement co-operation.
50 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 30.2 (a) and (b). Tampere reinforced these advances rather 
than supplementing them: Tampere Conclusions, Conclusion 43 and 45.
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No. 1 The "Conclusions” o f  the Special Justice and 
Home Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 and their implications fo r civil liberties.
It is also believed that Europol has opened a similar file on eco-terrorism.
Personal interview with Mariano Simancas, Head of Europol C-T Unit, 30 May 2001 The 
Hague.
257
Prior t o l l  September, EuropoTs potential for supporting terrorist related 
investigations was compromised because of the reluctance of national units to 
contribute sensitive information to EuropoTs analysis files or to seek 
assistance beyond asking for information. The revelation of the threat posed 
by international tenorism, however, has resulted in a political commitment by 
the EU Member States to place Europol at the centre of the EU’s counter­
terrorist programme. To reinforce this position the JHA Council has targeted 
reluctance amongst the national authorities, instructing them to fulfil their 
obligations to Europol and authorising EuiopoTs Director to inform the 
Council of any problems?^
Underlining the commitment of the Council in this ai*ea is EuropoTs housing 
of a specialist counter-terrorist team, comprised of officers seconded from the 
Member States, in which Europol officers can also participate.^"  ^ The 
inclusion of intelligence service officers also serves as a reinforcement of the 
Council’s commitment. These agencies have obtained a new significance in 
defeating terrorism in the post-11 September environment. Europol is now the 
only co-operative law-enforcement forum to include representatives of these 
agencies in its mandate against terrorism. This team, however, will have an 
operational role; consequently so will the Europol operatives. This contradicts 
the Europol Convention and therefore, the remedy required is an amendment 
to the Convention (see Chapter Vll). In doing so Europol is finally crossing
Statewatch. Op. Cit., analyses: No. 1 
The Europol Convention obliges the law-enforcement authorities of the Member States to 
contribute the relevant information unless it falls under grounds of national security, 
protecting investigations or personal security, or specific intelligence activities (Article 4.5).
The participation o f Europol officers in this group has sti iking parallels with Interpol’s TE 
Group who are able to second their counter-teiTorist officers to national investigations.
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the ambiguous gap between “operative” and operational powers. Most fai’- 
reaching of all, however, is the development of plans to allow Europol access 
to the SIS II records. The Coimcil charged a working party at the begiiming of 
2002 to begin preparations on this matter. Under the two-stage EU Presidency 
proposal, Europol will be able to add and amend data, as well as consulting it. 
In addition to the massive amount of data that would become available, this 
proposal would also afford Europol another operational role, enabling it to 
enter names of suspects into Alerts so that they would be subject to “discreet 
surveillance” and “specific checks” (Article 99, Implementing Convention). 
Such changes, if they occur, will again mean alterations to the Europol 
Convention, as Article 6(2) expressly forbids the linkage of EuropoTs 
database to any other law-enforcement database. The ramifications of 
merging these databases in terms of data protection and civil liberties, along 
with the overall direction of Europol, are considerable. If substantial 
amendments are made to its Convention then Europol will be transformed into 
a much more powerful organisation, giving greater credence to speculation 
that has dogged Europol since its inception: that it is moving ever closer 
towards becoming a European FBI. These issues are essential to the direction 
being taken by the EU towards internal security, and will be discussed in detail 
in the following chapter.
Not all expansions related to EuropoTs mandates, however, have been 
bestowed directly onto the organisation. The Tampere summit rectified a gap 
identified by the EU’s Article 36 Committee (senior officials from the 
Member States’ interior ministries) between the intelligence and information
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on serious organised crime (thi'ough Europol) and its translation into 
operational activity, by establishing the Euiopean Police Chiefs Operational 
Task Force. This structure is closely associated with Europol, but stands 
outside it, comprised of high-ranking police officers as well as representatives 
from both Europol and the European Commission.^^ While it covers all areas 
of police policy, it is essentially geared towards operational aspects and “top 
priority” organised crime problems.^^ Additionally, while Europol is strictly 
regulated by its Convention, the Task Force was designed as a “flexible, 
evolving and initially informal structure”. B y  placing the Task Force outside 
Europol, the intent has been to address the operational aspects of co-operation 
-  something Europol was unable to do, because of its Convention. With 
changes plaimed for EuropoTs Convention, however, these issues will 
themselves be negated.
Parallel Networks
EuropoTs assignation by the JHA Council as the central agent in EU co­
operation against terrorism may also lead to a finalising of responsibilities in 
this sphere. Currently thiee agencies share the responsibilities of facilitating 
co-operation against terrorism: Interpol and its European Secretariat, the 
PWGOT and Europol. Prior to EuropoTs arrival, the PWGOT and Trevi were
The Task Force has other duties as well. Recently it was given responsibility for the 
security o f the EU’s internal and external borders in the wake of 11 September, mandated to 
draw up a report on additional measures needed at the external border and to implement any 
decision to reinstall internal border checks. (Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No. 7 EU anti­
terrorism action plan: “operational measures” Points 15 & 20)
Al-Qaeda’s attacks have placed terrorism as a “top priority”, and the task force is currently 
working with Europol to draw up the operational strategy for the new counter-terrorist unit 
being established under Europol.
’^ statewatch. Op. Cit., analyses No. 1, Point 8
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the favoured forums here; Interpol, regardless of its reforms, was still not as 
trusted as the other two. By the same token, EuropoTs mandate against 
terrorism placed it in competition with a tiied and trusted structure. The 
reluctance to utilise EuropoTs services is to some extent explained by the 
traditional conservatism associated with sensitive issues such as terrorism. 
Equally, the existence of a “rival” structure, i.e. the PWGOT, is also a factor 
in this equation, and one capable of inhibiting EuropoTs mandate if the 
national police forces prefer to maintain the PWGOT as their principal 
instrument of co-operation. EuropoTs Director, Jürgen Storbeck, has warned 
that Europol will “stand or fall according to whether Member States supply (it 
with) good quality information” is particularly pertinent to the argument. 
Routing key intelligence relating to terrorism through the PWGOT rather than 
Europol would impinge upon the latter’s counter-terrorist performance. 
However, the JHA Council’s emphasis, in September 2001, on EuropoTs 
counter-terrorist competencies taking centre stage in this area of co-operation, 
now allays this fear.
Without this firm commitment from the JHA Council, however it is likely that 
problems would have arisen in the relationship between Europol and the 
PWGOT. Europol was designed specifically to avoid the danger of duplication 
of roles with the existing stmctures, as it contributed towards the security 
needs of European integration (unlike Inteipol) and acted as a support 
structure, rather than as an informal forum (the PWGOT). Nevertheless, 
where Trevi and the PWGOT complemented each other (the former being
Lindsay Jenkins The European Police Force -  a New Threat, in CIB Independence No. 40.
2 6 1
strategically motivated; the latter, more focused on operational concerns) 
Europol and the PWGOT did have a significant overlap. As a support 
structure, Europol has some functions similar to that of the PWGOT. It serves 
as a conduit for information transfer, and while it does not (yet) have 
operational powers, it can be employed tactically by other Member States, 
imbuing it with a day-to-day practicality. Subsequently one can see that some 
problems would factor in the introduction of Europol into the counter­
terrorism community. The opposition by the UK, France and Demnark to the 
granting of the counter-terrorism mandate, based on the argument that the 
political comiotations of terrorism would hamper Europol, and that the 
PWGOT could perform this function equally well, if not better, does therefore 
have some merit. To some extent, then, the beneficial relationship that exists 
between the regulated and informal areas of co-operation jars here. The 
problems faced by Europol regarding its counter-terrorism mandate could and 
should have been forecasted and dealt with much earlier, clearly defining its 
role in the matter. Beyond this, steps should have been taken to address the 
reticence of the Member States’ counter-terrorist investigators, moving the 
PWGOT closer into the Europol fold either thiough direct incorporation or by 
association in a manner similar to that of the creation of the Police Chief Task 
Force. The recognition by the JHA Council of EuropoTs position in matters 
of counter-terrorism may have greater success than previous measures as it 
provides Europol with a wider range of services that could tempt the national 
law-enforcement authorities into greater usage. However, this recognition
Cyrille Fijnaut The Schengen Treaties and European Police Co-operation in European 
Journal o f Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 1 No. 1 1993 p 52 
These countries also rejected any “communitisation” o f police co-operation. Additionally the 
PWGOT was, like Trevi, a UK dominated sti'ucture in terms of its design, and it did not want 
to lose influence in this area of policing.
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should have gone one step further. It has set Europol as the hub, but it has 
neglected to set the PWGOT as one of the spokes.
Conclusions
Europol is the most advanced co-operative law-enforcement structure on the 
planet. By no means is it perfect. It has yet to fully garner the trust of the 
Member States’ counter-terrorist officers, who have remained suspicious of 
passing sensitive intelligence on to a centralised agency, rather than to an old 
friend through the PWGOT’s secure telecommunications. Neither has it been 
able to fully exploit its unique position of being a co-operative investigative 
structure under one roof. Investigations must be separate and sub judice, to 
preserve the sovereignty of intelligence provided by the Member State. This 
enforced barrier between investigations, preventing the exchange of 
intelligence linkage, is a mistake of serious magnitude, given the existing links 
between terrorists and organised crime. Europol is the only encompassing co­
operative structure within the EU to focus on all types of serious transnational 
crimes, and therefore the structure most likely to detect information relating to 
other criminal activities when it investigates terrorism and vice versa. If the 
JHA Council is truly serious in wanting Europol to be the primary EU 
instrument against terrorism, then this confidence-building measure requires 
revision.
Where Europol excels however is in the services it offers, principally in 
facilitating investigations and their co-ordination. These services have been
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underused, especially by counter-terrorism departments; this is changing for 
two reasons. The first is that Emope has grown very complicated over the 
years, as integration has deepened. This has had a derogatory effect on the 
traditional informal style of co-operation developed during the EEC, which 
has now become dated, and is unable to meet the needs of the European 
Union. The Cross Chaimel Intelligence Service, for example, soon found 
itself left behind by developments created by Schengen. As the EU develops 
so increases the need to utilise Europol to navigate thiough it. National 
agencies dealing with drugs and organised crime were quick to take advantage 
of Europol as these tlneats developed, but because terrorism was mostly 
limited to national pockets during the 1990s, counter-teiTorist agencies saw 
little need to transfer their co-operative practices to Europol. This changed 
with the realisation of the emerging threat posed by Islamic extremists in 
2000, and the hard reality of 11 September. The old informal system was 
designed to deal with a teiTorist threat that was at heart, disorganised and 
sporadic. The threat from 2000 onwards is recognised to be highly organised 
and enduring, together with a willingness -  indeed a desire -  to cause mass 
casualties. This is a threat requiring an organised and regulated response, 
something unsustainable by relying upon an informal approach. This threat, 
together with the JHA Council’s emphasis on Europol being the principal 
agent against terrorism within the EU, should enhance Europol’s counter­
terrorist competencies and their utilisation.
What we are also seeing within Europe is that the Member States are 
beginning to think “European” rather than exclusively “national” in their
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outlook towards the terrorist threat. Member States’ law-enforcement 
agencies are actively co-operating against the terrorist threat, passing on an 
unprecedented amount of intelligence that would previously have been 
inconceivable under the more basic co-operative structure during the EEC, 
regardless of the scale of terrorist threat. The extensive “road map” of 
counter-teiTorist measures and initiatives serving as the reference point to the 
state of play on the EU action plan to combat terrorism demonstrates the depth 
to which the Second and Third Pillais are committed to resolving this thi*eat.^  ^
They have become much more willing to pass on information as they receive 
it to their colleagues in other EU states. This has quickly created a network of 
intelligence shuttling back and forth between the Member States, allowing 
arrests to occur, which in turn allows new intelligence to be transfened, 
resulting in new arrests. Europol is the forum that has been chosen as the axis- 
point for this advance in co-operation. However, one must also consider how 
much of this improved co-operation is simply post-11 September Zeitgeist. 
Once the shockwaves of this event have passed, will co-operation 
“deteriorate” to more familiar levels; or has co-operation reached the stage of 
being able to sustain this current activity indefinitely? Europol has yet to 
actually prove to the national police authorities that it can successfully 
negotiate a counter-terrorist strategy. Nevertheless, as has been suggested 
above, the ongoing European Project should help lock this co-operation into 
place once the crisis has passed.
Council o f the European Union 10773/2/02 European Union action plan to combat terrorism 
-  update of the roadmap, Brussels 17 July 2002
265
An area for concern yet again is the issue of accountability. Europol’s 
Convention makes it perhaps the most accountable structure within the JHA 
field, although it is by no means perfect, due to the fact that its own watchdog 
is internal. As Europol grows in influence, however, accelerated by the events 
of 11 September, this becomes an increasing concern, especially in relation to 
data protection. Europol’s intention to merge its TECS with the SIS -  a 
criminal and a non-criminal database -  would have profound implications for 
data protection, in an area poorly protected by weak legislation. Effectively 
Europol would in a position to dominate internal security co-operation within 
the EU. No longer would it simply be an important flanking measure. The 
Member States have been adamant that Europol could never be pei*mitted 
operational powers, and have provided us with a cast-iron constitution to 
ensure this. Yet, as we have seen, this seems to be a less secure guai’antee, 
month by month. Has EU co-operation reached a stage where it is ready to 
conceive of a quasi-federal police force within a union of sovereign states? 
Eui'opoTs position within the integrative process is a curious one because of 
this question mark continually associated with it. Clearly, the regulatory 
effects of the JHA process have shifted Europol away from the influences of 
neo-functionalist theory, despite the strong role we see played by individuals 
such as its director. Such an important feature of the JHA process cannot be 
other than defined by intergovernmental policy; the most telling evidence for 
this is demonstrated tluough the “double-locking” of Europol by the JHA 
Council into a Convention and the Third Pillar. Nevertheless, federal 
overtones remain. The acquisition of an executive mandate for Europol would 
shift the balance decisively towards supranationalism; federalism would begin
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to make its presence felt in the JHA arena, significantly strengthening the 
supervisory role required by the EU institutions over Europol. At the stroke of 
a pen, police co-operation in Europe would be transformed, but as is discussed 
in Chapter VII, subsidiarity would also be overruled were such an organisation 
created. The very real implications of this mean that we must fiilly understand 
where Europol sits within the integrative process.
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Chapter VII
The Position of Investigative Co-operation against Terrorism within the 
European Integration Process
Whereas the elements relating to co-operative border security within Europe 
have traditionally been regional constructs, investigative co-operation has 
maintained a more inclusive approach, through the establishment of pan- 
European networks. Interpol, Trevi, and the PWGOT are all examples of this 
methodology. Their co-operation is not directed to a spatial area, but rather to 
a particular area of policing. The regulatory Third Pillar has solidified this 
approach with the adoption of Europol as the principal vehicle for co­
operative investigation within the EU. Even the reticent intelligence agencies, 
which have previously maintained a distance from co-operative frameworks, 
acknowledge the Third Pillar as a co-operative medium.* These frameworks 
are the preferred choice for this type of co-operation because the nature of 
criminal investigation usually requires assistance in dealing with an issue that 
transpires beyond that of the frontier, thus negating any such border treaties. 
While border treaties can be particularly detailed in their co-operation because 
of the regional commonality, these same agreements cannot extend right 
across a country. Even the Schengen Implementing Convention only relates to 
the border aieas within the signatory states. A broader approach is necessary 
instead to tackle issues requiring co-operation outside these areas. Interpol,
' While these agencies do utilise frameworks such as the Club of Berne and the Kilowatt 
Club, their highly informal attitude towards co-operation results in a preference towards 
bilateral action. Each agency maintains ties o f varying strength with its colleagues. 
Expressly, the sensitivity o f the information passed on relates to the level of trust between the 
individual agencies.
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for example, allows police in Austria to work with their colleagues in Poland 
to help resolve an investigation. By adopting an inclusive approach in 
establishing these structures, the purpose is to develop a co-operative network 
that can be utilised by all members, rather than relying on bilateral 
agreements, for the resolution of tackling general transnational crime.
Bilateral agreements are aimed at resolving a specific criminal activity 
peculiar to the signatories involved. The implementation in 2002 of the 
agreement between the British and Irish governments discussed in Chapter II, 
along with protocols between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the 
Garda Siochana, is aimed at curbing the organised crime operating across the 
Anglo-Irish border.^ Despite being directly concerned with cross-border 
incidents, it also establishes liaison officers between Dublin and Belfast; thus 
its pui'pose extends beyond the border area in an effort to tackle the common 
thieat.
The encompassing characteristics of these co-operative structures also suggest 
the possible inclusion of common denominator politics in their makeup, aimed 
at avoiding including radical and controversial conditions that would 
otherwise inhibit would-be signatories from partaking. Such constructs tend 
to be dominated by intergovernmental control, to ensure that then direction 
remains one favourable to their signatory states. The Schengen Implementing 
Convention provides such an example. Equally, the issue of terrorism, as 
Chapter IV demonstrated, requires a firm intergovermnental hand at the tiller 
to prevent co-operative exuberance from floundering amid particularly
 ^The Implementation o f Recommendations Concerning North/South Co-operation on Policing 
Matters, Lateral Entry and Secondments -  A Joint Timetable by the British and Irish 
Governments
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sensitive socio-political policy.^ All the areas of co-operative investigation 
examined in the previous two chapters demonstrate either an exclusive 
mandate against terrorism or its inclusion within a broader remit. Prima facie 
one might conclude that intergovernmentalism will dominate this area of co­
operative policing. The argument is indeed strong, but one should not ignore 
the subtleties of incorporating this particular area into the Third Pillar. The 
concept of counter-terrorism as essentially a national response has been 
shaken by the events of 11 September. Thrusting additional powers upon 
Europol by the JHA Council to help counter the transnational/international 
terrorist threat is a clear indication of the glowing awareness regarding the 
necessity of a European solution. As this thesis argues, placing any aspect of 
co-operative policy within the “melting pot” of European integration and 
expecting it to remain uninfluenced and imchanged may be politically naïve. 
Emopol, as we shall see, has been double-locked within an intergovernmental 
agreement. These enhancements, however, produce a Europol very different 
from the one established in the 1995 Convention, in effect reopening the 
European FBI debate, and thereby renewing concerns about a federalist-type 
entity within the JHA sphere and what this would mean for future law- 
enforcement co-operation. Current debate as to its future stems from these 
enhancements, along with the challenges faced by accession.
While we cannot purport to know the future, we can determine with some 
degree of accuracy how far Europol and the future of investigative co­
operation have traversed down the supranational path and whether action is
 ^Gaping holes in co-operative policing along the Anglo-Irish border could not be resolved 
while the socio-political situation in Northern Ireland remained incompatible with measures 
necessary to resolve this.
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necessary to curtail this."* By examining the integrative makeup of 
investigative co-operation outside pre-JHA, it becomes possible to ascertain 
the underlying co-operative typology endemic to counter-terrorism. In 
understanding the raw material, so to speak, it becomes possible to appreciate 
how it will react to incorporation within an intergovernmental sphere, which 
itself bobs on supranational “water”. This achieved, we can next determine 
how secure Europol’s intergovernmental fetters are, and the strength of any 
supranational pull. Having established this, we are now in a position to clarify 
Europol’s location within the JHA sphere and any occurring drift. Beyond 
this, though, we are also able to question whether the intergovernmental 
approach is the most conducive to co-operation. The previous two chapters 
have raised some concerns regarding the issue of accountability, and here we 
shall revisit the argument that addressing the democratic deficit brings us 
closer to the federalist position. Would a two-speed Europol address some of 
these concerns?^
 ^The thesis’s analysis o f intergovernmental policy via comparison with other integrative 
theories is a great boon in helping to determine possible outcomes -  currently unforeseen -  
emerging fi'om JHA policy. An awareness that not all areas of JHA policy operate at their 
most effective under intergovernmental conditions, and that intergovernmental contiol over 
other areas, such as certain aspects o f border security, is not absolute, allows us to appreciate 
that changes, neglected on the intergovernmental timetable can occur.
 ^The concept of a two-tier Europe recognises that not all Member States are able or willing to 
proceed towards integration at the same pace, and that procedures should be established to 
administer this. (Tindemans Report, 1975). However, the Member States argued that a two- 
speed Europe would be damaging to the uniform application of the acquis Communautaire, 
the budget and solidarity. The reality, however, is that while the policy of a two-speed Europe 
does not exist de jure', it is essentially de facto. The exchange-rate mechanism and subsequent 
Euro-currency membership; Schengen; and the ensuing “opt-ins” for the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark, are just some examples of divergence within EU uniform policy. Additionally, the 
membership enlargement process o f 2004 will require these new Member States to operate at 
a different level in certain areas of integrative policy. Internal borders, for example, will 
remain in effect until their “flanking measures” are judged to be sufficient. Insofar as Europol 
is concerned, could it operate at a deeper integrative pace for those Member States who 
wished to sign up to this, whilst maintaining its current co-operative level?
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Investigative co-operation against terrorism in Europe has been nailed to the 
mast of the EU’s law enforcement flagship in the wake of 11 September.
Only by understanding Europol’s construction and how susceptible it is to the 
integrative influences inherent to the European Project is it possible to 
determine the direction of co-operative law-enforcement counter-terrorist 
policy in Europe.
The composition of non-JHA Counter-terrorist co-oneration
Under this particular heading the co-operative structures discussed in Chapter 
V are re-examined from the perspective of their placing within the concept of 
Eui'opean co-operation, rather than their actual role. Interpol, Trevi, the 
PWGOT, and intelligence agency co-operation have all influenced, to some 
extent, the co-operative structure of the Third Pillar.
Interpol
It may seem peculiar to begin this analysis by focusing on what is effectively 
an international structure, and therefore one possessing tenuous links to 
European integration at best. Indeed, Interpol’s primary function has been to 
serve as a means of communicating between national police bodies. This 
would be to ignore, however, the Eur opean origins of Interpol, its part as the 
initial focal point in European police co-operation, and the continuing role it 
plays.
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As explained in Chapter V, Interpol is not a political body; its membership is 
composed of police agencies, not governments. It eschews politics. Its 
deformation by the Nazi state for political policing is seared into Interpol’s 
institutional memory, hence its initial constitutional impediment against 
tackling terrorism. If it is not political, does that mean that it cannot be 
involved in integration? Interpol does not engage in integration, but it does 
provide law enforcement with experience in co-operating with one another. 
This experience on a day-to-day basis, however, is limited to contact tluough 
the National Central Bureaus rather than via officers from other national 
forces.^ Interpol is opposed to unofficial contact between forces, arguing that 
this risks duplicating other investigations, depriving the police of information 
and potentially even jeopardising their enquiry by failing to comprehend the 
possible differences between various criminal justice systems.^ Some 
countries try to check such behaviour by prohibiting direct contact, insisting 
that Interpol can be the only channel for this. Germany, for example, made it 
an offence for any of its forces other than the BKA to make an inquiry abroad 
or to respond to such an inquiry from another country.^
Such restrictions place Interpol very much as a functional tool. Even its 
expansion of services to the EEC states via the European Secretariat and 
Liaison Bureau can be construed as a response to the needs of its key users, as
 ^The exception being the TE Group, which does “loan” out officers seconded to it. 
 ^Benyon et al Police Co-operation in Europe 1993 pl28  
® Ibid.
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was the inclusion of the counter-terrorist mandate.^ One cannot write Interpol 
off, though, as a “neutral” factor in the integration process. It did advance co­
operation, but essentially for reasons of self-preservation. However, it was 
also kept out of the initial discussions on the formation of Europol because 
France was against this, believing Inteipol to be an American Trojan Horse, 
and argued that this new policing initiative should be unique and therefore free 
from “older influences”.*** This very much restricts the argument that Interpol 
has had any significant influence in shaping the JHA structures. Neither for 
that matter is it conducive to facilitating neo-functionalism, due to the minimal 
contact process between its members. Equally, intergovermnentalism is 
negated by the very limited role played by governments here. To cite a 
particular example, although communication between the Baghdad NCB and 
Lyons during the Gulf War nosedived, within weeks of its end the Iraqis were 
seeking help in connection with ancient art treasures worth millions of pounds 
stolen from Iraqi museums under cover of war and spirited onto the illegal 
international antiquities market.** Technical imperatives rather than political 
ones drive Interpol’s expansion: the organisation has expanded its services as 
new teclmology becomes available (in addition to the requisite financial
 ^The disgruntlement horn European police forces regarding the quality and range of 
Interpol’s services, prompted the General Secretariat to establish a European Secretariat in 
1985, as part o f its reform programme, aimed at enhancing European police co-operation. 
This expansion continued with the creation o f the European Liaison Bureau in 1988 focusing 
on Euro-specific issues, as well as providing Europe with a liaison unit within the Secretariat. 
These measures, however, were to make Interpol more attiactive to its European members, as 
it feared the possibility of a new rival policing structure. The figures clearly illustrate 
Interpol’s concern in addressing these issues: The Council of Europe members account for 
eighty per cent of Inteipol’s usage while the EC Member States (The Twelve) accounted for 
forty per cent. In funding terms the EC provides a third of Interpol’s income, with an 
additional twenty per cent above their annual subscription to fund six liaison officers at the 
General-Secretariat to coordinate drugs enquiries. (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee 7* Report Practical Police Co-operation in the European Communitv Session 
1989-90 363-1 pp 3-4)
Anderson et al Policing the European Union 1995 p 70 
" Fenton Bresler Interpol 1992 p 213
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resources) displaying the Darwinian necessity to evolve or die. The purpose 
that maintains and drives Interpol is to serve as a conduit for facilitating 
international police co-operation only. In this way, it isolates itself from 
European police co-operation because the structure-building here does not 
reflect its own specific purpose and mechanisms. Indeed, European 
advancement in this field is potentially dangerous for Inteipol as it creates 
rival structures,*^ hence the initial criticism that Interpol’s General Secretary, 
Raymond Kendall directed at the creation of Europol.*^ Inteipol’s actual 
influence on European law-enforcement co-operation is therefore limited to 
the experience obtained by those players participating in Interpol, and 
transferring it to their own programme.
Trevi
Trevi, as a unique EC construct, provides us with a better understanding of the 
influences at play within the European context than Interpol, with its European 
membership subsumed within its international emphasis. As precursor to 
Europol, Trevi’s position in counter-terrorism underlines the approach taken 
by European governments in this field. This approach is emphatically 
intergovernmental in origin and administration; although miiToring to some 
degree the regional intergovermnental border agreements, a significant level of 
devolution was also granted to Working Group I: counter-teiTorism.
In the sense that the EU Member States could use an internal structure to replicate the 
services offered by Interpol, thereby bypassing Interpol at the regional level,
Bresler, Op. Cit., pp 391-6
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Trevi was the first experiment of its kind to be conducted against terrorism, an 
issue that greatly concerned the EC governments at the time, as it does so 
again today. This concern, coupled with the sensitive nature of the work, 
ensured the exercise of significant government control. The ministerial 
involvement lay at the heart of Trevi’s controlling body, the Trevi Steering 
Group (although Trevi itself was a non-treaty based organisation). This 
group’s following of the troika and later the piatnika (1989) system of 
chairing demonstrated the emphasis on political policy control. *"* Beyond 
this, though, was the governments’ desire not only to isolate, but to hide 
Trevi’s existence from the EC institutions -  so strong was their commitment to 
maintain absolute intergovermnental control. Ironically, although both 
politically and operationally sensitive, counter-terrorism often tends towards 
the need for urgency. Consequently WGI developed a “more powerftil” 
bottom level, which could be “mandated to do more” than the other working 
groups, in order to bypass bureaucratic procedures.*^ This measure of 
autonomy for the elite-actors of WGI, however, was not sufficient to lead to 
any influx of supranational influence such as neo-functionalism. By ensuring 
that WGI was “mandated”, the governments maintained their control; WGI 
could not undertake measures that had not already been “mandated” in the first 
instance, rather it was granted the flexibility necessary to do its job. Equally 
important, though, is the concept of national awareness, imbued in these
The troika system was a means o f maintaining policy continuity in the EC, introduced in 
1977, as an operational necessity for European Political Co-operation, whereby the country 
holding the presidency along with the immediate predecessor and successor presidencies 
chaired ministerial meetings.
Lisa Riley Working Paper X: Counterterrorism in Western Europe. Mechanisms for 
International Co-operation A system o f Police Co-operation in 1992, 1992 p 41 
(Quotations by F. J. Mulschlegal of the Netherlands Police Studies Centre, and a member of 
the Dutch representation on WGII)
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officers through countering a thi'eat that is directed against the sovereignty of 
their own country, thereby establishing a form of prophylactic against 
supranationalism.
The intergovernmental approach does have a particular weakness in the fact 
that it generally reacts to developments, rather than relying on a continued 
growth pattern. After 1977, WGI entered a lull in development growtli 
because of the absence of any major new terrorist tlueat. Only with a flare-up 
of international terrorism in the mid-1980s did Trevi engage in any new 
enhancements, following a summit meeting in June 1985. In integrationist 
terms, this identifies Trevi as reactive rather than organic in enhancing co­
operation. A forceful neo-functionalist-orientated approach would have given 
greater concern to the advancement of co-operation, rather than limiting co­
operation to that of a pre-determined level, unable to build upon that without 
intergovernmental sanction. In other words, even if Trevi were in a position to 
expand its abilities, it could not do so without unanimous political approval. 
“Task Expansion” is therefore enacted via intergoveiimiental policy, rather 
than tluough neo-functionalism. From a practical perspective this can hinder 
counter-terrorism as it becomes difficult for co-operation to evolve at a natural 
pace, “matching” the learning curve of the ten orist groups, and thereby being 
unprepared, in co-operative terms, for the next development in the “politics of 
the latest outiage”.*^  However, as we have already noted (Chapter IV), this 
argument has another side to it: the necessity for democratic accountability. It 
would have been politically impossible for Trevi to have expanded unchecked.
Paul Wilkinson The Lessons o f  Lockerbie Conflict Studies No. 226 p 7
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not so much because of socio-political concerns about terrorism, but because 
powerful police institutions evoke strong memories in Euiope.*^ One can 
reasonably conclude, therefore, that the development of Trevi was best suited 
to intergovernmental practice, in the absence of any sophisticated co-operative 
infrastructure capable of addressing these concerns.
The PWGOT
The PWGOT is another intergovernmental structure, although at first blush its 
appearance suggests a neo-functionalist dominance, due to the leading role 
assumed by police officers throughout, especially when one considers that it 
was disgruntlement with the degree of ministerial control over Trevi that led to 
the creation of the PWGOT. This, however, would be to ignore the various 
govermnental directives which impose ceilings on the discussions that their 
police and intelligence agencies may be involved in, frequently stamping 
information with requirements of “no foreign dissemination”.*^  Beyond this 
censorship, though, the governments have kept out of the working group’s 
affairs. In this respect, the PWGOT provides an interesting microcosm of 
integrationist study. Its initiation, agenda, co-ordination and administration 
are entirely elite-actor orientated; yet it has remained consistently within the 
intergovernmental dictate. This outlook reflects the political thinking of the 
time where neo-fiinctionalist critics such as Stanley Hoffman argued that a 
distinction existed between “high” and “low” politics, and that integration
German public opinion against the computerised profiling of terrorist suspects 
(Beobachtende Fahndung ‘BEFA’) forced the government to scrap the programme in 1981, 
despite its high rate o f successes, because it was seen as too intrusive into public life,
Peter Chalk West European Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 1996 p i29
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affecting the former (positive integration) would compromise the autonomy of 
the state. Consequently this area possessed near immunity from any impact or 
“spill over” from the negative integration ongoing in the welfare-economic 
sector. Even some neo-functionalists such as Lindberg and Scheingold 
accepted this division, although they did not view it as a timeless one.^ ** Witli 
the EEC entering a decade-long period of integrationist atrophy however, 
supranational theories looked increasingly dead in the water.
Haas always maintained however that there was no permanency about the 
qualities of “high” politics: “Whether ‘politics’ is more important than 
‘economics’ is an empirical question, not a dichotomy given by nature”. He 
saw it as dependent upon the particular individual or group ascendancy for the 
traversing of this barrier.
The revival of European integration in the mid-1980s, including that of neo­
functionalism as a possible explanation for the advances in police co-operation 
that were beginning, vindicates Haas’s position, but nevertheless cuts little ice 
with the development of the PWGOT, which has changed little from its initial 
intergovernmental blueprints.^^ The explanation of the PWGOT’s solid 
adherence to intergovernmental policy rests partially with the politically 
imposed ceilings on particular areas of co-operation, but equally this could
R. J. Harrison Europe in Question 1975 pp 58-61, 197-201 
Ibid. pp 198-200
21 The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of pre-theorising” 
International Organisation XXIV, 4, 1970 pp 629-30 cited in R. J. Harrison Op. Cit., p 199 
^ The revival of the integrative process, and its quickening tempo, reflected a renaissance in 
neo-functionalist theory, illustrated by the functional and political spillover occurring 
throughout Europe. Anderson explains that the former relates to the process o f integration, 
from a predominately structuralist perspective, undermining the effectiveness o f existing 
policy, similar in many respects to the classical definition of spillover. The latter however, is 
predominately agency-based, occurring where the existence o f supranational organisations 
triggers a self-perpetuating process of institutional development. Policing, as part of the 
“1992” process typified this integrationist expansion. (Anderson et al. Op. Cit., p 94)
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have been due to pressure from below, as police co-operation began to expand 
within the EU matrix. That it did not implies that no pressure from below was 
forthcoming, because the ultra-informal “construction” of the PWGOT is not 
conducive to supranationalism. The PWGOT was created because counter­
terrorist officers eschewed the politics and bureaucracy of Trevi (even though 
the latter was limited). The PWGOT has no real administrative machinery; to 
advance the PWGOT in further areas of co-operation would be to complicate 
it, and would require such machinery. It is for this reason that the PWGOT 
happily stays within the intergovernmental sphere. Task expansion cannot 
occur without such machinery, due to the sensitive area in which the PWGOT 
is involved.
Intelligence agencv co-operation
Prior to the events of 11 September, the co-operation engaged by the 
intelligence agencies of the European Member States was very much limited 
to the intergovernmental approach. This was because these agencies 
represented what Hoffman refers to as:
the ineffable and intangible issues of Grosspolitik when grandeur 
and prestige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at 
stake.
Stanley Hoffman “Discord in Community ” in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., 
(eds) The Atlantic Community, Progress and Prospects (New York, Praeger, 1963 p 13) cited 
in R. J. Harrison Op. Cit., p 201
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Indeed the mechanisms built to accommodate intelligence agency co-operation 
have been particularly informal outside the European Project, ensuring 
inoculation against supranationalism. Only within the confines of military 
intelligence, has co-operation been particularly advanced, but again these 
remain within the limitations of intergovernmental policy. Does the recent 
partial inclusion of intelligence agency co-operation against terrorism within 
the parameters of the JHA sphere portend a possible breaching of this previous 
imperviousness?
As intelligence agency co-operation currently stands within the JHA 
continuum, attached loosely to a counter-tenorist team within Europol, and an 
informal forum for intelligence chiefs to gather and discuss matters, the 
probability of supranational influences affecting the co-operation is 
exceptionally low. The manifestation of the co-operation is extraordinarily 
simple in its mechanics, mirroring that of the PWGOT, thereby rendering it a 
particular immunity. Additionally, involvement with intelligence agencies 
encourages an awareness of national policy, in effect helping to prevent the 
syndrome of “going native” when involved in the JHA continuum. 
Paradoxically, the growth of intelligence agency involvement in countering 
criminal activity will increasingly bring these agencies into contact with JHA 
co-operation, opening those departments or units involved in these ar eas to the 
possible susceptibility of supranational infiltration over the long-term period.
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Conclusions about the composition of the non-JHA counter-terrorist co­
operation
Insofar as the co-operative compositions of these structures are concerned, one 
sees that, for the most part that they all lack any strong display of 
supranational tendencies. Interpol alone, which owes no allegiance to any 
state or region, rather to its member police agencies, has shown the ability to 
expand the services it offers independently -  subject to finance.
Consequently, its position lies closer to the functionalism exhibited by the 
institution of the United Nations than it does to intergovernmentalism. By 
contrast, the exclusive European sti'uctures have been dependent on 
intergovernmental instruction in their expansion. It is clearly apparent, 
however, that there is an inbuilt self-checking quality within counter-terrorism 
co-operation at this level that has encouraged governments to adopt a 
relatively hands-off approach, confident in the knowledge that their officers 
have no wish to involve themselves in co-operation building that might 
threaten the preferred loose networking system that they have developed. This 
lack of integrative ambition noticeably places this type of co-operation at odds 
with the development of the EU’s JHA field, which is altogether much more 
“assertive” in its structural design. That is to say, JHA C-T development is 
one that continues to develop its range and powers, and is squarely associated 
with the process of EU integration, whereas the more traditional areas of C-T 
co-operation remain relatively distanced from JHA policy, and less ambitious 
in co-operative terms. Does, then, the provision of a counter-terrorism 
mandate to a permanent and regulated structure, located in the centre of EU
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co-operation, rather than on the periphery, imply a different outlook, and 
consequently a different approach?
The composition of JHA counter-terrorist co-operation
Under this heading, the co-operative structures discussed in Chapter VI are re­
examined from the perspective of their placing within the concept of European 
co-operation, rather than their actual role. The principal focus is directed at 
the European flagship, Europol, which represents the culmination of 
investigative co-operation to date.
Europol
The precursors to Europol have been comfortable in following an 
intergovernmental approach to facilitate co-operation against terrorism, and 
one might reasonably expect Euiopol to follow suit. Europol, however, is a 
unique construct in terms of police co-operation, thi'ough both the services that 
it provides, and also the strong latent supranationalism with which it has 
become associated. No other structure focusing on investigative law- 
enforcement co-operation has inculcated such associations before. It has the 
potential to take European policing into an entirely new dimension. The 
acquisition of the counter-terrorist mandate in 1999 began Eui opol’s push to 
be at the forefront of co-operative action against terrorism. How secure, then, 
are the intergovernmental checks, and how potent a force is this latent 
supranationalism?
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Intergoveriimentalist Stmcture Building
Europol was designed as a means of asserting intergovernmental primacy 
within the sphere of EU law-enforcement co-operation. Its blueprints were 
decided upon after a protracted period of intergovernmental bargaining, 
designed to squeeze out any supranational elements inherent to the process. 
The drafting of a Convention to further secure Europol’s intergovernmental 
position, along with a watch-dog body, illustrate the desire of the Member 
State governments to retain control of Europol, and not let it fall into the hands 
of the EU institutions.
Establishing Europol was a particularly convoluted process, resulting in two 
missed deadlines before the Convention -  of which there had been at least 
seven drafts -  was ready to be put forward for signature on 26 July 1995. '^* 
Much of the delay centred on “technical” legal issues, especially the 
controlling mechanisms such as political accountability, budgetary control and 
legal protection.^^ The thorny question of the European Court of Justice and 
its jurisdiction over Europol was the bone of much contention.^*  ^ Germany
Statewatch EÜ in disarray over Europol Convention Vol. 4, No. 6 November-December 
1994, p 16.
30 November 1993 and October 1994 were the two initial deadlines.
^ Willy Bruggeman, Europol: A Castle or House o f Cards? in De Schengen à Maastricht voie 
rovale et course d’obstacles (ed.) Alexis Pauly, p27
^ The Court is one o f the supranational institutions of the EU, and ultimate arbitrator of 
community law. It has described its definitive rationale as to enable “the Community interests 
enslu'ined in the Treaty to prevail over the inertia and resistance of Member States”. It looks 
behind the wording o f texts to the underlying objectives o f the Treaties, as expressed in their 
preambles, with their constant refrain of progressive realisation of the European Union. Where 
the fundamental purpose of a piece of legislation is broader than its literal meaning, the ECJ 
generally treats the purpose as oveniding specific provisions. On this basis, staunch 
supporters of intergovernmentalism could have cause for concern, as it would be possible for 
the Court to revise a particular Article of the Convention, were it brought before it, to an end 
more attuned with supranationalism than intergovernmentalism.
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supported the view that the Court should have uniform inteipretation over the 
Convention, while France and Britain, ever suspicious of supranational 
expansion, espoused the primacy of the national courts. The position of the 
Euro-enthusiastic Benelux Countries heightened the debate: they declared that 
they would not ratify the Convention until the matter had been resolved, their 
patience over the numerous delays having finally buckled.^^ A classic 
compromise, archetypal of intergovermnental bargaining, resolved the matter 
through the introduction of an optional protocol, declaring the signatory’s 
consent regarding the Court’s jurisdiction in these matters, which was agreed 
on 24 July 1996. Only the UK did not sign up to this protocol.^^
One should understand that if the Member States wished to isolate Europol 
from all supranational contact, they would have placed it outside the context 
of EU co-operation as a whole. Doing so however would make Europol little 
different from the previous structures. The involvement of the European 
Court of Justice therefore provides Europol with an anchor to the European 
Project. Unlike an anchoring to the Parliament or the Commission, the 
Member States’ control of Europol remains more or less absolute, because the 
Court’s involvement is reactive, not proactive, and limited to interpretation 
only. Equally, its jurisdiction was seen as the necessary solution to potential
(Timothy Bainbridge and Anthony Teasdale The Penguin Companion to the European Union 
1995 pp 97-100; Rodney Leach A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union from 
Aachen to Zollverein 1998)
F. Verbruggen, “Euro-Cops? Just Say Maybe. European Lessons from the 1993 Reshuffle 
of US Drug Enforcement” in European Journal of Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
1 9 9 5 -2 , Vol. 3 pp 150-201, pl92
^ Statewatch Europol “compromise” protocol agreed Vol. 6, No. 4 July-August 1996, pp 21- 
2
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future sticking points relating to interpretative disputes between Member 
States, which could impede both Eui'opol’s progress and performance.
The other impediment responsible for the protracted negotiations was the 
debate over what should be included in Eui’opol’s mandate, specifically 
terrorism. A counter-terrorist role had been stated in Article K. 1 (9) of the 
TEU, as well as agreed in principle by the JHA Council in November 1993, 
but some Member States retained reservations regarding its sensitivity. Both 
the UK and Germany wished to maintain the existing Trevi and PWGOT 
networks, thereby keeping counter-terrorism outside the purview of the JHA 
Council and the need to report to the K4 Committee.^^ Indeed, the meeting of 
the JHA Council on 30 November 1994, prior to the 9 December Essen 
Summit, became so involved in protracted argument on this issue that other 
important issues regarding Europol were not discussed; in total the meeting 
achieved nothing, resulting in these umesolved issues having to be carried 
over onto the new French Presidency in January.^** Without dwelling too 
much on the differing standpoints taken at this particular meeting, its heated 
natuie clearly illustrates the intergovernmental-driven bickering and 
bar gaining endemic to EuropoTs establishment.
The stand-off was finally resolved in April 1995 after Spain adopted the 
intergovernmental equivalent of gunboat diplomacy, raising the contentious 
issue of Gibraltar’s status vis-à-vis the External Borders Convention in an 
effort to force Britain’s hand. Spain had long seen Europol as a potential
Statewatch. Op. Cit., 6 November-December 1994, p 16 
Ibid.
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weapon against the ongoing Basque tenorist campaign, and along with Greece 
(another Member State with an ongoing terrorist problem), it had canvassed 
for some time to have the mandate included. This pressure led to its 
provisional insertion in the June 1994 draft. The Geimaii Presidency, aware of 
the pitfalls surrounding this particular mandate, preferred to adopt a gradualist 
approach, addressing nuclear crime in the initial brief, with other aspects of 
terrorism to be included later. Spain was unhappy with this approach, and 
thus resorted to “playing hardball”. The subsequent French Presidency 
proposed another compromise, one that addressed the complications of this 
thorny issue. Europol’s mandate would be extended to general counter­
terrorism matters two years after the Convention’s signing was completed.
This delay was designed to allow a breathing space for Member States to 
prepare for the incorporation, at the same time granting Europol a “warming- 
up period in less stormy waters”.^ * This later changed after the Convention’s 
adoption, to two years following ratification.
Europol’s journey from concept to actuality was an arduous one, prone to 
delays caused by the intransigence and legal complexities associated with 
negotiating intergovernmental co-operation. The determination with which 
Member States engaged in addressing individual national concerns left little 
place at the table for supranational issues. However, it was also 
intergovernmental bargaining that produced consensus resolving these issues. 
The concept of a European police force, involved in tackling political- 
orientated crime, has touched a nerve not only with those Member States that
Verbruggen, Op. Cit., p i92
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suffered Nazi occupation, but also with those who became Soviet client- 
states.^^ So sensitive was the issue of Europol to the Member States that at the 
Brussels Summit of 10-11 December 1993, the decision was taken to replace 
the Ministerial Agreement designated for Europol with that of a separate 
convention within the Third Pillar. This convention reflected Europol’s 
uniqueness, whilst bolstering the intergovernmental foundations within the 
Third Pillai*. No serious dissent was raised over this (unlike with the terrorism 
issue), but the negotiation process concluded at the Cannes Summit was, in 
Verbruggen’s words, “a painful affair”.^ ^
The Europol Convention
The Member State governments established the Europol Convention to 
securely fix Europol to the intergovernmental approach. Europol would 
remain so affixed until (or if) the EU reached a stage of integration where this 
approach would no longer be sufficient. How then does the Convention 
maintain intergovernmental control?
As a codification of its mission statement, the Convention controls the 
direction in which Europol may move. Only with the unanimous consent of 
the European Council can the Convention be modified, and only then after the 
matter has first been discussed with the Management Board (see below).
The amendment may then enter into force once all the Member States have
Advances in the EU have reached the stage that some thought must also be given as to how 
the accession states will be able to incorporate them.
Verbruggen, Op. Cit., p i51 
Aiticle 43 Europol Convention
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ratified the change (Aiticle 45(2)). Significantly, the Convention does not 
allow Member States to enter into reservations, thereby preventing a 
fragmented or multi-speed Europol fiom developing (Aiticle 44).^  ^ Again 
with the consent of unanimity, the European Council, after consulting the 
Management Board, can act on the initiative of a Member State to “amplify, 
amend or supplement” the definitions of criminal acts contained within the 
Annex, as well as introducing new ones (Article 43(3)). In this way, the 
Member States are able to expand Europol’s mandate. In this last matter, 
ratification is not required, merely unanimous consent. The purpose is not 
aimed at altering the Convention but to establish a speedier process when 
dealing with alterations to Europol’s criminal mandate.
As we can see, the Convention is not cast in stone; it is open to change. The 
key factor to note is that unanimity by the Member States is a necessary 
condition of this change, not qualified majority voting, very much reinforcing 
the concept of intergovernmentalism. The other EU institutions play no part 
in forcing such change. Europol has been designed to advance at the pace of 
its slowest or most reluctant member, and not to leave any behind.
The Convention also details the role of Eiu'opol’s Director and Deputy 
Directors, who are appointed by the European Council (Article 29) and 
answerable to the Management Board, which has the power of dismissal if 
necessary. This watchdog is composed of one representative from each 
Member State (Article 28). Its role includes overseeing Europol’s strategy.
The Protocol regarding the ECJ was signed before the Convention became active.
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including the Director’s performance, finances and the composure of annual 
reports on Euiopol’s activities. The Board exercises its intergovernmental 
control in that it may invite the Commission to attend its meetings, although its 
representative has a non-voting status (Aiticle 28(4)). Interestingly, the 
Board’s responsibilities include the one area where unanimous voting is not 
required: as final arbitrator in disputes between Euiopol and the Member 
States, subject to a finding of two-thirds majority (Article 28.1(21)). In 
support of this watchdog, the Convention also maintains a National 
Supervisory Body (Article 23). This construct is composed of national bodies 
designated by Member States to monitor independently, in accordance with 
respective national laws, the permissibility of the input, and the retrieval and 
communication to Europol of personal data by the Member State concerned, 
along with their ELOs and their duties.
The Member States also retain significant sway over Europol by controlling 
the purse strings. Unlike many other elements of the Third Pillar, which, after 
Amsterdam, receive their funding from the EU central budget, Europol 
receives its directly from the Member States.^^ By maintaining control here, 
the Member States are in a position to check Europol’s activities (if 
circumstances were such that this were ever required). When Europol 
received its counter-terrorism mandate, for example, an increase in its budget 
allocation was r eq u i red .B y  connotation, neo-functionalist task expansion
Treaty of Amsterdam Aiticle 41.3: European Parliament Session Document 1999-2004, 16 
May 2002, A5.0173/2002, RR/469336EN.2doc, Rapporteur: Gerard M.J. Deprez Protocol on 
Amending the Europol Convention (title abridged) Paragraph I, Recommendation 2 
The 2000 budget was set at €27,446,000, a significant increase from the 1999 budget of 
€18,896,000. The lion’s share of this (€7 million) was requfred for the new TECS; the 
remainder for the mandate increases o f money laundering and terrorism, as well as new staff.
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could not occur without the finances to pay for it; consequently, a 
supranational Europol could not exist under the current conditions without the 
support of the Member States. This practice places Europol very close to the 
Member States. From a pragmatic perspective, this allows a quick response to 
a crisis via supplementary financing. The counter-terrorist task force, for 
example, established after the 11 September attacks, cost an additional €3.16 
million.^^
Equally, though, political measures can also affect such financial 
arrangements. The UK’s threat to block the Europol Drug Unit’s funding in 
June 1996, along with seven other law-and-order proposals, if the EU 
continued its ban of British Beef, is a case in point.^^
One should also bear in mind that the only permanent staff attached to Europol 
are its administrative and Information Teclmology (IT) staff: all others are 
seconded. The absence of any permanent staff in this capacity also serves as 
an inhibitory factor against supranationalism, particularly neo-functionalism 
and its elite-actor driven orientation. The process of neo-functionalist 
engrenage has difficulty amalgamating these units into a cohesive integrative 
force if Europol’s staff retains a nationalist outlook."^^
(29^ ** Council Meeting -  Justice and Home Affairs -  Brussels. 2 December 1999 Tampere 
Follow-up-Preparation o f the Scoreboard Section: Europol: Budget for the Year 2000) 
Europol Annual Report 2001, p26
The UK’s contribution amounted to 13% of the Europol budget.
Daily Telegraph Howard set to block Europol drug budget 4 June 1996 (online edition) 
One could argue that other EU institutions also contain an element o f seconded staff, but 
these institutions were deyised as supranational in the first place. The concept of  
supranationalism emerging from an intergoyernmental stincture has yet to occur.
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In constructing Europol, the Member States have aimed at wedding it firmly to 
the concept of intergovernmentalism, designing control mechanisms to keep it 
securely on this track. Fundamentally, no significant alterations can be made 
to Europol without unanimous consent. Practically, this approach is well 
suited to a structure comprising a counter-terrorist role, as it allows the 
circumvention of much red tape in the event of rapidly changing 
circumstances. Moreover, it maintains this sensitive policing role in the hands 
of the Member States. One might say that Europol has been seconded to the 
EU by the Member States, rather than fully integrated into it. The length to 
which the Member States have gone to ensure intergovernmental authority 
over Europol does, however, raise some curiosity as to why this has been 
necessary.
Dormant Supranationalism?
The “double-locking” of Europol to intergovermnental policy via 
incorporation into the Third Pillar and through a Convention implies an 
element of concern by the Member State governments regaiding the placement 
of Europol within the JHA gamut. Originally, the Convention had not been a 
foreseen requirement, implying that the Member States believed it a necessary 
requisite later on. Such measures ensured a stronger association with 
intergovernmental co-operation. Why, though, was it necessary to secuie 
Europol so rigorously to intergovernmentalism? Did the Member State 
governments fear a “hijacking” by supranational EU institutions or a drifting
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of Europol away from intergovernmental control; if so, was this because 
Euiopol contained a supranational legacy?
The Legacv
The establishment of a European Police Office had been a vision of German 
politicians since the 1970s (although not its BKA Chiefs)/^ Their enamour 
stemmed partially from Germany’s “zealous advocat(ion) of official extension 
of police co-operation with neighbouring countries”, and from sharp criticism 
against Interpol, especially in British, German and Dutch police circles/^ 
Politically, the view was that an EC federal police force would not only act as 
a jumpstait to the dormant integration process, but would also serve as another 
means of alleviating war-guilt as Germany strove to develop her credentials as 
a good European. Additionally the police failure at the Munich Games and 
the rise in international terrorism demonstrated the appeal of a centralised 
response.
The “Europol” became a particular idée fixe of Chancellor Kohl, and 
throughout the 1980s it moved ever closer towards official government policy. 
Kohl’s vision differed from Wolfgang Schaüble’s, his Interior Minister, who 
saw it as a support agency, not a European FBI.'^ '^  The BKA chiefs finally
C. Fijnaut The Schengen Treaties and European Police Co-operation European Journal of 
Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1993-1, p 41 
Ibid., p 40; C. Fijnaut Police Co-operation within Western Europe in Frances Heidenson 
and Martin Farrell (eds) Crime in Europe 1991, p 105 
If the European Coal and Steel Community’s purpose was to prevent war between Germany 
and France thi ough the sharing of these industrial resources, then the thhiking was that a 
European police force would prevent the emergence o f a powerful police state within 
Germany.
Fijnaut, Op. Cit., 1993, p 42
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came onboard for pragmatic reasons. The events of 1989 and the rapid 
meltdown of the Soviet Union forced a rethink among Germany’s senior 
police officers. Reunification brought with it a mafia class fiom the East, and 
the eastern borders were now porous without the Iron Curtain.'^  ^ Such senior 
officers discounted Kohl’s FBI-style agency as ^"Zukenftsmusik” (pie in the 
sky). They could only envisage this as a possible long-term attainment.' '^' 
Other police forces were equally as sceptical regarding a Europol with 
operational powers: “Not...in a million years,” confided a senior British 
officer, who saw problems with organisational difference, accountability and 
sensibility as the underlying factors prohibiting such a move.'^^
The concept of a supranational legacy does not therefore stand the test. Only 
elements within the German political establislunent, spearheaded by 
Chancellor Kohl, favoured a European-type FBI. Other European leaders and 
Europe’s law-enforcement authorities did not take this view. Certainly the 
notion of a Europol began as an integrative and federalist concept, but it was 
held by a minority within the EC/EU who ultimately did not have the strength 
to force the issue, despite representing one half of the integrative “motor of 
Europe”. Rather Kohl’s proposal was adopted as an intergoveimnental 
response to the ongoing progress within the SEA, and as a necessary 
component of the fiiture European Union. Europol’s conceptual origins do not 
provide it with a supranational latency, but, as an organisation in its own is it
Berlin for example was considered by law-enforcement officials to be the centre of Russian 
mafia activity in Europe, with approximately 30,000 ex-soviet citizens as residents. 
(Chi'istopher Ulrich Transnational Organised Crime and Law-Enforcement Co-operation in 
the Baltic States Transnational Organised Crime Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1997 p 124 
Anderson et al, Op. Cit., p 83 
Ibid., p 82
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capable furthering co-operation via its elite-actors as defined in neo­
functionalist theory?
The Director and Management Board
“Better to have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in,” 
was the typically frank opinion of President Lyndon Baines Johnson regarding 
his FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover. Whatever his faults, no one can deny that 
Hoover helped to establish an impressive law-enforcement agency, leaving 
behind a lasting legacy by stamping his own image on the Bureau. LBJ’s 
statement acknowledges the power wielded by Hoover. The influence wielded 
by the Director of Europol, currently Jürgen Storbeck, thankfully cannot 
match that of Hoover’s, primarily because tenure of the post is limited to a 
maximum of two four-year terms (Article 29), rather than Hoover’s forty-eight 
year incumbency.'^® Nevertheless, the Directorship retains significant scope 
for influencing Europol’s direction. Much of this depends on the measure of 
the individual and their abilities. One sees a remarkable difference between 
the vibrancy of Jacques Delors Presidency (of the European Commission) and 
the mediocrity of his successor, Jacques Santer, whose Commission collapsed 
under corruption scandals in its first term. The example of Hoover also 
illustrates the considerable influence that can be brought into play by a 
proficient individual. A new institution requires a strong and dynamic leader 
to captain it thiough the initial growth period of the first few years. This 
figure can be decisive in shaping the different tasks, strategies and goals of
Storbeck was given an initial five-year term as the first incumbent.
295
Europol’s mission.'^^Storbeck can be considered such an individual (he was 
once tipped to succeed Raymond Kendall as Interpol’s General Secretary).
Whilst Europol is an intergovernmental body, one should bear in mind that 
Storbeck’s background is steeped in federal policing, having previously been 
deputy BKA chief, and his views and ambitions for Europol reflect this. He 
expressed the belief in 1994 that efficiency could be improved by equipping 
Europol with a central computer and providing it with similar powers to the 
BKA (but without the executive role involved within investigative powers).^^ 
Later he advocated the creation of “international task forces” whereby national 
police authorities could take necessary investigative action in their own state, 
but the investigation itself would be centrally led.^  ^ The establishment of the 
TECS addressed the former concern and Amsterdam and the Conclusions at 
Tampere addressed, to a fair extent, the investigative requirements, permitting 
Eui'opol to request national authorities to conduct investigations on its 
behalf.^® While Storbeck admits that Europol presently stands as “a platform 
for and an expression of intergovernmental co-operation”, he himself prefers 
to perceive Europol as an “almost federal central police agency comparable 
with the Bundeskriminalamt (of course without the latter’s powers of
Verbruggen, Op. Cit., p 165 
Bresler, Op. Cit., p 391 and p 388
FECL 21 Europol ChiefJilrgen Storbeck Tells Tales Out o f School December 1993/January 
1994
It should be remembered that the BKA was the first European police force to effectively 
utilise computers in a policing capacity, when it employed the Beobachtende Fahndung 
(BEFA) analysis system against the Red Army Faction.
FECL Europol Chief Storbeck on the State and Prospects o f his Agency November 1996 
Recommendation 45 of the Tampere Summit.
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investigation)”.^ '^  Indeed Storbeck’s BKA past is very likely responsible for 
his advocacy of executive powers for Europol. In a speech to the UK Police 
Foundation he argued that “the calls for. ..executive powers may prove 
irresistible” if the Member States fail to supply sufficient good quality 
information, and “we may have to go and find it”.^  ^ Storbeck is sufficiently 
sanguine on the eventual inclusion of executive powers:
The Convention does not iyet\) give Europol any executive 
authority. Europol officials are not empowered to arrest criminals, 
carry out searches or seize evidence. There is no EU-wide legal 
basis (yetV) for discharging any such powers^^
An energetic Director, one must conclude, does have some bearing on the 
direction of Europol. Does this relate, though, to any supranational influence? 
Neo-functionalism springs most readily to mind as a possibility: are the 
Director and his deputies sufficiently powerful to initiate an elite-actor driving 
force? A reassessment of the Convention’s controlling mechanisms in relation 
to the Director’s powers provides something of an answer to this.
Internally, Europol’s Director wields an impressive array of powers. The 
Director, for example, maintains authority over all Europol’s employees
Speech given at the fourteenth Conference o f German Lander Ministers Responsible for 
European Affairs in October 1996. Cited in FECL 48 Europol Chief Storbeck on the State 
and the Prospects o f his Agency November 1996 
The Police Foundation 1999 Lectuie, 21 September cited in Independence The European 
Police F o rce -A  New Threat to Britain No. 40, Autumn 1999 
Storbeck addressing the Garda Sfochâna Conference The Challenge of Change -  Policing 
2000 A Europol Perspective Dublin 27 September 1999
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(although less so regarding the semi-autonomous ELOs). Article 29 (3) details 
the Director’s main responsibilities:
1) performance of the tasks assigned to Europol;
2) day-to-day administration;
3) persomiel management;
4) proper preparation and implementation of the Management Board’s 
decisions;
5) preparing the draft establishment plan and draft five-year 
financing plan and implementing Europol’s budget; and,
6) all other tasks assigned to him in this Convention or by the 
Management Boaid.
Particularly interesting is the fact that Article 32 extends the Director’s powers 
beyond the propinquity of Eiuopol. The Director may prevent any member of 
staff from providing evidence in court without his permission, if he judges it 
“necessary to protect the overriding interests of Europol or of a Member State 
or States that need protection” (Article 32/3). Indeed, staff possess immunity 
from prosecution, unless waived by the Direc tor .The  case of the Europol 
official arrested in May 2001 by the Dutch police for embezzlement of the
Article 8 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities o f Europol, the Members o f its 
Organs, the Deputy Directors and Employees o f  Europol, 1997. Such immunity is a 
necessary condition of working in a centralised organisation dealing with acts that ti ansgress 
the national laws of Member States. Occasions may arise when an employee has unwittingly 
infringed some such law in the execution of his duties. Without such immunity, Europol 
might well be a hazardous environment in which to work.
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Europol budget, however, demonstrates that Article 32 is not expected to be 
employed other than in a professional capacity.^®
The counterweight to the Director is the Management Board, but in reality, its 
powers are limited. The Board’s duties as declared in Article 28 provide for a 
light supervisory touch. Article 28/1.9, for example, “shall examine problems 
which the joint supervisory board brings to its attention” and allows it to 
“deliver opinions on the comments and reports of the joint supervisory body” 
(Article 28/1.8).^^ These measures are hardly sanctions. Other than its role, 
along with the Director, in drawing up the budget, the Board has very little 
influence in the day-to-day rumiing of Europol, or over the Dhector. Its only 
real teeth are contained in Article 29/6, but even these are more or less drawn. 
The Board may only recommend the dismissal of the Director to the JHA 
Council. (No other censure options exist other than the non-renewal of 
contract if the incumbent is still in their first term). The dismissal of the 
Director would be very much a political and controversial action (unless he 
had committed some criminal act) requiring unanimity. Just as no European 
Commission President has been dismissed, the chances of dismissing a 
Europol Director aie equally as remote. To do so would be to attract 
enormous critical attention towards Europol as an institution.
The Director and Management Board became aware of the French official’s activities, and 
promptly informed the Dutch CID, leaving the enthe matter in their hands.
Europol Press Release 8 June 2001 
Article 24 provides for a Joint Supervisory Body to review Europol’s activities, focusing on 
the rights of the individual in relation to Eui opol’s data processing, storage, utilisation and its 
transfer.
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We can see, then, that the Director of Europol is an important figure within the 
JHA continuum. The incorporation of Schengen into the EU framework, 
bringing its flanking measures closer to Europol’s own role (especially with 
plans to link the TECS to the SIS II) enhances this position. To return to the 
question of whether the Director has the power to initiate integrative drive, 
one must express doubt. Ultimate power rests with the JHA Council, and 
through them the European Council, in terms of instigating change. The 
Europol Director, for all his influence, is extremely limited in this field, 
capable really of no more than persuasive argument. He is not the Director of 
a powerful supranational institution such as the Commission; his role is much 
more specific, limited to the law-enforcement responsibilities of an 
intergovernmental Europol. However, as Europol becomes more powerful, 
especially in light of the post-11 September enhancements, and the developing 
internal security continuum, so too does the Director’s influence. This is a 
fact that cannot be ignored. The adoption by JHA ministers of a “shopping 
list” drawn-up by Europol officials of twenty-five amendments that they 
would like to see made to the Convention, permitted the officials a political 
mandate to draw-up concrete proposals.^'^ This last point comprehensively 
illustrates that Europol officials are not simply executors of policy; they are 
prepared to lobby for change within their own organisation. Strong echoes of 
neo-functionalism emanate here. An intergovernmental agreement/bargain is 
first agreed, paving the way for later integration instigated by the elite-actors. 
The Europol officials demonstrate that politicians alone do not propose the 
changes in policy regarding Europol.
Statewatch Europol: Operational powers and a new mandate Vol. 11 No. 3/4 May-July 
2001 p 24
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No compelling evidence has emerged thus far to suggest that Europol is open 
to transmutational influences beyond that of intergovernmentalism. Certainly, 
the potential exists, and indeed there are, in situ, active integrative elements 
other than intergovernmentalism, but these are weak in comparison to the 
current intergovernmental hold. Why then, scattered amongst the literature 
and analysis on Europol, like so many tantalising clues, aie there numerous 
references to and remarks about a European FBI?
At the House of Lords Committee Report (12 '^') on the European 
Communities, the Minister of State for the Home Office’s reply to the 
question of “what would have to be added to Europol to make it a recognisable 
fledgling FBI?” was that Europol would “have to be a completely different 
organisation”.^’ This is certainly true, and while Europol has been expanding 
in terms of mandate (seventeen new crimes have been added since Europol’s 
inception and powers, these have not been sufficient to transform it into a 
“completely different organisation”. The proposed changes to the Convention, 
enabling faster enactment of amendments in the light of both 11 September 
and the next accession, would actually move Europol even closer to the 
current style of intergovernmental domination, as these would take national 
parliaments out of the equation.^®
House o f Lords Report Committee on the European Communities -  12 Report 
Correspondence with Ministers Session 1997-98, Paragraphs 2 0 -2 1  
Statewatch Press Release The activities and development of Europol — towards and 
unaccountable FBI in Europe 7 February 2002 
Council o f the European Union Amendments to the Europol Convention 6579/1/02 REV 1, 
Brussels 25 February 2002 paragraph 8
Amendments to the Convention currently require ratification by the Member States, which can 
take a long time. With accession bringing the total membership to a possible twenty-five in 
total, one can see that this would increase the duration.
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The Democratic deficit: a bulwark of intergovernmentalism
Europol’s Convention, while providing it with the highest degree of technical 
accountability within the Third Pillar, is also its greatest inhibitor against 
democratic accountability: Europol’s watchdogs are internal ones. Within 
the Third Pillar, but partially detached from it, Eui'opol has little involvement 
with the EU’s supranational institutions. The European Parliament’s role is 
limited to reading Europol’s annual report, and is only consulted on any 
intended amendment to the Convention (Article 34, Europol Convention).
The Commission’s role is just as limited, while the ECJ, although incorporated 
via an optional protocol, is restricted to an interpretative role. The 
intergovernmental argument is that Europol is accountable through the 
national parliaments of the Member States, rather than through any 
supranational organ. In truth, however, national legislatures are sidelined as 
much as their MEP colleagues. An addition to Europol’s Annex (the list of 
transnational crimes against which Europol is mandated for example) is made 
without legislative consultation, being a matter for the JHA Council 
(Convention, Article 43.3). Only actual amendments to the Convention 
receive legislative attention; this, however, would be jeopardised by the 
Spanish and Belgian proposals for removing the role of national legislatures in 
this regar d, in the interests of reducing “cumbersome” procedures.^^ Even the 
legislative influence over Europol’s internal watchdogs is limited. National 
parliaments can only call their own government representatives to account, not 
those belonging to another Member State. Consequently no direct influence
Steve Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 2000 p 218 
^ Council of the European Union. Op. Cit., paragraphs 5 and 8
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can be brought to bear over the collective element, thereby further reducing 
parliamentary authority over Europol.^^ With no external collective watchdog 
to oversee this area, Europol is very remote from direct democratic influence.
To address these concerns would be to weaken the intergovernmental grip on 
Europol. Essentially, the most effective way to achieve a solution would be a 
redrafting of the Europol Convention that takes greater account of both the 
European Parliament and national legislatures, and allows for a more 
authoritative role by both the ECJ and national cou r ts .T h is  would go some 
way to silencing the “murmurs of discontent” acknowledged by the Swedish 
Presidency regarding the less democratic elements of the original Convention. 
With Europol fast becoming the focal point of co-operative law-enforcement 
within the EU, it becomes ever more important that sufficient democratic 
safeguards are put in place. A more powerful Europol, enhanced tluough its 
counter-terrorist role, but without due accountability safeguards, is a 
somewhat ironic choice for the flagship of EU law-enforcement co-operation.
The European Parliament, which has always been concerned about its distance 
fiom Europol, has called for a number of changes to its current operating 
s ty le .Chief ly  these relate to consolidating the requirements of an effective 
and flexible law-enforcement vehicle with the obvious problems posed by the
^  Peter Chalk The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-terrorist 
Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability in Fernando Reinares (ed.) European 
Democracies Against TeiTorism 2000 pp 197-8 
There has been a tendency throughout the process of the Third Pillar o f excluding national 
parliaments from the overall process of negotiation, only bringing them in at the very end to 
ratify or reject the end result. This is very close to being a “rubber stamp”.
Peter Chalk, Op. Cit., p 197 
Treaty o f Amsterdam Article 41.3: European Parliament Session Document 1999-2004, 16 
May 2002, A5.0173/2002, RR/469336EN.2doc, Rapporteur: Gérard M.J. Deprez Protocol on 
Amending the Europol Convention (title abridged)
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enlargement process. As noted, the intergovernmental response to this has 
been to consider removing national legislatures from this element of the 
equation. The EP accepts that relying on so many national parliaments will 
undoubtedly take time (even with the system of “rolling ratification” which 
allows these annex additions to become active once two-thirds of the 
Membership have ratified them) and has proposed instead that the European 
Council dissolves the Europol Convention, replacing it with a Council 
Decision. Such a measure would be consistent with Article 34 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which permits this. In doing so, Europol amendments 
would be taken by the Council under qualified majority voting, thereby 
speeding up the process. Secondly, this would integrate Europol directly into 
the Third Pillai* rather than its remaining on the periphery, as the Convention 
places it. This would erode the democratic deficit as the European Parliament 
would have to be consulted before the Council adopted any implementing 
decisions (Article 39, Amsterdam). If the Council failed to do this, then the 
Parliament would have the right to bring an action before the ECJ. 
Additionally Aiticle 35 of Amsterdam would provide for automatic 
application of the ECJ’s jurisdiction to all decisions adopted by the Council 
under Aiticle 34.^^
Beyond this, the Parliament has proposed a greater input in Europol’s affairs 
for the EU’s supranational institutions; amending, for example. Article 48 of 
the Convention to include two representatives each fiom both the Commission 
and Parliament in addition to the single representative to the Management
69 Ibid., Section E
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Boaid from each Member State/'^ The Parliament’s involvement, jointly with 
the Council, in the appointment and dismissal of the Europol Director is 
another such proposal put forward by the Parliament. The Parliament also 
wishes to break the hold that the Member State govermiients have over 
Europol’s budget, by replacing direct contributions with funding from the EU 
budget.^’
It seems such a simple measure, replacing the Convention with a Council 
Decision, as a means of breaking the excessive intergovernmental hold over 
Europol. Such a measure would not remove Europol from intergovernmental 
control, which is, after all, symptomatic of the Third Pillar. What it would do, 
though, is to encourage the development of integration within Europol, by 
ending the current conditions of the intergovernmental bargaining process. 
Qualified majority voting would permit a more radical style of development 
because unanimous consensus would no longer be applicable. The rapid 
development of a federal-type Europol would remain an unlikely occurrence 
simply due to the fact that very few of the Member States support the 
development of such a structure. Rather, by including a supranational input, 
one would expect certain aspects of Europol’s development to reflect this. 
The ability of the European Par liament, for example, to request Europol’s 
Director to appear before a committee has significant connotations with the 
US Congress’s right of calling the Directors of the FBI and CIA before an 
oversight commit tee.Such measures would enhance the powers of the 
Parliament, adding to the supranational presence within the EU. One could
Ibid., Recommendation 4 
Ibid., Recommendation 2
Ibid., Recommendation 4 (an amendment to Aiticle 34 of the Europol Convention)
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also argue that such an approach could actually increase the influence of the 
Europol Director, as he would no longer be under the sole authority of the 
Member State govermnents, for the simple reason that no one centre would 
have power over him. Still more significant would be the concatenation of the 
JHA process as a whole. The present system is a fragmented one, due to 
Europol’s disassociation with the other “flanking measures” (only with the 
newly established Pro-Eurojust does Europol maintain some direct linkage 
A Europol, however, that is fully integrated within this process would 
encourage the development of approaching internal security matters from a 
JHA perspective, rather than a solely Schengen or Europol-orientated one, for 
example. As this thesis has illustrated, terrorism affects many areas of the 
internal security gamut, the border, investigative law-enforcement and judicial 
measures being three of the principal ones. A fully cohesive approach or 
“joined-up internal security co-operation” would be a definite improvement to 
the system.
By loosening the restrictive intergovernmentalist hold on Europol, the 
Member States would open the possibility of creating a genuine democratic 
policing system within the EU. In doing so, however, they would lose the 
absolute control that they currently hold over Europol. The European 
Parliament in its proposal puiports perplexity as to why the Council has not 
selected the conversion of the Europol Convention into a Council Decision as 
a solution.^'’ As tliis chapter has made abimdantly clear, the Convention was
Provisional Eurojust is the Third Pillar structure devised to facilitate judicial co-operation 
within the EU. Although it is administered through a Council Decision, it can be thought of as 
a sister-agency to Europol (see Chapter VIII for a detailed account o f this structure).
Treaty of Amsterdam Article 41.3. Op. Cit., p 17
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designed as an intergovernmental barrier against supranational influences. It 
is most likely to remain in place until JHA co-operation has advanced further, 
along with EU integration as a whole, to a point where it will no longer be 
necessary to keep Europol separated in this fashion. Presently though, the 
emphasis placed on internal security in the post-11 September milieu and 
Europol’s augmentation through its counter-terrorist role will most likely 
ensure that the Member States are in no hurry to share this instrument with the 
EU’s supranational institutions. It cannot be overemphasised how important 
the issue of sovereignty becomes when terrorism is involved.
One final issue requiring address, and one that stems from these discussions, is 
the conceivability of a two-tier or multi-speed Europol. Cun ently the 
Convention prohibits such a move by preventing Member States from entering 
into reseiwations, and thereby enforcing a singular pace (Article 44). This 
pace might not be fast enough, or even heading in the preferred direction for 
some Member States, such as Germany. Would a solution then be to advance 
the co-operative pace between those Member States that desire it? Certainly, 
the EU is not short of precedents in terms of multi-speeding: the European 
currency and Schengen represent two particularly significant examples. 
Establishing such a system, however, would be problematic only in terms of 
the TECS being a particulai* source of headaches. Adapting the TECS to dual­
speed conditions would introduce severe fragmentation into the Europol 
structure, possibly even reaching breaking point because of the problems that 
would be created by sharing certain types of information that have been 
inputted by differing levels of access. Consider the difficulties that the CCIC
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would have faced if the UK had remained outside of the SIS. It would be far 
wiser to concentrate on the other areas of Europol’s mandate. Contracting 
parties could for example expand the remit of Europol officers operating on 
their soil, in a manner paralleling Interpol’s TE Group, but with additional 
powers could be granted to the seconded officer, as is occurring between PSNI 
and Garda officers following the implementation of the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland’s Report. This in itself would 
not be too difficult, simply requiring an optional protocol between the 
contracting parties on what is permissible by Europol officers on their soil.^  ^
This would actually be very similar to the bilateral agreements regarding “hot 
pur suit” and observation under the Schengen Implementing Convention. 
Whether the consent would be required of all signatories for their officers to 
operate with entranced conditions in a Member State that has contracted to a 
multi-speed approach or thr ough a bilateral basis is a matter for the negotiating 
table. To cite a comparative precedent would be Germany’s open declaration 
under Article 41 of the Schengen Implementing Convention, removing any 
time or distance factors that would prohibit the continuance of a “hot pursuit” 
across its territory. Under this declaration, no bilateral accord was required as 
a precondition.
The Federal Alternative
Many of the solutions for resolving the democratic deficit are synonymous 
with federalism. As Chapter IV illustrated, a federal Europe is capable of
” Certainly it would not be as contentious as granting Europol operational 
powers of investigation as an agency per se.
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realising this, but what exactly would Europol’s position be within a federal 
Europe: in other words, would it be a European FBI?
The answer to this question lies with the proviso attached to the concept of 
European federalism -  sui generis. We must not fall into the trap of 
automatically associating a federal Europe with a federal police force. Under 
the concept of subsidiarity, an EU police force serves as an unnecessary 
intrusion of sovereignty (although this is relative to the taken definition of 
subsidiarity). To make this point, let us consider the US model for such a 
police force, as this is the one most touted as Europol’s endpoint. The FBI’s 
mandate centres mainly around cross-border and federal crimes -  terrorism 
being a case of the latter, and for the most part this works fairly well in 
America. However, we should also bear in mind that the FBI was established 
in 1908, and has had many years’ exclusive experience of tackling these types 
of crimes. The US was undergoing a political, social and economic 
transformation at the time the FBI was founded, with advances in 
communications and transport focusing attention on the need for a greater 
investigative input from the federal govermnent. Professional policing could 
no longer be left to cities or large townships.^^ This shift by the public 
towards favouring a federal response was coupled with the idealistic reforming 
zeal of what has become known as the Progressive Era, circa 1900 -1918, 
personified by President Roosevelt. These “progressives” believed 
government intervention at all levels was necessary for justice within an 
industrial society; specifically, “experts” were needed to achieve this goal.
History o f  the FBI, Origins (www.fbi.gov)
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The agents of the FBI represented one such group of experts Such experts 
were all the more necessary because subsidiarity, deeply embedded in the 
American constitutional system, established a fragmented policing system/®
The US a century ago is radically different to the EU today. The justice gap 
has long since been filled in Europe, by national police forces, trained to 
tackle all types of crime, including those specific to the FBI. Moreover, lack 
of a fragmented policing structure means that there is little need for the 
establishment of a new investigative body such as a European FBI. Actually 
establishing such a body would require the fragmentation of national law 
enforcement to accommodate this new Euro-FBTs investigative mandate. 
However, as has already been made clear, establishing such an organisation 
would be the law-enforcement equivalent of robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
Subsidiarity, in relation to modem Eui'ope, would prevent the establishment of 
a central authority to execute what the Member State is perfectly capable of 
performing.
Consequently, even within a federal Europe, the notion of a Euro-FBI is 
remote. Rather, Europol would be best suited to its present role of support 
structure. Fédéralisation of Europe would ensure some changes to Europe as 
it currently stands, but these would relate primarily to removing its 
accountability deficit as detailed above. In terms of Europol’s operational 
capacity, a federal system could imbue it with additional powers to obtain 
information that was unforthcoming from national authorities, by making this
Ibid
78 Today the distribution o f officers in the US is 82% local, 10% state and 8% federal 
(Verbruggen, Op. Cit. p 153).
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a federal offence for example, but otherwise it is difficult to see any significant 
change beyond this. There is, after all, only so much that can be done with a 
support structure.
Europol should not be perceived as an embryonic federal police force. Such a 
concept is entirely impractical. However, for those Member States who wish 
to advance further with Europol, the option of a dual-speed Europol is a 
possibility. Creating dual-speed conditions would lead to flirther 
fragmentation within the JHA process. While some Member States might not 
wish to see their flagship co-operative law-enforcement structure become 
fragmented, this option does offer a realistic alternative to addressing the 
desires of Member States who wish to push further ahead with co-operation in 
this area. The advances made in law-enforcement co-operation amongst the 
Schengen states, together with their Roman law heritage, may perhaps make 
them more willing to expand upon these with further integration via Europol. 
Europol, it should be remembered, was also as much a political as a practical 
construct.
Conclusions
Investigative law-enforcement co-operation against terrorism has been an area 
that some Member States have shown particular keenness in keeping on the 
periphery of the JHA field. Europol, although the first of these instruments to 
be placed inside the EU fold, and taking advantage of the close co-operative 
structures within it, has maintained elements of this traditional policy via its
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“prophylactic” Convention, because of the concern of many of the Member 
States. Most Member States have yet to be convinced that the EU is a fomm 
where a successful counter-terrorist policy can be established, although 
evidence suggests that this is changing, with the JHA Council’s emphasis now 
being placed on the counter-ten orist competences of Europol, following the 
11 September attacks. These boosted competences, however, have also driven 
the Member States to shore up their influence over Europol, rather than 
devolve it further towards the EU.
From an operational perspective, intergovernmental policy is a perfectly 
capable choice for leading the mechanics of investigative counter-terrorist co­
operation. It provides an authoritative edge to persuading law-enforcement 
authorities, often suspicious of sharing sensitive information of this kind, to 
engage actively in co-operation. Most law-enforcement officers still view the 
idea of a federal-style EU force with suspicion, although as we have 
demonstrated, these grounds are without merit. Indeed, the measures taken to 
bolster counter-terrorist co-operation since the 11 September attacks enliance 
the intergovernmental position of Europol, and are aimed at demolishing tlie 
prevarication with which many of the Member States’ counter-terrorist units 
have treated the organisation’s counter-terrorist auspices, resulting in the 
“malfunctioning” of Europol’s analysis flles.^^ Issues of trust therefore remain 
a paramount concern for these agencies, clearly reflecting the correlative 
variant between the new “European” approach and the traditional “informal” 
style. Intergovernmentalism, however, does not necessarily equate to superior
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No. 1 The “Conclusions” o f the SpecialJmtice and 
Home Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 and their implications for civil liberties Section 
9 i.e. The files were not receiving “premium” grade intelligence.
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security and trust within a structure, but it does provide these agencies with the 
comforter they require in order to utilise this service beyond half-hearted 
measures. Unfortunately, as the example of the faults arising within the co­
operation over the Strasbourg plot demonstrates, this approach can also lead to 
a blinkered national response, ignoring the transnational requirements of 
tackling what are transnational -  not simply national -  threats.
The problem with the current intergovernmental approach taken by the 
Member States is not that it is responsible for encouraging such attitudes, but 
rather its unenthusiastic response to addressing the democratic deficit within 
the structures that it has created. It is not necessary for Europol to be an EU 
institutional instrument with operational powers to execute its role effectively. 
What it does require, though, is greater democratic control. It is not an 
intelligence agency, it is a law-enforcement agency, primarily utilised by the 
police forces of the Member States. Greater democracy does not mean 
surrendering it to supranational control. Rather it means providing an 
accountable police agency -  the requirement of any democratic state. 11 
September provided an opportunity to re-examine the EU’s response to 
terrorism. In re-examining EuropoTs counter-terrorist role, an opportunity to 
open up the structure has been squandered.
Regardless, though, of where we view Europol within the EU spectrum, it is 
steadily growing as a law-enforcement agency. It has obtained “operative” 
powers from Amsterdam and Tampere, as well as from the JHA Council’s 
response to 11 September. Perhaps even more fundamental is the recognition
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of Europol by third party agencies and their willingness to actively engage in 
co-operation with it as an agency in its own right. Europol has signed a 
number of agreements with countries, including the USA, the Czech Republic, 
and Norway, as well as Interpol, permitting the exchange of information. 
Through these agreements Europol secures for itself a greater legitimacy as a 
significant co-operative structure within the EU, moving it closer to centre- 
stage; its position is fiirther strengthened by the possible acquisition of access 
to the SIS databanks; meanwhile the co-operative agreement with the USA 
against terrorism, signed in December 2001, underscores Europol’s counter- 
teiTorist credentials.
Europol’s position within the EU has improved co-operation against terrorism. 
This we have seen with the extraordinary wave of airests throughout the EU 
against suspected Islamic extremists -  although it took a crisis to actually 
implement EuropoTs utility here for the first time. The support structure to 
enhance investigative co-operation offers a number of options, both informal 
and regulated; these options did not exist during the Lockerbie investigation. 
Investigative co-operation, as embodied tlirough Europol, also differs, 
comparatively, from the standpoint of border security. Europol is not in a 
position to actively encourage further developments in co-operation beyond 
the services it offers, because it functions as an organisation in its own right 
rather than as a framework. Where the Schengen Implementing Convention 
enthusiastically encourages additional bilateral co-operation, Europol cannot, 
because any co-operation would be independent of it. This would detract fiom 
EuropoTs purpose. Only if individual Member States sought to extend it on a
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bilateral basis, implementing a multi-speed Europol, could such co-operation 
be possible. From this perspective the flagship of European law-enforcement 
co-operation, like any organisation, cannot push collaboration beyond the rate 
at which the JHA Council provides it with new competences. Even the level 
at which police agencies employ Europol will not actively increase their own 
co-operation with other agencies, as they deal primarily with Europol. Only 
thi'ough its co-ordination capacity is Europol able to offer national police 
agencies face-to-face co-operation with other national agencies. This is an 
area, however, where we have yet to see any real evidence of firm co­
operation in the counter-terrorist field. Consequently, the argument that the 
informal PWGOT structure is better suited to formulating co-operation 
between counter-terrorist agencies still stands. From this perspective, we can 
see that there is a notable difference in integrative terms between a regulated 
organisation and regulated fiamework.
Investigative co-operation has increased tremendously with the establishment 
of a permanent and regulated structure under the competences of the JHA 
security continuum. Europe appears to be reaping the rewards of this long 
building process, with the arrest of numerous suspects, and very importantly, 
no successful attack on European soil by terrorists. This last point is 
emphatic: Europe is far more vulnerable, both geographically and socially, to 
such attacks than the USA, whose much smaller Islamic community provides 
less water for the tenorist fish. The work in Europe, though, is unfinished. 
Law-enforcement co-operation continues to make advances, although the 
levels vary somewhat throughout the field. Integration has become a driving
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force in law-enforcement co-operation, whatever the methodology. Currently 
Member States adopt the intergovernmental approach, albeit one flawed 
through its dismissal of democratic accountability; nevertheless it is driving 
co-operation forwai'd. As this thesis has shown, lire intergovernmental route is 
not absolutely necessary for fuithering law-enforcement co-operation; even in 
a Europe of sovereign states, we have observed other methodologies more 
suited to certain conditions. Intergovernmental policy can be well suited to 
the likes of the PWGOT and the former Trevi, provided there is sufficient 
latitude on the pail of the central authorities towards their inherent neo- 
functionalist tendencies to allow the co-operative organ to function, much like 
the examples of co-operative border control discussed earlier. Indeed, 
intergovernmentalism is a useful policy tool for forcing the co-operative pace 
where necessary, whilst respecting the scepticism national police authorities 
have for wholeheartedly embracing a pan-European approach to tackling 
transnational crime. However, as we have discovered, a federal approach need 
not mean the subservience of national police forces to a central authority, or an 
agency encroaching on their mandates. Business would continue much the 
same as usual, as we have observed regarding the issue of federalism and 
border security. The real difference would be seen in terms of improved 
accountability and a greater authority for Europol vis-à-vis obtaining data. 
Moreover, within a federal Europe, one could perceive a greater commitment 
by national police forces to utilising the services offered by Europol precisely 
because it would be a federal organisation, with greater access to intelligence.
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and hence would be held in greater esteem. Thus far, federalism offers a 
genuine alternative to the intergovernmental approach.
Neo-functionalist policy, by contrast, is more limited in what it can achieve, 
due to the lack of any true geo-spatial environment offering commonality 
upon which to build -  counter-terrorism still maintains its national 
perspective. Rather, what we may witness insofai' as Europol is concerned is 
that it may push for a greater role for itself, via the personality of the Director, 
if he is so inclined. In truth, however, such a move would differ little from 
any other organisation seeking to consolidate its position within its own 
business environment. Neo-functionalist oriented co-operation here is not 
strong enough to dominate intergovernmental control; instead, it is limited to 
pushing forward the edges of EuropoTs role.
The level of law-enforcement co-operation open to participating agencies is, 
of course, also determined by the degree of judicial co-operation between the 
Member States. Neither Schengen’s Implementing Convention nor Europol, 
for example, could engage in active co-operation without the pre-existence of 
some judicial arrangements. It is to this area of co-operation that we now turn, 
in an attempt to fully understand the developments in law-enforcement co­
operation, as well as making the case for a field of co-operation against 
terrorism in its own right.
Subject to Europol successfully delivering the services it offered.
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Chapter VIII
The Mechanics of Judicial Co-operation against Terrorism
If the criminal justice system of a state is the forge upon which its counter­
terrorist policy is tempered, judicial co-operation between states is the anvil to 
the hammer of law-enforcement co-operation. Without effective judicial co­
operation, the efforts of law-enforcement officers are severely diminished.
This does not relate simply to the extradition process of a terrorist suspect 
after he has been located, but to almost every aspect of the co-operative effort. 
Co-operation relating to the transfer of evidence is equally as important, as are 
the testimonies of witnesses, and their cross-examination in court. Even the 
exchange of information requires judicial safeguards to ensure that an officer 
is not acting on information that could be classified as inadmissible in his own 
territory, but not in another, as demonstrated by inclusion of legal experts 
amongst the SIS’s SIRENE staff to guard against this very issue.
Tertorists have recognised the power of the judicial system when it is set 
against them, and have sought to intimidate it, thereby demonstrating their fear 
of it. Their efforts ranged from the intimidation of jurors in Northern Ireland, 
leading to the establishment of the controversial juryless Diplock Courts in 
1973 to try terrorist cases, to the assassination of judges. The IRA have 
murdered eight members of the judiciary, whom they regard as primary targets 
along with members of the RUC and British Army, especially after the 
introduction of the Diplock Courts denied the IRA jurors to tlueaten.
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heightening the role of the judges themselves.' ETA has conducted a similar 
campaign, most recently assassinating a Supreme Court Judge in Madrid on 30 
October 2000, and the Chief Prosecutor of Andalusia earlier the same month.^ 
Similai'ly the Red Brigades kidnapped Judge Giovanni d’Urso, responsible for 
running the special prisons established to hold terrorists, in December 1980, in 
an attempt to force the govermnent to close these prisons.^ Meanwhile the 
Italian Mafia, although not technically terrorists, have engaged in terrorist- 
type acts, and targeted members of the judiciary to deter investigations against 
them. Most notable were the assassinations of leading anti-Mafia prosecutors 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino and their bodyguards in May and July 
of 1992 respectively. Thieats have also been carried out by terrorist groups 
against the judiciary. Abu Nidal tlueatened to kill any judge who signed the 
order to extradite Mohammed Rashid, a member of his organisation who had 
been apprehended in Greece and was subject to a US extradition request for 
planting a bomb aboard a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Hawaii in 1982, which 
killed one passenger."' Similarly, Francisco Mugica Garmendia, a former ETA 
leader arrested in France in 1992 before being extradited to Spain in 2000, 
threatened the High Couit judges at his trial with assassination. The campaign
* Malcolm Sutton Bear in mind these dead... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 
1969-1993 1994. Information updated by Sutton on the Cain Website (Conflict Archive on 
the Internet) www.cain.ulst.ac.uk, Appendix: Statistical Summary -  updated October 2002 
Lord Justice Gibson, for example, was murdered by the IRA, along with his wife, on 25 April 
1987, in revenge for his acquittal o f four RUC Special Branch officers who had shot dead 
three unarmed IRA men in their car, Kinnego, 27 October 1982. Gibson’s ruling on 5 June 
1984 that the men were “absolutely blameless”, congratulating them on bringing the IRA men 
to “ to the final court of justice” indicated to the republican and nationalist community that a 
“shoot-to-kill” policy did exist, “underwritten by highest levels o f the judiciaiy” (Peter Taylor 
Brits: the War Against the IRA 2001 pp 249-50)
 ^Dailv Telegraph Rush-hour blast kills Spanish judge  31 October 2000 (online edition); Daily 
Telegraph News in Brief 10 October 2000 (online edition).
 ^Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock International Terrorism in the 
1980’s: A Chronologv of Events Vol. I. 1980-1983 1989 p 108 
Patrick Brogan World Conflicts pp 602-3 
Although not extradited, Rashid was tried in Athens, in October 2001, for the bombing and 
convicted in Januaiy 1992 (see below).
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against the judiciary began eleven days after he was sentenced to a thirty-year 
prison sentence for his involvement in the 1989 murder of a public
prosecutor. ^
The judiciary are just as much a threat to teiTorist groups as the police. 
Accordingly, transnational co-operation in this area is equally as important as 
that of law-enforcement. In comparison, however, the advancement of 
judicial co-operation has, until very recently, been a much slower affair, 
almost snail-like in movement. Extradition treaties have traditionally been 
regarded as the key instrument in tackling teiTorism in the area of judicial co­
operation, but for the most part, they have been hopelessly outdated in relation 
to the issue. Neither, for that matter, are they directly associated with the EU, 
but rather with the pan-European Council of Europe. Only within the past few 
years of the EU integiative process has work seriously been undergone to 
address the deficit injudicial co-operation. The Amsterdam Treaty began this 
process of “catch-up”, recommending the establishment of a European Judicial 
Network (EJN) to facilitate judicial co-operation, following it tlirough with the 
Tampere Conclusions, which placed significant emphasis on the improved 
judicial co-operation. It is the events of 11 September, however, that have 
catapulted judicial co-operation forward, with the establishment of the 
contentious European Arrest Warrant, which removes the need for the 
extradition process between Member States in relation to particular crimes.
 ^Daily Telegraph Rush-hour blast kills Spanish judge 31 October 2000 (online edition).
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In ascertaining the effectiveness of the judicial measures ranged against 
terrorism, this chapter addresses the concept of extradition as a measure 
against terrorism, as well as the various extradition treaties at both the Council 
of Europe and EU level. Understanding their effectiveness is critical in view 
of the dominating hold that they have had on tliis area of co-operation.
Beyond this is the need to understand how the changes at EU level will affect 
the co-operation as a whole. Likewise, are they effective in addressing the 
emerging terrorist threat?
Extradition
Extradition is the process by which a state may request the return of a wanted 
fugitive who is currently residing in another country. It is an exact science, 
requiring precise wording and filing of what is known as a commission 
rogatoires or a rogatory letter, for it to be considered a proper request. The 
British authorities were much chagrined when their initial request to Belgium 
for the extradition of an IRA suspect, Patrick Ryan, was refused because it had 
been incorrectly drafted.^ It is also usually a very long process, because few 
fugitives do not contest their extradition. The process, from start to finish, can 
take as long as several years, as it is effectively fought as a court case.^ Those
® Brogan, Op. Cit., p 427
See below for a fuller discussion of the Ryan case. Similar examples include the release of 
Evelyn Glenholmes(who was wanted by Britain in connection with the Brighton bombing 
1984) from Irish custody in March 1986 following administrative errors on the extradition 
warrant. A similar case occurred that August, resulting in the release of Gerard O’Reilly. 
(Cain Website (Conflict Archive on the Internet) A Chronology o f the Conflict: 1986 
www.cain.ulst.ac.uk)
’ Unless a special bilateral arrangement exists permitting a speedier extradition process, as 
exists between Spain and France, or the UK and Slovakia. Under this latter arrangement, 
three IRA suspects anested in Slovakia, 5 July 2001, were rapidly exh adited to the UK the 
following month. (BBC News Terror charge three extradited 30 August 2001)
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cases involving terrorists typically result in generating significant publicity for 
the terrorist and their cause. The British government’s nine-year battle to have 
the IRA terrorist, Joseph Doherty, extradited from the United States, became 
very much a cause célèbre, turning Doherty into a hero of the Republican 
movement. Extradition does not deny the terrorist “the oxygen of publicity”, 
and a sophisticated group such as the IRA or ETA is capable of drawing as 
much advantage from the process as possible. Doherty, for example, used the 
media attention to convey the image of the IRA as a legitimate resistance 
group rather than a tenorist organisation, undoubtedly harnessing additional 
support for the republican cause from sympathisers in the US.^
Conversely, the opportunity also exists for the aggrieved govermnent to 
explain its position to a wider audience, and if it wins the extradition case, it 
serves as a sanctioning of their counter-tennrist policy by another state. 
Unfortunately this rarely rectifies the massive publicity bestowed upon the 
terrorist, and the occasional extradition case that is lost can be most damaging 
to the legitimacy of a state’s counter-terrorist policy. A UK court overturned 
the Home Secretary, David Blunkett’s decision, in November 2001, to return 
to France Rashid Ramda, an Algerian suspect wanted by France in connection 
with the 1995 Paiis Metro bombings; expressed doubts on the evidence 
against him; and ultimately expressed concern that Ramda might be subject to 
mistreatment in a French prison. This overruling indirectly infers a 
condemnation of French penal policy regarding terrorists.^ Similarly, the
® See Martin Dillon’s Killer in downtown 1992 for an excellent account of the extradition 
process against Doherty.
 ^BBC News UK to extradite Paris terror suspect 9 October 2001 ; BBC News Paris bomb 
suspect's extradition blocked21 June 2002.
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refusal of the Irish Attorney-General to extradite Patrick Ryan to the UK on 
the grounds that the British government and newspapers had made so many 
prejudicial statements against him that he could never receive a fair trial, also 
stands as a criticism of Britain’s counter-terrorist policy in this regard."'
Extradition, nevertheless, has been the only process available to governments 
seeking the return of wanted terrorist suspects." It is often a convoluted 
process, but much of the complexity stems from the fact that the procedure is 
designed specifically to protect the wanted individual’s rights, through a 
regulation of procedures, as much as it a respect of the sovereignty of other 
states.'^ A visitor to another country is, after all, entitled to the same 
protection as that of its citizens. To casually return a wanted individual to a 
requesting country would be to fly in the face of centuries of juiispriidence, as 
well as to display a blatant disregard for the concept of sovereignty. The 
above examples of Ramda and Ryan demonstrate how the procedures 
governing extradition can protect these rights.
Ramda was taken into custody in the UK in 1997. Britain refused to uphold France’s 
extradition requests as evidence suggested that one o f those convicted for the bombing, 
Bouaien Bensaid, had been mistreated by the French authorities.
While the UK redrafted a corrected extradition request for the Belgian authorities, the 
Belgian government quickly expelled Ryan to Ireland rather than continue his detention. The 
fallout o f this decision led to severe sti aining of relations between the UK and Ireland and 
Belgium, The incident occurred over a particularly short period of time, between November 
and December 1988.
“ At least the only legal option available; the SAS snatch squads that operated along the 
Anglo-Irish border are a case in point. France, having secured a guarantee of non­
interference from the Sudanese government, apprehended Carlos the Jackal in Khartoum, 
August 1993, by abducting him in a covert operation. The United States, meanwhile, through 
its rule of extraten-itorial jurisdiction, ensures that a US court takes no account of how the 
suspect actually ai rived there; that he is standing before them is all that is o f concern.
Through this policy, the US has been able to employ inventive methods of apprehending 
terrorist suspects. Fawaz Younnis, for example, was convicted for ah piracy and hostage 
taking, and sentenced to thirty years imprison, after being lured into international waters 
between Cyprus and Lebanon. Mid-air refuelling ensured that he always remained in 
international airspace on his journey to the US. (Christopher Harmon Terrorism Todav 2000 p 
254)
Geoff Gilbert Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and other 
Mechanisms 1998 p 6
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Terrorists, extradition and the political exemption
One of the most problematic issues to affect the Western European states in 
the early 1970s was how to deal with international terrorists after they had 
been apprehended in a country. The political overtones claimed by the 
terrorists of their acts created much disan ay within European judicial systems, 
especially as the pan-European Convention on Extradition 1957 clearly 
emphasised under Article 3.1 that:
Extradition shall not be guaranteed if the offence in respect of 
which it is required by the requested Party as a political offence 
or an offence connected with a political offence.
This Article and the resulting confusion, in conjunction with the initial belief 
that the international terrorism spilling over from the Middle East and 
affecting Europe would only be a temporary phenomenon, resulted in 
European states being prepared to tlrrow their caught terrorist “fish” back into 
the water. The discovery of a massive shipment of Czech arms, bound for the 
IRA at Schiphol airport, Amsterdam in October 1971, for example, did not 
lead to any arrests on the Continent. Those involved in the operation (Maria 
Maguire and David O’Connell -  one of the chief contenders for the command 
of the PIRA) fled the Continent to Ireland, but the Dutch did not request their 
extradition fi’om Ireland. Only Switzerland enforced an exclusion order
The shipment contained a formidable amount of ordnance: 166 crates, including grenades, 
rocket launchers and bazookas. A detailed account of this operation is contained in the 
Maguire’s recantation of Republican violence: Maria Maguire To Take Arms: A Year in the 
Provisional IRA 1973, especially chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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against the duo, when it discovered that they had used Zurich to transfer the 
funds necessary for payment of the shipment, converting the monies from 
Irish into Swiss ciurency.'"' Clearly, the smuggling of an arms shipment was a 
criminal offence in breach of Dutch law. That the Dutch took no judicial 
action is illustrative of the ambiguous political overtones regarding terrorism, 
which pervaded European states during the early 1970s,'^ This reluctance to 
take legal action against political offenders stemmed from the late eighteenth- 
and-nineteenth century origins of the modern European state. Democracies 
were loath to persecute or extradite revolutionary radicals who were 
attempting to ferment change in their own authoritarian regimes, their own 
democratic existence having stemmed from past revolutions. Contemporaiy 
terrorism, however, is several steps removed fr om both the tactics and 
strategies of its revolutionary origins, and neither is it aimed exclusively 
against authoritarian or ‘occupying’ states. The realisation that international 
terrorism was not going to abate forced the European states to rectify the 
political exemption clause by imposing conditions upon it."  ^ In December 
1975, and again in July 1976, the European Council called for co-operation in 
extraditing and prosecuting terrorists. The European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism 1977 (ECST) was the means of addressing this 
problem.
Ibid., pp 45-6, 67-8
Neither were the Dutch prepared to allow French Special Forces to storm their Embassy in 
The Hague, following its seizure by tlnee members of the United Red Army of Japan in Sept 
1974.
The political offence itself remained a bar to an extradition request within the EU until 1995 
when the newly implemented EU Convention on Extradition removed it (Article 5).
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The ECST‘^
The EC ST followed in the tradition of European efforts at regulating the 
Byzantine complexities of extradition law, and was essentially an extension of 
the European Convention on Extradition 1957.'^ Its purpose was to 
consolidate the spirit of Aiticle 3 of the 1957 Convention with the 
practicalities of dealing with modern-day terrorism. The Convention’s main 
thi'ust was to list a series of specified offences, archetypical of a terrorist act, 
under which the political exemption clause offered no succour. These were as 
follows:
- an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 
1970;
- an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal 
on 23 September 1971;
- a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity 
or libeidy of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic 
agents;
The past tense is used to refer to the ECST insofar as this thesis is concerned with EU 
Member States, where this Convention is now effectively redundant.
Prior to the 1975 Convention, extradition relied upon the reciprocity o f bilateral ti'eaties 
(which were in no way standardised). In an effort to prevent lawbreakers from exploiting a 
chaotic “system” that no longer reflected post-war democratic Europe the 1957 Convention 
introduced regulation along with a set minimum standard for extradition among the 
signatories. A later supplementary protocol ETS 86 (1975) paved the way for the ECST by 
removing war crimes and crimes against humanity from the political exemption clause.
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- an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious 
unlawful detention;
- an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic 
firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
- an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as 
an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an 
offence.
(Article 1)
Whilst a commendable staid, the Convention’s list of proscribed activities can 
be circumvented under certain conditions, depending on the weapon used. The 
RAF’s murder, by a sniper, of Detlev Rohwedder, the director of the 
Treuhandanstalt, in Dussledorf in April 1991, would in theory fall outside the 
remit of Article 1, because the weapon used was not an automatic one.’^  The 
same principle could apply to any IRA sniper operating in South Armagh or 
November 17’s murder of Pavlos Bakoyiannis, chief parliamentary 
spokesman of the conservative New Democracy party, in Athens September 
1989, with the signature .45-calibre p isto l.N eith er November 17’s murder 
of Richard Welch, the CIA station chief at the US Embassy, in December 
1975 nor that of the British defence attaché. Brigadier Stephen Saunders in 
March 2000, with the same signature weapon would, however, fall under 
Article I ’s scope, as they were both diplomatically protected persons.
The Treuhandanstalt was responsible for the privatisation o f the former state industries of 
East Germany. (Charles J M Drake Tenorist’s Target Selection 1998 p 24)
George Kassimeris Europe’s Last Red Terrorists 2001 pp 88-9, 73-4, 104 
(Although Saunders’ murder occuned after the 1995 EU Convention on Extradition, the 
simplified extradition convention has yet to be universally ratified by the Member States).
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Equally, had Joe Doherty fled to a European state rather than to the USA, he 
would have found it much more difficult to contest his extradition. Although 
it is not known who amongst Doherty’s unit operated the heavy M60 machine 
gun that killed SAS captain Herbert Westmacott (it is IRA policy that a 
volunteer never takes responsibility for “a kill” or admits to who used the 
murder weapon), it is known that Doherty did fire his Heckler and Koch 
automatic rifle at the soldiers.^’ Involvement in such a particular terrorist 
incident would fall under Ai*ticle 1. This loophole was partially addressed by 
Article 2, which permitted the exclusion of additional offences flom the 
political exemption clause, but this was not a universal condition. A 
contracting party could make a declaiation, but unless the other state involved 
in the extradition process had made a similar declaration, then it could not 
count.
Another potential wrecking device is Article 5, which permitted a state to 
refuse extradition if it has cause to believe that the fugitive was being 
prosecuted/punished on account of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion. The premise of this article is to prevent a state being forced to 
extradite a persecuted individual, but it also allows a state to decide 
unilaterally what composes or defines a racial or political persecution. Most 
terrorists would claim that they were being persecuted by a state for at least 
one of these reasons.
Dillon, Op. Cit., Chapter 6, especially pp 98-99, 1992
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The most astonishing loophole, however, was that contained under Aiticle 13, 
permitting a signatory to reserve “the right to refuse extradition in respect of 
any offence mentioned in Article 1, which it considers to be a political offence 
or an offence inspired by political motives”. This clause effectively flies in 
the face of the ECST’s initial purpose. The only limitation that a signatory 
need undertake before making its unilateral interpretation of a political crime 
was “due consideration when evaluating the character of the offence, any 
particular' serious aspects of the offence including:
- that it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity or 
liberty of persons, or
- that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it, or
- that cruel or viscous means have been used in the commission of the 
offence
The inclusion of Article 13 clearly established a potential derogatory effect 
against the spirit of the Convention, so much so that one might ask whether 
the intent was to create a paper tiger.
Paper Tiger or First Step?
There is much to criticise in the ECST concerning its failure as a resolute 
bulwark of judicial co-operation against terrorism. Beyond the two main 
flaws discussed above is the criticism that it invited a host of reservations, 
declarations and territorial declarations to be made at signature. France, for
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example, placed reservations and declarations in respect of her constitutional 
and revolutionary context: “anyone persecuted on account of his action for the 
cause of liberty has the right to asylum”. Belgium reserved the right to 
decline to extradite offences it considered political with the exception of 
hostage-taking. Greece, meanwhile, reserved the right to refuse the 
extradition of any of the offences listed under Article 1 if she believed that 
“the offence is being prosecuted for his or her action in favour of freedom.”^^  
Reservations such as these stretched the purpose of Article 1 to breaking 
point, by appropriating the right to dictate what was and what was not a 
political offence rather than leaving it to the provisions of the Article.
Further evidence to support the paper tiger argument lies not so much with the 
Convention itself, but with the significant delay in many Member States 
putting it forward for ratification. Italy, France and Greece, for example, did 
not ratify the European Convention on XeiTorism 1977 until 1986, 1987, and 
1988 respectively.^^ Again, such measures seriously dilapidated the fibre of 
the Convention. The ECST’s purpose was supposedly to bring some 
unanimity to bear against the new phenomenon of modern terrorism. Such 
fragmentation made this exceedingly difficult, as we shall shortly see. Some 
of the delays were the result of constitutional issues; Ireland continued to 
refuse to sign, arguing that Article 29 of her constitution prevented the 
extradition of political offenders. Such an interpretation, however, generated 
considerable academic and political controversy: in practice, the refusal to
Alfred P. Rubin Extradition and Terrorist Offences in Terrorism Vol. 10, No. 2 1987 p 87; 
List of reservations made with respect to treaty no.090 European Convention on the 
Suppression of Ten orism. Complete chi'onologv on: 16/02/01 Council of Europe 
^ See table vii for a full listing of the ECST’s signatories and their ratification dates.
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extradite political offenders appears to be a matter of state discretion, and 
consequently, if it is a rule of international law, then it is permissive rather 
than obligatory?"' A. E. Evans is extremely critical of this position, arguing 
that a rigid adherence to such a principle is “a narrow conception of the nature 
of international law and the process of its growth”?^ Similar arguments go a 
long way towards dispelling the “sacred” defence of all political offenders. 
Indeed the recent advances within the EU demonstrate how quickly such 
beliefs have fallen by the wayside. This attitude displayed by some states 
towards the ECST is further borne out by the failure of the Dublin Agreement 
of 1979.
The Dublin Agreement 1979
The Council of Europe, not the EEC, had taken the lead in attempting to 
galvanise judicial co-operation against terrorism. Some within the 
Community felt that with their close links, they should also be able to 
contribute some sort of additional effort in this area. Belgium therefore 
proposed that the Member States should shore up the ECST by speedily 
ratifying it, without reservations; the proposal was opened for signature at the 
Dublin European Council in 1979.
^ Juliet Lodge with David Freestone The European Community and Terrorism: Political and 
Legal Aspects in Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers (eds.) Terrorism in Europe 1984 p 
83
Ibid. The original source is A.E. Evans The Apprehension and Prosecution o f Offenders: 
Some Current Problems in A.E Evans and J.F. Murphy Legal Aspects o f International 
Terrorism (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1978) p. 499
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While work on the Belgian proposal was underway, the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament “took a much bolder initiative, which 
for a time monopolised the attention of the Nine and delayed progress on the 
Belgian proposal”?^ The Committee was considering a proposal made in 
December 1977 by the French President, Giscard d’Estaing, for the 
establishment of an espace judiciaire européene. This was aimed at 
facilitating co-operation in criminal matters, particularly with a view to 
simplifying extradition procedures and the application of the principle “to 
extradite or prosecute” (see below), rather than an attempt at establishing a 
common jurisdiction, legal code, or legal process?^ Although the Tyrell 
Report looked favourably on the French President’s proposal viewing it as 
perfectly feasible, France’s Community colleagues had a maikedly cooler 
response. They were concerned about how this would affect the powers of the 
Community, while Britain feared that its common law tradition would become 
open to inroads from the Napoleonic system. The French proposal was 
submitted as a draft at a meeting of the Ministers of Justice in Rome, June 
1980. The Dutch government, believing that it would not be successful in 
carrying the support of its par liament, was responsible for actually sinking the 
French proposal, by their refusal to support it; consequently, the draft was not 
opened for signature. In retaliation, France refused to ratify the Dublin 
Agreement, sinking it in turn. This was partly a retaliatory response, but also 
because France’s National Assembly, as well as French public opinion, was 
hostile to the weakening of the traditional right of political asylum.^^
Antonio Vercher Terrorism in Europe: An International Comparative Legal Analysis 1992 p 
356; Simon Nuttall European Political Co-operation 1992 p 295 
Vercher, Op. Cit., pp 356-57
Simon Nuttall European Political Co-operation 1992 pp 295-6
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This particular case illustrates the failure of the Community members to 
achieve even a relatively simple attempt at solidarity against terrorism, 
symbolised by the Dublin Agreement. Indeed, its failure served only to 
diminish enthusiasm for judicial co-operation against terrorism among the 
Member States for some time to come. France made a renewed attempt with 
her Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter, proposing in September 1982 a 
European criminal court to handle terrorist cases. Her Community partners 
were less enthusiastic and pressed France to ratify the Dublin Agreement 
instead.^^ Only with the impetus generated by the TEU were there the 
beginnings of significant change.
Why was this co-operation so reticent? Could those Member States who 
supported the Dublin Agreement not go ahead with the measures that they had 
agreed to in signing the forlorn agreement bilaterally? Perversely, states have 
a tendency to shy away from multilateral commitments, unless they can be 
certain that others will also follow them. To commit unreservedly to the 
ECST would curtail the options open to a government in dealing with certain 
terrorist issues. Sometimes it is easier to be able to ignore or expel a wanted 
terrorist rather than risk reprisal attacks. This is despite the limitations of 
Article 1 and the customary derogation clause, Article 14, which permits 
immediate derogation from the ECST (Article 13 would be effectively 
nullified as all signatories would be confirming their commitment not to
The Dublin Agreement remained in perpetual limbo. The agreement required unanimity in 
ratification before it could come into effect; therefore although France was later to sign and 
ratify it, so too now was it required o f the new Member States. Greece, although signing it, 
had yet to ratify it. This state of affairs continued until the agreement became surpassed by 
modern developments.
Vercher, Op. Cit., p 357
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include reservations with regard to the political offence). Without a universal 
commitment, some states would be reluctant to sign an agreement that limited 
their options, and not those of their neighbours.
The ECST put into practice
Without doubt, the ECST was riddled with inconsistencies, but ultimately the 
proof of it being a paper tiger lies in how effectively it was enforced by its 
signatories. Certainly, the Convention was used to extradite terrorist suspects: 
two IRA escapees arrested in the Netherlands in January 1986, for example, 
were extradited to the UK the following December. Han-Joachim Klein, a 
former compatriot of “Cai'los the Jackal”, was extradited by France to 
Germany following his arrest in September 1998, and brought to trial in 
December 2000.^' Equally, the latter aspect of the Convention’s principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or try) has at times been put into practice, 
rather than resorting to actually extraditing a suspect. The purpose of this 
principle, attributed to Grotius, is that contracting states on whose territory 
those reasonably suspected of terrorist acts happen to be, must either try them 
or hand them over to the requesting contracting state, according to the 
Convention. Simply letting them go in the face of reasonable evidence is not 
permissible.^^ This principle might be invoked if the state in question does 
not believe that the suspect would receive a fair trial if extradited, or might
Cain Website (Conflict Archive on the Internet) A Chronology o f the Conflict: 1986 
www.cain.ulst.ac.uk
BBC News Jackal ally triedfor OPEC kidnap 17 October 2000; BBC News Christmas 
killings that shocked the world 15 Februaiy 2001 
Vercher, Op. Cit., p 350
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face mistreatment or capital punisliment?^ Greece tried Mohammed Rashid 
for the 1982 Pan Am bombing in October 1982, rather than extraditing him to 
the USA, and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison?"' Greece did this, 
partly because it feared terrorist reprisals, but also because the Greek 
government has had a policy of maintaining good relations with the 
Palestinians.
The negative cases, however, undoubtedly overshadow the history of ECST. 
Tenorist intimidation and/or political motivations typically lie behind any 
failure to follow through on the commitments made under the ECST. Perhaps 
the most notorious example of this is France’s decision to huniedly expel two 
Iranians rather than extradite them to Switzerland to face charges of 
assassinating two Iranian political exiles late in 1993. France feared Iranian 
terrorist retaliation as well as the possibility of jeopardising her growing 
export market with Iran.^  ^ Similarly, Greece expelled to Libya in 1988, Abdel 
Osama A1 Zomar, a Palestinian, who was wanted by the Italian authorities for 
his alleged involvement in the bombing of a Rome synagogue. ^^Equally, the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle has been grossly abused, with prosecutions
Co-operation between Europe with the United States over extradition, in the wake of 11 
September, has become somewhat problematic because of the death penalty, as we shall 
discuss later on.
Yoram Schweitzer The Arrest o f Mohammed Rashid—Another point fo r the Americans The 
International Policv Institute for Counter-Terrorism : articles www.ict.org.il 
Rashid was released for good behaviour in 1996 after serving eight years. He was 
subsequently apprehended by US officials in 1998 and brought to trial.
Peter Rudolf Critical Engagement: the European Union and Iran in Richard N. Haass (ed.) 
Trans-Atlantic Tensions: The United States. Europe and Problem Countries 1999 p 75 
Pierre Marion, a former DGSE Director, lamented that little could be done to respond to the 
terrorist threat against France, because there was no consistent counter-terrorist policy: “The 
influence of the pro-Iraqi, pro-Libyan, pro-Palestinian lobbies dictates the orientation of  
external action and blends its efforts with the military-industrial complex to increase arms 
sales”. (Douglas Porch The French Secret Services 1995 p 433)
Malcolm Anderson Counterterrorism as an Objective o f European Police Cooperation in 
Fernando Reinares (ed) European Democracies Against Terrorism 2000 p 239
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having been conducted half-heartedly. No watchdog mechanism existed to 
ensure wholehearted commitment to the Council of Europe’s ECST; thus 
there was nothing to deter states from acting in the interests of short-term 
realpolitik. As one MEP put it:
We have a convention that is valueless.. .because of the 
contradictions it contains and the opinion it offers of paying no 
attention to the very rules it lays down '^^
The comment is harsh, but justifiable. There is much to criticise in the ECST, 
not least the reluctance of the Member States to commit themselves fully to its 
principle. It is much easier to commit oneself to a police-co-operation 
agreement where, should realpolitik dictate, one can simply withhold 
information without others knowing; extradition, on the other hand, is an 
entirely public matter. Consequently the ECST was intentionally riddled with 
escape clauses.
Do such infractions and contradictions make for a paper tiger? The ECST is a 
weak piece of legislation, certainly, making as much sense as a doorway in the 
middle of a field. If you so choose, you could pass thiough the door, but 
equally you could ignore it. The ECST did however have a positive affect on 
European attitudes towards tenorism. It established the concept that a 
teiTorist crime need not necessarily be -  indeed was most likely not -  
politically motivated. This immediately became a focal point in dealing with
Noemi Gal-Or International Cooperation to Suppress Tenorism 1985 p 294
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terrorism, sweeping away the aimless confusion of the past and dramatically 
curbing the number of terrorists who were simply being expelled because 
govermnents did not know what else to do with them. Beyond this, the ECST 
also illustrated the beginnings of the Community Member States focusing on 
the possibilities of developing an EEC response to terrorism. The Dublin 
Convention marked the basis for the first exclusive agreement among 
Community states to combat terrorism.^^
It is perhaps unfair then to criticise the ECST too harshly; whilst it practically 
invited its signatories to run a coach-and-horses through it, it was also a 
revolutionary piece of legislation, re-evaluating the whole ethos of the 
political offence as an exemption from extradition. It tore down a 
fundamental and historical leitmotif, which had stood unassailable for more 
than two centuries within extradition law. The failure of the ECST lies in the 
fact that it was not followed by a more committed Convention to ‘plug’ the 
exposed holes. Instead, judicial co-operation against terrorism was left 
withering on the vine over a long period, during which time terrorism 
continued to develop.
Readdressing extradition: the EU initiatives
The advancement in co-operative law enforcement throughout the EU against 
terrorism, as well as traditional criminal activities, ensuied that extradition
Vercher, Op. Cit., p 352
The Dublin Agreement was not the initial judicial effort by the Community against terrorism; 
efforts were being made to establish an extradition treaty to combat terrorism, but the Council 
of Europe pipped the Community to the post with the ECST. Consequently the Community 
dropped its own plans as there was little point in establishing a parallel system.
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procedures would invariably have to be reassessed. The Schengen 
Implementing Convention, for example, included a necessary supplementary 
section (Title III, Chapter 3) to the 1957 Convention and Benelux Treaty of 
1962 in recognition of the fact that if its provisions increased the movement of 
police officers across internal borders, then so too would the standard 
extradition practices also require supplementing. However, it is the EU 
Convention on Extradition 1996 (signed 27 September 1996) which simplifies 
the extradition process between the Member States; it was also the first piece 
of legislation to accurately recognise the advances made in law-enforcement 
co-operation. Aside from the literal simplification of the correct procedures 
suiTounding an extradition application (the bane of many a refused request), 
the Convention also removes the category of a political offence (Article 5.1) 
and refuses, unconditionally, the inclusion of any reservations regarding 
terrorist offences (5.2). This does not render the ECST obsolete, as Article 5 
(of the ECST) is retained. It does, however, effectively address the majority 
of the flaws endemic to the ECST. Additionally, Aiticle 7 puts forward the 
principle of extraditing nationals. It recognises that many Member States do 
not follow this practice, and that some have constitutional bairiers prohibiting 
it, but asserts the argument that im oads should be made because of the “shared 
values, common legal traditions and the mutual confidence in the proper 
functioning of the criminal justice systems of the Member States of the 
European Union” (Article 7). The Italian authorities faced this problem when 
their request for the extradition of Tarek Maaroufi, an Islamic preacher of 
Tunisian origin, whom they believed to be a key figuie in a thwarted bombing
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campaign in Strasbourg, December 2000, was refused because Maaroufi also 
possessed Belgian citizenship.^^
What is most controversial about this Convention is that it extends extradition 
into the area of acts of “conspiracy” or participation in a criminal 
organisation, even if these are not offences within the requested Member State 
(Article 3.1)."^ ° The Explanatory report from the Council argues that this is 
necessary to adequately prevent extradition failing against “organised crime in 
all its forms”.'*' In doing so however it removes another tradition of 
extradition law, that of “dual criminality”: that the crime must be an offence in 
both countries for an extradition request to be received. While certainly 
boosting the scope of extradition against teiTorists, this does generate some 
wonying concerns as well. In February 1996, relations between Belgium and 
Spain were strained by the former’s refusal to extradite two Spanish Basques 
who had applied for political asylum, having been accused by Spain of 
providing “logistical assistance” to ETA tenorists. A straightforward and 
reasonable charge, one would assume, but it failed because the Belgian courts 
argued that the ECST did not maintain provisions for charges of supporting a 
terrorist group -  an offence for which Belgium has no criminal statute in any
Wall Street Journal Foiled Strasbourg plot underscores obstacles to fighting terrorism 24 
October 2001
However, this is conditional on the offence bemg punishable by at least one year’s 
imprisonment, and that the conspiracy must have as its objective an either an act o f terrorism 
or “di'ug trafficking and other forms of organized crime or other acts of violence against the 
life, physical integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective danger for persons”.
Convention relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union -  
Explanatoiy Report (Text approved by the Council on 26 May 1997) 41997Y0623(01) 
OfficialJournal C 191, 23/06/1997 p. 0013-0026 Aiticle 3
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case/^ The egregious part of this particular incident, however, was that the 
offence charged by Spain had actually occurred in Belgium, when the Basque 
couple allowed some ETA members to stay in their home. The new EU 
Convention on Extradition prevents any similar case failing on this particular 
ground.''^ Indeed, it was Spanish lobbying, concerned with bringing greater 
pressure to bear against ETA, that pushed for this provision to be included in 
the Convention.'*'* It is understandable that the requirement of dual criminality 
may at times legitimately be seen as a perversion preventing extradition; 
however, if the offence occurred in the requesting state, this legislation 
ensures that an individual’s actions abroad, rightly or wi'ongly, become a 
matter of prosecution within the state.
Overall, tins Convention builds significant inroads towards addressing the 
weaknesses within the ECST, making terrorism a compulsory extraditable 
offence. However, its erosion of the dual criminality principle does raise 
important concerns, particularly in the case of defining “logistical assistance”, 
and while ignorance of the law is no defence, the example of EU nationals 
arrested in Greece 2001 on espionage charges while plane-spotting (see
FECL 48, November 1996 Agreement on Extradition puts an end to Spanish-Belgian 
Dispute', Monica den Boer The Fight Against Terrorism in Maastricht in Reinares, Op, Cit., p 
216
A bilateral agreement was signed between the two countries in November 1996 addressing 
these Spanish concerns, as it would take some years, even with the “rolling ratification”, 
before the EU Extr adition Convention became active. ( FECL 48, November 1996 Agreement 
on Extradition puts an end to Spanish-Belgian Dispute) Indeed, following this new 
agreement, the two Basques in question, Raquel Garcia and Luis Moreno, were extradited to 
Spain the following year subsequent to a similar Spanish request. (Statewatch artdoc (online) 
Spain: Torture and Extradition Februaiy 1997)
A similar case occurred in Germany, leading to the extradition of Benjamin Ramos, a Basque, 
in September 1997, on charges o f assisting ETA. (Arm the Spirit Basque Solidarity Action in 
Berlin email communiqué 9 January 1998 (www.burn.ucsd.edu/archives/ats- 
l/1998.01/msg00026.html) 
den Boer, Op. Cit., p 213
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below) illustrates the merits of dual criminality requirements while Europe 
continues to maintain differing judicial systems.
The transfer of evidence
Just as individuals are transferred to a requesting state tlmough the procedures 
of an extradition hearing, so too does the request for evidence and witnesses 
progress through a fomial procedure. The EU Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000 complements the simplified EU 
Extradition Conventions and is the enhanced successor to the Council of 
Europe’s European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
1959. The 1959 Convention applied to all offences, with the exception of 
fiscal, military or political crimes.'*  ^ Working on the principle of 
Commissions Rogatoires, the request is usually made tlnough the interior 
ministries, and then forwar ded to the relevant judge or magistrate. 
Additionally, information from judicial records can also be requested (Article 
13). That Britain did not sign up to this Convention until 1991 (or ratify the 
1957 Extradition Convention until 1990)'*  ^proffers some explanation towards 
certain of the problems faced by the Lockerbie investigation, despite the Lord
A 1978 Protocol inter alia removed the exemption for fiscal offences, although a state could 
still retain the exemption in part.
The UK was late in entering into these Conventions because her criminal law tradition did 
not comfortably correspond to the changes that they would brmg, without inducing alterations 
to the UK legal system. At the same time the UK’s geographical position served as an 
effective ban ier against transnational crime, which was then in its infancy, therefore change 
was considered unnecessary. The growth in fransnational crime, especially drug trafficking, 
along with increased travel and globalisation resulted in the UK bowing to the inevitable and 
signing the Convention, after having introduced the necessary changes to her extradition law 
via the Extradition Act 1989.
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Advocate’s own Commission Rogatoire to the Frankfurt state prosecutor’s 
office asking for all possible assistance in the inquiry/^
The 2000 Convention is essentially an update of the 1959 Convention, 
especially acknowledging technological advances. Telecommunications 
intercepts, for example, have become much more common in couif, but they 
remain a highly contentious source of evidence, due to their “big brother” 
overtones; hence the need to ensure adequate provisions sympathetic to data 
protection legislation, whilst also providing for the facilitation of their 
transfer. The Convention also represents a political expression in the battle 
against organised crime throughout the EU, with JHA Ministers recognising 
the Convention’s “capital importance” in tliis fight.'*  ^In this respect, the 
Convention is also particularly usefiil against terrorism, because it can 
facilitate the transfer of evidence towards an investigation, as well as a 
prosecution.
Perhaps most interesting in the 2000 Convention is its interpretation of the 
advances made in European co-operation through provisions which impart 
greater powers in the gathering of evidence and obtaining of witnesses, 
without their consent if necessary (although witness statements may be made 
via video conference, rather than compelling individuals to appear in the court 
of another Member State). This is a significant step on the 1959 Convention: 
although it permitted a judge to request the attendance of witnesses who
David Leppard On the Trail o f Terror 1991 pp 85-6 (Although Scottish law has greater 
commonality with Continental Roman law than English Common law.)
House of Lords Select Report on the European Union 12"' Report 18 July 2000, Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union 
-  The Final Stages. Introduction and Background, paragraph 1
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resided in another state, the summons only became binding if the witness 
actually entered the requesting state and had ignored the said summons. The 
new provisions offer a definite advantage in tackling international terrorism, 
where witnesses are likely to reside outside of the prosecuting state. During 
the Lockerbie trial, the Crown was unable to compel any witnesses other than 
British nationals to testify, and found this a hindrance when airport staff 
workers at Luqa airport in Malta, where the lED was placed aboard PAN AM 
103, refused to provide evidence."^ Once the Convention comes into effect, 
such occurrences should no longer be an i s s u e . I n  view of the current 
transnational terrorist threat facing Europe and the world, the removal of 
impediments to trials is an important step.
The European Judicial Network (EJN)
The progress made in law-enforcement co-operation throughout the Member 
States has ensured that judicial co-operation in criminal matters cannot be 
exclusive to extradition. As part of the EU’s strategy against serious crime, 
the Council established the EJN through a declaration in June 1998.^' By 
creating a series of contact points between the judicial authorities of the 
Member States, the Council aimed to improve the speed and methods of 
communication in this area, paralleling, to a certain extent, the role of liaison 
officers in facilitating police co-operation.
BBC News Witnesses pull out o f  Lockerbie trial 13 July 2000 
Malta is also on course for EU membership at the next accession. 
The EJN was officially inaugurated on 25 September 1998.
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The EJN works on three levels: firstly, the Member States each propose one or 
more contact points, “taking care to ensure effective coverage of the whole of 
its territory and all forms of serious crimes” (Article 2.1).^  ^ These contact 
points then liase between their own judicial and national authorities, and with 
the sister facilities in the other Member States, and are able to provide legal 
and practical information to facilitate judicial co-operation and requests. The 
second level involves periodic meetings of the EJN to serve as “a forum for 
the discussion of practical and legal problems encountered by the Member 
States in the context of judicial co-operation” (Article 5.1(b)). The third level 
concerns the dissemination of information within the EJN (Title IV), where 
the contact points must have permanent access to the following four types of 
information:
1. full details of the contact points in each Member State with, where 
necessary, an explanation of their responsibilities at national level;
2. a simplified list of the judicial authorities and a directory of the local 
authorities in each Member State;
3. concise legal and practical information concerning the judicial and 
procedural systems in the 15 Member States;
4. the texts of the relevant legal instruments and, for the conventions 
currently in force, the texts of declarations and reseiwations.
(Article 8)
52 Council Joint Action establishing the EJN, 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998.
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One can immediately see the resemblance to areas of law-enforcement co­
operation such as the Terrorism Directory, as well as the liaison officers, in 
these provisions. Essentially though, the EJN is designed for speediness; 
consequently the Joint Action necessitates that the Member States keep the 
information required by Article 8. Speed is vitally important as in many cases, 
once a criminal activity is uncovered, a rapid response is required before the 
transgressors have time to react. Richard Gerding, a deputy chief prosecutor 
in Rotterdam, and in charge of the Secretariat of the EJN, gives the 
hypothetical example of the discovery of a child pornography site in The 
Netherlands, where the information for the site came from an Austrian service 
provider.Traditionally a rogatory letter would be sent by a Dutch prosecutor 
to the competent Austiian authority, requesting the seizure of the site’s 
material. This would take time to process, allowing a significant possibility 
that the material might disappear by the time the police arrived. Direct 
communication between the contact points dramatically reduces this risk, 
particularly due to the seciue telecommunications system linkage (Intranet) 
established in June 1999 (Article 10). With the EJN, the Dutch police can call 
upon their contact point who can then consult the Austrian Legislation on 
Child Pornography and the coercive measures permitted under Austrian law. 
Computerised telecommunications make the transfer of information almost 
immediate. Provided Austrian law permits the judicial authorities to conduct a 
computerised search, the contact point can obtain the evidence and hand it 
over to the Dutch magistrate, all without the need to draft and send a 
commission rogatoire.
Conference Paper, Child Welfare Initiative, ASEM Resource Centre, Vienna 29 September- 
1 October 1999, Richard Gerding Combating Child Pornography on the Internet — The Role 
o f the European Judicial Network paragraph 16
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These sorts of procedures work equally well against terrorism, enhancing the 
authorities’ ability to rapidly seize documents and information, especially 
when it is considered how important the Internet has become as a means of 
communication between terrorist cells. The EJN is therefore an 
acknowledgment of increased integration and the advances in technology that 
allow a nineteenth-century procedure to be updated to apply to the realities of 
the twenty-first. '^* However it is the embiyonic European judicial co-operation 
unit, commonly know as Eurojust, that represents one of the two co-operative 
judicial measures with the teeth to fight terrorism.
Eurojust
As the name suggests, Eurojust is the judicial equivalent of Europol, and 
likewise, is based at The Hague. The decision to establish such a unit was 
made at the Tampere summit in October 1999 in order:
to reinforce the fight against serious organised crime, the 
European Council has agreed that a unit (EUROJUST) should be 
set up composed of national prosecutors, magistrates, or police 
officers of equivalent competence, detached from each Member 
State according to its legal system^^
A former US Attorney-General described extradition laws as belonging to “the world of the 
horse and buggy and the steamship, not in the world of commercial jet air transportation and 
high speed communications”. (Gilbert, Op. Cit., p 1)
The Council Decision of 28 Februaiy 2002 that implements Eurojust proper, has yet to 
come into effect. (32002D0187 2002/187/JFIA: Council Decision o f 28 February 202 setting 
up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime Official Journal L 063, 
06/03/2002 P. 0001-0013 
Tampere Conclusion No. 46
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Like Eui'opol, Eurojust began its role in a provisional capacity (Pro-Eurojust), 
on the grounds that the experience gained would serve as the basis for its 
establisliment as a pennanent body. It began operating in January 2001, 
having received the necessary political endorsement by the JHA Council the 
previous July; it became fully operational in December 2001 Moreover, 
like Europol, it too is controlled by a Convention, immediately suggesting 
strong intergovermuental control. Similarly, its competencies cover the same 
criminal activities as Europol, with a particular emphasis on financial crimes 
(Article 5).
Eurojust’s objectives (Article 3) are aimed at improving both the co­
ordination and co-operation of investigations and prosecutions between the 
Member States, along with improving the areas of mutual assistance and 
extradition requests.^^ To this end, it includes a database support arm, capable 
of imparting legal and practical information to the Member States’ judicial 
authorities, as well as establishing an index of data relating to investigations, 
along with temporary work files also containing personal data (Article 14.4). 
Again, like the databases of the SIS and Europol, these are accessible only by 
liaison officers, termed “national correspondents” (Article 9). Moreover, 
Eurojust has the capacity to establish joint investigative teams to facilitate the 
work of the Member States (Article 6 a(iv)), greatly adding to its co­
ordination abilities.
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 3 P* Report A Provisional Judicial Co­
operation Unit issued 15/10/2000 paragraph 14.2; Statewatch post 11.09.01 analyses: No. 1 
The “Conclusions” of the special Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 
and their implications for civil liberties 
Aiticle 3.2 does permit Eurojust to assist a Member State with a non-Member State.
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Eurojust’s capacity for facilitating co-operation was demonstrated with the 
arrest of an ETA suspect, Ramon Rodriguez, in Amsterdam, Januaiy 2002. 
This was the first time the Dutch and Spanish had worked together to make a 
terrorist-related arrest. Certainly a significant factor in the Dutch co-operation 
towards the Spanish request rested on post-11 September attitudes towards 
tenorism; however it was the facilitatory input from Eurojust, encouraging the 
sharing of information, which actually created the conditions permitting the 
arrest.
Eurojust represents a new approach towards judicial co-operation, moving 
away from a reactive stance, most typically represented by extradition, to a 
more proactive one. By serving as a facilitator of judicial co-operation, 
Eurojust effectively acts as a pilot for the Member States’ authorities in this 
complex milieu, thereby encomuging this co-operative approach. It is able to 
fuse law-enforcement and judicial co-operation concurrently into an 
investigation rather than the traditional approach of judicial co-operation 
following the police investigation. The result is a more effective investigation 
due to judicial support tliroughout.*^®
This new-style approach is especially important in tackling the emerging 
threat of transnational terrorism. Here, the transnational and international 
interlinkages involved require proficient judicial support for investigative co­
operation to make any headway. The case of Tarek Maaroufi above is an
BBC News Dutch police arrest ETA suspect 17 January 2002 
^ In any event, such progress is a necessary package of the JHA programme. For judicial co­
operation to remain focused around extradition would have been to stymie the advances made 
at the law-enforcement level. Police co-operation can only progress so far without similar 
advances made at the judicial level.
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example characteristic of the legal complexities involved here. The JHA 
Council, clearly aware of these attributes, has put significant emphasis on 
Eurojust’s role in countering terrorism in the post-11 September environment. 
Its role in joint investigations has been boosted with representatives from 
Eurojust participating in the special counter-terrorist teams set up to “co­
ordinate current investigations into terrorism which are in any way linked”. '^ 
Additionally, co-operation between anti-terrorism magistrates is being 
strengthened by Eurojust bringing such magistrates together to focus on this 
i s s u e . O n e  of the more significant expansions of Eurojust’s powers is 
through a protocol adopted by the Member States to the 2000 EU Mutual 
Legal Assistance Convention.^^ The protocol extends the MLA Convention to 
place obligations on member states to provide information on banlc accounts, 
banking transactions and surveillance of banking transactions, and removes 
some of the existing grounds on which Member States can refiise to co-operate 
with requests. Another of Eurojust’s roles is to find “practical solutions” 
should a Member State refuse to co-operate with a request made under these 
provisions.^'* What exactly these “practical solutions” may be is unspecified, 
although the implications are that Eurojust might take a mediatory role. In any 
event, this addendum to Eurojust’s role is illustrative of the growing 
significance attached by the Member States to its position in facilitating 
counter-terrorism.
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No 7 EU anti-terrorism plan: “operational measures” 
Point No. 2
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No 1 The “conclusions " of the special Justice and Home 
Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 and their implications for civil liberties Pomt No. 6 
" The protocol has yet to be ratified by all the Member States, although the target date set for 
this was for the end o f 2002.
^  Statewatch Post. Op. Cit., analyses: No 1, Point No. 20
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As the above example of Ramon Rodriguez demonsti ates, the sea change 
towards terrorism has promoted a hardening of attitudes amongst even the 
more liberal-minded of EU Member States. Undoubtedly this has had its part 
to play in the increased co-operation occurring in Europe since the al-Qaeda 
attacks in America. However, the co-operative structure that has been put in 
place by the Member States is primarily responsible for achieving this co­
operation. By enhancing co-operation at the judicial level, the Member 
States’ law-enforcement agencies have been able to progress further in their 
operations than ever before. Eurojust is grease to the judicial wheel: its 
purpose is not to alter the system, but to make it run more smoothly. The UK 
Home Secretary’s failure to extradite a GIA suspect to France by overruling 
the courts demonstrates that neither Eurojust, nor the EJN for that matter, are 
capable of interference in a Member State’s judicial matters. The planned 
introduction of a European Arrest Warrant, however, will result in a radical 
and controversial overhaul of the extradition process as we currently Imow it.
The European Arrest Wanant
The second measure devised by the EU Member States (adopted 13 June 
2002) with teeth to fight terrorism is the European Arrest Warrant. Its purpose 
is to replace the extradition procedure on a range of crimes with a fast-track 
arrest warrant, which can be executed at greater speed, as it will involve an 
emphasis on administrative rather than judicial procedure. This is achieved 
tlii'ough the principle of mutual recognition of criminal judgements within the 
Member States -  that court orders and decisions taken in one country are
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recognised and enforced by all the others.^^ Consequently certain extradition 
measures would be dissolved, such as some rights of appeal, with the warrants 
being executed by designated judicial authorities, rather than the continuous 
need for a higher national authority to be involved — as the Home Secretary is 
in the UK, for example. '^^ Moreover, the warrant allows the authorities to 
request an individual be detained, searched or surrendered by police in another 
Member State.^  ^ Again, such measures represent a move away from the 
reactive nature of judicial co-operation, towards a more proactive response.
The war rant, however, is much more than a fast-tracking of the extradition 
process. Its ability to request another Member State’s police force to detain 
suspects, coupled with the much faster transfer process, effectively introduces 
a structure into the EU whereby suspects can be detained at the transnational 
level almost as comprehensively as at the national. Additionally, the warrant 
dissolves the concepts of both dual criminality and nationality, completing the 
initial inroads made in the 1996 Convention against these traditional pillars of 
extradition law (Articles 2.2 and 5.3 respectively Under these provisions, 
cases such as that of Tarek Maaroufi could be resolved, as the warrant
Ibid. Point 1
Council Framework Decision o f 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States 2002/584/JHA, Articles 6 and 7; BBC News 
Suspects face quicker extradition 27 June 2002 
Statewatch Post, Op. Cit., analyses; No 1, Point 1 
^ Only if the warrant is for the pmposes of enforcing a custodial sentence or detention order 
may the right to surrender a national be refused, if the state consents to execute the said 
sentence or order under national law (Article 4.6). See also Article 5.3 
2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member 
States on the adoption of the Framework Decision 32002FO584 Official Journal L 190, 
18/07/2002 P. 0001-0020
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removes nationality as a prophylactic to transfer. Quite how the 
constitutional arrangements of some Member States ar e going to be reconciled 
with these provisions is another matter.
The warrant also adds a new dimension to counter-tenorism strategy thi'ough 
a much-reduced timescale leading to surrender. This provides a motivation to 
request the detention and surrender of a suspect, principally for the purposes 
of interrogation, rather than for trial. Such suiTender would of course involve 
a trial, but because the scope of the warrant covers crimes punishable by a 
minimum of four months imprisonment or more — rather than the traditional 
one year for extraditable offences -  the opportunity exists to develop a new 
mindset of casting nets to catch minnows as part o f an investigation to lead 
them to a pike.^ ** This concept provides for the continuation of a proactive 
rather than a reactive counter-terrorist policy.
The warrant is a potent weapon against terrorism, but it contains the same 
weaknesses as any other extradition mechanism: to function, it requires the 
Member State to surrender the terrorist suspect, even in the face of terrorist 
intimidation or realpolitik. To expect the warrant not to be tested in this way 
would be naïve. Terrorism’s raison d ’être is to use intimidation to force a 
given change. The UK government, for example, had little choice other than
The matter o f recognising terrorism as a criminal offence in national legislation was finally 
resolved by the establishment of a coimnon definition on terrorism thr oughout the EU, at a 
Council meeting on 6 December 2001. The definition covers terrorist offences, as well as 
those linked to them, including incitement and abetting (Articles 1, 2 and 3). Prior to this 
definition, only Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain and Portugal incorporated any such definition 
into their national legislation. The EU had began work on this issue in 2000, but the al-Qaeda 
attacks in September 2001 accelerated the process.
(Council o f the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings; 7 December 2001. Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism. 14845/1/01 Rev 1 Limite)
™ Article 2.1
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to release the PFLP hijacker, Leila Khaled, in September 1970, despite an 
Israeli extradition request, after the group hijacked a BO AC jetliner on 1 
September 1970. The PFLP thieatened to kill the passengers and crew, along 
with those of two other hijacked European liners at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, 
if a number of their colleagues were not released from Switzerland and 
Gennany, along with Khaled.
More recent was the case of Abu Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, who became 
something of a ‘hot potato’ for several EU governments when he arrived in 
Italy on 12 November 1998 seeking asylum. On his arrival in Rome, Ocalan, 
who was regarded by most Western governments as a terrorist, had two 
outstanding arrest warrants against him issued by Germany and Turkey. Italy 
refused Turkey’s extradition request because her constitution prevents her 
extraditing prisoners to countries with capital punishment. The ECST’s 
dictate of aut dedere aut judicare did not apply, because Ocalan was wanted 
on chaiges of treason, not terrorism. Germany’s warrant was also declared 
invalid by the Italian court because Germany had replaced the original 
international warrant with one that could only detain Ocalan if he actually 
went to Germany. Ocalan, however, was very much an unwanted guest, just 
as he had previously been in both Syria and Russia. That no government 
would want to take him in is understandable, but Germany did not press its 
case to have the PKK leader before its courts. Bonn’s silence stemmed from 
its wish to avoid inflaming Germany’s large Kurdish migrant gastarbeiter 
community. Greece’s eventual sanctuary of Ocalan in its Nairobi embassy 
could be construed as sympathy for the PKK, especially considering the
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antipathetic relationship between Athens and Ankara; but equally, suspicions 
were also raised that the Greek government betrayed Ocalan, allowing 
Turkish special forces to capture him in Nairobi on 16 February 1999/'
The Ocalan case demonstrates the nervousness that can develop towards 
having an infamous terrorist on one’s soil, let alone in the dock. Even the 
notorious East-German Stasi grew concerned with their patronage of “Carlos 
the Jackal”, fearing that he would turn on them if they put too much pressure 
on his g r o u p . O n e  could argue, though, that 11 September truly was a 
watershed in the way that we view terrorism, and that consequently resolve 
has been significantly stiffened to stand firm in the face of terrorist 
intimidation. This, however, would blinker the fact the realpolitik is rarely 
comfortable with the concept offlat iustitia ruat caelum. British policy 
towards alleged Muslim terrorists within the UK illustrates a potential sticking 
point with the Arrest Warrant. On many occasions, the UK’s European 
partners have accused British concern with Irish terrorism as having a 
detrimental effect on awareness of other terrorist thr eats. With twenty-eight 
per cent of the UK’s Security Serwice budget allocated to international 
counter-terrorism and thirty-two per cent to Irish terrorism during the period 
April -  December 2001, this is, however, a questionable c ha r ge .Wha t  can 
be said, although it has never been made explicit, is that British policy adopted 
a low-key approach to Islamic militants prior to 11 September, reflecting
”  The Guardian Turks angiy as Italian court frees Kurdish leader 17 December 1998 p 15; 
The
Observer Can’t stay, won’t go: Italy’s difficult guest 3 January 1999, p 17; The Times The 
Ocalan Test 17 February 1999, Editorial 
John Follain Jackal 1999 p 228 
^ MI5: The Security Service. Fourth Edition 2002 p 11
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asylum law, but also the realpolitik of deterring militants from engaging in 
acts of terrorism within the UK. Rather, British intelligence monitored the 
extr emists, utilising gained intelligence to thwart attacks being planned 
elsewhere. '^* Abu Qatada, for example, the controversial Jordanian-born 
cleric, who entered the UK in 1994 seeking asylum, and who is wanted in 
eight countries on terrorist-related charges including the USA, Belgium,
France and Spain, and has been described as “Osama Bin Laden’s ambassador 
in Europe”, has not been extradited to any of Britain’s EU partners.^^ His 
disappear ance in December 2001 sparked rumours that he had turned 
“supergrass” and was being protected by the Security Services. More to the 
point, however, is the fact that the investigation by the British into Qatada and 
a number of other clerics has found little evidence to support the claims made 
by their European col leagues.This difference of opinion stems from the 
differing legal systems in operation between the UK and her continental 
partners. Once the Arrest WarTant comes into force (scheduled on 1 January 
2004 tlrroughout the EU^^), one can expect that a number of warrants will be 
issued against many Muslim radicals living in Britain. Should, or rather, when 
this occur s, the British government will be placed in the dilemma of whether 
or not to enforce them. If it does so, it goes against traditional British policy 
in these areas, as well as possibly risking al-Qaeda reprisals for this u-turn, but
Jane Corbin The Base 2002 pp 202-3
Although no EU Member State has yet made a formal request for Qatada’s extiadition. 
BBC News Cleric held as terror suspect 25 October 2002; India Times Online Edition 
Fugitive Cleric Linked to Al Qaeda Arrested in Britain 8 November 2002 
BBC News Britain “sheltering al-Qaeda leader ” 8 July 2002 
The Guardian Allies point the finger at Britain as al-Qaeda’s “Revolving Door” 14 
February 2002, (On Line edition).
Council Framework Decision, Op. Cit., Article 31
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to refuse them would be to contradict government policy on its support for the |
“war on teiTorism”.
There are also a number of other concerns regarding the Arrest Warrant, not 
least that it covers a range of crimes far exceeding the more serious offences 
such as terrorism and murder. Rather, its sweeping list of thirty-two offences 
includes illicit trafficking in cultural goods, antiques and works of art, 
swindling, arson, and racism and xenophobia (Article 2.2).^  ^ Such a broad 
scope, together with the removal of dual criminality and nationality, seriously 
erodes the sovereignty of national criminal law and the safeguards it offers.
Its acceptance of the premise of mutual recognition of criminal judgements 
amongst the Member States in a Union whose degree of judicial integration 
remains in its infancy is erroneous at best. The argument that all the Member 
States are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
consequently serves as a bolster or safety-net to the premise, similarly falls 
flat. The farcical arrest and trial of fourteen British and Dutch plane-spotters 
in Greece, accused of espionage by the Greek authorities, clearly illustrates the 
lack of minimum judicial standards across the EU. The inability to 
comprehend the concept of “plane-spotting” led the Greek authorities to 
pursue the charge after arresting the plane-spotters in November 2001, and 
after trial, find them guilty in April 2002 (although this was later quashed 
upon appeal). Aside from the incredulous charges (the plane-spotters had 
received permission from the airbase authorities to be there), the case
Unpleasant as these latter two offences might be, classiJying them as crimes is highly 
contentious; the State should have no right to legislate as to how people think. These are 
individual beliefs and opinions, not criminal acts in themselves.
BBC News Greek tragedy for ja iled  plane-spotters 27 April 2002
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highlights further dangers regaining the use of the Warrant. The plane- 
spotters’ rights were abused, tlirough the fact that they were not charged 
within seven days of arrest, and although the magistrate accepted that there 
was no evidence against them (ftesh charges were made), they were remanded 
in custody, with the hearings heard in private.^' Notably, one of the plane- 
spotters, Michael Keane, was unable to return to Greece for the appeal on 
health grounds, and consequently was not acquitted. Although espionage does 
fall under Article 2 of the Warrant’s scope, the example stands that similar 
circumstances covered by the Warrant could theoretically lead to the surrender 
of Keane to Greece to serve out his sentence, unless he appealed.
The Warrant is a useful mechanism against the type of terrorism cun ently 
threatening the EU Member States, but its scope is too wide, too early. Two 
of the plane-spotters arrested in Greece have begun lobbying the European 
Parliament for a common judicial standard tln'oughout the EU.^  ^ Only when 
the Member States begin to rectify this problem will the Arrest Warrant as it 
stands be a welcome addition to Euiopean judicial co-operation.
Conclusions
Judicial co-operation against terrorism has progressed significantly since the 
drafting of the ECST. Only recently, though, have these developments 
actually taken off, catalysed by the advent of the al-Qaeda thi'eat; without the 
progress in European integration these developments were simply not in a
BBC News Plane spotters “could be at risk even at home ” 30 November 2001 ; BBC News 
Greek tragedy for ja iled  plane-spotters 27 April 2002 
BBC News Plane-spotters seek EU law change 19 November 2002
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position to occur. The 11 September attacks accelerated much that was 
already in the pipeline. Many of the flaws inherent within the ECST have 
been rectified by the EU 1996 Extradition Act, which is in turn about to be 
superseded by the introduction of the European An est Wan ant. The Warrant 
has the benefit of rapidly speeding up the transfer of wanted fugitives, and this 
reduces the “oxygen of publicity” capable of being generated by a terrorist 
fighting the request for his/her sunender; nevertheless, at heart, it remains a 
form of extradition, with similar weaknesses.
It is interesting that extradition’s inherent weakness when faced with terrorism 
has not deterred the Member States from focusing co-operation, for the most 
part, on this concept. The predominant demand of a Member State would still 
seem to be that a terrorist should not escape the long arm of the law, 
principally its own arm. How this weakness is resolved ultimately depends 
upon the nerves of the individual Member State(s) concerned. Extradition 
agreements have failed to effectively stiffen this resolve against terrorism due 
to their numerous “escape” clauses related to the issue. Extradition works 
well against “common” criminals, but in targeting terrorists, it also reflects on 
politics. This is problematic because extradition legislation is extremely 
sensitive of the requested state’s sovereignty, as it must be, since it is dealing 
with the criminal law of another sovereign power. When politics enters the 
equation, however, as can happen in terrorist extradition cases, national 
sovereignty has a greater tendency to reassert itself, even if it is only in the 
interests of “self preservation”. Observing the loopholes in the ECST, we can 
see that this is no exception, even in relation to terrorism. Extradition accepts
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the realpolitik of Hedley Bull’s Anarchical Society; the agreements and 
regulations only denote an understanding between two states that wanted 
fugitives may be returned to the requesting state i f  certain conditions are met, 
but the prerogative remains with the requested state as to whether this should 
take place -  the commitment is not binding/^ Within the EU, the recent 
integrative advancements within law-enforcement and judicial co-operation, 
especially Eurojust, are more likely to hold a Member State to its 
commitments than they were ten years ago. Bull’s anai'chical society holds 
less sway over the integrating European Union, which is held together by 
processes far beyond mere international treaties and agreements. This is not to 
say that extradition of terrorists and others will not always be refused, as there 
are sometimes good reasons to do so when it is felt that justice would be ill- 
served. The Irish government clearly felt that this would be the case with 
Patrick Ryan, as do the UK courts with Rashid Ramda. With the arrival of the 
“New Terrorism” however, and the nightmare scenarios which it is capable of 
producing, even this model of integration may be sorely tested by terrorist 
intimidation.
The recent advances injudicial co-operation have, however, changed the 
nature of counter-terrorism, allowing the development of a much more 
proactive stance. No longer is it simply a case of waiting for an extradition 
request to be acted upon. The Warrant and Eurojust offer new strategic
^ Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: a Study in the Order of World Politics 1995 
Bull’s classic realist study o f international relations argues that that rules which govern 
relationships and behaviour between states are almost ethereal in nature unlike those at the 
national level, because international society has no centre of authority. The United State’s 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is a classic example of realist argument, where the might and 
primacy of American power is sufficient to allow it to act unilaterally if necessary.
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opportunities. Combined with the developments in law-enforcement, this 
significantly extends the Member States’ reach against terrorism.
Judicial co-operation has yet to reach the stage whereby Europe is capable of 
developing an espace judiciaire européene, although certainly current 
developments have surpassed Giscard d’Estaing’s original vision here. Some 
progress has been made at the bilateral level towards the literal meaning of 
this concept. The development of a “common area of freedom, security and 
justice” between Spain and Italy has led to the replacement of extradition by 
administrative transfers for all offences caiTying a minimum prison sentence 
of four years. Unlike the AiTest Warrant, the crimes are all encompassing, and 
surrender is automatic unless there is either inadequate documentation relating 
to the request or the case concerned is granted immunity by legislation in the 
"requested s t a t e A c h i e v i n g  such integration on an EU-wide basis is 
another matter entirely. Although one should be wary of pushing judicial co­
operation too fast, the Warrant’s large scope is too overloaded for the current 
level of judicial integration within Europe.
This integration is a little difficult to place within the traditional context 
because of the conservative nature of judicial co-operation. Traditional co­
operation was limited to closing loopholes in extradition legislation via the 
Council of Europe, but attempts to move beyond this via the European 
Community failed abysmally. The JEIA process has provided a new canvas, 
and the co-operation which has occurred in improving the extradition 
arrangements, establishing the EJN, Eurojust and the fast-track arrest warrant.
Statewatch Protocol on extradition Vol. 10 No. 5 September-October 2000 p 4
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has done so because European integration, as well as law-enforcement co­
operation, has reached a state of affairs far more sophisticated than that of the 
late 1970s. We can see that judicial co-operation is moving towaids parity 
with the transnational work of their police colleagues, and as such, perhaps we 
can expect co-operation here to be open to the same type of influences as those 
that have affected law-enforcement. The emphasis on developing stmctures 
puts individuals at the forefront of some of the co-operative facilitation here, 
principally within the EJN and Eurojust, perhaps leading to the budding of 
neo-functionalist collaboration at a later stage. Intergovemmentalism 
certainly defines co-operative policy at the moment, but again the concept of 
federalism within judicial co-operation is a tantalising one, and a necessary 
building block of a federal Europe. On matters of counter-terrorism, could a 
common policy against this thr eat be achieved at the judicial level without 
resorting to the federal route; more to the point, is the intergoverimiental 
course capable of this?
As judicial co-operation develops from the new facilitatory structures, we will 
see further developments within law-enforcement co-operation. Tampere’s 
recommendations for establishing an EJN and Eurojust ensured that new 
opportunities would open to the existing JHA structures, once these came into 
effect. Unlike the developments at the traditional extradition level, these 
enhancements allow co-operation to develop, since they are not limited to 
executing extradition requests, focusing instead on actually developing 
judicial co-operation between the Member States. By developing judicial co­
operation, the ground is prepared for further developments within law-
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enforcement, which are able to progress with new initiatives that would 
previously have been unworkable, similar in some respects to the concept of 
spillover. As developments occur in one area, so they have a positive laiock- 
on effect on another. Hence, as the EJN and Eurojust develop facilitatory co­
operation with national judiciaries within the Schengen Area, this will 
improve rate and performance of border co-operation. The process for 
obtaining warrants permitting cross-border observation will, for example, 
become easier as links between the national judiciaries improve.
The advances injudicial co-operation therefore have important implications 
beyond their own immediate connotations. The Member States are now in a 
much better position to tackle terrorism than they have ever been, especially 
with the introduction of the Arrest Warrant. However, as mentioned above, 
the integrative process has an important part in steeling the mettle of the 
Member States to their signatures on these agreements, and it is to the 
advances in Euiopean integration which we now turn, in order to observe how 
judicial co-operation fits into the process of the European Project.
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Chapter IX
The Position of Judicial Co-operation against Terrorism within the 
European Integration Process
The progress of judicial co-operation within the EU over the past five years 
has been remarkable, both in terms of pace and through the development of a 
proactive approach. Admittedly, however, these developments have remained 
centred around the concept of extradition, either through its simplification or 
its alteration into a transfer process, with Eurojust and the European Judicial 
Network serving primarily as facilitators for this co-operation. This focus 
illustrates the naiTOW margin of co-operative scope available to the Member 
States within this particular area. Expanding co-operation beyond this area is 
perceived as too sensitive an issue, encroaching as it would, in the most direct 
terms, on the last bastions of national state power: criminal jurisdiction, 
criminal trial and criminal sentencing.^ Consequently, judicial co-operation 
remains concentrated primarily on facilitation rather than harmonisation.^ 
However, the arrival at a common definition of terrorism by the EU Member 
States at the end of 2001, together with a listing of terrorist groups and 
individuals both inside and outside the EU, does represent a haimonisation of
* Wolfgang Schomburg Are we on the Road to a European Law-Enforcement Area? 
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters. What Place for Justice? European Journal of 
Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 8 Issue 1, 2000 p 51 
 ^Fleur Keyser-Ringnalda in her study of a common EU policy towards the confiscation of 
criminal gains, points out that the advantages made available fi'om the wholesale 
harmonisation of penal law do not easily outweigh the sacrifices required to reach such a goal. 
(Fleur Keyser-Ringnalda European Integration with regard to the Confiscation o f the 
Proceeds o f  Crime in European Law Review Vol. 15 1992 p 484)
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definitions, if not actual counter-terrorist policy? Even the advances made in 
the extradition process are effectively a streamlining process, although 
clumsily executed in the case of the Arrest Warrant; one could argue however, 
that the removal of the nationality exemption clause does surrender a sliver of 
sovereignty.
The limited parameters of judicial co-operation against terrorist related 
matters, together with the employed methodology, suggest very little scope for 
supranational influences. Equally though, the concerns of the last chapter with 
certain issues of co-operation, particularly the Arrest Warrant, question 
whether the current intergovermnental approach is the most suitable for 
stewarding judicial co-operation. The sway of intergovernmental decision­
making dominating the current advances in co-operation has been 
demonstrated many times. Should we therefore discount supranationalism as 
superfluous to the equation? Far from it: while it is undeniable that 
intergovernmentalism currently shapes co-operative policy in this area, the co­
operative constructs that are emerging do have the potential to be more open 
to supranationalism further down the road. This would also theoretically 
support the neo-functionalist philosophy that the intergovernmental bargain is 
necessary to malce the initial inroads, but having done so, the way is open for 
spillover. Tliis chapter explores these possible supranational undertones, 
while also addressing the dominance of the intergovernmental approach. The
 ^Council Common Position (2002/976/CFSP) o f 12 December 2002 updating Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat ten orism and 
repealing Common Position 2002/847/CFSP; Council Common Position (2002/947/EC) 
implementing Aiticle 2(3) o f Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing 
Decision 2002/848/EC.
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author however does not agree that judicial co-operation against terrorism 
need be as limited in scope as traditional thinking dictates. Consequently, two 
alternative models have been included: an advanced intergovernmental 
approach, and a supranational one, both of which expand the remit of counter­
terrorist judicial co-operation beyond current conceptions. Following on from 
this is the need to analyse the causes responsible for the explosive pace of 
advancement over the past five years. Crucially, what role has terrorism had 
to play within this? Equally why has recent emphasis centred on a proactive 
stance; is terrorism again responsible, or does the answer lie deeper within the 
integrative process? Addressing these issues allows us to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the strategy being developed against 
terrorism through judicial co-operation.
Intergovernmental dominance
Intergovernmental policy dominates the current law-enforcement co-operation 
within the JHA continuum, so it is of little surprise that it also controls the 
integrative energy behind the equivalent judicial co-operation. Judicial co­
operation, however, has lacked any tangible efforts outside the competency of 
the Council of Europe until the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provided an 
objective to maintain and develop the EU “as an area of freedom, justice and 
security”. Article 31 required Common action in a number of areas including 
co-operation between ministries and judicial authorities, facilitating 
extradition, preventing conflicts of jurisdiction and the progressive 
establishment of minimum rules relating to the constitutive elements of
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criminal acts? Maastricht did not sufficiently address the issue of judicial co­
operation in criminal matters (JHA Provisions, Article K.1.7) beyond 
highlighting it, along with the other JHA provisions, as a “matter of common 
interest”, whereas law-enforcement at the very least was promised Europol 
(Article K.l .9). Progress in extradition of course preceded Amsterdam, with 
the Schengen Implementing Convention and the simplified EU extradition 
treaties, but it was the second TEU, together with Tampere, which initiated the 
building of the co-operative facilitating mechanisms? With such a short 
pedigree (outside extradition agreements), judicial co-operation has not been 
in the European arena long enough to develop roots, let alone develop any 
supranational outlook or influences.
The Member State governments’ anxiety to maintain control of their criminal 
law-making powers is without doubt, however, the cardinal explanation for the 
dominance of intergovermnental policy. Keeping the co-operation tightly 
focused within set parameters such as through the Eurojust Convention also 
facilitates intergovernmental control. One should also consider the argument 
that judicial co-operation is not particularly open to developments without the 
encouragement and sanction of the executive and legislature in any case. 
Cadoppi makes the point that lawyers tend to be conservative regaining their 
own criminal justice system, even “in the face of superior needs of the
 ^Jôrg Monar An “area offreedom, justice and security”? Progress and deficits in Justice and 
home affairs in P. Lynch, N. Neuwahl and W. Rees (eds.) Reforming the European Union: 
from Maash'icht to Amsterdam 2000 pp 143-5
 ^The Benelux Union also included some necessary enhancements in Judicial co-operation to 
equate to its co-operative law-enforcement, especially in the area o f extradition. Only 
Amsterdam however, offered the fu'st all-encompassing approach.
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society”? Such an explanation may partly account for the failure of the UK 
government’s policy to target “yob culture”, through the introduction of 
twenty-four hour magistrate courts? Cadoppi uses the example of the failed 
UK Criminal Code drafted by James F. Stephen in the late nineteenth century, 
scuttled through “laziness and conservatism by legal practitioners and 
judges”? Cadoppi acknowledges that such a mindset is less of an issue today, 
and one most likely incapable of hindering any possible unification of criminal 
laws were a united Europe ever to occur. What this principle does imply, 
however, is that the natural conservativeness of the national judicial 
establishment is unlikely to develop co-operative measures without 
governmental sanction, and moreover, initiation. This is further supported by 
the lack, until recently, of co-operative structures capable of inducing contact 
between members of the Member States’ judiciaries. Extradition requests, 
excluding those of the new Arrest Warrant, are administered exclusively via 
diplomatic channels or the relevant national ministry, thereby further denying 
the development of a network of contacts, as was possible thr ough localised 
police co-operation.^ National criminal-justice policy was therefore 
effectively isolated from the European Project until the arrival of the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
 ^A. Cadoppi Towards a European Criminal Code in European Journal o f Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 4 Issue 1, 1996 pp 7-8 
 ^BBC News Night courts "to be dropped” 30 December 2002
However, as the Lord Chancellor’s Department summarised, the high costs of the project, 
together with its lack o f real results are primarily to blame.
 ^Cadoppi, Op, Cit., p 7
 ^G. Vermeulen and T. Vander Bekon Extradition in the European Union: State o f the Art 
Perspectives in European Journal of Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 4 Issue 3, 
1996p 214
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Supranational potential?
The move away from solely extradition orientated co-operation begun at 
Amsterdam has continued into the post-11 September environment, 
establishing forums through which individuals from the Member State 
judiciaries may meet on a regular basis. Eurojust functions through Member 
State magistrates, national prosecutors and equivalent law-enforcement 
officers working together under a single roof to achieve its aims, in the same 
manner as Europol. National correspondents/liaison officers administer its 
database, thereby establishing a network of contacts, while Eurojust’s 
Convention permits the establishment of joint investigative teams (Article 6a 
(iv)) further enhancing this network, as Eurojust officials will work with 
national judiciaries and law-enforcement officers in the “field”. The reaction 
to 11 September has enhanced the role of these networks, with Eui ojust 
participating in special counter-terrorist teams. Meanwhile, the new informal 
forum bringing anti-terrorism magistrates together to discuss ways of 
combating the renewed threat of terrorism, mirrors the original Trevi working- 
group, suggesting a strong emphasis on utilising this traditional approach to 
develop initial co-operation here.
Where there was little contact before between the Member States’ judicial 
authorities, there is now a great deal more. Even the new Arrest Warrant 
contributes to this though increased judicial communication between 
designated national judicial authorities that administer the surrender requests. 
The establishment of these networks, both formal and informal, goes some
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way to deconstruct the isolationist state of the Member States’ national 
judiciaries. In itself, this does not detract from the current intergovernmental 
captaincy of judicial co-operation; rather it implies the germination of 
supranational potential within this previously exclusive area. Increased 
transnational communication and co-operation between judicial officials 
initiates the concept of elite-actors into the equation; but given the limited 
access points for communication, via named “competent judicial authorities”, 
this is not a major revolution in judicial co-operation.^® Moreover, whereas 
police co-operation, especially in border regions, has been able to take some 
initiatives in developing co-operation (Nebedeag-Pol), the judiciary is limited 
to enhancing co-operation through existing regulations. New laws cannot be 
introduced without the approval of legislative and executive, especially in 
those countiies that operate under Roman Law, with a criminal codex, and 
consequently cannot utilise the concept of precedent and interpretation to the 
same degree as permitted by Common Law. However, this increased co­
operation will give judiciaries a stronger voice in requesting or demanding 
new transnational legislation to facilitate co-operation against terrorism and 
crime in general, because they will be in a position to discuss such problems 
amongst themselves. Now inside tlie EU arena, these gioupings will be able 
to engage in the politics of integration as actors in their own right. If the JHA 
Council is unsympathetic to a particular concept suggested by one of the co­
operative structures, then the judiciary are in a better position to attempt to 
galvanise support for this fi'om other EU institutions or even Europol.
Equally, Eurojust is in the position to become an important actor in its own
Council o f Europe Council Framework Decision o f 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Articles 6 and 7.
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right. Controlled by a Director in a similar fashion to Europol, such an 
individual is not a voice in the wilderness. If, for example, the Director 
believed that greater integration was required to tackle the threat of terrorism, 
perhaps moving in the direction of a common criminal policy, then such a 
concept would gain an element of credence, if nothing else. By drawing the 
elite-actors into the equation, the current intergovernmental approach is 
diluted. Consider the broad scope of the Common Arrest Warrant and how 
this takes the matter of extradition for a great many offences out of the hands 
of government, and directly into those of the judiciary.
Essentially the establishment of networks puts judicial co-operation on the 
same track as its law-enforcement counterpart, opening it up to similar 
integrative influences. Police co-operation has had a head start of some 
twenty-yeai's, but the acceleration witnessed within judicial co-operation, with 
the establishment of a formalised structure, Eurojust, and its incorporation into 
the JEIA machinery without any prior informal structure building, along with 
fuilher enhancements in the wake of the 11 September attacks, demonstrates 
that it will quickly catch up. Law-enforcement co-operation will retain its 
intergovernmental drive, although its supranational elements will be capable 
of directing some influence, however minor.
Throughout this thesis we have questioned the merits of the intergovernmental 
approach vis-à-vis some of the supranational alternatives; in some areas it 
serves as a positive effect, in others, less so. In the case of judicial co­
operation, this comparison is less clear-cut, not only because it is essentially
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virgin territory in terms of EU co-operation, but because the current co­
operative structure, it is safe to say, would not exist without the initiatives put 
in place through intergovernmental integration. The practitioners were in no 
position to initiate such moves; neither were the Commission or the European 
Parliament, without the active support of the Council. The reality of the 
situation is that intergovernmentalism has been a necessary motor in this area 
of co-operation. However, we also have the somewhat brusque position taken 
by the current intergovernmental approach towards the issue of democratic 
accountability, and as the policy of rushing the controversial Common Arrest 
Warrant through national parliaments demonstrates, the Member State 
governments are content to continue this policy in the matter of judicial co­
operation. This therefore raises concern over a continued intergovernmental 
dominance injudicial co-operation. By contrast, a federal approach would do 
much to alleviate accountability concerns. In doing so, however, it would 
change the direction and pace of judicial co-operation, focusing it towards a 
common criminal policy. A controversial issue, certainly, but would it not 
also be a practical one?
Two integrationist models supporting a unified European criminal policv on 
terrorism
Does the EU need a common criminal policy to tackle terrorism effectively? 
Without doubt, a common system would make co-operation throughout the 
EU a much easier process. Information could be more readily shared because 
it could be accepted as evidence in any Member State court, while many
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bureaucratie procedures could be swept away, simplifying and speeding up 
investigations. A year after the 11 September attacks, over eight hundred 
suspects were identified in Europe as having ties to al-Qaeda, but with the 
number of trials occurring being marginal, none have yet been convicted. * ’ 
Beyond these practicalities, a common judicial policy would also serve as final 
recognition by the Member States that terrorism will not be brooked anywhere 
within the EU. The common EU definition on terrorism moves in this 
direction, but agreement on a definition does not provide the emphasis of 
determination that the establisliment of a common judicial policy would bring.
The dissolution of Europe’s internal borders has, to an extent, increased the 
EU’s vulnerability. The terrorist’s life has been made easier, allowing him to 
disperse his planning elements throughout the Union, making it more difficult 
for operations to be detected by national law-enforcement agencies, only 
bringing everything back together for the actual attack.*^ The realisation of 
the extent of interlinkage between North African terrorist cells and groups 
within the EU, in the wake of the Strasbourg plots and 11 September attacks, 
does provide grounds for serious consideration regarding a common criminal 
policy towards terrorism.
The threat posed by these groups, hidden within the ethic minority populations 
of the Member States, is serious, from the point of view of both their numbers
BBC News Europe‘s hunt for al-Qaeda 6 September 2002.
Indeed to date, only one individual has been sentenced in connection with the 11 September 
attacks: a German court convicted Mounir al-Motassadek, a Moroccan, to fifteen years 
imprisonment for his part in the logistical work of the Hamburg cell. fBBC News First 11 
September suspect ja iled  19 Februaiy 2003)
BBC News Europe’s hunt for al-Qaeda 6 September 2002
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(Germany’s BKA put the figure at several thousand) and their willingness to 
use mass-casualty weapons?^ This is the reason why the co-operative pace 
must be increased.
To the Member States’ credit, retrenchment of European integration has not 
occurred; on the contrary, co-operation, as we have seen, has only been 
enhanced. For the most part however, this enhancement has continued along 
the track of facilitating co-operation, with only the Common Arrest Warrant 
bucking the trend. Facilitation is producing results, but as the IRA warned 
after the Brighton bombing, “Today we were unlucky. But remember we only 
have to be lucky once. You have to be lucky everyday” "^^. A common 
criminal policy would increase the co-operative pace.
Prior to the 11 September attacks, there was little practical reason for initiating 
a common judicial policy against terrorism. As we have noted, the concept 
did not fit the integrative trend adopted by the Member States. Public opinion 
would most likely be hostile to an integration of judicial systems. As 
Wilkinson has clearly emphasised:
national publics may often criticise aspects of their own systems 
and demand refoims in the law, but they are not sympathetic to 
the idea that their own system should change in order to
BBC News Germany predicts al-Qaeda strikes 28 May 2002 
BBC News The IRA campaign in England 4 March 2001
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accommodate to some supranational or intergovernmental 
design
The apprehension generated by the “new tenorism” is not in itself sufficient to 
cause or indeed justify such change to the national judicial systems. Europe’s 
citizens are split deeply, for example, over the current “war on terrorism”, 
especially with regard to engaging in war against Iraq. It is extremely 
doubtful therefore that opinion would warm to such a move on the grounds of 
countering terrorism alone. However, a harmonisation of European judicial 
systems, specifically directed against terrorism, is now a legitimate possibility, 
thanks to the progress made within European JHA integration.
The progress made within the European Project, particularly monetary union, 
has demonstrated to the European public that even sacred cows may willingly 
be sacrificed before the altar of integration; usually by their elected 
governments, rather than the citizens themselves. Wilkinson’s assertion, it 
should be noted, was made in a time when integration in counter-terrorism 
was rudimentary by compaiison to today. As this thesis has continually 
shown, the Member State governments have quite happily initiated reform 
thi'oughout the JHA continuum without seeking public support, let alone, in 
some cases, that of both national and supranational legislatures. In simple 
terms, if the change is regarded as a practical necessity, then generally, 
opinion grudgingly supports the change, or remains mutely apathetic. In such 
a climate, an effective argument supporting increased integration via the
Paul Wilkinson Terrorism and the Liberal State 2"'* edition 1986 p 291
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judicial system against terrorism is quite possible. The greater challenge 
against deeper JHA integration comes from within the system, rather than 
from the public; but that too no longer has the same support it once had.
The “natural” isolation of national judiciaries to the European Project has been 
eroded, to some extent, by the progress made within judicial co-operation.
The EJN and Eurojust illustrate that co-operation is no longer exclusively an 
extradition issue. The Arrest Warrant further substantiates this, representing 
mutual recognition and confidence in the criminal judgements of each 
Member State, regarding a great number of offences. To take another step and 
integrate a common judicial policy against terrorism would not be a 
particularly arduous task. We are not, after all talking about initiating an all- 
encompassing common criminal policy. The ground is prepared, and the 
climate requires it.
The intergovermnental model
The manifestation of a common judicial policy against terrorism would require 
the surrendering of further sovereignty, although the extent would depend on 
the type of approach taken. Would a centralised court be required to try 
terrorist cases, as proposed by the French Interior Minister, Robert Badinter in 
1982, and since carried on by many academics such as Wilkinson and Paul 
O’Higgins, or would national courts conducting tenorist trials operate under a 
common set of rules? How would the special requirements of the anti- 
terrorism legislation of the Member States, such as the UK’s Diplock Courts
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in Northern Ireland or France’s juryless assize courts, which try terrorist cases 
that try all terrorist cases that are not regional in character, contend with this?^ ® 
Indeed should a common policy apply only to acts of international terrorism, 
and if so, how exactly do we define that in the current climate? Suppose a 
Groupe Salafiste pour Prédication et Combat cell (GSPC), having lived in 
London for several years (and based there), were to carry out a bomb attack in 
the UK. Would this be an example of international terrorism, or only if the 
group crossed the English Channel, and attacked Paris? The situation is 
complicated flirther by the many false identities, together with matching 
documents, under which these terrorists operate. Indeed, it is not uncommon 
to find a suspect with up to forty different identities. Consequently, can one 
even be sure of their nationality?
Resolving these questions, and many others, would not be an easy process, but 
neither would it be an impossible one. One possible approach would be to 
initiate a common legislation against terrorism by taking advantage of the fact 
that most Member States have only recently decreed terrorism as a specific 
crime onto their statute books. In so doing, they are recognising that terrorism 
requires specific legislation to curtail it, beyond the normal requirements of 
criminal law, as the UK found when it was compelled to initiate emergency 
legislation to deal with the situation in Northern Ireland. Under this premise, 
it should be possible to draft a EU-wide generic counter-terrorist legislation 
capable of replacing national legislation. Taken from this perspective, a 
common legislation is not as imposing or intrusive as the concept initially
Antonio Vercher Terrorism in Europe 1992 pp 320-1
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implies. Particular problem areas such as Portugal’s national criminal law 
system’s refusal to recognise life sentences have to an extent already been 
resolved tlii'ough Portugal’s declaration of the 1996 EU Extradition 
Convention (Annex) and the Common Arrest Warrant (Article 37), whereby 
the assurance is made that if a life sentence is decreed, it will not be carried 
out. Portugal would therefore be exempt from enforcing any sentence beyond 
the maximum twenty-five years permissible by its national law. More 
problematic areas such as the terrorist situations in the Basque Country and 
Northern Ireland, which have required specialised legislation in the past, could 
be covered by temporary national legislation, specific to these areas, 
superseding the EU common policy.
Establishing the enforcement body of this policy is more likely to prove 
contentious than the actual common approach. The cunent JHA provisions, 
after all, remain subservient to the Member State’s right to determine their 
own internal security and law and order measures (Article 33, Nice), thereby 
allowing a Member State to rescind from the actions relating to any 
agreement, if it deems it necessaiy. Creating an actual European terrorist 
court would be problematic in its logistics, but precedent has been set thi ough 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Additionally one might 
be able to seek inspiration from the Lockerbie Trial, conducted under Scottish 
law and sovereignty, whilst in another country -  The Netherlands. A more 
practical solution though is to allow the national courts to enforce a unified 
policy rather than act through a centralised agency. Eurojust is in the ideal 
position to act as co-ordinating agency; its position reinforced by the JHA
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Council’s emphasis on Eurojust’s counter-terrorist role?^ The concept of such 
a court stems from a period when judicial and JHA co-operation in general, 
were insufficiently developed to induce significant confidence between the 
Member States regarding this co-operative policy. Its conceptualised purpose 
was to try terrorists and international criminals that a given European country 
had refused to extradite or try on its own territory. Hence, Badinter saw such 
a court as “removing emotional aspects of political trials which France fears 
could affect judgements on alleged terrorists who have taken refuge in other 
European countries”. Current levels of judicial co-operation, however, as we 
have seen, have alleviated most concerns of fellow Member States evading 
their obligations through acquiescing to terrorist intimidation.
Execution of a common approach by national courts would still require some 
form of enforcement mechanism. Under the present intergovernmental 
approach, adopting a common judicial policy against terrorism, the most 
practical solution would be to draw up an implementing convention in the 
same manner as that which enforces Schengen’s flanking measures. This 
stance permits a flexible approach to allow for specific geo-political 
conditions. Stylised on such a convention, there is no actual agency involved, 
as is the case with Europol. Rather it is “simply” the case of executing a 
common approach throughout the Union. The involvement of the European 
Court of Justice as an interpretative body in the event of disputes arising is 
strongly advised. This, though, would actually be a less contentious issue than 
the division that occurred over the Court’s role within Europol. The Court
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses: No 7 EU anti-terrorism plan: "operational measures " 
Point No, 2 
Vercher, Op. Cit., p 357
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would be strictly limited to the parameters of the common legislation, which 
itself would be the result of an agreement superimposing this over national 
legislation; the ECJ would therefore not be in a position to override specific 
national provisions. The Court’s role is important as the ultimate arbitrator in 
what would be a piece of judicial, rather than political legislation. The final 
word is thus removed from the politics of the JHA Council. Legislation 
dealing directly with the law requires a judicial authority. Additionally the 
Court’s incorporation deepens the position of the common legislation within 
the context of the EU Project, without any actual detriment to the 
intergovermnental approach.
The federal model
Developing a deeper approach towards a common judicial policy against 
terrorism would require adopting a supranational methodology. Only the 
federal approach, however, would be conducive to such deepening, as the 
needs of the cuirent climate are far too pressing to justify the time required to 
develop the integrative developments obtained from the slower-paced 
functionalism or neo-functionalism. A federal alternative, however, would 
require the active participation of the Member States’ governments in order to 
bear fruit. The fundamental difference to the intergovernmental approach 
would not be the actual legislation, but that an independent 
enforcement/interpretative body would be necessary, together with a gi'eater 
emphasis on EU involvement as a whole. Establishing the type of court 
advocated from a nmnber of quarters above to try terrorist cases, would
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certainly be less complicated in a federal environment. However, it would not 
be quintessential to the process. Unquestionably, a legislative authority would 
be required, but it need not be a centralised working court trying terrorist cases 
as a matter of course. The enforcement body’s principal role would be 
interpretation of the legislation, but unlike the intergovernmental case, its 
authority would supplant the Member States’ in this area. Amendments by the 
Member States to their counter-terrorist legislation would, one presupposes, 
require the approval of this body. This implies that this federalised body 
would also have authority or influence over the counter-terrorist initiatives 
conducted within Europol and Eurojust. National courts could continue to try 
terrorist cases under the common approach, with the enforcement body 
dealing with cases where a Member State refused to try a case and/or as a final 
court of appeal. Indeed, to categorise terrorism specifically as a federal 
offence would create many enforcement problems. As the principle of 
subsidiarity has illustrated, the enforcement of counter-teiTorist policy is best 
left at the national level, which can draw upon the assistance of centralised 
support bodies as required. Attempting to square the national counter-terrorist 
legislation with federal law, together with actually trying a terrorist suspect 
before a federal court and perhaps sentencing him to a federal prison, would 
cause significant judicial and logistical problems. Indeed, it is doubtful that 
many Member States would be predisposed towards having to build new 
prisons specifically to host these special category inmates.^® The input of
The UK maintained two prisons in Northern Ireland for incarcerating convicted terrorists: 
Crumlin Road gaol and Long Kesh/Maze Prison. The latter o f these has been earmarked 
either for demolition or to be turned into a museum, in light of the ongoing “peace process”. 
This example demonstrates that States have no particular interest in maintaining specific 
prisons for terrorists other than out of necessity. Furthermore, Long Kesh was necessary 
specifically to deal with the significant number of terrorists indigenous to the situation in
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federal law would, at this stage be an unwarranted intrusion upon the counter­
terrorist policy of the Member States. In short, if terrorism were to be 
categorised as a federal crime, then the federal authorities would be required 
to undertake counter-terrorist policy. Yet, we know that this is not conducive 
to effective counter-terrorist policy and co-operation within the EU. Instead, 
the adoption of a common approach to counter-terrorist legislation would be 
far more conducive to the situation, as well as satisfying the requirements of 
subsidiarity. We should remember, after all, that under the new EU common 
definition of tenorism, every Member State is obligated to deal with this 
threat, with no real recourse to refuse the extradition or transfer of a terrorist 
suspect wanted by another Member State. That it is dealt with on a national 
basis rather than from a federal position does not detract, qualitatively, from 
actually administering justice.
Adopting a common approach is similar to the stance taken under the 
proposed intergovernmental model, except that under a federal system an 
enforcement mechanism would be essential to ensure that Member States 
abided by a common approach. If, for example, a Member State failed to 
adopt a forceful or just approach in the execution of its counter-terrorist 
policy, then it could be held to account by this body, with disciplinary 
measures taken against it in the form of fines. In this way, the federal
Northern Ireland. To disperse such a large number of prisoners tlii’oughout the mainland 
prisons was seen both as impractical and a possible contravention o f human rights, due to the 
travel difficulties that this would impose on visiting relatives. By contrast, though, recent 
Spanish penal policy has removed its ETA prisoners from Basque gaols, and dispersed them 
throughout Spain, in an effort to dispel both their influence on ETA members at large and to 
counter intimidation against prison officers living in the Basque Region (as happened in 
Northern Ireland) where ETA’s influence is strongest. Dispersal would be the most efficient 
way of dealing with such “European terrorists”.
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approach is able to enhance co-operation against teiTorism, without eroding 
the principle of subsidiarity and the benefits that are provided by national 
counter-terrorist legislation any more than is necessary.
Such an enforcement body requires real teeth, but it must also be subject to 
checks and balances. Without such safeguards, a central court or body, as 
described above, would be too powerful, making it difficult, for example, for 
Member States to challenge the court’s ruling. Without checks and balances, 
the court’s existence would be a powerful blow against democratic values. A 
federal approach would therefore also have to widen the roles played by the 
European institutions in counter-teiTorism, laying the foundations for this by 
redressing the democratic deficit, enhancing the role of the other institutions, 
but especially that of the European Parliament -  the only true democratic 
element within the EU. Additionally, however, one should also beai* in mind 
the role played by the European Court of Human Rights. “Federalising” even 
a small ar ea of criminal policy within the EU requires a greater emphasis on 
enforcing human rights legislation to safeguai d against any abuse of these 
rights. The ECHR has found elements of national counter-terrorist legislation 
wanting on a number of occasions (notably some of the interrogation methods 
practised by the security forces in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s), 
leading to their correction. This role remains just as important, indeed more 
so, because of the encompassing effect of a single policy (in this respect, the 
ECHR’s role is equally necessary under an intergovernmental approach).
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The level of democratic accountability would be elevated -  an increasingly 
important quality as our counter-terrorist measures are enhanced. 
Additionally, it would reduce the potential for fragmentation within the 
common policy, because of the more rigorous enforcement mechanisms, 
which are naturally slacker under the type of intergovernmental convention 
discussed above. National courts would still carry out trials, and national 
police officers would still conduct investigations, but the federal approach 
truly gels a co-operative counter-terrorist policy together in a way that the 
current intergovernmental approach does not.
Towards an espace judiciaire eurovéenel
Returning to the realities of cuirent integration within the judicial sphere, the 
previous chapter concluded that the EU had yet to reach the level of 
integration whereby it could implement a common judicial space. As the 
models discussed above illustrate, however, this concept could be equally at 
home with either one of them. The espace judiciaire européene, as Freestone 
correctly surmises, is “an indeterminate flexible concept”.^ ® It would exist as 
a matter of course under a federalised approach, but from an 
intergovernmental perspective, the concept is an acceptable mechanism to 
adopt -  the intergovernmental model of the common judicial policy against 
terrorism demonstrates this. A common judicial space, for example, could 
function under the parameters of Giscard d’Estaing’s original concept. The 
advanced intergovernmental model meets not just Giscard d’Estaing’s desire
I
David Freestone The EEC Treaty and Common Action on Terrorism Yearbook o f European i
Law, 4 (1984), p 209 cited in Vercher, Op. Cit., p 359 :
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to simplify extradition procedures and the application of the principle “to 
extradite or prosecute” (already met under current co-operative conditions), 
but could also be extended in its definition to have a common jurisdiction and 
legal code or process met. Freestone does consider that an espace judiciaire 
européene would require some form of European Criminal Court to co­
ordinate efforts; but at a purely intergovernmental approach to co-operative 
policy Eurojust, as has been indicated, is in a position to administer the 
necessary co-ordination.
The proactive stance currently developing within judicial co-operation is 
illustrative of changes ongoing within this sector of collaboration. Terrorism, 
embodied through the attacks against the United States, has played a role in 
this transformation, although one essentially limited to facilitating the passing 
of these measures at a quicker pace. As explained in the previous chapter, 
these co-operative advancements facilitating proactivity were already in 
development several years before September 2001, as part of the spearhead 
towards establishing an area of “freedom, security and justice”. The 
importance of the terrorist attacks carmot be underestimated, however. Article 
31 of Amsterdam, which deals with judicial co-operation in criminal matters, 
provides for “common action” in these matters, but no deadline is given by 
which this “action” must be taken. Only at Tampere were any firm deadlines 
set, with judicial co-operation in criminal matters allocated a five-year 
deadline from enforcement of the treaty (Conclusions 49-51). Although work 
has begun on some aspects of Tampere, the treaty has yet to officially come 
into force, requiring as it does a minimum of thirty ratifications by 21 June
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2003. Effectively the Member States are therefore not obligated to engage in 
work on the judicial measures required by Tampere until 2008. That they 
have been engaged in working on these measures almost immediately after 
Tampere was opened for signature is indicative of their willingness to commit 
to constructing these measures, displaying no evidence of heel-dragging. The 
rise in co-operative judicial measures following 11 September demonstrates 
that with the official deadline for initiation of work far ahead in the distance, 
the teiTorist attacks have significantly increased the pace of co-operative 
output.
The proactive approach is indicative of a more cohesive effort at co-operation, 
but also one that is moving away from intergovernmental micromanagement 
to a more devolved approach, at least in the area of extradition and transfer. 
Without tliis requisite, the proactive approach would be impossible to realise, 
and instead would be bogged down in time-consuming micromanagement. 
Indeed the emphasis on speed injudicial co-operation, promoted by the JHA 
Council, would also be hampered by too much control stemming ftom the 
“centre”. Consequently, a more “aggressive” style of judicial co-operation is 
redirecting the traditional approach of intergovernmental management in this 
field, inducing an element of autonomy for the actors and structures 
concerned, all the while maintaining the intergovernmental strategy. As was 
pointed out earlier, this sti'ategy will ultimately weaken intergovernmental 
policy through the introduction of autonomy, increasing the influence of the 
non-governmental players involved, and sowing the seeds of supranational 
influences such as neo-functionalism within the system.
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Conclusions
The EU has been something of a late starter in terms of judicial co-operation 
on criminal matters, leaving it primarily in the hands of the Council of Europe 
and its extradition conventions. That it has taken off has been due to the 
integrative foundations developed by the treaties on European Union, allowing 
follow-up work such as Tampere to complement the ongoing progress in law- 
enforcement co-operation with supportive judicial measures. The shock to the 
system caused by the tenorist attacks on America has acted as a catalyst 
within all areas of JHA co-operation; but it is in the judicial spectrum that it 
has produced the most controversial of all measures, namely the Common 
Anest Warrant -  demonstrating that judicial co-operation is not exempt from 
the intergovernmental accountability deficit.
Unlike other areas of JHA co-operation, judicial co-operation has been 
immune to supranational influences, isolated within national boundaries and 
executing co-operation through sterile extradition channels. Entry into the 
JHA gamut has removed this isolation, and like every other area, it is 
susceptible to non-intergoveinmental integrationist influences. These 
influences will not occur overnight, but the neo-functionalist seed is there. As 
the pace of co-operation deepens, supported by the new proactive direction, 
the cohesion of these actors will in turn intensify, as they develop their 
working relationship. From the perspective of influence, tliis group will have 
greater authority over any challenge or request made to the Member State 
governments than their police colleagues could have, due to their judicial
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background. In other words, their opinion would automatically take legal 
considerations, as well as practical ones, into account.
Taking all of this into account, we can expect the days of judicial co-operation 
trailing behind that of law-enforcement to be well and truly over. Wliere its 
future lies is, like everything else within the European Project, uncertain.
What is certain is that a number of pressing problems concerning the issue of 
counter-terrorism remain umesolved. Existing judicial co-operation has yet to 
gravitate towards increasing the number of trials, let alone convictions of 
terrorist suspects within Europe, in the wake of 11 September. Greater law- 
enforcement co-operation, certainly, is improving the arrest rate; but this is of 
little use without convictions before a court of law. That Member States have 
continued to rely upon their judiciaries and rule of law, rather than quick-fix 
politically imposed solutions, such as internment, to resolve this problem is to 
be congratulated. The British courts’ overturning of the Home Secretary’s 
decision to extradite Rashid Ramda to France is illustrative of this position. 
Nevertheless the threat posed by terrorism does present judicial co-operation 
with new and urgent challenges, namely how to draw the most efficiency out 
of a co-operative counter-terrorist policy that is operating under fifteen 
(currently) different systems. The solution must ultimately be the 
harmonisation and subsequent integration of counter-terrorist co-operation at 
the judicial level, achieving a single EU counter-terrorist legislation. This 
would dramatically increase the pace of judicial co-operation, improving both 
trial and conviction rates. This is not an umealistic proposal; it is perfectly 
feasible under the current conditions of integration, and enforceable through
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an intergovernmental mandate with minimum loss to sovereignty. Indeed if 
one were to stick fully to the practical argument, the policy could be executed 
as a temporary one, with the option for renewal, mirroring the erstwliile 
administration of the UK counter-terrorism legislation. If problems arose that 
could not be resolved, or when the “war on terror” reaches a conclusion, the 
common policy could be rescinded. Equally, a Member State could puli out of 
the agreement if they so desired. A common policy need not mean 
fédéralisation of that policy. However, under a federal approach, derogation 
would be impermissible, and enforcement mechanisms would attempt to 
ensure that Member States abided by such common policy.
If the EU wishes to develop an efficient approach to combat teiTorism, the rate 
of judicial co-operation must be increased. As the situation currently stands, 
terrorists have, and are able to exploit weaknesses in co-ordination between 
national policies. With the threat remaining high, especially after the 
discovery of the biological toxin, ricin, during a police raid on a flat in London 
in January 2003, these weaknesses require resolution without d e l a y . A  
common judicial policy against terrorism goes a long way to achieving this. 
Moreover, a comprehensive single judicial policy against terrorism will also 
produce beneficial spillover effects within law-enforcement co-operation, 
allowing frirther developments to match the new progress taken at the judicial 
level. Co-operation against terrorism would then be in a position to develop 
around this new common approach, producing a much more systematic 
methodology, replacing the patchwork affair that has traditionally been 
indicative of JHA co-operation.
BBC News Terror police find deadly poison 1 January 2003
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Chapter X
Conclusion: Patchwork Policy or Comprehensive Security?
This reseai'ch has aimed soberly to identify the explanations as to why co­
operative counter-terrorist policy between EU Member States has remained 
very much a marginalised affair in comparison to “First Pillar” activities. 
Other writers have given attention to specific aspects of counter-teiTorist 
policy within the EU, but no research has undertaken a systematic and holistic 
approach to this area until now.* Only by doing so can we appreciate the 
complications and subtle nuances involved in ascertaining a pertinent answer 
to the deceivingly “simple” question above. It is too easy to focus entirely 
upon the intergovernmental approach to co-operation, without giving due 
attention to other background influences (neo-functionalism and federalism, 
for example). Typically, these are neglected by the literature. Nevertheless, 
significant attention must be given to the development of the JHA 
ar chitecture; this is, and will remain for some time to come, the blueprint for 
co-operation in counter-terrorist matters.
Monica den Boer, writing before 11 September 2001, argued that the third 
pillar of the EU is an inappropriate locus for dealing with matters of 
terrorism.^ She points out that the architecture of the Economic Union treaties 
is both “sloppy” and “hierarchical”, resulting in an inadequate response to 
fast-moving security situations such as terrorism, and is critical of “lowest
 ^Chalk, den Boer, Reinares, and Anderson amongst others.
 ^Monica den Boer The Fight against Terrorism in Maastricht in Fernando Reinares European 
Democracies Against Terrorism 2000
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common denominator” agreements and the rule of unanimity. Crucially, den 
Boer questions the appropriateness of a communitaiian response against 
terrorism, arguing that the principle of subsidiaiity should be weighed together 
with the principle of proportionality appropriate: a regional or bilateral 
response may be better suited to dealing with particular issues, leaving the 
weight of all the Member States to deal with those issues that cannot be 
resolved.^ These are salient points; the internal security structure built within 
the EU is by no means a honed piece of machinery. Indeed, it might be more 
accurately described as a patchwork of agreements, mechanisms, and 
conventions cobbled together to form a security continuum, with new pieces 
continually being added. This statement is an accurate reflection of the origins 
of police and judicial co-operation in Europe; however the component parts, 
while certainly diverse, ar e being Eised together under the direction of the 
JHA Council and policy, and this is ironing out any incongruities. Den Boer’s 
criticism that the JHA machinery is ill suited to responding to terrorism is, 
however, more difficult to judge. The one available opportunity for 
effectively testing the structure within the framework of a significant 
transnational investigation (the Strasbourg plots of 2000) was effectively 
squandered by the investigating national forces’ neglect to fully utilise the 
services of Europol, which could have injected the greater degree of co­
ordination and co-operation so lacking towards the end. As more recent 
events have shown however, the EU’s machinery has proven adept at tmning 
to face the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaeda and its associates. Moreover, the 
JHA Council has attempted to resolve the issue of national agencies bypassing
Ibid., p 218; p 220; p 222
390
Eui'opol, by ending the ambiguity that previously suiTounded Europol’s 
counter-terrorist competences: an ambiguity which originates in part from the 
initial political reluctance to provide Europol with such a mandate, preferring 
instead to keep this area exclusively in the hands of the PWGOT.
Even if we discount the renaissance in internal security co-operation in the 
post-11 September environment, den Boer’s criticism is still somewhat unfair. 
Much of the problem has resided not so much with the structure, but with the 
willingness -  or lack thereof -  of the police forces to utilise it correctly. 
Certainly, the practice of building these structures through reaching the 
“lowest common denominator” via intergovermnental agreements cannot have 
installed the greatest confidence in their co-operative abilities. Weaning 
counter-terrorism officers -  and their governments -  away from the traditional 
style of co-operation, especially when this style remains in place, embodied 
through the PWGOT, has proved a difficult task. Den Boer’s opinion 
regarding the importance of subsidiarity is, as this thesis has demonstrated, 
unassailable. However, her argument implies that even under the current 
intergovernmental JHA policy architecture, greater use could be made of the 
principle of subsidiarity. To do so, however, would risk undermining the 
common approach emphasised at Gomera in 1995: that combating terrorism 
should be treated both as a priority and as a matter of common interest.  ^
Subsidiaiity is a fundamental condition of EU internal security co-operation. 
This would be particularly true under a federal Europe, where it would allow 
counter-terrorist policy to operate with the minimum of interference from a
La Gomera Declaration. Annex 3: Terrorism, Madrid European Council 15 and 16 
December 1995 Presidency Conclusions
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cumbersome centre -  which would otherwise risk damage to the execution of 
comiter-terrorist policy/ We see the merits of bilateral co-operation against 
regional terrorism, such as Franco-Spanish efforts against ETA, can be 
eviscerating in its effect. Furthermore, the Greek authorities managed to bring 
down November 17 with the technical advice and experience of a New 
Scotland Yard team, although good fortune ultimately provided the crucial 
dividend.^
Equally, terrorism, in its Islamic extremist guise, is a threat pervasive to the 
entire EU, and it is correct that it is dealt with by employing the full weight of 
the EU’s JHA machinery. However, returning to the failures of the Strasbourg 
investigation, we can see that these failures occurred precisely because the 
investigation was limited to a regional context against a genuine transnational 
threat. Indeed, the danger of placing too much emphasis on subsidiarity is that 
it risks emasculating the genuine solidarity that has developed against 
terrorism. This new unity, coupled with the much belated arrival of a common 
European definition of terrorism, and with the emergence of a common list of 
proscribed groups and individuals, finally establishes the concept of the 
terrorist as hostis Europa civisJ Solidarity against terrorism is the most 
effective way of bringing it to heel, and it is unwise to advocate an alternative 
route in this case. Tenorism can rarely be limited to a specific state or region; 
its acts invariably cause undulations beyond the scene of conflict. The Middle
 ^The preconditions of accountability and security of the federal union as a whole would 
obviously apply.
® On 29 June 2002, Savvas Xiros was apprehended after being injured by the premature 
explosion of a bomb that he was planting in Athens. His subsequent interrogation created a 
cyclical effect o f further arrests, interrogations, and more arrests. (BBC News How November 
17 was cracked 19 July 2002)
’ A definition, one might add, achieved through the machinery of the JHA co-operation.
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East represents a case in point; equally, organised crime and smuggling, in 
which many groups are involved, will have repercussions for other states. 
Italia’s mafia may be rife in its southern regions, but its criminal interests and 
activities are not limited to that area. Neither could we dispute the fact that the 
IRA’s activities have caused concern for other European states, contributing in 
a large part to the establishment of the PWGOT. Equally, November 17 
became a concern for the UK when it murdered one of its diplomatic staff. 
Certainly, these terrorist gi oups remain the primary concern of the country 
plagued by them, and one might expect another interested party to offer 
bilateral support, as the UK did, following the murder of Brigadier Saunders in 
Athens in June 2000.  ^ Having begun this co-operation, the Greek authorities 
moved towards closer relations with other European counter-terrorist 
authorities, including Europol, which held a briefing for a number of Greek 
police officers, many of which were anti-terrorist officers, on the subjects of 
organised crime and terrorism, in June 2001^.
These thi'eats illustrate the growing need for a transnational approach. The 
offices of the EU accept this as a fact, and voice a one for all and all for one 
philosophy:
* BBC News Brigadier's body flown home 13 June 2000
The insular philosophy o f November 17 meant that multinational co-operation was never 
required in tackling them. Indeed the UK co-operation was aimed specifically at assisting the 
less experienced Greek police in tracking down the killers within their own borders. While 
the overriding determinant of this bilateral co-operation was a marriage between Britain’s 
desire to see Saunders’s murderers brought to justice and Athens’s anxieties about keeping the 
2004 Olympics.
 ^Embassy of Greece Press Office Bulletin Tougher Anti-terrorism Law Vol.7, No. 6 June 
2001
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“When ETA increased its attacks in Spain, Justice and Home 
Affairs ministers decided that terrorism was no longer a 
national matter,” the EC source told Reuters.
“An attack against one Member State is an attack against the 
Union."'"
Subsidiarity has an important role in the internal security of today’s EU, and a 
possible future federal one. Achieving the right balance between the security 
of the EU as a whole, and that of individual Member States will be no easy 
task.
Developing Counter-terrorist Integration
In almost every way, the level of co-operation in counter-terrorist policy today 
in Europe is staggering in comparison to its inception in the mid-1970s.
Police and judicial co-operation have made massive strides in the past few 
years: the exchange of liaison officers occurs as a matter of course; massive 
computer databases permit intelligence to be exchanged instantaneously; while 
extradition procedures have been significantly streamlined, finally and 
irreversibly removing the contentious political offence from terrorist acts. 
Today we are enjoying the dividends of developing an internal security 
continuum as an integral part of the Treaties of Economic Union, with a wave 
of aiTests occurring throughout Europe against Islamic extremists, and the 
successful thwarting of terrorist plots. That Eur ope has not yet suffered any 
similar attacks in the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s devastating assault on America
CNN. Com/World EU plans terror threat crackdown 22 August 2001
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is a testament to the co-operation that has gradually but continually been built 
upon. Europe, following 11 September, is not a soft tai’get.** Moreover, the 
renewed Franco-Spanish co-operation against ETA, following the collapse of 
the terror group’s ceasefire at the close of 1999, is a further illustration of the 
advances made in Europe.
Advances in technology have played no small part in developing this level of 
co-operation and co-ordination. The technology revolution has enabled law- 
enforcement to harness these advances to the application of co-operation, 
improving the overall benefits. The SIS II, for example, with its vast 
databanks of information and ability to transfer data on fingerprints, ballistics 
or DNA, is the central point of the Schengen Implementing Convention and 
addresses the security deficit in the policy on open borders. Without doubt, 
however, the leading factor responsible for the advancements made in counter- 
tenorist co-operation is the inclusion of a Justice and Home Affairs policy 
within the European integi ative process. By incorporating this area of policy 
into the fold, the Member State govermnents dramatically forced the pace of 
law-enforcement co-operation, transforming it from an informal system to a 
regulated structure, thereby allowing new types of co-operation to emerge, 
such as Europol and Eurojust. Equally important, as this thesis has 
consistently argued, is the fact that the placement of co-operation against 
serious crimes such as terrorism within this rubric, will encourage co-
Instead al-Qaeda related attacks have targeted Westerners (amongst others) abroad. A 
suicide bomber in Kabul, June 2003, killed four German peacekeeping soldiers; while co­
ordinated suicide bomb attacks in Morocco included the targeting of Western and Jewish 
targets, killing 41 and wounding over 100 in May 2003. Most notoriously of all was the Bali 
bombing the previous October. BBC News Peacekeepers killed in Kabul blast 7 June 2003; 
BBC News Terror blast rocks Casablanca 17 May 2003
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operation to develop in a manner not always consistent with intergovernmental 
policy.
The major criticism of the co-operative advances made against terrorism, aside 
from the noticeable democratic deficit, is that they have taken almost thirty 
years to reach the cnnent stage of development, especially in the judicial field, 
where only very recently has a common European definition of terrorism 
emerged, and the glaring inconsistencies in extradition conventions finally 
been rectified. Developments in European integration have certainly not been 
a requirement in addressing these latter issues, although the integrationist 
trough that ended with the Single European Act of 1986 has had its pait to 
play in holding back progress. Nevertheless, if the European Member State 
governments had been consistent in developing a unified strategy against 
terrorism, Europe would have arrived at the current stage of development that 
much sooner. Unfortunately, national prerogatives, together with a dogged 
stance towards sovereignty, dominated during a period when governments 
quaked before the terrorist theatre of Car los, now revealed as a shabby dog- 
and-pony show in comparison to the ambitions and capabilities demonstrated 
by al-Qaeda. Instead, it has been the events of 11 September that have 
propelled forward the EU’s embryonic counter-terrorist policy.
As we conclude this thesis, it now becomes necessary to address the overall 
degree of efficiency developed over the past thirty years in counter-terrorist 
co-operation under the stewardship of intergovernmentalism, and to determine 
the appropriateness of continuing to maintain this policy through
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intergovernmental control, or at the very least, this version of it. After this, we 
can ascertain what lessons the development of European co-operation in this 
area holds for other countries and the “war on terrorism” in general.
Intergovernmental bonsai?
Intergovernmental direction has been the guiding force in shaping the co­
operative internal security policy currently in place within Europe. Without its 
leadership and drive, the structure in place would be nowhere near as 
developed as it is today, remaining instead wedded to the traditional informal 
approach. The initial hostility of many of Europe’s police forces to the idea of 
Europol is illustrative of their unwillingness to shift direction. They saw it 
principally as a needless political construct foisted upon them.*^ By 
introducing JHA policy, the Member State governments were taking direct 
control of this area, allowing them to build the regulatory co-operative 
structures necessary to compensate for the security deficit created by the four 
freedoms. Counter-terrorism, however, was an area of policy that some 
Member State governments did not want included in this new co-operative 
structure. That counter-terrorism has become a primary concern of JHA co­
operation can in no small way be attributed to the events of 11 September. We 
have acknowledged that intergovernmentalism is not the sole defining 
foundation of police co-operation; neo-functionalism has also played a 
defining role in fleshing out much of the bilateral co-operative border 
agreements. This supranational influence, however, has rarely been in a
Malcolm Anderson et al Policing the European Union 1995 p 53, 79
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position to enjoy exclusive rights in police co-operation. Even the CCIC and 
regional Benelux border co-operation has been limited by issues of 
sovereignty, with the former risking dissolution because of a divergence of 
policy between the UK government over Schengen and her continental 
partners. Federalism, by comparison, has never made its presence felt in 
internal security co-operation, due to the powerful antipathy from many 
Member States to a federal Europe, which they view as an anathema. Rather, 
the federal model serves instead to provide a feasible alternative to the current 
development intergovernmental JHA policy.
Despite the initial attempts to stifle a counter-terrorist policy under JHA, co­
operation has developed steadily, paving the way for a “joined-up” approach 
with developments in the judicial arena finally meeting up with those in law- 
enforcement. Having ascertained the progress of police and judicial co­
operation throughout Europe since 1972, it would be profoundly wrong to 
place the burden of culpability on intergovernmentalism per se for the lack of 
progress in developing a cohesive counter-terrorist policy. No other 
integrationist theory was in a position to develop co-operation as far as 
intergovernmentalism has. Federalism, as we have seen, has been a non­
starter in this capacity, while neo-functionalism, although useful in 
administering co-operation at a local or regional level, has been unsuccessful 
in crossing the divide into the broader context of co-operation. Moreover, 
counter-terrorist co-operation, as we have seen, contains an inherent self­
regulating quality based on a dominant national perspective, which has 
prevented neo-functionalist characteristics, or any other supranational
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tendencies, from supplanting intergovernmentalism, despite the loose rein 
allowed by Member State governments in some instances (PWGOT). Rather, 
intergovernmentalism is to be congratulated in taking forward internal security 
co-operation (albeit a little half-heartedly initially where counter-terrorism was 
concerned) into a regulated and progressive policy arena -  JHA. The fault line 
in reaching a cohesive counter-terrorism policy has instead rested almost 
exclusively on the failure of the European Member States to develop the 
political will necessary to engage terrorism on a strategic basis. Progress in 
counter-terrorism was moving in the right direction towards the end of the 
1970s with the development of co-operative law-enforcement structures and 
the beginnings of a judicial policy -  the ECST -  aimed at ending the confusion 
over how to deal with apprehended transnational terrorists. The level of 
terrorist threat, coupled with the geo-political environment, ensured that 
nothing more sophisticated than this was required at the European level until 
the integrative developments of the SEA and TEU. The exception to this 
urgent need was closing the loopholes within the ECST to ensure a uniform 
judicial codex for dealing with terrorist extradition amongst the Member 
States. The dismal failure of the Dublin Convention and lack of any further 
serious attempts in this area condemned co-operative European counter­
terrorist policy to the self-centred national prerogatives of the individual 
Member States, effectively making a mockery of co-operation when wanted 
terrorists were quickly expelled fr om their territory rather than extradited to 
face justice.
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One could look at this failure in policy and argue that a communitarian 
approach, with all the regulatory systems and locking-in mechanisms of the 
EC, would have forced the Member States to acquiesce to the demands of such 
a Convention, and in this way intergovernmentalism is responsible for the 
failure here. This, however, would be to ignore the reality of the political 
situation at the time: the Member States would never have surrendered 
sovereignty over matters of counter-terrorism. The EC, regardless of the 
views of its supranational institutions, had no authority outside the scope of 
economic affairs. That, even today, relatively few prerogatives in counter­
terrorism have been surrendered outside the implications of the Common 
Arrest Warrant, remains telling. A Community approach, however, with all its 
supranational connotations, was not the only remedy to this problem. All that 
was required was the political will to shore up the ECST and stand by it. The 
Member States were incapable of this.
The emphasis on the need for political will or backbone to maintain a credible 
counter-terrorist policy is, to some extent, lessened within the JHA era. While 
by no means a communitarian approach, the ongoing co-operation within the 
intergovernmental Third Pillai' has reached a level of sophistication whereby it 
would be very difficult for a Member State to refuse to extradite or surrender a 
terrorist on national or political gi'ounds. It is more than simply conventions 
and agreements without loopholes however; the machinery in place is too 
advanced, and the needs too great to allow any one Member State to attempt to 
“buck” the system. Engrenage, although a neo-functionalist term, can be as 
justifiably applied to the Third Pillar of the EU as to the First; the Member
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States are enmeshed. Even the UK had no option but to partly enter the 
Schengen acquis after its own police chiefs pressed the benefits that the SIS 
would bring, together with the consequences for intelligence co-operation if 
they did not. The regulated structure building holds the Member States 
together in a way that the traditional informal style could not.
The style of co-operation within the JHA field is certainly different to its 
earlier predecessors, and to those remaining outside its authority. Regulation, 
where it is strict, undoubtedly limits co-operation to within these parameters. 
Europol, the flagship of Eur opean police co-operation, is the perfect example 
of this regulatory approach. Its Convention defines EuropoTs scope, duties 
and mission statement, and only JHA Council approval can make amendments 
to this. Europol cannot act outside these parameters. There are two important 
reasons for adopting the regulated approach as a matter of course thr oughout 
JHA policy. The first is that the traditional relaxed approach has little place in 
the current geo-political environment of Europe. Advances in integration and 
teclmology have drawn the Member States much closer together, making it 
unacceptable to rely upon a co-operative policing system that is little more 
than an old-boys network. This would not work in any Member State, and 
neither can it be expected to work within the European Union. The EU is a far 
more complex structure than the old EEC. As has already been stated, the 
relationship between the Member States of the EU cannot be equated to Bull’s 
“Anarchical Society”; regulations and procedures are a fundamental part of 
this working relationship.*^ Moreover, the widespread utilisation of
Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: a Study in the Order o f World Politics 1995
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technology in police co-operation demands a regulated approach both to 
safeguard abuses and also to encourage deposition of intelligence into a 
pooled reservoir in the first instance, acknowledging that fixed controls exist 
regar ding the use of this information.
The second point to make is that the thr eat from transnational crime has 
increased, both in the customary sense of the meaning, and in its transnational 
capacity, exploiting the four freedoms for its own illegal benefit. One of the 
effects of the collapse of the USSR was the emergence of a new 
entrepreneurial criminal class, greedy to exploit the wealth and openness of 
the EU; more damaging though was the rise of the Russian Mafia, soon to 
spread its organised crime tentacles throughout Europe and beyond. 
Meanwhile, the implosion of the former Yugoslavia destabilised law 
enforcement in the region, leading to the development of a stronger and more 
pervasive organised criminal class on Europe’s own doorstep. The influx of 
highly aggressive Albanian criminal gangs to Europe in recent years has led to 
their domination of the illegal sex trade in London, currently controlling thr ee- 
quarters of the industry, according to NCIS.*"* Even teiTorism requires a 
regulated approach; it is no longer an isolated phenomenon, conducive to 
heing dealt with on an informal footing. The threat level posed by the “global 
reach” of al-Qaeda and its associate cadres is huge, illustrated in Europe 
through the revelation of a diverse network of North African terrorist cells 
following the thwarting of the Strasbourg plot, and subsequent investigations 
after 11 September. Neither Interpol nor the PWGOT are capable of dealing
BBC News Sex workers say “let us stay ” 18 February 2003
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with this complex level of threat alone. By comparison, the negative 
associations of too strict a regulatory approach make it difficult to adapt to a 
new or changing threat. Consider Europol’s counter-terrorist mandate, overly 
delayed due to political intransigence from the UK and Denmark, who 
preferred the traditional PWGOT approach, which would have kept counter­
terrorism out of the regulatory requirements of the Third Pillar. Had these 
governments been able to continue their procrastination, Europol might not 
have been in the position today to support the Member States’ law- 
enforcement agencies against the al-Qaeda related tlu'eat. This factor only 
relates to contentious issues, however, as an expansion of Europol mandate 
requires only a two-third majority from the JHA Council, and this can quickly 
be enforced, as was the case with the addition to its mandate of the sex trade in 
women and children in 1996, following the infamous Dutroux case in 
Belgium.*^
One could argue that a loosening of the “apron strings”, similar to the policy 
adopted by central govermnent and the Benelux border-regions, and the 
regional border-agreements between the Benelux and Germany, such as the 
Nebedeag-Pol agreement, might encourage further co-operative growth.
These agreements exploit the best of both worlds, through government or local 
authorities demarcating set parameters beyond which co-operation may not 
expand, but otherwise leaving the detailed implications in the hands of the 
police authorities. In most cases, where political obstruction is minimal, this 
has led to a flourishing of cross-border co-operation. We have already seen
Europol annex.
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the adoption of this approach through the Schengen framework, establishing 
set minimum levels of mandatory co-operation, but leaving anything beyond 
this to the bilateral level, acknowledging the previous existing agreements. 
Consolidating this approach with other areas of JHA policy is less clear-cut.
In most cases, the process of co-operation, whilst becoming more advanced, is 
still limited in the actual process of bringing national authorities together. Co­
operation is focused instead thr ough the medium of facilitatory agents such as 
Europol, Eurojust and the EJN, who respond to requests from national 
authorities. JHA policy does not place much emphasis on encouraging non­
regulated approaches towards co-operation. Rather this approach reinforces 
the intergovernmental stance, preventing law-enforcement co-operation from 
becoming too informal, which under the highly integrated EU environment 
would lead to a hotchpotch of agreements; these would ultimately prove an 
administrative and legal nightmare under the integrative relationship between 
the European Member States, where national sovereignty remains essentially 
sine qua non. Moreover, this continues the traditional theme of law 
enforcement collaboration, whereby the geographic realities of border co­
operation demand active responses between the neighbouring police forces, 
something that is not required between non-neighbouring forces. For the most 
part this is sound enough policy under the current integrative enviromnent; 
however, one area that does require more manoeuvrability, especially in terms 
of counter-terrorism, is judicial co-operation, specifically the European 
Common Arrest Wanant. The Council Framework Decision on the Warrant 
places emphasis on specifically declared judicial authorities within a Member
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State as being competent authorities for the handling of all matters concerning 
the Warrant, with recourse to a central authority if so required.*^ A more 
genuine transnational alternative would be to refocus the emphasis on any 
competent yxàiQidX authority, effectively paving the way for the development 
of a whole network of judicial co-operation. Political hesitancy over 
requesting or surrendering a terrorist suspect would be mitigated significantly, 
tlirough further devolution of the decision making-process into one more 
likely to coiTespond to judicial rather than political interests. This would not 
produce the same chaotic circumstances envisaged by relaxing similar 
restrictions related to police co-operation, because judicial procedures would 
still be required. Operationally, it is feasible -  utilising the European Judicial 
Network and Eurojust, and indeed, Interpol, as co-ordinating bodies, to help 
determine the location of wanted individuals.
From an integrative perspective, this would have profound consequences, 
ending the transnational isolation of national judiciaries and initiating the 
development of a co-operative network of national judiciaries throughout the 
EU, dealing directly with each other, rather than through intermediates. Over 
time, this would produce an environment conducive towards producing greater 
co-operation, due largely to the network of contacts created amongst the 
European judiciary through such direct communication. In some respects, this 
would bear pertinent echoes of neo-functionalism. Working together in this 
everyday maimer would encourage the development of relationships between 
members of the European judiciary, leading to a possibility of positive
Council Framework Decision o f 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States 2002/584/JHA, Ai'ticles 6 and 7
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spillover at a later stage. The degree to which the natural conservatism of 
national judiciaries would prevent this is uncertain, when we consider that 
these groups have previously been isolated from transnational co-operation.*^ 
Although it might be going too far to say that such a network could be the 
germination of a genuine common European judicial code, it would be correct 
to say that their input into the JHA process would be increased, as they discuss 
matters and policy with their colleagues, reaching and recommending 
conclusions to the JHA Council. This supposition is supportable by the 
positions of Eurojust and the EJN, which serve as a forum for advancing co­
operation in the first instance, particularly with the counter-terrorist 
magistrates brought together under Eurojust to discuss policy matters in this 
area.
In the area of investigative policing, however, intergovernmental co-operation 
is close to having run its cour se. Establishing a support structure (Europol) to 
provide assistance to counter-terrorist investigations is as far as we may 
reasonably assume co-operation to progress in this area. Certainly there are 
areas still requiring address, such as closer co-operation between the PWGOT, 
intelligence agencies, national police forces, and Europol, including 
secondment of Europol officers and improving EuropoTs ability to collect 
data. Equally, the multitude of data held under JHA auspices also needs to be 
addressed in accountability terms. Essentially, though, there is not much more 
work to be done in this sphere. Attempting to establish an operational Europol 
through a European FBI would be a legislative minefield, and one detrimental
A. Cadoppi Towards a European Criminal Code in European Journal of Crime. Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 4 Issue 1, 1996 p 7
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to counter-terrorism as a whole -  even in a federal Europe, this direction is 
one to avoid. Consequently, Europol must remain a support structure.
Because of the folly of attempting this route. Member State governments have 
little to fear from neo-functionalist influences within Europol. The Director 
and his staff may push for greater powers for Europol, but there is a definite 
cut-off point. Rather, neo-functionalism should be encouraged within 
investigative co-operation, as its human element possesses distinct advantages 
in encouraging officers to co-operate and trust each other in the first instance. 
The impersonal developments established by intergovermnental and federal 
co-operation are capable of producing the necessary machinery, but neo- 
functionalism provides the best impetus in getting police officers to utilise 
them. The initial scepticism of national police forces to Europol, together with 
the less than committed approach by counter-terrorist officers to its services, 
illustrates the extent to which neo-functionalism is missing from the equation. 
We should remember, however, that neo-functionalist co-operation is most 
conducive to the border areas of the Member States, where geo-social 
commonalities are facilitative to co-operation. Co-operative investigation 
against terrorism by contrast, has greater difficulty in generating these 
transnational connections, all the more so because of the greater awareness of 
national politics characteristic to C-T officers. Developing policy to bridge 
this gap is a necessity if counter-terrorist co-operation is to be advanced. An 
intergovernmental solution will prove more difficult to engineer than a federal 
one due to the former’s robust association with national sovereignty. A 
federal approach to counter-terrorism, however, while remaining true to the 
concept of subsidiary, does soften this association. Indeed, co-operative
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investigation would obtain many benefits operating within a federal Europe, 
the principal one being the redress of the accountability deficit. However, it 
would also stand to gain greater access to intelligence from Member States, 
who are loath to share such information under the cuiTent approach to co­
operation, even with the JHA Council demanding that they do. After all, the 
Council has not provided Europol with any additional means of accomplishing 
this, other than that the Director may make a formal complaint if he finds that 
he is heing obstructed.*^
From a holistic perspective, however, the intergovernmental approach serves 
the interests of the EU best at this current stage of development, and is at 
present the most realistic. Intergovermnentalism gives govermnents 
controlling sanction over JHA policy, preventing it from ‘running away’ from 
them. The emphasis on controlling mechanisms within JHA policy, such as 
the Em'opol Convention, is indicative of strong intergovernmentalism, as well 
as an awareness that incorporating such a policy within the architectme of the 
European Project runs the risk of supranational influences taking hold on 
susceptible areas. As this thesis has shown, areas of police co-operation are 
hospitable to neo-functionalist drives. Neo-functionalism, by contrast, is 
unsuitable for the regulated approach required by the EU in JHA policy, 
because its style is undisciplined and not amenable to accoimtability. While 
this could be considered tolerable, perhaps even inconsequential, in the early 
days of European co-operation, the systematic approach to law-enforcement 
co-operation and the threat it must now counter demands a regulated approach
Statewatch Post 11.9.01 analyses; No. 1 The “Conclusions " of the Special Justice and 
Home Affairs Council on 20 September 2001 and their implications for civil liberties.
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-  something that neo-functionalism cannot offer. Equally, its role in counter­
terrorism would be problematic in certain areas, hence its lack of relevance 
along the Anglo-Irish border. What neo-functionalism does offer to the 
overall equation is an impetus to push for co-operation, which Member State 
governments must take seriously. The UK’s partial entry into the Schengen 
Information System in 2000, along with certain areas of the Implementing 
Convention, were direct results of pressure by her police chiefs.*^ Neo­
functionalist co-operation serves with great efficacy as a pressure group, 
checking potential atrophy within JHA policy.
The application of a federalist approach as an alternative contender for 
advancing JHA policy is a problematic one, principally because Europe is not 
politically ready for such a move. The sui generis relationship developed 
between the European Member States, for all the EU’s espousal of freedom, 
could scarcely be described as a democracy itself. The European Union may 
hold many democratic values, but it is no state; rather it is a club. The checks 
and balances system that exist within the EU are skewed towards the Member 
States’ own controlling interests via the European Council, rather than the 
supranational interests represented through the remaining institutions. JHA 
policy, entirely under the rubric of intergovernmentalism, is effectively 
isolated from the remaining checks and balances, operating as it does outside 
the formal structures of the Community legal framework. The European 
Union treaties limit the European Parliament to receiving and debating one 
annual report from the Member State governments on their JHA activities,
House of Lords European Communities-Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, Schengen and 
the United Kingdom’s Border Contiols. paragraph 62
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effectively limiting regular debate/** The European Court of Justice, 
meanwhile, has no jurisdiction to rule on issues of law and order or internal 
security, other than an interpretative ruling requested by the Council, 
Commission or a Member State/* The Commission, as we have seen from 
numerous examples, is often invited to attend meetings, such as EuropoTs 
Management Board, but is permitted no executive role concerning the matter 
under deliberation/^
Were this shortfall effectively addressed by national parliaments, much of the 
problem might be mitigated; unfortunately, the executive dominates JHA 
policy, having developed a tendency to marginalise legislatures in policy­
making matters, with much of the work being carried out by ministerial 
Council meetings. Indeed the argument can be made, as it has been by Lode 
Van Outrive, that the JHA Council has executive, legislative and judicial 
power:
• legislative in that it has the capacity to adopt rules, measuies and 
provisions together with the power to amend and/or supplement 
such measur es;
• executive in that it has the capacity to decide on the suspension or 
otherwise of initiatives made before it;
Peter Chalk The Maastricht Third Pillar Reinares, Op. Cit., pp 197-8 !
Treaty of Nice Article 35.5 |
Europol Convention, Article 28.4 i
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judicial in that it has the capacity to monitor, interpret and settle 
disputes/^
Seen from this perspective the JHA Council is something of an anomaly in 
relation to normal democratic political structures. By contrast, parliaments are 
turned to only as a rubber stamp for ratification or rejection.^^ Even this area 
is under threat. Amendments to EuropoTs Convention currently need 
ratifying by all Member States (Article 43, Convention); proposed changes by 
the European Council would however ensure, in the name of progress, that 
amendments could in future be made by a Council decision alone, just as the 
Council does with additions to EuropoTs criminal annex.^^ In view of the 
important re-emphasis of EuropoTs role following 11 September, along with 
that of Eurojust, the proposal to dilute still further the influence played by 
national parliaments seems particularly egregious.
It is, to an extent, understandable as to why the Member State governments are 
reluctant to provide a greater voice for their national parliaments: doing so 
would inevitably slow down the whole process, with ratification from all 
Member States taking time. The ratification of the Treaty of Nice, paving the 
way for the accession of an additional ten candidate countries, only 
complicates the issue further, and has profound consequences as a whole for 
how the EU will operate in the future. Moreover, there is an evident secrecy 
hangover implicit within the third pillar, derived from the application of
Chalk, Op. Cit. Van Outrive was discussing the JHA Council’s predecessor, the K4 
Committee, but the comparison still holds.
Ibid., p i97
^ Council o f the European Union Amendments to the Europol Convention 8579/1/02, 25 
February 2002, specifically Article 9.
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protecting internal security against threats from terrorists. It is understandable 
that secrecy is a necessary prerequisite at the operational level in countering 
terrorism, but it is surely an unnecessary condition to carry over into the 
policy-making process under the aegis of EU co-operation. Unfortunately, it 
would seem that this has occurred nonetheless.
Even if the Member State governments finally rid themselves of this 
detrimental mindset and increase the role of their national parliaments in JHA 
policy, we cannot ignore the fact that a greater role is also demanded of the 
EU institutions. JHA is a European affair, yet national parliaments can only 
bring to account their own government, and no other. Consequently, a 
supranational watchdog is required. Another reason for increasing the 
supranational input, and fundamental to securing accountability within the 
JHA field, is the need to address the inadequate data protection legislation 
currently in place, at both the national and supranational level. This has 
become imperative of late, because of the growing employment of JHA 
computerised databases, such as the SIS II and the TECS, to facilitate the 
transnational transfer of information between police forces. These are 
particularly useful in helping to identify an individual, especially when SIS 
IPs transfer of fingerprint and DNA intelligence becomes operational. The 
positive counter-terrorist connotations provided by this service are evident. 
Technology has greatly enhanced the importance of information held by 
states, improving access and exchange with ease and speed. It should also be 
noted that this is not an area limited to states; it is just as beneficial to 
commercial interests. As this technology evolves, so too do the implications
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for the right to privacy, but also more fundamental liberties such as the right to 
a proper trial, and the rights of defendants in the judicial process. The UK has 
seen this issue flare up recently, over the controversial decision by the Home 
Secretary to increase police powers, allowing them to take fingerprints and 
DNA samples from everyone arrested, whether they are charged or not, and 
place them in a computerised database.^'' Data protection will inevitably be 
one of the ongoing fundamental issues sometime yet to come. As the situation 
currently stands, the only Common European data protection legislation in 
existence is in the form of the Council of Europe Acts of 1981 and 1987, but 
no enforcement arm exists here; meanwhile, the national legislation of the 
Member States varies widely. With the growing daily exchange of 
information within the European field, and agreements signed between 
Europol and third parties such as the USA and Interpol, it is essential that a 
specific EU response and safeguards compatible with the ECHR be 
implemented, establishing a regulatory mechanism. Such a body would 
require the teeth to ensure enforcement of the legislation, and this would 
obviously weaken the primacy of the current intergovernmental approach.
That the EU develops a strong data protection body is important, because this 
would pave the way for a German proposal, made in March 2002, for the 
introduction of computerised data profiling on an EU-wide level, to become at 
least theoretically possible. The BKA has reinitiated its old and successful, 
but controversial, Beobachtende Fahndung (BETA) system of computerised 
terrorist profiling, which was used to great effect against the Red Army
I
BBC News Police DNA powers to be extended 27 March 2003 ^
Council o f the European Union. ENFOPOL German delegation proposal: Europe-wide 
computerised profile searches 8 March 2002
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Faction, but mothballed in 1981, following a tide of negative public opinion 
against the system, as people felt that it had become too intrusive. BEFA was 
a revolution in intelligence gathering: utilising computers for the first time, it 
permitted German police forces access to information that had previously been 
difficult to obtain, since it existed only in individual card files at separate 
police stations. BEFA revealed links between apparently unconnected 
information, such as a specific car type having been used in several terrorist 
operations, which would show an investigator if a similar car had been used in 
the case on which he was currently working. Upon the discovery of the 
Mohammad Atta’s Hamburg Cell, and the significance it played in the 11 
September attacks, BEFA was reintroduced to help hunt terrorist “sleeper” 
cells.^ ® The German proposal ai'gues that computerised profiling would be 
much more effective if it were applied on a European-wide scale. If such an 
application were as successful as it was against the RAF, then perhaps it could 
be equally as successful against transnational terrorism, turning the anonymity 
of the terrorist against themselves: BEFA, for example, pinpoints bills and 
transactions paid for in cash, and begins to narrow down factors from there.^^ 
Given the general practice of utilising computerised databases at the EU 
policing level, the Geiman proposal has some foundational support. However 
little support has been forthcoming from the other Member States for such a
Wall Street Joui'nal (on line edition) Pioneered by a German cop, computerisedprofding 
makes a comeback 10 December 2001, suspected o f planning a bomb attack on a US military 
facility in Heidelberg,
The system, however, is by no means infallible. Questions were asked in September 2002 
as to how Osman Petmezci, an ethnic Turk and his US-German partner, Astrid Eyzaguirre, 23, 
suspected of planning a bomb attack on a US militaiy facility in Heidelberg, managed to avoid 
detection in a computerised profile search o f the entire community. Petmezci made no secret 
of his anti-Semitism, and had six convictions for theft, embezzlement and drug dealing, while 
his partner has been granted a pass by the US authorities, giving her access to high security 
areas. (Guardian Online German right tries to capitalise on arrest o f German bomb suspects 9 
September 2002)
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proposal. To implement this system correctly would require new European 
data protection legislation to make it palatable to the European public. This 
author could not support such a system otherwise. However, this prerequisite 
would be detrimental to the present intergovernmental approach, as the JHA 
Council would no longer be the controlling voice over the application of 
personal information held in databases throughout the Union. Because of the 
significant effort devoted to computer databases in EU police co-operation, 
this might not be seen as a price worth paying for an EU-wide BEFA. This is 
very much a sticking point with the present intergovernmentalist style of co­
operation.
The EU has been experiencing something of a renaissance in the field of 
counter-teiTorist co-operation over the past few years, assisted in many 
respects by the need to improve the co-operative response in the wake of the 
al-Qaeda attacks. However, much of the fundamental work, such as 
establishing a common definition of terrorism, and even the Common AiTest 
WaiTant, was ongoing prior t o l l  September; the attacks served principally to 
accelerate the process and focus terrorism in the minds of European leaders, as 
events did in the 1970s. Maintaining this momentum is crucial if Europe is to 
achieve the sophisticated counter-teirorist structure that will forever deny to 
the terrorist the opportunity to exploit the concept of sovereignty between 
neighbouring states. Such a renaissance, however, can only be welcomed if it 
is duly accompanied by reformation. The lack of adequate accountability 
safeguards currently in evidence, carried over in scale to a completed internal 
security structure, would portend Orwellian overtones of a Big Brother within
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its makeup. This is why the EU must pause for moment in its ongoing 
construction of an internal security edifice to reflect upon the implications of 
its work.
How long before a common counter-terrorist policy?
The EU appears to be moving ever closer towards a unified approach on 
terrorism, especially after the alarm call of 11 September. The JHA 
machinery is of a sophisticated level to enmesh the Member States within the 
structure; nevertheless, counter-terrorist policy remains primarily nationally- 
orientated. The JHA law-enforcement machinery is limited to facilitation 
alone; hence, the national units of the Member States execute the lion’s share 
of counter-terrorism. Such a policy is indicative of intergovernmentalism: no 
sovereign unit exists outside the Member States with an executive mandate for 
dealing with terrorism. If the Member States ai e to tackle transnational 
terrorism as fluidly as indigenous national terrorism, there needs to be greater 
unity in their approach. The investigation into the Strasbourg plot 
demonstrates that, despite the structure being in place, long-term co-operation 
and co-ordination is a problematic for national police forces. The sense of 
urgency created after 11 September and new developments made to Eui opean 
counter-terrorism co-operation have improved the situation, as we can see by 
the unparalleled collaboration that has occurred; ultimately, though, this is 
unsustainable. Despite the impressive number of an*ests, many were shown to 
have been made on the flimsiest of evidence; indeed, many of the suspects
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were subsequently released/^ Such careless work has significant 
ramifications for both the efficiency of counter-terrorism and human rights 
legislation. For this reason it is crucial that the Member States take the next 
step in the development of counter-terrorist structure-building, and establish a 
common criminal policy on terrorism to consolidate the work already achieved 
here. A common policy would place transnational terrorism on a par with 
national terrorism by removing the differences between Member State 
legislation, at all levels, in the manner in which it is tackled. This would result 
in a much improved and cohesive effort against transnational terrorism; 
moreover, it would pave the way for the development of an external authority 
with an executive mandate to conduct operations at the transnational level in 
conjunction with local authorities. The evidence suggests that the Member 
States require an agency with authority to co-ordinate and enforce such 
investigations, capable of avoiding the sometimes self-absorbed mindset 
associated with national perspective, and the problems that has brought to 
counter-terrorist co-operation in the past. Europol presents itself as a suitable 
candidate: however, improved judicial co-operation is just as important. 
Sharing the role with Eurojust would therefore provide a more encompassing 
approach, while also preventing any one agency from dominating this area.
As Chapter IX has argued, such a common policy should be exclusively 
limited to terrorism, for practicality, if for no other reason. Limited to one 
criminal area, it can be managed effectively within a non-federal Europe. 
Equally, an executive mandate given to Europol is not going to create a
Many of the arrests made in Spain for example have been overturned due to lack of 
evidence, while the much lauded arrest o f twenty-eight Pakistani immigrants outside Naples, 
in Januaiy 2003, accused of planning to attack NATO bases in Italy, have also been released 
on similar grounds (BBC News “Major al-Qaeda attack foiled" 24 January 2003; BBC News 
Italy frees Pakistani terror suspects 2 February 2003).
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European FBI, because the scope is so limited, but it will provide much 
needed guidance in an area where Europe’s police forces and judiciary are still 
finding their footing.
From the intergovernmental perspective, the establishment of a common 
criminal policy against terrorism, together with a limited executive mandate 
for Europol is a feasible one. It would mean however that for the first time, 
some degree of sovereignty connected with counter-terrorism would have to 
be surrendered to a “supranational” authority.^ ^ This contradicts all previous 
intergovernmental policy; nevertheless, this break is necessary if Europe is to 
move towards a complete and cohesive common criminal policy against 
terrorism. However, having observed the common denominator politics of 
intergovernmental bargaining throughout the years, it is doubtful as to whether 
the Member States, as a whole, are ready to make this step yet. This inbuilt 
need to defend subsidiarity in matters of internal security is an effective 
prophylactic for preventing substantive change, and one of the weaknesses of 
intergovernmentalism.
Implications of the European approach bevond its borders
The experiences of the European Member States in establishing an internal 
security space are something that has not been lost on other attentive 
countries. Europe is one of the few democratic regions in the world to have 
been troubled consistently by terrorism since the late 1960s. Many lessons
Moreover, taking such a step would mean establishing some form of regulatory body, be it 
intergovernmental or a greater role for the EU’s supranational institutions.
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have been learnt from how Em'ope has chosen to approach the threat, both 
nationally and transnationally. Right from the very beginning, when the EEC 
Member States established the Trevi Group to help counter terrorism, other 
countries expressed an interest in its work, leading them to become associate 
members as “friends of Trevi”. T h e  JHA process, despite its sui generis 
qualities, holds a similar interest, not least for the EU candidate members, 
whose successful membership requires their meeting the JHA Acquis 
Communautaire.^^ Non-candidate countries, for whom interest in JHA affairs 
does not hold such direct implications, are also attentive over events.
Europol’s information-sharing agreement with the FBI, for example, is one of 
mutual benefit. Meanwhile, the application of the Schengen acquis, especially 
the SIS flanking measure, has for some time piqued interest within the 
Canadian government as a means of policing the border with the US. The 
significant number of terrorists believed to be operating in Canada, taking 
advantage of her more liberal asylum rules, has generated concern over the 
threat they pose to the USA, due to the ease with which it is possible to cross 
the almost 4,000 mile long border. '^* After 11 September, a survey revealed 
that eighty-five per cent of Canadians favoured a Schengen style agreement
Austria, Morocco, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA and Canada.
”  These new Member States will however remain outside the Schengen Area, until such time 
as the Schengen Members view them able to enter. (Personal meeting with Geoffrey 
Sonnenberg, Head o f International Section, Police and Organised Crime Unit, Home Office, 2 
April 2001).
A  1999 report by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service revealed that fifty foreign 
terrorist groups are operating in Canada, with 400 mdividuals suspected of terrorist 
involvement. Additionally a series of reports in Autumn 2000 concluded that international 
terrorists and organised crime groups were using Canada as a significant base of operations, 
endangering both Canada and the USA. Immediately after the 11 September attacks, the FBI 
requested that the RCMP and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service check on 100 
associates of Osama bin Laden, thought to be in Canada.
Christopher Sands Canada and the War on Terrorism: the U.S. Challenge on the North 
American Front Centre for Strategic and International Studies (online edition) Vol. 2 Issue 3 
October 2001 ; Public Policv Forum Disappearing borders and economic integration: learning 
from the European Union Report PPF Executive Study Tour, 2-9 November 2001 (online 
edition www.ppforum.com)
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with the USA, demonstrating Canada’s willingness to enhance security, 
without detriment to the benefits of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).^^ Reaching such an agreement need not be an 
impenetrable issue, despite the comparative lack of integration between the 
US and Canada in contrast with Europe. Removing the fixed border controls 
from the highly porous frontier -  when we consider the usual teiTorist capacity 
to bypass such measures -  would not be an illogical move, considering their 
replacement by more effective flanking measures, coupled with the benefits 
generated by increased freedom of movement and trade. How a “wounded” 
American public would view the removal of their northern border, with the 
physical, but false sense of security which it provides, in the post-11 
September Zeitgeist is much more questionable. The Schengen acquis, 
however, scarcely infringes on sovereignty, as it is only a framework for 
facilitating and regulating co-operation, and therefore a palatable option.
Modelling a police organisation on Europol is more problematic, because no 
other region has developed the level of integration necessary to achieve it; 
political reasons, as much as pragmatic ones, are responsible for Europol’s 
creation. Europol requires the pooling of a significant amount of sovereignty 
for it to function, especially in relation to the TECS. The EU is the only group 
of sovereign states in the world familiar with pooling such sovereignty, almost 
as a matter of course. Considering that no other co-operative policing model 
of non-federal origin, such as Interpol or Aseanapol, is able to match the depth 
of services offered by Europol, and that no attempts have been made to
Sands, Op. Cit.
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establish something similar, it is very unlikely that a regional equivalent of 
Europol could emerge elsewhere without tliis deep integrationist background.
The EU’s experiences are also making themselves heard within the broad- 
based Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), of which 
all European states are members, together with Canada and the USA. 
Counter-terrorism is a new activity for the OSCE, and one initiated following 
the attacks of 11 September. The organisation’s initial response following al- 
Qaeda’s attacks was to launch an action plan at a summit in Bucharest which 
included stepping up both border security and information exchange, as well 
as making efforts to accede to all of the UN’s conventions and protocols on 
terrorism by the end of 2002.^^ Such measures cannot match the sophisticated 
response of the EU to internal security co-operation, especially witli the lack 
of integrative enforcement tools; however, under the leadership of the 
Portuguese Presidency (2002-3) there has been a significant shift of emphasis 
towards terrorist-related issues. An anti-terrorist conference in June 2002 
focused on co-ordinating counter-terrorist initiatives, along with highlighting 
the need for greater co-operation between the world’s various security 
agencies .Most important was the decision, following the June conference, 
to adopt a Charter on Preventing Terr orism in December 2002. Such a charter 
will provide the political and legal basis necessary for developing OSCE co­
operation against terrorism, especially in the complicated development of 
extradition arrangements between member countries.
BBC News OCSE moves against terror 4 December 2001 
BBC News OSCE discusses terror charter 12 June 2002
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The EU’s influence within the OSCE is significant, both in economic terms 
and in size -  representing over a quarter of its membership at present, which 
will soon increase to almost fifty per cent. The counter-terrorist arrangements 
being developed by the OSCE draw some parallels with the EU’s 
developments, especially in terms of providing a political and legal basis for 
co-operation. For the EU, this was the TEU and its Third Pillar. Although the 
OSCE developments cannot match those of the EU’s JHA, the Charter on 
Preventing Terrorism does provide the opportunity to develop co-operation 
further, now that the foundations have been laid. Co-operation at the OSCE 
level also serves the EU’s interests, allowing it to exert influence beyond its 
borders in tackling terrorism, particularly in relation to the former Soviet states 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where 
Islamic extremism is a problem. Aside from holding conferences on these 
problems, tangible programmes include improving policing in Azerbaijan 
through training seminars.^^ Moreover, the adaptation of the charter will 
require institutional reforms to effect co-operation, and here the EU and its 
experiences stand as a useful model for these future developments.
Not all the commitments made by the OSCE in targeting terrorism are likely 
to be immediate. Despite the commitment to sign all the UN’s conventions 
and protocols against terrorism, one particularly embarrassing issue remains 
for the EU. The UN’s International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999, if conscientiously enforced, 
would significantly hamper terrorist funding. The proviso to effective 
employment of this convention, however, is that financial transparency
Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2002: Activities in the Field p 34
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requires improvement within national legislation to increase the likelihood of 
detecting such monies and transfers in the first instance. Luxembourg and 
Austria have nonetheless refused to lift the veil of financial secrecy 
surrounding their banking laws unless Switzerland follows suit.^  ^ The EU has 
considered economic and political reprisals against Switzerland, a country 
which some Member States accuse of allowing EU citizens to evade tax, but 
because its own membership is divided over this issue, a solution is some 
distance away. Furthermore, the commitment to upholding human rights, for 
instance, has been routinely flouted by Russia in its action against Chechen 
separatists both in Chechnya and more recently during an armed siege in 
Moscow in October 2002, where security forces controversially employed a 
chemical agent to break the siege. Despite worldwide condemnation of 
Russia’s actions, the EU itself has done little in attempt to effect change here.
Europe’s approach to tackling teiTorism is carefully regulated by the Member 
State’s adherence to the European Court of Human Rights. Its ruling against 
UK interrogation methods at detention centres in Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s ended this policy. Similar methods are now being inflicted by the USA 
on prisoners from Afghanistan, held under very dubious and messy judicial 
procedure at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. This is not to say that there 
have not been further Eui opean deviations from the principles of human 
rights; collusion between RUC officers and loyalist terrorists in Northern 
Ireland, or the GAL death squads, are two particularly disturbing examples. 
Nevertheless, there is constant pressure to expose any wrongdoings by the
BBC News EU to warn Swiss on bank secrecy 8 October 2002
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security forces: for example, the Stevens Inquiry showed great determination 
in the face of security force obstruction, in investigating allegations of RUC 
involvement in the murder by loyalists of Pat Finucane in February 1989 and 
Adam Lambert in November 1987."^  ^ The Bloody Sunday Enquiry also 
continues to attempt to determine the truth behind the deaths of thirteen 
Catholics, shot dead by the British Army during a Civil Rights march in 
Derry, on 30 January 1972. In Spain the GAL investigations have led to a 
number of jail sentences for Civil Guard officers and government officers, 
including a seventy-one year sentence each for Spain’s most decorated police 
officer. General Enrique Rodriguez Galindo, and the Civil Governor of 
Guipuzcoa, Julen Elgorriaga in April 2000.
The application of human rights legislation, however, faces two particular 
problems. The first is the cunent climate of fear and urgency following 11 
September; the second is the extension of policing and judicial co-operation 
into the transnational sphere. Insofar as the first problem is concerned, 
Europe’s desire to smash al-Qaeda related cells has led to a significant number 
of unsubstantiated arrests, and subsequent re leases .The  impression given is 
that national police forces are, in many cases, simply “fishing” for whoever 
fits the profile of a “terrorist”. In the example of the twenty-eight Pakistani
Mr Finucane was a well-known lawyer with a number of Republican clients, while Lambert 
was a Protestant student mistaken for a Catholic.
The Times General Jailedfor murder o f Basque rebels 27 April 2000 p 16 
These investigations even threatened, for a time, the former Socialist Prime Minister, Felipe 
Gonzâlez with investigation and prosecution.
On a side note, the recent inclusion of the ECHR into UK legislation in 2000 after a two- 
year waiting period means (although Scotland incorporated the ECHR legislation in 1999) is 
still experiencing teething problems. The UK Courts’ overturning the Home Secretaiy’s 
attempts to introduce new asylum measures curtailing benefit payments o f those who delayed 
application for asylum, ruling that they would infringe the human rights of asylum seekers, 
being a case in point. (BBC News Blunkett's asylum appeal rejected 18 March 2003)
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immigrants arrested in Italy, the evidence for their arrests points to the fact 
that they were Muslim, and a large group living together in an isolated and 
dilapidated fai’m house. Based on a lack of any substantial evidence before 
such an arrest, this type of profiling borders on racial discrimination. The al- 
Qaeda related threat is an Islamic extremist one, and its perpetrators are 
mainly Muslim immigrants, but greater protection must be afforded to the 
overwhelming iimocent and law-abiding majority of this community; 
therefore, human rights legislation, which has always played a positive role in 
the counter-teiTorist policy of the Member States, should not be neglected 
because of the current climate. Indeed, to neglect this would be dangerous, as 
emphatically argued by Wilkinson, and more recently, Peter Chalk, because it 
could ultimately serve to alienate this persecuted community, thus improving 
the currents in the water of the terrorist “fish”."^^
The second concern relates to the extension of internal security into the 
transnational arena. Although human rights legislation has a more secure 
position here than do issues of democratic accountability and data protection, 
because of its transnational capacity via the ECHR, it is nevertheless in need 
of further bolstering. Some of the changes made by the JHA Council to 
extradition legislation and proceduie have profound consequences for human 
rights. The removal of the dual criminality clause from the simplified EU 
Convention on Extradition 1996 becomes an issue when another Member 
State’s anti-terrorism legislation is sufficiently encompassing to merit the 
arrest of a EU citizen for assisting, even in the loosest sense of the word, a
Paul Wilkinson Terrorism and the Liberal State (2"^  Edition) 1986; Terrorism verses 
Democracv 2001 chapter 5; Chalk, Op. Cit., pp 183 -203
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terrorist or terror group beyond its borders. The Spanish offence of providing 
“logistical assistance” to a tenorist group may well have serious implications 
once the European Arrest Warrant becomes active. This can only emphasise 
the need to increase the role of the ECHR in these procedures, now that the 
traditional extradition legislation devices that protected individuals’ rights 
have been removed.
Co-operation and co-ordination
The explanation accounting for these difficulties lies in the fact that 
information exchange has dominated counter-terrorist co-operation to the 
point that it has become synonymous with it. Without a doubt, information 
exchange is instrumental in defeating terrorism; it is the fulcrum of effective 
co-operation. However, its predominance within counter-terrorist co-operation 
also stems from a means of co-operation which impinges least on sovereignty. 
Information exchange can be strictly controlled by the national authorities of a 
Member State, whereas co-ordination of efforts does remove some degree of 
control over a teiTorist matter, as action cannot be taken until all national 
authorities are ready. Under such conditions, Belgium and The Netherlands in 
the example above would be constrained against action by France. Permitting 
the presence of an active tenorist cell on one’s soil for the benefit of another 
state’s intelligence gathering would be an action that few governments would 
be inclined to take, and certainly not for any significant period. It carries the 
same risks as “controlled delivery” in counter-terrorist matters. In any event, 
such a commitment would, unless voluntary, be contrary to Article 33 of the
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Treaty of Nice/"^ This provides sufficient explanation of the inherent 
problems associated with the lack of effective co-ordination within European 
counter-terrorist co-operative co-ordination. Consequently, it is no great 
suiprise that there has been a dearth of counter-terrorist agencies clamouring 
to take advantage of Europol’s co-ordinating facilities since its arrival on the 
scene. This is an unfortunate case of affairs as the terrorist threat has changed 
from one that was predominantly national, where information exchange was 
sufficient to tackle terrorism, to a situation in which transnational terrorism is 
now the key threat, and one which requires transnational counter-activity to 
effectively target it.
There has been some effort at co-ordination of efforts since 11 September, 
such as the seven montli-long investigation by Germany, Spain, America and 
France, and subsequent aiTest of Ahmed Brahim, a key al-Qaeda figure, in 
April 2002. However, as the sweeping arrests of the “usual suspects” 
indicates, such co-ordination has not dominated European counter-tenorism. 
Europol’s co-ordinating abilities are not being utilised as they might. The 
explanation behind this does not rest so much with the actual counter-terrorist 
agencies, who are chiefly concerned with the guarding of their intelligence, as 
with those higher up the chain of command. The intergovernmental ethos of 
co-operation, is intrinsically hostile to losing any degree of control over 
counter-terrorist operations, which is ironic, considering that we have 
established that a federal Europe would impinge as little as possible in the 
running of C-T policy. Instead, change is necessary; relaxing the grip of
The safeguarding of internal security and policing of a Member State cannot be overridden 
by any article o f the TEU.
427
intergovernmental control, either through the establishment of a common 
criminal policy against terrorism, or, less likely, passing the baton to a federal 
Europe, would serve to encourage co-ordination.
The failure in co-ordination, despite the ever-increasing co-operation against 
terrorism, represents a serious threat to the efforts of co-operative counter­
terrorism as a whole. The terrorist threat has rapidly evolved, and is itself 
much more co-ordinated in its efforts, requiring a similar response at the 
transnational level. Counter-terrorist co-operation urgently needs to put 
behind it the legacy of the days in which sharing intelligence was sufficient -  
this is simply no longer the case. Intergovernmentalism, as it presently stands, 
is non-conducive to the necessary requirements, hindering progress through its 
reluctance to relinquish subsidiarity. The intergovernmental approach must be 
dramatically rethought if European counter-terrorist co-operation is to have 
any real teeth against current and future terrorist thi'eats. We should not be 
afi*aid of federalism; it offers greater internal security than the present 
intergovernmental approach to co-operation.
For most Member State govermnents, such a conclusion is a radical one. 
Rejecting this conclusion out of hand, however, would be premature. The 
author set out, and maintained throughout, no predetermined conclusion; 
principally, this research has aiTived at its conclusion by analysing not just the 
specific co-operative counter-terrorist structures, but also police and judicial 
co-operation in general. Internal security matters are thereby ascertained in a 
more holistic manner. Fundamental to the author’s approach, is the direct
428
linkage of internal security co-operation to the European Project and its 
ongoing integrationist development. The importance of this serves not only to 
sharpen the critical analysis of intergovernmental policy by offering an 
alternative perspective via neo-functionalism or federalism, but also to 
determine the extent to which this is justified. This latter point is determined 
by establishing the degree to which these integrationist theories are present or 
applicable to individual areas of co-operative policing and counter-terrorist 
policy. Appreciating the existence of such integrationist background 
influences is crucial to any serious study of internal security co-operation 
between the Member States. Accepting the primacy of intergovernmental co­
operation in directing counter-terrorist policy simply because JHA policy is 
classified as intergovernmental is ill advised. Academic research should 
challenge established presuppositions wherever possible; in so doing we 
contribute to critical debate. Reintroducing these previously neglected heavy- 
hitters of European integration studies has been a key feature of this reseai ch, 
and one intended not only to challenge the complacency of JHA studies in 
their approach to intergovernmentalism, but also to bring about their 
rehabilitation. Utilising and debating these theoretical approaches as a means 
of taking integration forward is as valid within twenty-first century Europe as 
it was in the 1960s and ‘70s.
Research into counter-terrorist co-operation within JHA policy is thin on the 
ground, with Peter Chalk offering the most comprehensive analysis."^  ^
However, Chalk’s emphasis relates specifically to empirical analysis, and his
Peter Chalk West European Terrorism and Counter-TeiTorism: The Evolving Dynamic 
Peter Chalk The Maastricht Third Pillar 1996; Fernando Reinares (Ed.) European 
Democracies Against TeiTorism 2000
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1996 work has rapidly become dated due to advances in JHA affairs. Equally, 
Chalk offers no real alternative to the problems associated with 
intergovernmental policy. Neither for that matter does Chalk address the 
evolution of counter-terrorist co-operation, so crucial to understanding C-T 
policy today, to the same depth as this research. This effectively makes this 
research a one-stop shop for anyone wishing to understand counter-terrorist 
policy within Europe. Moreover, as has been indicated in the introductory 
chapter, where the literature does address JHA affairs, it is in relation to 
general police co-operation; and again we see little analysis beyond an 
empirical approach."^  ^ Key structures of European police co-operation -  
Europol and Schengen -  have previously been given short shrift in analysing 
their counter-terrorist value. This research addresses this shocking shortfall. 
If we are truly to comprehend the value of counter-terrorist co-operation 
within Europe, we must understand the role played by these structures in 
facilitating this. The ongoing debate regarding a possible executive mandate 
for Europol has significant connotations for counter-terrorism throughout 
Europe. The author’s opposition to the conféraient of such powers, while 
advocating a federal approach for investigative co-operation, also clearly 
illustrates the utility of approaching these issues from an integrationist 
perspective.
The existing literature is also limited in relation to the events of 11 September 
2001, specifically in the consequences that this had for European internal 
security. Al-Qaeda’s attacks forced terrorism to the forefront of international
Anderson et al Policing the European Union 1995 is one of the few areas in the literature to 
address the political theory o f police co-operation.
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and domestic policy, thereby making it imperative that the literature in both 
the field of counter-terrorist and European studies address these consequences. 
This is additionally important because of their acceleratory effect on JHA 
affairs and the subsequent downgrading of accountability concerns. Again, 
this research not only addresses these issues, but arguably, it is also the first to 
do so within academic literature. For students of EU politics, this resear ch 
offers an invaluable account of progress within the JHA sphere and its 
interlinkage with counter-terrorism, during a period of EU enlargement and 
structural change under the discussions of an EU constitution, and set against 
the backdrop of the international “war* on terror”.
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Diagram II
Ibid.
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Table II
Number of ETA suspects arrested in Spain (light) and France (dark) between 
the period 1 December 1999 to 31 December 2002. Figures have been broken 
down to a quarterly basis after December 1999.^
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 ^Data derived from BBC News online archives between the period 1 December 1999 -  31 
December 2002 to determine the total number arrests.
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TABLE III
Official “Alert”* Figures entered into the SIS since its launch in March 1995
1995 3,868,529
1996 4,592,949
1997 5,582,240
1998 (5 Mai-ch 1998) 8,826,856
* Figures based on the total number of alerts held in the SIS on a 
single day. They do not reflect the numbers deleted or added 
during the course of a year."^
TABLE IV
Total number of “positive responses" or “hits” recorded by the SIRENE BUREAUX
1995 31,585
1996 33,179
1997 36,949
(One of the largest categories of “hits” covers “aliens” to be refused entry 
under Article 96)^
TABLE V
Official “Hit” Figures recorded by the SIRENE Bureaux. 1997
Internal External
France 9,029 3,143
Germany 2,612 6,625
Belgium 3,397 2,425
Spain 2,106 468
Netherlands 2,214 1,609
Luxembourg 909 303
Portugal 404 113
Italy 136 895
 ^Statevyatch. Schengen: Joint Supervisory Authority denied resources Vol. 9, No. 3 & 4 May 
-August 1999, p22
 ^Statewatch. Schengen: an annual report shows over 14 million entries in the Schengen 
Information System Vol. 8, No. 3 & 4 May -  August 1998, p28 
" ibid., p27
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Austiia 381 72
Greece 182 16
The number of “hits” recorded show that there were 15,669 “hits” recorded for 
the ten Schengen states where the originating country had a “hit” abroad 
(termed “external”) and 21,280 “hits” where a country recorded a hit based on 
an “alert entered abroad”.^
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GRAPH I ’
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security work and administrative end support areas.
 ^FAS Intelligence Resoiu-ce Programme Website Budget and Staff - Security Service MI5 
www.fas.org/irp/world/nk/mi5/budget.htm
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Table VII
Council of Europe Membership and signature and ratification of the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977
Member
States
Date of 
Signature
Date of 
Ratification
Date of entry 
into force
R: Reservations 
D: Declarations 
T: Tenitorial 
Deck
Albania
Andorra
Austria 27/01/77 11/08/77 04/08/78
Belgium 27/01/77 31/10/85 01/02/86 R
Bulgaria 11/09/97 17/02/98 18/05/98 R
Croatia
Cyprus 27/01/77 26/02/79 27/05/79 R/D
Czech Rep. 13/02/92 i 15/04/92 ii 01/01/93
Denmark 27/01/77 27/06/78 28/09/78 R/T
Estonia 03/05/96 27/03/97 28/06/97 R
Finland 16/11/89 09/02/90 10/05/90 R
France 27/01/77 21/09/87 22/12/87 R7D/T
Germany 27/01/77 03/05/78 04/08/78
Greece 27/01/77 04/08/88 05/11/88 R
Hungary 03/05/96 06/05/97 07/08/97 R
Iceland 27/01/77 11/07/80 12/10/80 R
Ireland 24/02/86 21/02/89 22/05/89
Italy 27/01/77 28/02/86 01/06/86 R
Latvia 08/09/98
Liechtenstein 22/01/79 13/06/79 14/09/79
Lithuania 07/06/96 07/02/97 08/05/97
Luxembourg 27/01/77 11/09/81 12/12/81
Malta 05/11/86 19/03/96 20/06/96 R
Moldova 04/05/98
Netherlands 27/01/77 18/04/85 19/07/85 R/T
Norway 27/01/77 10/01/80 11/04/80 R
Poland 13/09/95 30/01/96 01/05/96
Portugal 27/01/77 14/12/81 15/03/82 R
Romania 30/06/95 02/05/97 03/08/97
Russia
San Marco
Slovakia 13/02/92 i 15/04/92j l 01/01/93
Slovenia
Spain 27/04/78 20/05/80 21/08/80
Sweden 27/01/77 15/09/77 04/08/78 R
Switzerland 27/01/77 19/05/83 20/08/83 R
“the former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia”
Turkey 27/01/77 19/05/81 20/08/81
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
27/01/77 24/07/78 25/10/78 T
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Table VIII
Criminal Acts Permissible for Surrender under the EU Common AiTest 
Warrant: Article 2.2
- participation in a criminal organisation,
- ten*orism,
- trafficking in human beings,
- sexual exploitation of children and child pornography,
- illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
- illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives,
- coiTuption,
- fi-aud, including that affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the 
protection of the Eui opean Communities' financial interests,
- laundering of the proceeds of crime,
- counterfeiting currency, including of the em*o,
- computer-related crime,
- environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal 
species and in endangered plant species and varieties,
- facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence,
- murder, grievous bodily injury,
- illicit trade in human organs and tissue,
- kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking,
- racism and xenophobia,
- organised or armed robbery,
- illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art,
- swindling,
- racketeering and extortion,
- counterfeiting and piracy of products,
- forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein,
- forgery of means of payment,
- illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters,
- illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials,
- trafficking in stolen vehicles,
- rape,
- arson, 1
- crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, |
- unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, j
- sabotage.
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